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Abstract 
 
The causes of success and failure of stand-alone solar electric systems in rural Guatemala may be technical, 
institutional, cultural or economic. This research examines these causes using a mixed-methods approach 
that includes interviews with members of poor, rural communities to which stand-alone solar electric 
systems have been donated, physical inspections of these systems, and conversations with development 
professionals working in rural electrification. “Success” is a complex concept, here defined as a 
combination of user perception of success, utility to users, and optimality as a source of energy. Economics 
are a strong driver of system success: systems generally offer users cost savings, but few income generating 
opportunities; access to capital when components need replacement is a significant obstacle; and relatively 
wealthier beneficiaries are better able to maintain donated systems than are their poorer neighbors. The 
institutions and relationships that surround systems also influence success and failure: local institutions like 
energy committees can help systems be more successful, while national and regional institutions such as 
Guatemala’s weak justice system and extensive organized crime networks contribute to failure. Beneficiary 
sense of “ownership” and monetary contributions to projects by beneficiaries are not contributors to system 
success, while accountability to donors and ongoing donor involvement are. The quality of the design and 
installed components of the physical system may have little bearing on system success. 
 
Donors must be clear about their own and beneficiaries’ definitions of success, and must be willing to 
challenge received wisdom about what will lead to more and less successful projects. Defining success as a 
high rate of operable systems will tend to favor relatively wealthier beneficiaries, leading to questions of 
social justice and whether energy interventions are most appropriate to those living in extreme poverty. 
Further, physically interconnected energy systems such as microgrids can lead to stronger social and 
institutional connections than do the physically independent systems included in this research. 
 
Readers: Dr. Emma Cervone, Dr. Benjamin F. Hobbs, Dr. Erica Schoenberger 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Distributed renewable energy systems can provide modern energy services to the rural poor in the 
developing world, improving their economic and human development opportunities while minimizing 
energy’s environmental impact. However, efforts to operationalize this ideal have been fraught with failure 
by almost any definition. 
 
Using solar electric energy in Guatemala as a case study, this research is a study of underlying assumptions 
about the success and failure of rural renewable energy systems: how success and failure are defined, by 
whom, and the contexts in which success and failure are considered. It also examines the technical, 
economic, institutional and social factors that contribute to these successes and failures in rural 
communities, based on a review of the literature and information from field work in Guatemala. 
 
The outcome of this research is knowledge that can help us understand the outcomes of energy-related 
development interventions and guide future development programs in their decisions to help achieve 
outcomes that all stakeholders will consider successful. 
 
1.1. Electricity in the developing world 
“There is a clear relationship between energy and human capacity and an inevitable corollary – the 
availability of abundant electricity is a fundamental for development.” (Briscoe, 1999)  
 
Almost one third of the world’s population currently lives without access to electricity (Acker and 
Kammen, 1996; Duke et al., 2002; WEHAB Working Group, 2002). Four out of five of these people live in 
rural areas of the developing world (UN-Energy, 2005). The potential for improvements in economic 
opportunity and quality of life are substantial when people have access to electric power (UN MDG’s, 
2000). 
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The demand for energy is rising fastest in the developing world (IEA, 2006), and the poorest populations 
benefit disproportionately from increased access to modern energy services. (UN-Energy, 2005) When 
rural areas gain access to electric power for the first time, whether to electrify an entire village or for a 
specific application, renewable electric power generation – including solar photovoltaic electric power 
production (PV), wind power generation, very small hydroelectric power production, and power production 
from biologically-based fuels – is sometimes appropriate. Decentralized renewable or fossil fuel-fired 
generation can be more reliable and cost-effective than extending the existing electric power grid over long 
distances or difficult terrain (Acker and Kammen, 1996; Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti, 2002; Huacuz, 
2005). Compared to more traditional diesel-fired generators, renewables have the advantages of using 
locally available resources (sun, wind, flowing water), having relatively few local environmental 
externalities (air or noise pollution), having generally few maintenance requirements, and being modular so 
there is little wasted fuel or power generation capacity. More than 1.3 million solar home systems1 alone 
have been installed in developing countries around the world (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001), in addition to the 
many other rural electrification applications. 
 
It is known among professionals who work in rural development that rural energy systems are often not 
sustainable over long periods of time, and that many fail almost immediately or are not fully implemented 
(Nieuwenhout et al., 2001; Acker and Kammen, 1996; van Roekel et al., 2004). Though accurate statistics 
on the failure rate of rural renewable energy systems are unavailable, anecdotal evidence indicates failure 
rates as high as 90% in some cases.2 Many rural development professionals have proposed various and 
sometimes conflicting reasons for these failures, but few have sought to test their hypotheses. The 
explanations proposed include issues of engineering, economics, geography, sociology and policy. This 
research is an effort to quantify and qualify several of the factors that predict and contribute to these 
                                                          
1 A solar home system in the developing world generally includes a panel, a battery, often a charge controller, several lights and 
outlets to power a small radio or charge a cellular telephone. In this thesis, “solar home system” will exclusively refer to photovoltaic 
systems, and not thermal water heating systems. 
2 Failure rates of such projects are categorically poorly documented, and information tends to be anecdotal and approximated. I 
conducted an informal survey of rural wind power systems in Mauritania, West Africa in June, 2002. Approximately 80% of direct 
water pumping wind mills and 100% of wind-electric wind turbines (in total, approximately 90% of wind systems I observed) were 
not functional at the time of my visit.  
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successes and failures. Given these opportunities and benefits, why do rural renewable energy systems fail 
with such alarming frequency? 
 
1.2. Research questions 
My basic research question asks why renewable energy systems implemented in a rural development 
context fail. In my earliest work in international development, I saw the remarkable failure rates of donated 
projects and began asking why, from the self-interested perspective that I did not want projects in which I 
was involved to fail. People experienced in energy and development were unsurprised by the high failure 
rates that I observed, and many had their own answers to the question of why. I found these answers to be 
sometimes inconsistent between equally experienced development professionals. I also found that few of 
the people with whom I spoke had tested their hypotheses. I found little available literature on the topic, 
and the handbooks issued by development agencies on “best practices” seemed to rely on the same received 
wisdom and untested knowledge upon which development professionals seemed to rely.  
 
I also found the information somehow inadequate. If the organizations that were espousing their own ideas 
as “best practices” were the same that experienced such high failure rates among their projects, I felt my 
question remained unanswered. 
 
To more usefully answer the basic question, I rephrased it and chose a case to study: what factors 
contribute to donated rural stand-alone solar electric projects’ success and lack of success in Guatemala? 
From this more focused but still very general question, the following specific – albeit closely interrelated – 
research questions and hypotheses emerged: 
 
Hypothesis: Higher economic value and greater practical utility to users lead to greater system success. 
Basic economic theory, previous studies and conventional wisdom all suggest that users of a practical thing 
that helps them save or earn money will invest resources in its upkeep. Does this hypothesis hold true in the 
context of rural PV systems in Guatemala? Do solar home systems save users money over traditional 
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energy sources, as suggested by previous research? Are there economic effects in the community beyond 
household energy cost savings? Specifically, is anyone earning money that they would not have earned 
absent the system, or is anyone losing money because the systems were donated? Beyond economically 
productive activities, to what uses do people put their systems? Do specific uses influence whether systems 
are successful or not? 
 
Hypothesis: The institutions and relationships surrounding donated systems influence and are influenced 
by the presence of and circumstances surrounding the donation, and those institutions and relationships 
can influence system success.  
A firmly entrenched belief in the development community is that user ownership of systems, and in 
particular ownership that is earned through a monetary or other contribution, is necessary for system 
success. This research poses two related questions: does beneficiary contribution relate to system success; 
and does legal or de facto user ownership of systems relate to system success? Many rural PV projects are 
implemented by donors or developers who then leave the community, without further or regular contact. 
Does maintaining a relationship with the donor matter for system success? What is the role of 
accountability in this relationship, if maintained? Does beneficiary involvement with the initiation, 
planning or implementation of the project influence overall system success? Many donor agencies help 
create maintenance or administrative entities to manage the projects, once the donor has left. Do these play 
a role in system success? Must they be legally established entities to be effective? The provision of 
technical and administrative training is considered by many to be critical to project success. However, the 
training provided is normally short and offered near the time of project implementation, without re-training 
later in the project life. Does this short training that is offered influence system success? Does the content 
or format of the training contribute to system success? 
 
Hypothesis: Characteristics of communities, users and systems can influence system success. What 
characteristics of users or communities influence how successful systems are? Does the user’s or 
community’s approach to system maintenance influence system outcome? Previous work has yielded 
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conflicting results about the effect of technical quality on system outcome. This research seeks to clarify 
whether high quality components, robust design and installation, and national codes and standards lead to 
better system outcomes, or whether lower cost of materials or installation leads to more success because 
systems are more easily maintained. Have local culture, religion, values, or physical environment been 
adversely affected by the introduction of novel energy technologies? 
 
These hypotheses, and the relationships between them, are examined in more detail in Chapter 3, and in the 
relevant results chapters. 
 
Questions of why solar energy projects are successful are predicated on a useful working definition of 
“success.” As described in detail in Chapter 2, the a priori definition of success proposed for this research 
consisted only of whether a system was currently operational and whether users said they found it 
successful. This definition proved inadequate. The working definition that emerged as a result of this 
research included operability in a more general sense, user perception of system value and utility, and a 
characteristic here called optimality, which considered whether the system donated was the best fit for the 
environment and application.  
 
1.3. Contribution of this research 
This research is intended to contribute to the body of knowledge about electrification in rural development 
by expanding the understanding of the realities of development within the academic community, and by 
providing information that can contribute to greater project success among governments, donors and 
development organizations. 
 
The conclusions of this research include results that challenge prevailing wisdom on several issues. Most 
importantly, this research fails to support the deeply-entrenched notions in the literature (Chapter 3) that 
“ownership” and user contribution to development projects are key to their success, and finds in fact that 
ownership may detract from outcomes that donors consider successful. Instead, this research suggests that 
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accountability on the part of the beneficiary to the donor or another outside party for the state of repair of 
the system may result in greater system success. Such a finding, if confirmed by future studies, calls into 
question the paradigm under which donation-based development is often approached. 
 
These results also call into question the utility of donated renewable energy systems as a means for poverty 
alleviation among the poorest beneficiaries. For those beneficiaries, other needs may supersede the need for 
electricity or they may be unable to overcome the short-term financial hurdles of ownership, maintenance 
or access in order to gain long-term economic benefit from the systems.  
 
However, the results of this research support other key findings of previous research (Chapter 3). Among 
other conclusions, I find that ongoing donor involvement in communities after projects have been 
completed helps systems succeed. Most users of stand-alone PV systems see economic benefit by reducing 
real energy costs. However, this study finds that few opportunities to augment income are presented by 
these PV systems, which is also consistent with previous findings. 
 
This study also finds that the insidious environmental and health impacts of lead from improperly-
discarded lead-acid batteries are not adequately communicated to system users by project developers, 
resulting in the very serious potential for lead contamination.   The lack of communication with 
beneficiaries about this risk was not noted in previous research. 
 
1.4. Research setting and methodology 
This research addresses many of the questions surrounding small renewable energy systems for rural 
electrification, but it is certainly not exhaustive. Many important topics are beyond the scope of this project. 
Specifically, the scope of the project is bounded as follows: 
– Guatemala. While problems with rural electrification are ubiquitous in the developing 
world, the problems are not necessarily the same in all locations. This study looks 
exclusively at Guatemala. 
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– Rural areas. The energy-related challenges encountered by the urban poor may be very 
different than those encountered in rural areas. This research examines only rural energy 
users who are also beyond the reach of the national electric grid. 
– Solar photovoltaic electricity production (PV). Many renewable energy sources may be 
 used singly or in combination to generate electricity for rural consumers, and electricity is 
 not the only form of energy needed or consumed by these populations. However, this 
 study focuses solely on PV.   
– Stand-alone systems. The energy systems included in this research are not physically 
 connected to other energy sources and are restricted to serving the electricity needs of a 
 single building. Physical interconnection of systems could affect outcomes due to 
 technical, economic, institutional, social or other issues. Further, the success or lack 
 thereof that was evaluated was the success of individual installations, leaving larger 
 questions of programmatic success outside the scope of this research. 
– Donated systems. All of the systems considered in this research were procured by their 
 users under a donor model, not purchased in market-based transactions.3 
– Local context. This research examines the environment, economy and society where the 
 systems are installed. Thus the question of environmental impact is one of how the local 
 environment is affected, not whether PV reduces carbon emissions on a lifecycle basis. 
 The economic benefit or cost to the community is considered, to the exclusion of 
 consideration of the influence of energy markets on the national economy. National and 
 global influences on the community are considered (e.g., fuel price volatility or the 
 influence of drug cartels), but the influences of the community on the nation or the world 
 are outside the scope of this study.  
 
Within these parameters, I examine the success and failure of rural stand-alone PV systems in Guatemala 
from the perspectives of community members in which these systems had been donated. The primary 
                                                          
3 The causes of success and failure of systems acquired through market-based purchases may be very different from the causes of 
success and failure of donated systems. The latter is the subject of this research and future study is proposed of the former. 
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methods of data collection took the form of surveys and semi-structured interviews with community 
members and physical inspections of systems. Additional information was obtained from a review of 
published literature; from interviews with personnel of and project documents prepared by donor and 
development agencies; conversations with knowledgeable non-stakeholders; popular press; and personal 
observation. The data collected and analyzed included information that led to the development of a 
definition of success used for this research, technical, economic, institutional and social contributors to 
success, and observations of the effects of the donation of these systems. 
 
1.5. Scope  
This dissertation contains detailed descriptions of the background, methodology, data, analyses and results 
of this research. Chapter 2 includes a review of previous studies on this and related topics, and a detailed 
description of the hypotheses suggested by that work. In Chapter 3, I review the context of the study, 
including the background of the country of Guatemala and its current political state, and describe the 
methodology used to conduct this research. Chapter 4 describes the definition of success used, and the 
analysis that went into creating that decision. The subsequent three chapters include the analyses and 
conclusions of this research, divided into three sections: Economics and Utility (Chapter 5), Institutions and 
Relationships (Chapter 6) and Characteristics and Consequences (Chapter 7). Finally, I summarize my 
major conclusions and highlight areas of future research that have been suggested by the context, data and 
analyses of this study. Associated definitions, survey instruments and resultant data are found in the 
appendices.
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Chapter 2. Defining Success  
“… Something died when the light went away...” 
     Owner of a failed solar home system 
 
This research focuses on the success and lack of success of stand-alone solar energy systems in Guatemala. 
To examine this topic, “success” must be defined. In this chapter, I examine “success” and create a working 
definition for purposes of this research.4 
 
The broadest definition of success looks not the performance of a system, but at the effects on the people 
and environment in which it is located. Who is impacted intentionally? Why those people? Who is 
impacted unintentionally? What are other resulting costs and benefits?  
 
The definition is inherently multicriterion in nature. There is no single metric since cost, reliability, 
convenience, social impact, aesthetics and a great many other criteria arguably must be included. The 
relative importance of each of these factors is subjective and will vary by stakeholder. To model the 
question in a decision analysis framework, it would be necessary to select the factors to be included, give 
weights to the relative importance of each, and set the definition of success based on these weighted 
factors. Must all reach a minimum level for the system to be considered successful? Can overwhelmingly 
positive outcomes for some factors make up for weaknesses in others?  
 
This approach is not used to define success for this research, first because it relies very heavily on expert 
opinion. The first step, defining whether aesthetics or convenience or cost is included in the list of factors 
to consider, depends on an “expert” decision, and yet one that is inherently subjective. The expert must also 
decide what information is reliable and credible and how to weight the values of the stakeholders against 
one another. If a representative sample of project developers weights one factor very heavily but a sample 
                                                          
4 Methodology referenced in this chapter is detailed in Chapter 4. Results referenced are tabulated in Appendix C. 
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of beneficiaries puts little weight on the same factor, the expert must decide how to account for these 
discrepancies in modeling success. 
 
Second, I know of no “expert” in the field of renewable energy for rural electrification in Guatemala who is 
not also a stakeholder in the projects examined for this research. The experts are the current and former 
project developers. The model becomes tautological: as stakeholders, the experts choose factors and 
weights for the model, and then as experts agree with themselves as stakeholders. 
 
As such, the definition of success for this research does not rely on expert opinion but is instead developed 
from the point of view of the beneficiaries. Are the systems successful for the beneficiaries themselves? 
 
Looking at the success of a single stand-alone solar PV system, however success is defined, is a small part 
of this broader definition. At the outset of this research, I held the assumption that a higher percentage of 
successful systems translated to a more successful project and program outcome. However, this analysis 
suggests that the characteristics of a beneficiary that is most likely to be successful with a stand-alone PV 
system are also the characteristics of someone who has less need of the donation: if you can manage a 
donated system without substantial effort, you may have been able to purchase it yourself. Section 2.1 
explores this idea further. 
 
The “success” examined in this research is less that broader definition of success and instead defines 
success based on individual systems and users. My original hypothesis was that success was defined by a 
simple combination of whether a system was operable and whether its user believed it to be successful. 
This proved inadequate, as examined in the sections that follow. 
 
The uncertainty in the definition of success in this context is compounded by the fact that the provision of a 
rural renewable energy system is rarely a goal unto itself. Solar home systems are intended to provide a 
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household with better quality light that doesn’t reduce indoor air quality. A PV water pumping system 
clearly exists to provide water. Renewables power rural health clinics, schools, churches, and community 
centers, but with the goal of helping those institutions achieve their missions rather than solely to provide 
power for its own sake. 
 
In this chapter, I begin by considering whether the goal of a high percentage of operable systems is 
appropriate, or if some broader definition of success is warranted. In Section 2.2. I examine definitions of 
success found in the literature, both in the context of rural electrification and of analogous development 
scenarios, including a brief case study of a successful small hydroelectric project in Guatemala. Section 2.3. 
explores operability as a defining factor for successful systems and presents a case study of two stand-alone 
PV systems as evidence that system operability is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to define 
project success.  
 
The important but confounding question of how beneficiaries themselves define success is addressed in 
Section 2.4. by analyses of the results of this study in the context of existing literature. Section 2.5. explores 
the concept of “optimality,” and explains its role in completing  the definition of success by examining user 
attitudes toward their systems. This chapter concludes with the working definition of success used in this 
research.   
 
2.1.  Are successful projects the right goal? 
This research specifically addresses the success or failure of individual PV systems. In this section, I 
explain that this definition must be weighed against the fundamental goals of development projects. The 
underlying assumption has been that a greater number of successful systems is equivalent to a more 
successful program (and a better use of development funds). Collier (2008) suggests that this risk-averse 
approach to development may not be the most apt, and may in fact exclude those who are most in need of 
development aid. While he speaks of large-scale development projects for the poorest, stagnating nations 
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(as compared to the poor but improving nations that make up the majority of the developing world), his 
conclusions might reasonably be extrapolated to communities within a developing country. It is possible to 
select the communities in which stand-alone solar energy systems are more likely to be successful on a 
project-by-project basis. These communities, however, may be those which are most likely to be able to 
develop with less outside assistance (due to level of income and other factors considered throughout this 
research). This may be true of relatively wealthier households or individuals within a poor community as 
well. As an example, delinquency rates are higher for IDB-financed publicly supported mortgages than 
they are for private-sector mortgages in the same locations (White and Bamberger, 2008). This is not 
evidence of programmatic failure compared to the private market; it is evidence that the public mortgages 
are intended for and benefit higher risk (poorer) borrowers. A lower failure rate could be attained by 
lending to people less in need of help. Similarly, as seen in this research and described in Chapter 5, 
exclusion of poor or marginalized individuals may boost the success rate of systems within a project, but at 
the cost of social equity and other explicit or implicit project goals. 
 
As project developer, the desire to see projects succeed is clear. As someone interested in development in 
general, perhaps development efforts are best applied where projects are less likely to succeed: a single 
success among a myriad of failures in the most extreme poverty may do more to improve quality of life and 
reduce environmental impact than would many successes in more moderate circumstance. The 
appropriateness of a development agenda to specific circumstances is also important: sometimes projects 
are unsuccessful because beneficiaries need other things more. 
 
The rate of success among systems installed under a particular program or project is a useful metric in 
comparing programs with like goals and beneficiaries but different implementation strategies. However, 
this success rate may be inadequate to assess how well a project meets stated or implicit poverty 
alleviation, improvement in quality of life or other development goals. 
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2.2. Project evaluation and project success: previous and analogous work 
2.2.1. Evaluation and success 
Systematic evaluations of policy instruments and interventions in international development are 
conspicuously absent. As in other fields that deal with developing countries, evaluation is complicated by 
the low availability and poor quality of data. Wealthy nations normally dictate the terms of evaluations and 
very often carry out evaluations based on their own priorities rather than based on the priorities of the 
targets of their evaluations. 
 
A review of the literature suggests that there are few standard definitions of success, and it is often in fact 
undefined. Agencies may be motivated to judge their own projects as successful. There has been little focus 
on results- and impact-based evaluations of project success, but it is increasing (Naudet and Delarue, 2008). 
Overall and by nearly any measure, stand-alone PV systems in rural developing world applications have 
not been successful. 
 
Billions of dollars have been poured into development projects absent even a “minimum standard of 
knowledge” of what works (Ruprah, 2008). Success rates cannot be quantified absent a relatively 
unambiguous definition of success. Most articles in the literature do not explicitly define “success,” and the 
definitions used by others vary widely. For example, data on system failure rates is notably absent from 
otherwise very informative reports on four communities in Guatemala (Fundación Solar 1, 2, 3 and 4, all 
2003). 
 
Sponsoring organizations or governments sometimes have motivation to declare a project successful 
without quantifying or concretely defining “success” (Ley, 2006). This has been suggested to me even by 
members of organizations proclaiming such successes (who would not like to be named). Even evaluating 
whether a project has had any impact is outside the mandate of many sponsoring institutions (Ruprah, 
2008).  
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In this section, I explore prior definitions of success and means for evaluation that have been used in rural 
electrification as well as in analogous development interventions.  
 
2.2.2. Evaluation and success in energy-related development 
Following are a few of the published examples and “conventional wisdom” regarding the qualification and 
quantification of success in rural energy systems. Though they are few and sometimes inconsistent, these 
formed much of the basis for my a priori definition of system success. In this section, I present specific 
examples of projects evaluated as successful or unsuccessful, followed by more general discussion of the 
conventional wisdom and expert opinion often used in practice. In the subsequent subsection, I compare 
these to the criteria used for evaluation in other areas of development. 
 
2.2.2.1 How successful are rural renewable energy systems? 
However unclear the definition of failure might be, it is widely reported: One report states that sixty percent 
of solar battery charging systems in Thailand are not currently operational (Green, 2004). An earlier report 
states that one third of solar water pumping systems in Thailand are not operational (Kirtikara, 1997). 
Ninety percent of wind turbines in one region in Mauritania are not currently operational.5 Forty four 
percent of solar home systems in Kenya are rated by their users as less than “functioning well” (van der 
Plas and Hankins, 1998). Forty-five percent of solar home systems were not functioning five years after 
implementation in a Fundacion Solar study from Guatemala (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). A review of 
available literature found a range of failure rates among solar home systems from over ninety percent “non-
operational” in Kiribati to twenty-three percent fully or partially non-operational in one study of Kenya 
(Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). After a single year, 70% of solar home systems implemented under a Brazilian 
program had failed (Ley, 2006). Even where success and failure are not explicitly defined, or when 
“success” is judged based on different criteria than “failure,” failure rates are high. 
                                                          
5 See footnote 3, above. 
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2.2.2.2. Poverty before and after as a measure of success  
Foster and Tre (2000) seek to show the correlations between poverty and access to energy. The study 
details extensively the use of a comparative methodology, looking at measures of poverty before and after 
an energy intervention has been implemented. Guatemala is used as a case study for this comparative 
methodology, but a single dataset is used and nothing to which to compare it is offered – and several of the 
data types emphasized as important in their methodology were found by them to be unavailable. Factual 
inconsistencies within the text make their data questionable. Their own inability to make use of their 
methodology (specifically failing to compare “before and after” data, and failing to collect data that they 
consider important) raise doubts about their conclusion that their methodology is an effective model to 
prescribe policy interventions in the energy sector and likely in the water sector as well. 
 
2.2.2.3. Improvement in specific activities as a measure of success 
On the island of Sagar Dweep in West Bengal, India, users of solar energy systems are reported to prefer 
electric power to other sources (e.g., kerosene lamps) because the light is brighter (Chakrabarti and 
Chakrabarti, 2002). The program that installed these solar energy systems is considered successful in four 
ways: it has improved education by allowing students to study longer at night; it has allowed shopkeepers 
and producers (e.g., weavers, betel leaf cultivators) to continue economic activity later at night; it has 
allowed people to “avail themselves of entertainment facilities” such as video houses; and it has allowed 
women to better do their household work. Improvements in specific activities can be a useful metric, but 
may not by themselves be an appropriate way to define success. For example, a medical intervention may 
use number of children vaccinated as a metric for the success of its program, but the number of 
vaccinations does not necessarily cause a decrease in childhood morbidity or mortality, which is more 
likely the goal of the intervention. However, looking at groups of activities in aggregate can be telling of 
the modes of success and failure of a project. 
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2.2.2.4. A “Table of Sustainability” to drive project success 
Michael Ross, an engineer with Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, is actively 
involved in implementing renewable energy projects internationally. Drawing upon his own personal 
experience and that of his colleagues, Ross proposes that there is a “Table of Sustainability” for any 
community owned project. This table is the foundation for system sustainability and is supported by three 
legs: robust design and quality components, proper operation and maintenance, and good governance and 
administration. “If any leg fails,” explains Ross, “the table falls and sustainability slides right off.   
Education and knowledge within the community bind the table together.”6 While protocols and industry 
standards exist to define the first two legs, “good governance and administration” are seemingly 
tautologically defined for this proposed “Table of Sustainability:” Good governance is seen as necessary 
for project success, but project success is the evidence presented that governance has been good. 
 
2.2.2.5. Meaningful sponsor involvement to drive project success 
 Woods (1998) proposed to qualify the reasons for success and failure of rural renewable energy systems in 
Nepal and Pakistan. While the insights of this study were valuable, only two variables were considered: the 
quality of the components installed and the quality of the ongoing support for their maintenance. Although 
the work implies that there are multiple factors that define the quality of the programs of support, the length 
of the commitment to support is the only characterization of these programs explicitly mentioned. This 
study offers no statistical analysis and merely comments on “higher” or “lower” probabilities of success 
without defining what is meant by success, but concludes that longer and more active involvement by 
donors correlates to higher probabilities of success. 
 
Analysis at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) by Taylor (1998) was based on the 
combined experiences of the NREL development experts. Taylor points to an ongoing commitment by the 
sponsoring agency as the most critical factor in the successes of projects. Additionally, success is greater 
                                                          
6 Personal communication with Michael Ross of Sandia National Laboratories on 26 October, 2005. 
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for project implementation programs having an in-country partner (if the sponsoring agency is foreign) to 
facilitate communication across languages and cultures, sending appropriate price signals to end users, 
using valid planning and analysis tools and techniques, and connecting power projects to other 
development efforts. Projects must also use “tried and true” technologies, and be located in close enough 
proximity to one another to facilitate maintenance. While these insights are valuable from the points of 
view of those with broad experience in rural electrification, the study did not systematically test these 
hypotheses either among projects completed by NREL or among other projects. Further, the analyses 
presuppose that commercialization of the systems themselves is the end goal, and defines success relative 
to that goal only. 
 
2.2.2.6. Stakeholder perception and success  
Studies suggest that users are generally more satisfied with their systems if their expectations of the limits 
and abilities of their systems are reasonable and realistic (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001; Ley, 2006). Users 
complain that solar home systems do not provide sufficient power to meet their needs, particularly during 
rainy seasons, or are disappointed that they cannot afford sufficient PV for cooking or ironing; this 
dissatisfaction is evidence of a failure to set realistic expectations before installation.7 It is evidence of the 
desire for expanded systems, not dissatisfaction with the system itself. This theme of “managing 
expectations” was reiterated often by project developers in formal and informal conversations that took 
place during the course of this research. 
 
The success of solar home systems seems to enable the adaptation of other renewable energy technologies 
such as biogas systems and solar box cookers, which was also observed in this study (see Chapter 5). 
However, when projects fail, confidence in the technology may be lost – even when the failure was due to 
the implementation process rather than the technology itself (Ley, 2006). This loss of confidence may be 
seen in users, sponsoring organizations, governments or the media. 
                                                          
7Source for this paragraph is (Acker and Kammen, 1996) except where otherwise noted. 
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The media sometimes presents subjective or inaccurate information about proposed projects (especially 
large, government-sponsored projects), leading to unreasonable expectations by the recipients.8  Media 
reports that distort or over-simplify the development process can lead future projects to fail if planners rely 
on those reports for guidance. These reports often lack adequate context and present only the “photo op” 
rather than the complicated issues that are involved. The scientific literature may present the same 
problems, and may be relied upon more heavily than mass media by the development community and 
therefore cause more damage if inaccurate. 
 
2.2.2.7. Weaknesses in planning for evaluation  
Traditional project planning has not included the design ex ante of project or program evaluations, so 
baseline data to which to compare outcomes have rarely been available (White and Bamberger, 2008; 
Ruprah, 2008). Thus even the best intentions of honestly evaluating “success” are often defeated by the 
lack of anything to which to compare. Most available literature on project success deals only with the first 
one to two years after implementation, which may give little insight on the long-term sustainability of the 
projects (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001) and may make projects seem to have a better success rate, though that 
part of the evaluation process is improving (White and Bamberger, 2008; Naudet and Delarue, 2008). 
 
2.2.2.8. Biases in evaluating success 
There are many potential positive biases in assessing project or performance success. The frequent lack of a 
control group or baseline data to which to compare (Ruprah, 2008) means that any improvement in 
outcome can be attributed to a project, whether it is directly related or not (White and Bamberger, 2008). 
Failed projects may be excluded from evaluation samples not with the deliberate intention of skewing a 
sample, but because a project with a known outcome may be perceived as not adding information to an 
evaluation (White and Bamberger, 2008). 
                                                          
8 Source for this paragraph is (Ley, 2006). 
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Projects that are selected for evaluation may over-represent the success of a program since evaluation 
samples normally include projects that are easily accessible both administratively (listed on maps or project 
registers) and physically (reachable by evaluators in a reasonable amount of time) (White and Bamberger, 
2008), especially focusing on pilot projects (Taylor, 1998). This evaluation selection bias may exclude 
projects that are perhaps most likely to fail, including those owned by marginalized populations or in very 
remote locations (White and Bamberger, 2008).  
 
Participant selection may bias reports of project success rate. Characteristics of beneficiaries who are most 
likely to be selected often correlate to characteristics of those most likely to successfully maintain projects 
(White and Bamberger, 2008; Naudet and Delarue, 2008). While this may not skew the reported success 
rate of a particular program or group of projects, it would overstate the likelihood of success were the 
project replicated and expanded to a less selective group. 
 
Project developers or the consultants they hire may be motivated to rate their own projects as successful or 
list fundamental problems as only recommendations for improvement in order to secure future funding or 
contracts (White and Bamberger, 2008). White et al. (2008) suggest that reports of this deliberate or 
borderline deceptive bias are “anecdotal” and that most organizations welcome negative feedback; I am 
less dismissive of this phenomenon because of reports from project evaluators (who wish to remain 
nameless) who have found themselves pressured to report success where there was failure or to cast 
marginal results in a positive light. 
 
Success, while poorly defined, has remained elusive in energy-related development projects. Poverty 
alleviation has been used as a measure of success, as have improvements in specific activities. Other 
measures of success also rely on outside opinion, and some become tautological, claiming that project goals 
are met because a project is successful but defining success by meeting project goals. Few past studies have 
 
 
20 
 
 
considered beneficiary perspective in concluding that a project is successful, but those that have note that 
these perspectives are more positive when beneficiary expectations are managed. Project developers 
normally evaluate or hire evaluators for their own projects, which is one factor that may lead to 
overstatement of success rates. Success is often not well defined because resources are not a priori 
committed for project evaluation so evaluations are planned ex post facto.  
 
Success can be evaluated in analogous situations or technologies implemented for international 
development, which may offer further insight into appropriate definitions of success in donated PV 
systems. 
 
2.2.3. Evaluation and success in water, sanitation and agriculture development 
As in rural electrification, a dearth of studies of the success of development interventions exists for other 
sectors of the rural economy (Berti et al., 2004; Fewtrell et al., 2005; Curtis and Carncross, 2003) and many 
existing studies are poorly conducted or reported. Publication, reporting and selection bias may overstate 
the effectiveness of some interventions; this same bias may be present in rural electrification studies, 
although it is not dealt with explicitly in the literature I have found. 
 
Water, sanitation and hygiene interventions in developing world applications are viewed as largely 
successful in some studies (Fewtrell et al., 2005), but others suggest that these interventions also suffer high 
failure rates. Among these interventions, the definition of success is necessarily different. An improvement 
in health outcome to any degree is a success in the latter case, where an energy system may not be able to 
succeed incrementally: it works or it doesn’t. 
 
As with energy, other interventions are also frequently studied only during or shortly after implementation, 
leaving serious questions about the long-term effectiveness of the projects (Fewtrell et al., 2005).  
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Several agricultural intervention studies were conducted long after implementation – between four and 
thirty years later (Berti et al., 2004). Just over half of projects studied had some long-term benefit (Berti et 
al., 2004). Counter-intuitively, among those, fewer than half of interventions that increased users’ incomes 
had a positive long-term effect on nutrition, as the increased produce was sold rather than consumed and 
resultant income was not necessarily spent on more or better food of other types (Berti et al., 2004). 
 
Research suggests that water and agriculture studies suffer shortcomings in their evaluation processes and 
definitions of success as well, as described below. Rather than considering the population at large, many 
studies on water, sanitation and hygiene consider only the impacts on small children (Fewtrell et al., 2005) 
and many agricultural interventions focus solely on women (Berti et al., 2004). Examining only a part of 
the population may omit negative or positive impacts on the rest of the community, in studies of energy as 
well as studies of water or sanitation. 
 
Studies on improved water supply often neglect the effects of possible increases in water use due to the 
water intervention (Fewtrell et al., 2005). Many studies of agriculture interventions, however, acknowledge 
their inabilities to identify the impacts of nutrition education, since it is never provided without additional, 
concurrent intervention activities (Berti et al., 2004). Though the outcome is the same (no new information 
is gained), the acknowledgement of the redundant or non-informing variable is important. 
 
Many analogies can be drawn between energy and water interventions in developing countries, and as such, 
lessons learned from these projects may be applicable to energy projects as well. However, key differences 
remain that make the analogy imperfect. 
 
Care must also be used in defining success among small-scale agricultural interventions. Many agricultural 
interventions increase food production, but do not necessarily improve health or nutrition of household 
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members due to a lack of consideration of “cultural, economic and social conditioning” factors (Berti et al., 
2004).  
 
“Successful” intervention may also be a proverbial double-edged sword. Water supply interventions that 
decrease the surface pathogens consumed by users have been known to increase arsenic exposure and 
poisoning (Fewtrell et al., 2005). Agricultural interventions that increase food supply at the expense of 
other tasks – such as childcare – may actually worsen childhood morbidity or mortality (Berti et al., 2004). 
Such serious, negative consequences were not considered in the rural electrification literature I found. It is 
not a priori evident that such potential consequences are absent or present. 
 
Two important lessons can be learned from an examination of the literature on water in development, 
including sanitation and irrigation. The first is that cultural, economic and environmental contexts must be 
adequately considered for projects to succeed. The second is that goals must be defined in order to judge 
whether they have been met successfully. 
 
Successful water and sanitation interventions require that technical, economic, and cultural issues be given 
appropriate consideration, and often require a variety of expertise to implement optimally (Fewtrell et al., 
2005). Interventions such as hand washing that require the modification of human behavior can only be 
successful if they are informed by an understanding of “what motivates, facilitates, and hinders” behaviors 
(Curtis and Carncross, 2003). Improvement in the long term success of agricultural interventions requires 
expertise from several disciplines: nutritionists, agricultural scientists and social scientists (Berti et al., 
2004). Though the analogy between these development interventions and rural electrification is imperfect, 
they suggest a significant value to including non-technical issues in the planning and evaluation of stand-
alone PV projects. 
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2.2.4. Success and evaluation in microfinance 
Microfinance as a means for development is less directly analogous to energy in development than is water. 
However, the initial purchase (if not donated) and ongoing maintenance costs of the stand-alone PV 
systems that are the subject of this research are capital intensive relative to the incomes of the beneficiaries. 
Thus understanding what succeeds and fails in microfinance schemes – and how success is defined – can 
point to potential causes of success or failure based on the economic aspects of these projects.  
 
Investment by development agencies in microfinance programs has far outpaced research on their 
effectiveness in poverty alleviation (Naudet and Delarue, 2008). Field research on specific microfinance 
programs is only now beginning.9 However, foreign investment in microfinance in 2006 was approximately 
$4 billion – triple what it had been in 2004. Some are for-profit companies looking to tap into the “fortune 
at the bottom of the pyramid,” others are altruistically driven groups looking to improve the lives of the 
poor, and some microfinanciers are driven by both, looking for opportunities to make money while helping 
the poor rather than taking advantage of them.  
 
Microfinance programs are generally viewed as successful if they are economically sustainable: the rates of 
repayments of loans and interest are sufficient to cover program costs above and beyond any subsidy that 
may exist. While promising, anecdotal reports of the success of microcredit programs should not be viewed 
as unqualified evidence of their success, even as the need for microfinancing is ever more apparent. Please 
see Chapter 5 for further discussion of the role of microfinance in rural PV dissemination. 
 
Microfinance as a means for development suffers the same lack of quantitative evidence of success as does 
energy in development. One conclusion of this research is that users cannot sustain that for which they 
cannot pay. Seeking opportunities for microfinance and evaluating the effectiveness of these opportunities 
is beyond the scope of this research, but is necessary for the sustainability of rural stand-alone PV systems.  
                                                          
9Source for this paragraph is (Collins et al., 2009) except where otherwise noted. 
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2.2.5. Success in an analogous situation: perceptions of a small hydro project 
The following anecdote illustrates some of the complexities of analyzing the success of a rural renewable 
energy project.  
 
Six small hydroelectric plants were donated to municipalities in Guatemala around 1994 or 1995. 
According to the office of one municipality, theirs was the only one of the six still in operation in 2008, at 
the time of our interview. They were asked why theirs still worked when the others failed, and what 
differentiated them. 
 
The response of the two employees of the municipality was in part about money. They said that they 
recognized the benefits of having the hydro, and as such were willing to invest in the (mostly minor) 
maintenance and repair that had been required since its installation. The other communities either did not 
recognize the benefits that the hydro brought them, or more likely did not find them worth the money to 
repair. There is money to be earned by having electricity, but that money must be reinvested in the 
electricity source. 
 
Their reasoning is clear, and may be analogous to the same issues that differentiate successful from failed 
stand-alone PV systems, but there are several important distinctions. First is level of education. The men 
who gave this answer seemed to be highly educated, with one of them having completed college. In 
contrast, most users of stand-alone PV in this study had very low levels of education. The second difference 
is that overseeing the system was a part of their job. They had a direct and unambiguous financial interest 
in keeping the hydro running in order to keep themselves employed. The third is level of poverty. The 
municipality where the hydro is located is neither as rural nor as poor as most of the communities included 
in this study, although there are some very poor agrarian households within the territory covered by the 
hydro. People in general did not use all of their available resources to pay for basic necessities like food 
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and medicine; they had enough income to work beyond the immediate. The community had maintained 
roads and the national electric grid reached it. And finally, the hydro plant is common property rather than 
the property of each individual. It is managed centrally on behalf of everyone in the municipality. Both the 
costs (in the form of taxes, if necessary, although the hydro was generally a net income source to the 
municipality) and the benefits (in the form of development opportunities, especially water and water 
management projects, and possibly reduced local taxes) were shared among all. The cash flow burden was 
also shared communally, with public coffers available to make purchases (or municipal tax base available 
to guarantee loans), so no individual household was compelled to raise a large sum of money alone. 
 
The basic conclusion that the men from the municipality reached, that they were successful where others 
failed because they were responsible enough to leverage the benefits to offset the costs, is reasonable on a 
fundamental level. However, the claim of superior understanding of the benefits or responsibility in 
maintenance also comes from the successful party itself, and may reflect a desire to believe in their own 
superior knowledge or skill rather than superior luck or circumstances beyond their control, which may also 
be the case if, for example, the other municipalities in the program were much poorer. 
 
The analogy that one household with a solar home system keeps it operable while a neighbor does not 
because only one is responsible enough to leverage the benefits (in reduced lighting costs, for example) is 
obvious, but fails dramatically in considering the factors that may enable one household to “be responsible” 
while a neighbor cannot make the same financial arrangements or attain the level of technical expertise 
necessary. 
 
2.2.6. Conclusions concerning project evaluation and success 
Although the literature on success and evaluation of energy projects and analogous development 
interventions is relatively scarce, many lessons can be learned. These ideas are incorporated into the 
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definition of success used in this research, as well as my a priori hypotheses on the causes of success and 
failure. 
 
2.3. Operability 
Based on the above review of existing literature and selected anecdotes, system operability and user 
perceptions are chosen a priori as factors to define the success of a stand-alone PV system included in this 
study. The following sections examine the shortcomings of those two factors as originally defined, and add 
the criterion of “optimality,” as defined below, to the definition of success used in this research. 
 
Where projects have been relatively successful, technical reliability is among the strongest drivers of the 
expansion of the use of renewable energy systems (Acker and Kammen, 1996). The definition of 
operability used in this study specifically does not require that the system be used for its originally-intended 
purpose to be considered operable. For example, solar panels may have been provided for a lighting 
application. If they are instead being used successfully to power a water pump, the system is considered 
operable. Further, the operability criteria for success are considered to be met for a system that is not 
functioning at the time of inspection but concrete steps are being taken to repair or replace it. For example, 
a PV-powered vaccine refrigeration system in one community was not functioning, but the refrigerator’s 
compressor had been removed and sent to the capital to be repaired, as it had been when it had broken 
previously. This is considered a successful system based on these operability criteria. And finally, a system 
is not considered “inoperable” if it has been removed because its use was intended to be temporary and it 
had been replaced with a permanent system. See Section 2.3.1. for a specific example of a system that, 
while no longer operating, is not considered “inoperable” when judging its success in these analyses.  
 
System reliability or degree of operability can be assessed easily if operators have kept logs of system 
events. However, the system users in this study include those with low levels of literacy and little or no 
motivation to keep such logs; among PV systems, none were encountered. One-time inspections yield little 
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information about the operability of a system. Measuring battery voltage can indicate if a battery is over-
charged or at a low state of charge, but neither necessarily means that a system is inoperable or gives a 
measure of the degree of degradation of system performance. A battery at a low state of charge may simply 
mean that the weather has been cloudy or that the battery was drained with the previous evening’s lighting 
and has not yet recharged during the day. Therefore, if system owners considered themselves to be able to 
use the system, the system is considered operable.  
 
2.3.1. Success and operability – the strange case of Chel 
This section reviews the case study of the community of Chel to critically examine the measure of 
“operability” used in this research. I had initially set the current functioning of a system as a prerequisite 
for calling it operable, and consequently successful. Anecdotally using Chel and surrounding communities, 
I must reconsider whether it is a necessary condition for success – how can a non-functioning system be 
successful while a functioning one is not? 
 
2.3.2. Chel background 
Chel is an indigenous, mostly Ixil community, according to people who live there. The Ixil have lived in 
the area for at least 1400 years.10 The area is ethnically homogenous and geographically isolated by 
surrounding mountains. The Ixil are poor and live traditional Mayan lifestyles, even compared to other 
rural indigenous people throughout Guatemala. 
 
In Chel, people say they didn’t take sides during the civil war, but all the young men were unofficially but 
forcibly conscripted to one side or another. A man I know there, Don Exito (not his real name, like all 
names reported in this research), served as a troop commander for the rebels when he was only sixteen 
years old.  
 
                                                          
10Source for this paragraph is (Stoll, 1993)  except where otherwise noted. 
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Civil war violence was disproportionately directed at the indigenous communities (Grandin, 2005), and the 
Ixil people suffered worse than most. The army “shot, hacked, or burned to death thousands of unarmed 
men, women, and children” (Stoll, 1993). 
 
Chel lies in the rural Western Highlands of Guatemala, in the Department of El Quiché, in an area that 
came to be known as the Ixil Triangle, which is among the areas worst hit by the civil war violence 
(Warren, 1998; Manz, 1988). The army “restored peace” in the area by executing nearly all people were 
accused of being resisters, leaving behind only those who were unwilling or unable to fight, as detailed in 
Chapter 3. Unlike in other indigenous areas, the army recognized that the support of the Ixil for the rebels 
came in part at least from an empathy shown by the insurgency for Ixil culture, language, and the everyday 
struggles of the people (Manz, 1988), while attempts at ladinoization (integration into mainstream 
Guatemalan Ladino culture) or castellanezation (imposition of the Spanish language) of Ixil people had 
been failing for 400 years (Manz, 1988)  – the Spanish empire had conquered the area in 1530, but few 
outsiders lived there before the 20th century (Stoll, 1993).  
 
General Efraín Ríos Montt is ambiguously viewed as the one who brought peace to the Ixil area and as the 
general who oversaw massacres of Ixil non-combatants (Stoll, 1993). He was unambiguously in command 
when the worst violence against Ixil people was committed (Stoll, 1993), but was also the force that 
systematized the violence from random, reactionary murder to predictable – and thereby often avoidable – 
killing as a consequence to particular actions (Stoll, 1993).11 
 
The brutality against the Ixil people included a massacre of about 100 people peacefully demonstrating in 
Chel – with women and children at the front of the line (“non-combatants” is the more modern term, since 
some women and children fight while some men do not, but the community deliberately put children and 
                                                          
11 In 2013, Ríos Montt was tried and convicted of genocide and crimes against humanity; the Constitutional Court of Guatemala 
overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial. At the time of this writing, the case is still unresolved, according to various news 
sources. 
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their mothers at the front of the demonstration).12 Soldiers dumped the bodies over a bridge and into the 
river that runs through the community. People there talk of the river literally running red with blood. But 
Chel was no longer a combat zone after the massacre, so some people in the area view the government 
troops as having brought peace to the area. 
 
When the peace accords were written in 1996, the government of Guatemala promised a great deal of 
reparation to the Mayan communities who were least active in the resistance but suffered the greatest loss 
of life, mostly at the hands of government troops and paramilitaries – though the rebels are not blameless. 
Chel had a hydroelectric power project on the drawing board at this point (described below). The NGO 
with the local presence suggested that the peace accords played some part in helping the Chel 
electrification project along (it was initiated after the massacre but before the peace accords). The 
government of the United States, through both USAID and DOE, put far more money into the project than 
the Guatemalan government did, according to a developer who worked on the project on behalf of DOE. 
But the national government of Guatemala did make financial contribution to the project and has been 
nominally supportive, in keeping with the peace accords 
 
2.3.3. Solar for phones in Chel 
A Guatemalan NGO worked with the adjoining communities of Chel, Las Flores, and Xesaí (hereafter 
referred to in aggregate as “Chel” for simplicity) for over ten years (Blanco Verdugo Ingenieria, 2001) to 
bring the project to fruition. The stated goal of their interaction was to bring electricity to the people of 
these three communities.13 While the initial idea had been the use of solar panels, the community and the 
NGO agreed early in their discussions that a small hydroelectric project on a river bordered by all three 
communities would serve their needs better – the same river into which the bodies of the massacre victims 
had been dumped. 
                                                          
12The massacre is briefly documented in (Stoll, 1993), but the details contained here are from “off the record” conversations with 
community members and development organizations that have had a long presence in Chel. Both the impression of the massacre and 
the persistent discomfort in speaking of it are conveyed strongly, even if details of dates and numbers of casualties are imprecise. 
13 Details of this project are from interviews with community members, unless specifically noted otherwise. 
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The relationship between the NGO and the communities was much more complicated than I am presenting 
here. Initial trust between the communities and the NGO, and between and within the communities, was 
very low. They worked together for years, with an NGO employee originally from a nearby community 
living in Chel, to help establish the credibility of the NGO, train people from the communities in the 
administration and maintenance of the project, and to see that all people were equitably represented. The 
end result was a hydro project that is largely successful (by almost any definition) in that it is technically 
operable, favored by its beneficiaries, administered in such a way that it pays for itself without subsidy, and 
is going to expand to provide electricity to other nearby communities because it has excess capacity. 
Although this research is not a study of the success of hydro projects, the process of creating the hydro 
involved the use of a PV system that is noteworthy. 
 
Even a “micro” hydroelectric project requires significant civil works, including a dam, entrenched pipe, a 
building to house machinery and electronics, and poles and wires to carry electricity from the generators to 
the users. Chel was, at the initiation of the project, a remote and isolated community. It lacked roads, 
telecommunications, and electricity of any sort. It was only accessible by foot because only a weak 
suspension bridge connected it to the nearest roads, still miles from the communities, and the bridge would 
not have held the weight of a car. Members of the communities were enlisted to help with the construction 
of roads to enable the project to start, and a pickup truck was brought to Chel (it was dragged across a 
shallow point in the river during the dry season and was made operable again after it dried). Roads solved 
only part of the problem: there was no way to communicate with the communities except by physically 
visiting them. 
 
To solve this problem, the NGO and the communities (who had by this point formed the Asociasión 
Hidroeléctrica Chelense, the association that governs the project and represents the communities’ interests 
in the project to the NGO and other outside parties) decided to install a solar-powered satellite phone (cell 
phone service was not available at that time). I was given conflicting reports of whether the NGO or the 
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association paid the initial costs of the phone and its energy system, but I believe it was the NGO since the 
cost of the system would have been prohibitive as the association didn’t yet have any income. Since the 
phone was used only occasionally for project-specific business, community members took an interest in 
using it for personal matters. The association saw this as a potential source of income and began charging 
for use of the phone. In time, they expanded the system to include two telephones and (according to one 
source) a fax machine. 
 
Throughout and after the long and labor-intensive process of completing the hydroelectric project, the 
association continued to rent the phone on a fee-per-minute basis. The association benefited in having the 
additional revenue source, especially when people were newly connected to their new electric microgrid 
and unused to paying monthly electric bills. The communities benefited from having access to 
telecommunications services that were previously unavailable. 
 
However, “recently”14 on a nearby river, construction began on a much larger hydroelectric plant that will 
be connected to the national electric grid. With the influx of workers and managers to the area, two of the 
country’s three cell phone companies constructed cell phone towers in the area. Additionally, the large 
construction company replaced the frail suspension bridge with a concrete bridge designed to handle even 
large truck traffic. The result was that cell phones became useful and readily available in Chel. Interest in 
the satellite phones quickly evaporated, and the association closed that part of its business. 
 
When I asked association members what had become of the panel or panels that had powered the phones, 
they did not have ready answers. A few said the NGO had taken them for other purposes, but most simply 
had no idea. Whatever happened to them, clearly they are not functioning in their originally-intended 
capacity. 
 
                                                          
14 Community members did not know even approximate dates. 
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Definitionally, I hypothesized that I should consider missing panels as not operational, whether they were 
stolen or sold or the owners don’t know what happened to them. And as “operability” is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for my definition of success, they must be considered unsuccessful projects. However, 
the panels were replaced by something the community found more useful, perhaps suggesting they were 
not the right thing to install in the first place. They went a long way towards enabling their replacement to 
happen. Solar panels, with their high capital costs and 20 to 30 year lifespans, are not generally good 
candidates for short-term use. Because I have to consider the now non-functioning solar-powered satellite 
phones represented a successful donated PV project in rural Guatemala, the “operability” criterion for 
project success has been broadened to include systems that operated when needed and then were removed 
at the end of their intended period of use.  
 
2.3.4. Solar for home and business 
The dramatic changes in Chel since the commissioning of the hydroelectric project, the opening of the 
bridge, and the arrival of cellular phone service are nowhere more evident than in the explosion of 
businesses in the town. Services that were unheard of or not needed previously (such as the photocopier, 
the pharmacy, or the tire repair business) now exist, and existing enterprises such as the bakery or the 
tienda now have ample competition from others in the same line of business, complete with refrigerators 
and lights at night. A young couple moved into Chel once these changes were underway and opened the 
photocopy business, with an odds-and-ends shop to draw additional customers. They installed a PV panel 
on their roof, despite the fact that their home/store building was connected to the (highly unreliable) 
hydroelectric microgrid. Because this panel was not donated to the household, the system is not within the 
scope of my study. But out of curiosity, I asked to inspect the system and interview the couple anyway. 
They had bought the panel second-hand in the informal economy, and a physical inspection of it quickly 
showed it to be of Mexican origin, and of the same make as panels that were donated to households in an 
infamously unsuccessful rural electrification project in southern Mexico (see section 3.3 for further 
information about the Mexican project). These panels were given to households without any instruction on 
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what to do with them, so many of them were immediately sold. The have been reportedly seen as far south 
as Panama. As such, it is my (unsubstantiated) conclusion that the panel I saw was, in fact, originally 
donated as part of the Mexican electrification program. The panel functioned well, was well maintained, 
and the couple was very pleased to have it as back-up power, needed a minimum of twice daily.  
 
The originally-intended beneficiary either sold it and opted to go without electric light, or it was stolen and 
the beneficiary was left in the dark. That household would have done as well or better if the government of 
Mexico had just handed them cash; the goal of household electrification (with the health, education, and 
communications benefits it brings) is not met. In this case, I see a donated PV panel that is functioning, but 
still I cannot consider it a successful project within the scope of this study. 
 
The examples of the solar phones and the photocopy business in Chel show that the seemingly 
straightforward criterion of operability is neither universally necessary nor sufficient to define project 
success or failure. Functioning but not serving the intended beneficiary cannot be considered success, while 
not functioning because of planned obsolescence cannot be considered failure. However, success intuitively 
relies in some form on operability: a PV panel that never produced usable electricity is not a success to 
donor or beneficiary.  
 
In this research, I consider “operability” to suggest that a system is operating generally as it was planned to 
operate. If a system was removed because its use was intended to be temporary, it was not inoperable due 
to any failure and as such is considered “operable,” as is the case in Chel. Since 100% reliability cannot 
reasonably be expected from any technology, systems may be found inoperable at a given moment because 
they are under repair, but this does not suggest failure from an operability perspective. Maintenance enables 
the continued operation of the system. Thus, for a system included in this research to meet an “operability” 
criterion of success, it must meet one of three conditions: 
1. it was producing usable electricity on the day of the interview or inspection; 
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2. it was not working, but concrete steps were being taken to repair it in the near future (for 
example, an organization responsible for system repair had been notified or a missing 
component was on order); or 
3. it had been removed or abandoned because it was intended to serve temporarily until  another 
electricity supply (such as the national electric grid or a microgrid connected to a small 
hydroelectric project) was implemented. 
 
2.4.  User perceptions 
The a priori definition of success that included user-reported perceptions of the straightforward question, 
“is this a success for you” suffered shortfalls, just as the straightforward criterion of operability did. These 
shortfalls and the expanded considerations of user perceptions are included below. 
 
2.4.1. User perception of success 
Stakeholders’ own understandings are often more effectively used to judge project success than expert 
opinion since the “expert” often lacks detailed local knowledge both about the physical system and the 
community (Fraser et al., 2006). An appropriate stakeholder group might be a sponsoring organization. 
However, as discussed above, donors and developers often do not have clear definitions of success 
themselves.  
 
The perception of success within one stakeholder group can be very different than the perception of 
another. The goals of a donor may be different from those of community members. This is not intended to 
be a study of whether the donor’s ultimate objectives of rural electrification are met – such as improved 
health, education, or income opportunities – but instead a study of whether the intermediate objective of 
providing electricity – for any reason – has been met (Fisher et al., 2002). Specifically, these analyses 
focuses on output: whether the service is available for use and whether people are using it (Bertrand et al., 
2004). Less focus is given to evaluation of the programs under which these systems were implemented. 
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The focus of this research is on the impacts of renewable energy systems in rural communities. It is the 
users’ or beneficiaries’ perceptions of success, not the donors,’ that are being considered. Community 
perception has been used in other studies as a measure of project success (Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti, 
2002; Nieuwenhout et al., 2001; Acker and Kammen, 1996; Ley, 2006). What are people’s expectations of 
their system, and how well does the system meet them? How do current expectations differ from the 
original expectations people had when the project was proposed or installed? How do they define the 
“success” of development projects in general, and this project specifically? However, the literature does not 
discuss how to gauge this perception of success when direct answers to the question do not yield useful 
information, as discussed below. 
  
When users were asked whether they felt their projects were successful, the near-universal answer (94% of 
respondents) was “yes,” and 6% of respondents described it as “more or less” successful.15  Only one 
respondent said no, that the project was not a success. 
 
There are several potential explanations for this counterintuitive response about some systems that had not 
functioned in years. As a foreigner asking about solar energy systems, I was perceived as a potential donor, 
despite having said that I was not. In the face of a potential donor, people may not want to seem ungrateful 
by describing previous donations as failures. Similar numbers of people answered affirmatively when asked 
if the project met their expectations. 
 
When asked how they defined success and what might constitute an unsuccessful project, answers differed. 
Some responded with the benefits it had brought to them personally: they found the light useful or 
important. Some spoke of the specific benefits they associated with having PV lighting, such as reduced 
                                                          
15See Chapter 4 for survey details. 
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energy costs, children’s ability to study later at night, and improved quality of light in the home. Most, but 
not all of these respondents had systems that were functioning at the time of the interview. 
 
Another category of responses was that any donation or development project was a success. People had 
benefited, even if they were not still benefiting, so the project was counted as successful.  
 
Some respondents, largely those with systems that were not functioning on the day of the interview, 
wavered on their definitive answer of “yes.” They made comments like “it was good while it lasted” and 
“there is no system maintenance so there is no sustainability.” One woman said her system was successful 
to her personally because she could afford to replace her battery, but not for others who couldn’t afford a 
battery and expected the donor to replace it for them (an expectation inconsistent with that specific 
donation program). 
 
Notably, the only two people who answered “no” unqualifiedly to the question of whether the project met 
their expectations had systems that were functioning on the day of the interviews. One said he was paying 
more for lighting with the solar home systems than he had previously; the other said that the community 
had expected panels of greater capacity. 
 
A “successful” system, however, was not synonymously one that provided value to the user, nor was an 
unsuccessful system necessarily one that failed to provide value. The subsequent section examines the 
concept of value and user’s perceptions thereof. 
 
2.4.2. User perception of value 
The “value” or “usefulness” of a project could be judged by a comparison of the village economic and 
social conditions with the project against a counterfactual “without” project condition. However, this 
definition of success is impractical to implement.  This is because construction of such counterfactuals 
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would either have to rely on outside “expert” opinion of the conditions in a community, which may not 
adequately account for beneficiaries’ sense of value, or upon a statistical analysis of a large enough number 
of communities so that the effect of projects can be statistically controlled for, which is not feasible due to 
resource constraints, data availability and political instability in the regions included in this study (see 
Chapter 3 for details).    
 
Instead, the end users themselves were asked to be the judges of the degree to which the project is 
important to meeting their needs. Where a community member surveyed reported that the project has not 
been important or valued, the project is not considered a success regardless of its operating condition.  
 
2.4.3. Users in their own words 
Specific responses and trends within responses are used to define both what constitutes a successful system 
and what does not. Several words and themes were recurrent, some of which are more easily directly 
translated from the language in which they were given than others. Below are several of these themes, and 
inferences as to the reasons for them. 
 
Different words used in different locations may simply be colloquialisms: people tend to talk as their 
neighbors talk. However, people have many ways of describing the same thing, and word choice may be 
meaningful.  Nonetheless, analysis of the words users spoke is limited because I am not fluent enough in 
Spanish to appreciate all the subtleties of the language. However, some words and the sentiments behind 
them were clear.  In the following subsections, I describe five specific words or phrases and the meanings 
ascribed to them. 
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2.4.3.1.  Bonito, bueno, and uts 
In talking about success, bueno (good) and bonito (pretty or nice) were among the most common words 
used. These are both insubstantial words that convey satisfaction without strong enthusiasm. They tell more 
of respondents’ reluctance to commit to a point of view during interviews than they tell of the success or 
failure of systems, as described below.  
 
Mayan Q’eqchi’ was spoken in twenty-nine of the sixty-five communities and sites visited during the 
course of this research.16 Most interview subjects in these communities spoke predominantly Spanish, some 
spoke predominantly Q’eqchi’, but nearly all used some hybridization of the two.  I am limited in the 
analysis I can do of the words of predominantly Q’eqchi’ speakers, since I must rely on the interpretation of 
a hired translator in cases where the interview subject could not answer questions in Spanish. However, one 
word I know is uts.  
 
Among Qéqchi’ communities, even respondents who speak Spanish often used the Q’eqchi’ word uts. 
Literally translated, uts by itself means “well done” or “a good thing,” according to Guatemalans who 
speak both Q’eqchi’ and Spanish, but its meanings in use are myriad. It is used in response to the question 
“how are you?” as one example. Another example is that when water is described as uts, it means the water 
is potable. In response to questions about the success of a solar energy system or how it has met or failed to 
meet expectations, it means the same as bueno or bonito: it’s nice. 
 
2.4.3.2. Anything donated is a benefit 
A common attitude among respondents in this study was “anything donated is good.” People considered 
their PV systems successful even when they had quickly stopped providing value – or considered projects 
successful even when they themselves had been excluded – because anyone in the community benefited for 
any period of time. People spoke specifically of benefit. “I benefited for a little while,” and “other people 
                                                          
16 Not all are included in the analyzed data because some did not meet the criteria for project selection.  
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are benefiting,” were common refrains when explaining why a seemingly unsuccessful project (from my 
perspective) was considered a success to them. “The light benefits us” and “having the project is a benefit” 
were things said by those with functioning systems. 
 
Differences are found between Ladino and indigenous communities, as discussed in Chapter 7. Benefit was 
a word used in indigenous communities, but little or not at all in Ladino communities. In Spanish as well as 
in English, “benefit” can be used to describe a good outcome from a thing: we benefit from having light. 
But it can also be used as a noun to describe an entitlement: Social Security is a government-provided 
benefit in the U.S. The Peace Accords signed to end the civil war in Guatemala  promised such benefits as 
development projects and education to the indigenous communities, but not to Ladino communities 
because they were not affected by the war in the same way. Although donated PV systems were not 
described as “Government benefits,” the term benefit implies a relationship between user and government 
or other donor. There is a sense of entitlement – people feel entitled to the benefits owed or promised to 
them – but also little sense of control. People have little control over what benefits are offered to them and 
when they will receive them. 
 
The idea that “anything donated is good” was also evident in comments about training, in which some 
respondents expressed happiness to get training on any topic (see Chapter 6). People find a way to derive 
value from what is offered to them, and seem to either be more successful at or have more confidence in 
their ability to do this than to decide independently what they need and then navigate an enormous and 
seemingly arbitrary web of development projects and organizations to see if they can obtain it. 
 
The logic behind this approach is solid. The values of community members do not necessarily correspond 
to the values of developers and donors. Many women interviewed for this study would like to have enough 
electric power to run blenders (something solar home systems are not designed to do). While blenders no 
doubt make kitchen work easier for women and allow them more time for other activities, whether 
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productive or of any other sort, expending critical community resources to search for a donor to provide 
blenders and the electricity to power them would be futile. I have found no evidence of any blender 
donation programs having ever existed in Guatemala. A better use of time and energy would be to work 
with the most available donor to obtain whatever was being offered, and then find the best way to take 
advantage of that.  
 
2.3.4.3. “We can complain, we can demand” 
A user of a microhydroelectric energy system in rural Guatemala said of the hydro, “It is successful 
because we can complain.” The hydro has a local governing body that represents the users and is 
answerable to them. In this indigenous community, among the most severely impacted by the civil war, the 
user described his project as successful because he felt safe to state a grievance and had the expectation that 
he would be heard.  
 
Analogously, the user of a solar home system in an indigenous community nearby who was part of a strong 
system management organization described success using the word “demand.” “We can demand and (the 
management organization) will have to comply.” 
 
Thus being part of a community that collectively manages renewable energy systems may empower people 
to act within institutions, while being the autonomous owner of a solar home system paradoxically may be 
less empowering. Rural energy systems can lead individuals to act politically on their own behalf, and to 
view the energy system as successful because of their own success within the institution built around it (see 
Chapter 6).   
 
2.3.4.4.  “What we achieved” 
Among users of communally owned systems, several respondents talked about the success of a project as 
their own or their community’s success. Even among projects that were not functioning, they talked about 
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their own accomplishment: we achieved this project; we met our goal; this was our objective and we 
obtained it. Unlike those who see anything donated as a success, this group saw success in what they did 
more than what was done for them.   
 
2.3.4.5.  Advancement, progress, development 
Contrary to my previously-held assumption, concepts of development and advancement were rarely 
suggested to be part of success. The few who brought the ideas into the conversation fit no particular 
description: two were users of collective systems, three were users of autonomous systems. Two were 
among the richest people included in this study, one was among the poorest. 
 
The products of “development” were mentioned by many: we have light, health is improved, and children 
can study. But being more developed was not itself a theme that emerged from respondents as a measure of 
success.  
 
Users’ perceptions of success are most meaningfully derived from their own words. Simple “yes” or “no” 
questions do not yield much information, but allowing users to express themselves gives insight into their 
thoughts on what success means to them. System users had understandings of system success that did not 
necessarily correspond to what developers might see as success; independently of labeling a system as 
“successful” or “unsuccessful,” systems brought value to users to varying degrees; and the words users 
chose to express their sentiments about and towards their systems and the programs that brought them are 
at times more telling than their answers to questions phrased in the words I chose. 
 
2.5. Optimality 
A final question of success is whether users consider PV to be the best solution for their energy needs. Do 
they want solar energy enough that they would choose it over other energy sources? If the system were 
damaged or destroyed, would they wish to replace it with another solar energy system, return to using 
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traditional energy sources, or replace it with a different energy system entirely? The question specifically 
did not ask whether respondents had the resources to obtain any of these sources, but simply what they 
would choose if they could. Systems are not considered fully successful if users would choose an energy 
source other than PV.  
 
Some users have complained that solar home systems do not provide sufficient power to meet their needs 
(Acker and Kammen, 1996). Though this dissatisfaction is evidence of the desire for expanded systems, not 
dissatisfaction with the system itself (Acker and Kammen, 1996), it is another example of a community 
perceiving a project that is technically operable as having little value. In this research, users who wish for 
more solar power are not necessarily considered to have unsuccessful systems unless they stated explicitly 
that the project failed to meet their expectations or wasn’t successful. On the other hand, users who express 
a desire for something other than solar are expressing dissatisfaction with the technology to the degree that 
it is not sustainable: they will switch if they can. Thus users who express a desire for a different form of 
power are not considered to have successful systems, regardless of the operating state of the hardware 
itself. 
 
These systems are not considered “successful” because they fail to meet users’ needs, even though from a 
developer’s perspective some might be considered among the most successful projects included in this 
study. Relatively affluent beneficiaries with systems in good repair who are pleased with the utility that the 
system provides within its capabilities may be dissatisfied with and limited by system capacity constraints. 
For purposes of this study, “better than nothing” is not sufficient to call a system successful. Successful 
systems are those that users would choose.    
 
2.6. Working definition of success 
A uniform definition of success is useful for analysis. The originally hypothesized definition of success, a 
system that is technically operable and considered successful by users or owners, is inadequate as described 
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above: systems that are inoperable because they are being maintained or have served their intended purpose 
are not necessarily failures, and users’ near-ubiquitous response that systems are successful when asked 
explicitly does not imply near-ubiquitous success. 
  
For this research, I have created an ontological definition of success (Goertz, 2006). That is, rather than a 
priori choosing characteristics to create an “if and only if” definition of success, the characteristics of the 
systems are examined first and success is defined based on these characteristics. 
  
Thus for this research, several criteria emerged as useful to define success. A system is counted as 
successful if it meets the following criteria: 
– The system was functioning on the day of the interview, or concrete steps were being taken to 
have it repaired in the foreseeable future, or it was removed because its use was intended to be 
temporary until another energy source (typically an electric grid) replaced it. Operability was an a 
priori part of the definition, but that technically inoperable systems could also be successful 
emerged as a part of this research; 
– The user considers it successful, feels that it has met his or her expectations, and finds it important 
in daily life or for specific events. The hypothesis that users could simply be asked whether a 
system was successful proved inadequate, and other measures of satisfaction and utility give more 
depth and meaning to user responses. 
– Assuming the resources were available, the user would not choose a different energy source if the 
PV system were (or had been) lost or damaged. A system may be tolerable to users in that it 
functions and is consistent with what they were promised upon installation, but willingness to 
trade it for a “better” alternative suggests that it is sub-optimal and does not meet the user’s needs. 
A system need not be operable to be optimal; if users would gladly go back to using PV if they 
could afford to, then it was an optimal solution. 
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This is not a rigid “if and only if” definition, but rather a set of characteristics that do not define success 
singly, but when taken in aggregate show that the user is getting long-term benefit from the system. It is, 
however, a noncompensatory definition: failure in any of the three categories is sufficient to call the system 
a failure. 
 
Notably, these criteria for success do not capture all possible failures. I would find it difficult to describe as 
successful any development intervention that makes users’ situations worse than they would be without the 
intervention – even if it operates as designed, users perceive the project as successful, and would not 
choose to replace it with something different. The provision of a tube well that turns out to be contaminated 
with arsenic (Hoque et al., 2006) may meet these criteria for success, but if arsenic contamination in wells 
poses greater risk than organic contamination in the surface water that the well replaced, I could not 
consider the project “successful.” While quantifying such risks in the case of rural electrification – and in 
particular quantifying the risks of the absence of rural electrification so the comparison could be validly 
made – is beyond the scope of this study, many factors not included in the original hypotheses and research 
questions are considered qualitatively in these analyses.  
 
2.7. Conclusions 
Success is defined narrowly for this research to relate specifically to individual systems and projects. The 
success of development aid in general and the process by which such success is evaluated are not examined 
further in this study, though they leave many questions unanswered. 
 
The definition of success built in this chapter, with its components of operability, user perception, and 
optimality, is the definition used throughout this research. Though the factors that lead to each success 
criterion being met or unmet vary and are examined qualitatively, quantitative conclusions and 
comparisons depend only on one question: based on this definition, is the system a success? 
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Chapter 3. Context, literature review and hypotheses 
In this chapter, I introduce the contexts in which this research takes place. I also discuss the hypotheses and 
research questions explored in this research, and review existing literature from which these hypotheses 
were developed.  
The idea of context is broad and I consider only a few specific aspects. This study includes communities, 
institutions and equipment that have been involved in or resulted from development aid programs. As such, 
I define the concepts of “development” and “aid,” and briefly discuss the histories, motivations, success 
and failures of programs and individuals involved. This thesis does not address the overarching questions 
of whether development aid accomplishes its goals or the degree to which outcomes are beneficial to 
donors or intended beneficiaries. However, the results of this study must be understood in the context of 
this donor-beneficiary model. 
 
The second aspect of context addressed in this chapter relates to energy. This study focuses on a specific 
type of energy system – photovoltaic electricity production in physically independent systems – in a 
specific application – rural electrification to meet development goals. Section 3.2 of this chapter briefly 
describes the human and economic development benefits derived from modern energy sources in general 
and from PV systems specifically. 
 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 then address the context of the country of Guatemala: why it was chosen, Guatemala’s 
history and current geopolitical environment, and the potential influence of these on the outcomes of this 
research. 
 
The remainder of this chapter reviews existing literature on the application of renewable energy in rural 
development and describes the hypotheses and research questions I derive from this literature, and 
highlights areas where this research may contribute to it. These hypotheses and research questions are 
grouped generally into three categories: economics & utility, institutions & relationships, and 
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characteristics & consequences. These categories are subsequently divided further into sub-sections, 
addressing particular aspects of each category. These are described in detail in the appropriate sections 
below. This categorization is for convenience, and should not be interpreted to mean that all hypotheses 
will fit neatly into a single category. Physical systems are shaped by institutional arrangements, which in 
turn take shape as a result of the characteristics of the donors and beneficiaries involved. These and many 
other interrelationships are addressed in this chapter and throughout this document, although the general 
categorization remains. 
 
This review of existing literature shows that, while much is known about the use of renewable energy in 
rural electrification, much is also uncertain and existing information is sometimes contradictory. This 
research attempts to answer just a few of the many questions on the success and failure of rural 
electrification using photovoltaics, and ultimately raises many more questions yet to be addressed. 
 
3.1. Context: International development and the concept of aid 
All research takes place in context. Contexts relevant to this research include the international aid and 
development paradigms, and the history and culture of Guatemala. In this section, I consider concepts of 
aid, development and “sustainability.” In subsection 3.1.1, I consider the concept of “sustainability” and the 
limits of its applicability in this research. Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 discuss the topics of international aid and 
international development. Subsection 3.1.4 considers the motivations of donors who participate in aid-
based development and potential effects of those motivations on system outcomes. Finally, subsection 3.1.5 
considers critically the ways in which international aid has succeeded and failed. 
 
3.1.1. Sustainable development and “sustainability” 
Rural electrification can be broadly categorized as “development” and using renewable resources such as 
solar energy as a means for electrification often is called “sustainable development.” Some would call the 
term sustainable development oxymoronic: development (growth, increased use of resources) is inherently 
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unsustainable in a world of finite resources. In contrast, others would call the term redundant. Maren 
(Maren, 1997) succinctly says “if it’s not sustainable, it’s not development.” 
 
Although this work deals with what may be considered an environmentally more sustainable technology 
(solar panels versus diesel generators or extension of a fossil fuel-powered national electric grid), broad 
claims about the sustainability of any technology are specifically excluded. Lifecycle impacts of the panels 
themselves, lead contamination from improper battery disposal, reduced dependence on petroleum-based 
fuel sources like kerosene, and other positive and negative environmental or fossil fuel related impacts of 
these systems will not be considered. 
 
Defining all the necessary and sufficient characteristics for an energy system to be considered “sustainable” 
is a significant task, fraught with controversy, and beyond the scope of this research. Here I merely 
postulate that a rural electrification system must be considered “unsustainable” unless its users can expect 
to have electricity into the indefinite future, just as their urban counterparts can. While a system that 
continues to work or will be replaced is only one necessary (though not sufficient) condition of 
sustainability, it is the only condition of sustainability considered in this research.  
 
3.1.2. International aid 
Indisputably, some people and nations in the world have much “more” than others: more wealth and 
economic opportunity; better access to health care and education; more freedom of speech, movement, and 
organization; better natural and built environments; longer life expectancy and better overall quality of life. 
The distinction between the “haves” and the “have nots” (and the “in-betweens”) can be made along many 
lines. The World Bank distinguishes between low, lower-middle, upper middle, and high income countries, 
while noting that “classification by income does not necessarily reflect development status” (Saghir, 2001). 
The United Nations Development Programme uses a continuous “Human Development Index” to rate 
countries based on income and quality of life criteria (UNDP, 2013). Some divide nations as OECD 
members or non-members. There can be said to be a “North/South” divide. Economist Paul Collier divides 
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the world into three groups: a small group of rich nations, a large group of developing nations, and a small 
group of nations that are categorically failing to develop (Collier, 2007). Some nations and individuals 
choose to become donors to others. Some choose to be beneficiaries by accepting what donors offer. Many 
are both. 
 
Approaches to aid (among them charity, development, social justice, discussed in this section) depend upon 
the perceived agency of the beneficiaries (Farmer, 2005), where “charity” may imply that beneficiaries are 
inferior and powerless victims of circumstance, “development” that beneficiaries can overcome their 
circumstances with the right tools, and “social justice” that circumstances must be change to empower 
beneficiaries. There is little discussion about the ability of those living in poverty or extreme poverty to 
survive or even prosper absent such aid or outside help in development (Collins et al., 2009), though it is an 
area that merits study. 
Regardless of the type of aid, the relationship between donor and beneficiary is complex. The current 
system of international aid for relief and development has many failings, despite what I believe to be the 
best intentions of most people who are involved. The low success rate of the donated solar energy systems 
considered in these analyses may be strongly affected by the success of donation as a model for aid. 
Although members of beneficiary communities included in this study were asked about their impressions of 
and interactions with project donors, this work is not a comprehensive empirical study of the 
donor/beneficiary relationship. However, these results exist within the context of the donor model, which is 
explored in further detail in this section. 
 
3.1.3. International aid for development 
This work focuses predominantly on what I call “development aid,” which I define to include donation or 
subsidy to projects or programs with goals of long-term benefits. The individuals and communities I 
studied are the recipients of donated or partially donated solar photovoltaic systems. The systems in this 
study are not portable, but are intended to be long-term investments in infrastructure. If a road washes out 
during a storm or becomes impassible because of lack of grading and other maintenance, it does not imply 
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that the road was intended to be temporary. Similarly, I assume “permanently” installed PV systems are 
intended for long-term use, whether or not they are usable in the long term.  
 
 “Development” has many definitions. “Persuading everyone to behave decently to each other because the 
society is so fragile is a worthy goal, but it may be more straightforward just to make the societies less 
fragile, which means developing their economies,” argues Collier (Collier, 2007) . Sustained economic 
growth, improved long-term quality of life, or both are generally the intended results of “development.” 
Economic growth in a county is said to benefit the poor as well as the rich (Dollar and Kraay, 2002; 
Collier, 2007), with incomes in the poorest quintile appearing to rise proportionally with a country’s 
median income (Dollar and Kraay, 2002). International aid to the poorest countries contributes to their 
overall economic growth (Collier, 2007). As such, most international aid should help the poorest people in 
beneficiary countries, subject to conditions including rule of law (Dollar and Kraay, 2002), accountability 
of government officials (Collier, 2007), and others. These conclusions are arguable: development is 
sometimes achieved on a national scale at the expense of the nation’s poor (Farmer, 2005), as when small 
farmers are left landless when a dam is built for hydroelectric power. In Central America, countries are 
generally on track to meet their UN Millennium Development Goals in urban areas, but are failing 
dramatically among the rural poor (United Nations, 2011). It can be said that many international 
development programs have the intention of producing economic growth opportunities among the poor 
(either to reduce inequity between rich and poor or to raise the standard of living of entire populations), 
whether as an end unto itself (Collier, 2007) or as part of a larger concept of quality of life (Farmer, 2005). 
“Who would argue with the proposition that a robust economy is preferable to handouts?” (Farmer, 2005). 
Aid programs with goals such as health or education may be called “photogenic” (Collier, 2007) or “starry-
eyed” (Farmer, 2005) by those advocating a purely growth-oriented strategy, despite that higher levels of 
education are often considered prerequisite (or at least contributing) to economic growth (Collier, 2007) 
and basic physical health is inarguably necessary for the unskilled laborers who are a key input to a 
growing economy. 
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Development aid under a donor model consists of the processes and institutions involved in pursuing 
greater economic opportunity or quality of life for beneficiaries, using (at least in part) resources from a 
donor or group of donors who perceive themselves to have an economic or quality of life advantage over 
the beneficiaries and to be in possession of the knowledge necessary to bring the beneficiaries’ economic 
and quality of life conditions closer to their own. 
 
3.1.4. Donor motivation 
Decisions to provide aid to specific countries are often politically driven or driven by the economic needs 
of the donor country rather than the beneficiary country. Aid might be seen as a means to extend a donor 
country’s influence over the beneficiary country without acquiring the responsibilities and international 
disrepute that are a part of explicit colonialism. For example, family planning efforts have been carried out 
in locations with some of the world’s lowest population densities but rich mineral deposits (Galeano, 1973), 
illustrating the use of aid to lessen competition for scarce resources. A delivery of emergency relief to 
Japan after a 1990 earthquake included 12,000 bras (Maren, 1997), illustrating aid being used as a means to 
soak up surplus goods that cannot be profitably sold in the donor country rather than to meet a beneficiary’s 
need. The U.S. Government’s significant involvement in foreign aid began with this objective in mind: the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 explicitly states its intention as finding 
markets for excess U.S. farm products and opening future markets for the same and furthering U.S. foreign 
policy objectives, while simultaneously helping to feed those people living in needy countries (Maren, 
1997). Prototype programs before this act also emphasized the absorption of excess agricultural products 
and the expansion of markets as goals, alongside feeding hungry people (Maren, 1997). Since the end of 
the Cold War, the opening of markets to free trade is a frequent, fairly direct goal of many international aid 
programs, pursued by donors even at the price of helping to secure the position of dictators or other 
repressive heads of state in beneficiary countries (Farmer, 2005). 
 
Discrepancies between what is wanted by beneficiaries and what is provided by donors can be attributed to 
self-serving economic or political agendas, as above, but are sometimes the result of misunderstanding of 
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or disagreement about beneficiaries’ needs. At the World Summit on the Information Society held in 
Tunisia in 2005, potential beneficiary countries questioned the need for computers to be donated to children 
living in extreme poverty when the One Laptop Per Child program was discussed (Smith, 2005). 
Participant Marthe Dansokho from Cameroon stated "What is needed is clean water and real schools" 
(Smith, 2005) . Another participant asked "What use is that computer for your children who don't have a 
doctor within walking distance?" (Smith, 2005). But the sincere desire to reduce the disadvantages caused 
by the so-called “digital divide” may have led many people from wealthier countries to see giving 
computers to poor children as a very positive step. 
 
In another example of donors’ incomplete understanding of beneficiaries’ needs described by Paul Framer 
(Farmer, 2005),  patient non-compliance with free tuberculosis treatment in Haiti was initially ascribed by 
some health professionals to patients’ beliefs that witchcraft caused the illness, making drugs and medical 
treatment useless. In fact, poverty made compliance with treatment impossible for some. Many patients did 
not have time to come to clinics for treatment because they were working to keep their families from 
starving, whether they believed sorcery played a role in their illness or not. People could not sleep away 
from others to avoid infecting them when the entire family shared a single-room hut. Patients were non-
compliant with doctors’ orders to eat well because they had insufficient food. In this case, “free” was still 
too expensive, and the donor initially did not understand this. 
 
As another example of donor motivation, aid may be used politically to improve the image of one country 
or organization, or to embarrass another. During a time when Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and then-
U.S. President George W. Bush had a clearly adversarial relationship, the Venezuelan government opted to 
provide assistance in paying for heating oil to poor families in the U.S. at the same time the U.S. federal 
government was cutting its domestic heating oil assistance program (Ekstrom, 2008). Reportedly in 
response to falling oil prices and in an effort to maintain its hard currency reserves, Venezuela suspended 
the program four years later in January, 2009 (Romero, 2009). In the same month, U.S. President George 
W. Bush was replaced by incoming President Barack Obama (Zeleny and Stolberg, 2009). 
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Political favoritism or attempts to influence political opinions are also motivations for providing aid. 
Members of one community included in this study received replacement batteries for their solar home 
systems from a political candidate immediately before an election.17 Communities in another district 
benefited from a government solar panel program despite that they had already benefited from a private 
program, in explicit violation of government program policy (an employee in the government program later 
insisted that no such double donations existed). Community members acknowledged that their 
representative at the time of the government installation was politically powerful in Guatemala City 
without directly drawing the link between his influence and their “unorthodox” participation in the 
government program. These cases are explored in more detail below. 
 
In my experience, most individuals who are involved as donors in any capacity have genuinely altruistic 
goals. However, there are many options for states, organizations, and individuals to become donors, and 
motivations for involvement in specific groups, locations, or types of projects vary considerably. The noble 
goal of feeding the hungry can be linked easily to a state’s political goal of opening new markets for its 
goods. Students’ genuine desires to improve infrastructure for those less fortunate may be leveraged to 
improve their résumés at the same time. Without second-guessing the good intentions that drive people to 
participate in donation-based development projects, their motivations for choosing their methods of 
involvement clearly impact who benefits and in what way. 
 
3.1.5. The success and failure of aid 
Donor and development agencies and organizations, whether public or private, are generally expected to 
define the criteria for success of their projects, and self-evaluate and report on this success, with evaluation 
and reporting often carried out by people who will themselves be judged professionally by the success of 
their projects.18 The U.S. government, which frequently awards contracts to these organizations, relies 
heavily or entirely on their self-reported success to justify the award of future contracts. In some cases, 
                                                          
17   Details of the case studies mentioned here are found in Chapter 6. 
18   Source for this paragraph is (Maren, 1997) except where otherwise noted. 
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USAID may also lack the means to successfully evaluate its own programs. The U.S. General Accounting 
Office noted in a 1993 report that USAID had no system to assess whether donated food in fact meets the 
goal of improving the “food security” of the beneficiary country (quoted in Maren, 1997). Specific 
examples of project developers’ evaluations of success in energy development are found in Chapter 2, 
Defining Success. 
 
International aid may take the form of “budget support,” which is merely a cash inflow into an existing 
government budget.19 The effectiveness of this type of aid is highly dependent upon the recipient 
government being “reasonable” in how it is spent; the more corruption there is – or the further apart the 
donor and recipient governments are in their goals – the less aid this money will bring to the intended 
recipients. Further, in the poorest countries, large amounts of aid money increase the statistical likelihood 
that a coup will take place.  
 
Project-specific aid is more relevant to these analyses, but it too faces many potential pitfalls. Beneficiaries 
seem unlikely to reject anything offered for free or nearly free, regardless of their need for it. In response to 
this, “participatory development” was a practice attempted by some project developers. Its intention was 
nominally to work with beneficiaries to assess their needs, but in some cases became more of a consensus-
building exercise in which donors sought to convince beneficiaries that they needed what the donor was 
offering (Maren, 1997).  
 
Aid agencies are not generally coordinated with one another and conflicting goals can place them at odds 
with one another (Collier, 2007; Maren, 1997), perhaps negating each other’s work. Further, logistics are 
an enormous challenge to project-specific aid, and may take up more time than the actual development 
work (Maren, 1997), creating a huge drain on available resources. And creating infrastructure or 
implementing hardware does not necessarily provide benefit. “Any engineer can construct an irrigation 
system, but using the system to grow food is another matter altogether” (Maren, 1997).  
                                                          
19 Source for this paragraph is (Collier, 2007) except where otherwise noted. 
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Aid can create unintended incentives for beneficiaries. People spend their energies getting access to what 
donors are offering rather than working towards self-sufficiency (Maren, 1997). “The donors are amateurs. 
The recipients are professionals,” notes Maren. Once the stream of aid stops, “professional” recipients may 
be left with a skill set that is no longer useful and no other means of supporting themselves. 
 
Aid itself can be the source of conflict (Farmer, 2005), with corrupt officials skimming off (or dipping 
deeply into) donated resources, populations being gathered together by promises of aid and then resettled 
according to a government’s plan, and tensions being created or heightened between recipients and non-
recipients, as in the case of refugees who get aid while the poor of their host countries do not (Maren, 
1997). 
 
Donations distort local prices, at times ruining local businesses by undercutting their prices (often to 
zero).20 This can have disastrous long-term impacts on a beneficiary country’s economy if those previously 
producing or importing the commodity being donated are forced permanently out of business; when the aid 
is no longer available, the means and markets needed to fulfill the demand no longer exist. 
 
Contrarily, in some circumstances (including the case of solar PV systems) donors may also build 
beneficiary countries’ markets by creating demand for a commodity to be purchased locally, providing 
needed training in a novel technology, and creating the demonstration projects that work as proof of 
concept for people who may later purchase systems themselves (Acker and Kammen, 1996). However, the 
risk of undercutting local prices (thereby threatening emerging markets) remains, even when local vendors 
are used, if beneficiaries sell their systems at below-market prices (Corsair and Ley, 2008). The positive 
and negative influences of donors on solar PV markets in rural developing world applications are discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
 
                                                          
20 Source for this paragraph is (Maren, 1997)  except where otherwise noted. 
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Donors’ impacts on development in beneficiary countries varies greatly, and may have unintended 
consequences and create perverse incentives. The questions of whether or to what degree rural stand-alone 
PV systems in Guatemala succeed or fail because they are donated under development models that don’t 
work, and whether donation bolsters or impedes local Guatemalan PV markets are not answered in this 
study. Donated systems are not compared to systems obtained through market or other models. However, 
the observed differences in success between programs in which donors remain involved and those in which 
donors leave suggests that some donation models are more suitable to PV for rural electrification in 
Guatemala than others. 
 
3.1.6. Conclusions concerning the contexts of international development and aid 
Although development aid is not the subject of this research, the stand-alone solar electric systems included 
in this research are donated under a development-based aid paradigm, and must be understood in that 
context. The level of development of a country and the aims of the process of development can be defined 
in many ways, but most center on economic opportunity and quality of life. Donor nations, organizations 
and individuals can have self-serving as well as altruistic motivations and intentions, and may consider 
their actions to be anything from helping the helpless to empowering people to overcome adverse 
circumstances to changing the underlying circumstances that cause them to need aid in the first place. In 
the following section, I consider Guatemala and electrification in Guatemala within this context of aid and 
development. 
 
3.2. Context: Electricity in Guatemala 
Guatemala, and specifically rural electrification in Guatemala, is a part of the context of this research. In 
this section, I explore briefly the rationale for electrification, and the history and culture of Guatemala. This 
section provides the background against which my hypotheses and research questions are framed in section 
3.5 
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3.2.1. The need for and advantages of renewable energy 
The provision of modern energy sources such as electricity is a goal of some development programs. In this 
section, I examine the rationale for including modern energy as part of a development paradigm, and the 
particular advantages of including renewable electric power generation. 
 
3.2.2. The need for electricity 
Energy is not an end unto itself: it is a means for achieving other goals. In the U.S., modern energy sources 
are the basis for our quality of life and economic opportunity. Potable water, our food system, medicine, 
homes, commerce, and industry all depend on the availability of inexpensive energy. Electricity provision 
has not always been an explicit goal of broader development agendas (Cherni and Hill, 2009}  and 
important goal sets such as the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s) omit quantifiable 
or qualifiable electrification targets (UN MDG's, 2000). 
 
In developing countries in rural areas, most of the energy consumed is traditional biomass: firewood, crop 
residue, dung, and other easily available combustibles (Saghir, 2005; Casillas and Kammen, 2010). These 
are normally burned in open fireplaces. In addition, many people have access to and use candles and gas or 
kerosene lanterns, and some rely on wooden torches. The potential for improvements in economic 
opportunity and quality of life are substantial when people have access to electric power (UN MDG's, 
2000; Saghir, 2005), and the provision of modern energy sources can contribute substantially to other 
development goals (Saghir, 2005; Rady, 1992; Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti, 2002). However, 
electrification does not by itself bring about these outcomes if other fundamental needs remain unmet 
(Casillas and Kammen, 2010). 
About 1.5 billion people in the world lack access to electricity (Legros, 2009) and electrification in rural 
developing world locations is particularly low (Rady, 1992; Barnes and Foley, 2004). Extending the 
electric grid to rural locations is often infeasible because of the high cost (Grimshaw and Lewis, 2010; Soto 
et al., 2012; Wiens, 2011),  or the demand density is so low that a grid system is technically infeasible 
(Rady, 1992), or is undesirable because grid electricity in remote locations is so unreliable (Acker and 
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Kammen, 1996; Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti, 2002) . That a community is connected to the grid is by no 
means an indication that all or even most of the households have electricity (Ailawadi et al., 2006; Rady, 
1992) , although the location is then considered to be “electrified” for government reporting purposes, as I 
also observed in Guatemala.  
 
3.2.3 Rural electrification using solar photovoltaics 
Small-scale renewable energy can offer advantages in development projects. Solar photovoltaics offer the 
technical advantage of being “scalable” (Breyer, 2010; Acker and Kammen, 1996); that is, regardless of 
amount of power needed, a system can be created that is very nearly ideally sized. Suites of intermittent 
renewable energy sources – or renewables in combination with diesel generators – may be the best 
approach to rural electrification near the equator, making photovoltaics particularly suitable (de Jong et al., 
2013; Alazraque-Cherni, 2008; Mostofi and Shayeghi, 2012; Tanoto, 2011). A disadvantage to PV in many 
developing countries near the equator is that they are frequently hot, and high temperature lowers the 
efficiency of PV (Skoplaki and Palyvos, 2012; Chow, 2010), which lessens the advantage of greater 
insolation. 
 
Intermittency can be an issue with renewable energy sources if highly reliable power is demanded. The sun, 
wind and flowing water may or may not provide maximum available energy when maximum power is 
needed. Providing very highly reliable power can cause large increases in the cost of stand-alone renewable 
energy systems (Corsair, 2005). However, the degree of reliability demanded in rural developing world 
applications is arguably lower than that which is needed for more “advanced” societies that depend upon 
electricity to meet basic needs.21 
 
Beyond the reach of the national electric grid in rural Guatemala, I observed home lighting produced from 
kerosene lanterns, candles, flashlights, and torches made from ocote, a resin-rich pine found readily in 
                                                          
21 For example, water provision in developed countries generally requires electric pumps; a loss of electricity means a loss of water 
and viable alternative sources are few. In contrast, in a location that water is drawn from a well by hand, an interruption in electricity 
supply has no bearing on water supply. 
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Guatemala, and sometimes provided by electric lights powered by car batteries that are re-charged by 
vehicles or in grid-connected communities. 
 
Solar photovoltaic electricity production can be used for lighting and other small applications in rural 
locations. Its use has numerous advantages over traditional energy sources or local diesel generators. Users 
of solar home systems with whom I spoke found the quality of light to be better than that from combustion 
sources, and some expressed appreciation for the improvement in indoor air quality. Ocote produces a 
particularly egregious amount of smoke and poor lighting quality, according to those who had used it for 
lighting.22 
 
Energy consumption is generally lower in rural, developing world environments than in urban 
environments in the same countries or in developed countries (Bazilian et al., 2011; Grimshaw and Lewis, 
2010; Rady, 1992), and Guatemala is not exceptional in that regard. Solar photovoltaic panels are very 
modular and systems can be sized to meet the small needs of rural households. 
 
Although photovoltaics have high up-front capital costs, PV can be most cost-effective means of energy 
production in remote applications, under some conditions (Casillas and Kamen, 2011; Chakrabarti and 
Chakrabarti, 2002), especially because the cost of transmission from centralized power plants can be high. 
Even micro-grids that link buildings in a single community to a centralized micro-hydroelectric or diesel 
plant have substantial costs. A particularly noteworthy example of the cost of micro-grids comes from the 
northern highlands of Guatemala: a small hydroelectric plant was installed to power three geographically 
close communities. These communities were not accessible by road, so all equipment and supplies had to 
be carried in by hand, and the community members were expected to provide all unskilled labor for the 
project, including transporting materials. Ten years after the inception of the project, every community 
member with whom I spoke about their personal contribution to the power system mentioned that they or 
their husbands helped carry the power poles from the end of the road, seven miles to the community. 
                                                          
22 See Chapter 5 for details. 
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Though this was not a monetary cost, it was the only cost unanimously remembered by the contributors, 
and was viewed by them as substantial. See Chapter 2 for more details about this community. 
 
A particular economic advantage to PV over diesel generators is insulation from fuel price volatility. In 
interviews conducted in the later part of 2008, most people who used diesel or gasoline in any capacity 
complained of the unexpectedly high prices during the much of that year.  
 
PV has the advantages of being environmentally benign on a local level (it creates no air or noise pollution 
in the location of use, and can be installed without the damage that can be caused by clearing rights-of-way 
for power lines). From a global perspective, once installed, PV does not contribute to climate change and 
does not rely upon exhaustible fossil fuels that must be imported and are therefore subject to disruption and 
price volatility due to events very far removed from the final energy users in the remote communities in 
Guatemala. 
 
Thus, quality of life and economic opportunities in rural areas are improved with the provision of modern 
energy sources. Photovoltaic electricity can offer both cost and environmental benefits over alternative 
means of providing electricity. 
 
3.3. Why Guatemala? 
Problems of rural electrification are ubiquitous. More and less developed countries alike have rural 
populations without access to national electric grids, or whose access is unreliable. Problems with solar 
energy in rural electrification projects are also broadly reported, as detailed in Chapter 2.  
 
In this way, Guatemala, the country chosen for this study, is not unique. Further, the solar energy projects 
within Guatemala that are included in this study share characteristics with many other solar energy projects 
within Guatemala, Latin America, and the developing world in general.  
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However, every nation has its own cultural and geopolitical environments that form the context in which 
electrification projects are undertaken. While it is fair to say that Guatemala, like other developing 
countries, experiences problems with solar energy in rural electrification, this study does not presume to 
present evidence that these problems are the same as problems encountered in other countries, nor even that 
the specific projects and areas studied are necessarily representative of those found in Guatemala as a 
whole. The results of this study may be a useful starting place for examining analogous systems, locations 
and environments. 
 
Thus the country of Guatemala and the projects and programs within the country were not chosen to be 
representative, but were instead chosen as a starting point against which to compare future and analogous 
studies. The country was chosen in large part to minimize demands on the constrained time and monetary 
resources of the research. Familiarity with the language, acquaintance with people and organizations 
working on electrification and development in the country, proximity to the home research institution, and 
relative political stability at the outset of the study were all factors that made Guatemala a favorable choice. 
Analogously, solar projects within Guatemala were chosen based on information available about them 
outside the communities, safety and stability of the departments in which they were located, and reasonable 
accessibility. Details of site selection are found in section 4.4.1, below. 
 
All results must be understood within the context of Guatemala as a country with a difficult physical 
geography that has played a significant role in its turbulent history and diversity of population. This 
research is not an analysis of a technology isolated in a laboratory, but tells the story of energy as a basic 
need of Guatemala’s rural poor, and solar photovoltaic electricity production as a resource to meet that 
need. 
 
3.4. Rural electrification in Guatemala, in context 
In Guatemala, many organizations have installed PV as part of solar home systems and other small stand-
alone applications. Although some programs have succeeded, the technology cannot be said to 
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categorically be a success. This research examines the differentiating factors between systems that succeed 
and those that fail. What exactly constitutes “success” is discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
As described in this section, Guatemala has suffered near continuous warfare and violence since the time of 
the Conquistadores. A 30-year civil war ended in 1996, after having killed or displaced huge segments of 
the population. The indigenous Mayans who make up half of Guatemala’s population suffered the most 
loss of both life and property during the civil war, and have been left with low levels of education and little 
trust for the government or other “outsiders,” as explained below. Currently, although no active political 
strife dominates the Guatemalan landscape (isolated political assassinations continue to take place, but they 
are targeted and have not led to much civil unrest), it is at risk of failing as a state as more and more 
territory is controlled by drug cartels and other organized crime.  
 
This study focuses on those systems located in areas that were governed by rule of law at the time of the 
study, though some areas were marginal and several have fallen to narco control since. In Section 3.4.1, I 
briefly describe the history and culture of Guatemala. Section 3.4.2 highlights the lasting impact of the 
recent civil war on the current political and social environments in Guatemala. Finally, Section 3.4.3 briefly 
describes the current opportunities and challenges in a country that has come increasingly under the 
influence of organized crime. 
 
The findings of this study may shed light on the analogous successes and failures in other locations, but 
these findings must be understood in a context that is uniquely Guatemalan.   
 
3.4.1. Guatemala background 
“We grow our corn; it is part of our culture,” said Federico Franco, then-Vice Minister of Sustainable 
Development under the Ministry of Energy and Mines, “but we are a land of rivers and trees.”23 
 
                                                          
23 The statement was made at a press conference, as detailed below. 
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Franco’s statement is aptly descriptive of Guatemala. It is an agrarian society in which 50% of the 
population engages in some form of agriculture (U.S. Department of State, 2009 (2)). Corn is a cultural 
staple as well as a food staple in Guatemala, especially in rural areas. It is described as an “extremely 
sensitive commodit[y] in the public consciousness” (Tay, 2007). According to one coffee and rubber 
plantation owner (interviewed in August, 2006), the peones who work his land prefer to grow their own 
corn than to buy it, despite the fact that seed and fertilizer prices made it more expensive to grow than to 
buy at the time.  
 
Franco’s statement also illustrates that Guatemala is a land in conflict, quite apart from the violent 
environment described in Section 3.4.3., below. The statement was made on 17 October, 2008, during a 
press conference about sustainable development. Leaders of rural communities who had not been invited to 
the press conference arrived to air their concerns; notably, they were concerned about their exclusion from 
discussions about development that involved them and the land that historically has been theirs. People in 
agrarian communities need land and water to produce food, and may find themselves in competition with 
both development and conservation efforts. According to interviews conducted during the timeframe of this 
study, the needs of farmers, pisciculturists, and other small water users are sometimes in conflict with the 
water needs of upstream hydroelectric power producers, and the voices of these small users are not always 
heard. 
 
Guatemala is a country of approximately 14 million people (U.S. Department of State, 2009 (2)), the 
largest population of any country in Central America (CIA, 2009). It is bordered by El Salvador and 
Honduras to the south, and Belize (a contested territory (U.S. Department of State, 2009 (1))) and Mexico 
to the north (U.S. Department of State, 2009 (2)).  
 
Approximately one half of Guatemala’s population is ethnically indigenous (Stoll, 1993), with estimates 
ranging from 40% to 65% (CIA, 2013; Plant, 1998). However, the indigenous populations should not be 
considered one homogenous culture. Indigenous communities may be differentiated from one another by 
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language, clothing, religion, location, and history. Although Spanish is spoken throughout Guatemala, over 
twenty languages are officially recognized (U.S. Department of State, 2009 (2)), mostly (though not all) 
Mayan languages. Some of these have dialects distinctive enough that speakers of what is nominally the 
same language were seen to have had trouble understanding one another. Traditional attire (worn 
predominantly by women) in Mayan communities varies by region. In urban areas, where most people 
eschew traditional clothing and work in non-agrarian jobs, the distinction between Ladino and indigenous 
can be nebulous.  
 
The Guatemalan people are poor, by almost any measure. Over half of Guatemalans live in poverty (CIA, 
2013). In rural areas, the poverty rate is higher, around 70% (UN World Food Programme, 2010). Over 
13% of Guatemalans live on less than $1/day (CIA, 2013), and Guatemala has one of the most unequal 
income distributions in the hemisphere (U.S. Department of State, 2009 (2)). Guatemala has the highest 
rate of chronic malnutrition in Latin America, and the fourth highest in the world (UN World Food 
Programme, 2010). The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) assesses poverty using both 
economic and quality of life indicators (UNDP Human Development Reports, 2010). Guatemala’s 2009 
HDI score, while an improvement over previous years, remains the lowest in Latin America (UNDP 
Human Development Reports, 2010). Poverty and ethnicity are strongly correlated, with indigenous 
populations being notably poorer than their Ladino counterparts (CIA, 2013; Plant, 1998). 
 
Despite their poverty, I have found Guatemalans (or Chapines, as they call themselves) to be both proud 
and generous. I was shown hospitality that surprised me both by the urban rich and the rural poor: from 
rides in helicopters to cups of coffee that meant someone in the household would do without. Several 
people spoke with pride about the Quetzal, their national bird, seeming to boast that it must live free. If it is 
caged it will die, suggesting that the people too will fight to the death for their freedom. 
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The earliest recorded history of people in the territory that is modern Guatemala is of the Mayan 
populations, some of whose descendants still live literally atop ruins of their ancestors’ civilization.24 
Spanish conquest of Guatemala’s lands began in the 1520’s (although parts of it remained largely 
untouched by Spanish or Ladino influence until the 20th century; Stoll, 1993), and Spanish rule persisted 
until September 15, 1821 (CIA, 2013). For over one hundred years thereafter, Guatemala “passed through a 
series of dictatorships, insurgencies…, coups, and stretches of military rule” (U.S. Department of State, 
2009 (2)) , including a coup enabled by the CIA that overthrew a short-lived but democratically elected 
government (Grandin, 2005)  to the benefit and with the support of U.S.-based corporations like the United 
Fruit Company (Bowen, 1983). Out of these four and a half centuries of violence and oppression emerged 
what is called the Guatemalan Civil War. 
 
The legacies left behind by Mayan, Colonial, and post-Colonial populations are certainly not limited to 
conflict. The ruins at Tikal are among the most significant archaeological finds of the Mayan people 
(Wiseman, 1998), and beautiful colonial architecture is found throughout the country. However, the 
outcome was none the less a civil war that cost between 100,000 (Grandin, 2005; CIA, 2009) and 200,000 
lives (Roht Arriaza, 2008; Ball et al., 1999).25 
 
3.4.2. The legacy of civil war 
In December 1996, Guatemala emerged from its bloody, 36-years-long civil war (U.S. Department of State, 
2009 (2)). Everyone interviewed for this study, which included only adults of at least 18 years, was school 
aged or older when the war ended. Although few chose to talk about it, I believe almost all remember and 
were affected by it. 
 
The brutality of the killings, rapes, tortures, and desecration of sacred places committed by or on behalf of 
the state make the Guatemalan civil war among the most violent modern wars seen in the Western 
                                                          
24 The above-mentioned 2006 interview took place on a coffee and rubber plantation (where the Ladino patron and indigenous peones 
currently live) that is constructed atop the ruins of an ancient Mayan city. The plantation owner has allowed archaeological 
excavation of some of the site. 
25 The wide disparity in values suggests that the reliability of one or more data sources may be questionable. 
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Hemisphere (Grandin, 2005), the specifics of which were little discussed by my informants and therefore 
will be included as a part of this work only if directly relevant. I find it sufficient to say that people 
interviewed in this study are closely akin to people who were long oppressed under a colonial regime, and 
who saw their countrymen slaughtered during the 1980’s and 1990’s.26 The difference in the impact of the 
war on Mayan and Ladino people may account for some of the categorical differences in their responses. 
Those differences are discussed where relevant in subsequent chapters. 
 
The indigenous people of Guatemala were more affected by civil war violence than their Ladino 
counterparts, and those in some departments were more affected than others. From colonial times to the 
1970’s, Ladino, elite, and government reaction to demands from rural Mayans typically has been to classify 
any protest gathering as a motín de indios (an Indian riot), and to react with force to suppress it.27 The four 
decades long civil war did not, initially, deal differently with indigenous populations than its colonial 
antecedent. Starting in the early 1980’s, the Guatemalan government and armed forces tactics changed 
from the use of violence as a reaction to specific events to a “scorched earth campaign” that left countless 
Mayans dead and over 400 villages destroyed. The campaign, begun in 1981, has been called genocide, a 
charge reinforced by staggering drops in population; national government estimates were nearly double the 
population that was measured by census or local health centers (Stoll, 1993). Notably, the number of 
indigenous Guatemalans killed is very uncertain, with Grandin (2004) claiming over 100,000, Roht Arriaza 
(2008) saying that “most” of 200,000 deaths attributed to the civil war were Mayans (Roht Arriaza, 2008), 
and Ball et al. specifically claiming that 83% of 200,000 murders were of indigenous people (Ball et al., 
1999). Additionally, an estimated one million people were displaced (Manz, 1988; Stoll, 1993), either 
internally, or for approximately 200,000 people, to neighboring countries (predominantly the U.S. and 
Mexico) (Manz, 1988). The purpose of the intensity of the violence seems not merely to destroy a then-
                                                          
26 One of the best-known authors to write about the struggles of indigenous peoples in modern Guatemala is Nobel Prize-winning 
author Rigoberta Menchu. While her autobiography is categorically believed to be representative of the plight of rural Mayans in 
general, there are several parts of it which she herself admits can be said to be perhaps truer in spirit than they are in fact. As a story-
teller who has illustrated the lives and deaths of Guatemala’s indigenous populations, she contributes a great deal. However, I do not 
cite her work in this research because she attests as facts things that she now admits she knew were not factually accurate when she 
wrote them. 
27 Source for this paragraph is (Grandin, 2004) except where otherwise noted. 
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current insurgency and its support base, but to “eliminat(e) future capacity for opposition” (Manz, 1988, p 
17). 
 
Violence and atrocities committed during the Guatemalan civil war were not exclusively committed by the 
state and state-allied paramilitary forces; rebel forces committed similar acts of violence, but in far fewer 
numbers (Ball et al., 1999). This fact is not presented as a justification for atrocities committed by 
insurgents, but rather a justification for focusing on state-initiated violence and its impact on rural Mayan 
populations in this work. 
 
The Guatemalan civil war was fought in a Cold War context, with most decisions and divisions based on 
Cold War political lines and priorities.28 The war began after the 1954 U.S. intervention that led to the 
overthrow of the democratically-elected president Jacobo Arbenz. The fight to democratize the nation – to 
free itself of its colonial and dictatorial past – was undertaken originally by reformers on both sides, but 
ultimately gave way to political pressures to appease and appeal to the Soviet Union on the left and the U.S. 
on the right, largely leaving out the very marginalized populations that were the original targets of the 
reform. The name “communism” became something for or against which opposing groups could rally (and 
rally international support), for practical purposes eliminating the possibility of left/right coalitions working 
towards a common cause. However, a small sense of political agency began to manifest itself within the 
population in general, which was a threat to the established political and economic elite. The populace no 
longer accepted at face value the colonial-era sense of entitlement held by the ruling class.  
 
The U.S. held ever-increasing influence throughout the Americas, and elites leveraged two U.S. goals to 
fortify themselves: the exclusion (local extinction?) of communism and the desire to secure U.S. access to 
markets and materials in the region (Grandin, 2005). Peasant and union movements came to be seen not as 
the democratization of the political sphere, but the incursion of communism. Democracy and development, 
which were seen to go hand in hand after World War II, were seen to be in conflict in Latin America as 
                                                          
28 Source for this paragraph is (Grandin, 2004) except where otherwise noted. 
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attracting foreign capital for economic development increasingly required repressing peasant and labor 
classes (Grandin, 2005).  
 
Guatemala, among many states in Latin America, eventually grew to a more democratic state that was more 
inclusive of the populace.29 In 1963, the U.S. again decided that its democratically elected government was 
a threat and aided the military in successfully overthrowing the president. However, the power behind the 
movement was vested more in an ambitious middle class than in the military or traditional elite. The 
government’s increasing political repression largely silenced the left’s traditional leaders that garnered their 
power from the working class, and power shifted to rural (and mostly indigenous) people who worked 
clandestinely as an insurgency rather than within the existing political paradigm. “In thousands – perhaps 
hundreds of thousands – of cases… government violence targeting political action had the effect of 
isolating individual leaders, wrenching them out of their larger political and ethical universe” (Grandin, 
2005). The government and paramilitaries began to treat all indigenous people as rebels. 
 
This is the backdrop against which the history of post-war Guatemala is set: colonial oppression leading to 
imperial repression and repression by the existing elite. The Cold War drama played out in Guatemala, just 
as on the international stage, in Guatemala’s case leading specifically to the wholesale slaughter of its 
indigenous peoples. It is my observation that the battles, both violent and political, the Mayans have fought 
have left them economically poor, poorly organized, distrustful of outsiders and even of their own 
neighbors, and reluctant to assert themselves publicly, either individually or as a group. For decades, the 
penalty for any action – not merely those in opposition to the government, but any action not initiated by 
the government – has been death. Specifically, between 1978 and 1980, the government sought to destroy 
legal popular grass roots movements by killing their leaders, leaving behind “a generation of dead or 
exiled… leaders” (Manz, 1988, P17). By 1983 when the rural areas were largely under military control, the 
population was left with many leaders dead and local institutions destroyed (Manz, 1988). People who 
                                                          
29 Source for this paragraph is (Roht-Arriaza, 2008) except where otherwise noted. 
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challenged the government were frequently tortured or murdered, though wide-scale massacres largely 
stopped by this point (Manz, 1988).  
 
Though this is in largest part no longer true (I have not heard rumors of peasants being disappeared by 
government or paramilitary forces, but high-profile political figures have continued to die under mysterious 
circumstances), the Peace Accords signed in 1996 seem to be interpreted by the indigenous with whom I 
spoke in the same context as the military rules that preceded them: the government said it would do a thing 
(perhaps install a small hydroelectric plant for a community), and the responsibility for not only building it 
but also for maintaining it falls on the shoulders of the government that agreed to it. Part of this expectation 
seems to come from an emergent sense of entitlement: after what the government did to us during the war, 
they owe this to us, and further, they agreed that they owe this to us. But part of this must come from the 
sense of paternalism that the government fostered during the civil war, as did colonial land owners before 
them. Effective self-determination is a skill set that has not been ignored but actively repressed for 
hundreds of years in the Mayan communities in Guatemala. Those who learn or are perhaps born with the 
sense that they have the power to significantly improve life for themselves and their families tend to select 
themselves out of village life by migrating to Guatemalan cities, to Mexico, or to the U.S. The local elites 
who do choose to remain in the communities tend not to wear traditional Mayan dress. Whether divorcing 
one’s self from parents’ traditions is a necessary condition for or a consequence of rising socioeconomic 
status is not the subject of this research. But the history of Guatemala from colonialism through the end of 
the civil war has done a great deal to shape rural indigenous communities. 
 
Those who committed the war crimes and atrocities during the Guatemalan civil war have done so with 
near complete impunity, as described in this section.30 The State still lacks either the will or the ability to 
investigate or prosecute past crimes by most of these powerful actors (Deibert, 2008). International 
criminal tribunals, whether the International Criminal Court or the specific tribunals, have been set up to 
prosecute “humanitarian law violations” by individuals untouchable by the justice systems in their own 
                                                          
30 Source for this paragraph is (Roht Arriaza, 2008) except where otherwise noted. 
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countries. While these tribunals have had success in prosecuting individuals of crimes against humanity, 
they have done little or nothing to help build and strengthen states’ legal institutions and abilities to 
prosecute their own criminals; a state with independent and strong legal institutions should cease to need 
outside institutions to prosecute violations of its own laws, regardless of the perpetrator. 
 
Hybrid international and national courts have been established in Sierra Leon, Cambodia, East Timor, 
Kosovo, and, in 2006, Guatemala.31 In theory, these hybrid courts will be better at building local legal 
capacities and aligning national laws and expectations with those of the international community, and, 
importantly, legitimizing the outcomes of legal proceedings in the eyes of the people being prosecuted and 
represented. They have met with mixed success.  
 
Two hybrid approaches have been used in Guatemala to bring otherwise untouchable actors to justice. 
Guatemala, with the United Nations, established the Comision Internacional Contra la Impunidad en 
Guatemala (CICIG), translated as the Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, with the goal of aiding 
Guatemala to investigate and prosecute the current clandestine actors in Guatemalan courts (Roht Arriaza, 
2008). Because of this structure and goal, CICIG can neither subpoena nor indict; local courts have legal 
authority, and CICIG can only work with their support (Deibert, 2008).32  
 
Independently of CICIG, Guatemalan courts have worked simultaneously with courts in Spain and Belgium 
to prosecute war crimes (Roht Arriaza, 2008). Spanish law dictates that these war crimes can only be 
prosecuted in Spanish courts if the suspects have not been “convicted, found innocent, or pardoned abroad” 
(Roht Arriaza, 2008), ironically allowing trials in domestic kangaroo courts to cement suspects’ impunity 
rather than weakening  it, but even these sham trials largely have not taken place.  
 
                                                          
31  Source for this paragraph is (Roht Arriaza, 2008) except where otherwise noted. 
32   On 12 January, 2010, the CICIG concluded that the murder of a prominent lawyer, blamed on the president of Guatemala and his 
wife, was orchestrated as a sophisticated assisted suicide by the lawyer himself. This finding is being called a cover-up by some 
Guatemalans, purportedly including some close to the accused president himself. The credibility of the CICIG and its long term 
effectiveness may depend upon the public’s final acceptance of the finding. Though I know of no formal surveys, anecdotally some 
Guatemalans seem to view the outcome as the “business as usual” impunity with which their leaders operate. 
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However, hybrid tribunals and transnational prosecutions require the support of the domestic legal 
establishment in order to investigate crimes and to arrest and extradite defendants. Similarly to what has 
been seen in the Sudan, the former Yugoslavia, Nigeria, and Indonesia, Guatemala’s judges, investigators, 
and prosecutors are widely subject to bribes and intimidation, and have not proved very effective in this 
regard (Roht Arriaza, 2008). Treaties signed by Guatemala explicitly state that crimes of this nature that are 
alleged abroad must be investigated and prosecuted domestically, if the country involved refuses to 
extradite (Roht Arriaza, 2008). Again, Guatemalan legal institutions have not done this (Roht Arriaza, 
2008). The legacy of impunity continues. 
 
The civil war left in its wake a culture of mistrust – not just of authority figures, the military and outsiders, 
but within communities and even families (Warren, 1998). Warren (1998) quotes an indigenous 
Guatemalan speaking of the war: 
Some people would say, “How are you?” … They wanted to get something out of us. But 
we ignored this because it was not a good thing… You couldn’t know who he would talk 
to. There were cases… where you couldn’t talk with your own wife — if the wife sided 
with the guerrillas or with the army. If the children were with the guerrillas and the 
father with the army… Even among brothers, one wouldn’t know if someone had been 
paid. Because money does all sorts of things… 
 
In May of 1978, government troops killed somewhere between thirty-five and several hundred (depending 
on the version of the story told) indigenous people who were protesting (or rioting, again depending upon 
the account) in the Mayan town of Panzós (Grandin, 2005). Grandin (2004, p.171) quotes a witness who 
lived downstream: “Every day… I dreamed that they were the same bodies that floated down the river. 
Even though I knew it wasn’t possible, it was too awful to believe that each day the river brought new 
dead.”  
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The rising generations are being shaped as much or more by a new oppressive order in Guatemala: drug 
cartels and organized crime. And each day from their compounds and airstrips, clandestine holding sheds 
and known drug warehouses, the rivers bring new dead. 
 
3.4.3. Modern Guatemala 
Modern Guatemala exists in an environment of “chronic political uncertainty” (Warren, 1998, p 3). The 
violence associated with the 2007 presidential elections, described as “the worst political violence since the 
end of the civil war,” suggests that the decade succeeding the signing of the 1996 Peace Accords did little 
to stabilize the political sphere (Rosenberg, 2007). Dutch ambassador Teunis Kamper described modern 
Guatemala as “a paradise for organized crime” (Scholfield, 2008). Carlos Castresana, the UN-appointed 
head of the CICIG, resigned his post on 7 June, 2010, stating that the Guatemalan government lacks the 
political will to reform its justice system and accusing top government officials of ties to organized crime 
(La Prensa Libre, 2010). The civil war is over, but people continue to live in fear of violence and 
corruption (Abom, 2004). 
 
The impunity with which war crimes were committed continues with other crime in modern Guatemala. 
Many of the same people in power during the civil war continue to exercise clandestine (and sometimes 
overt) control over many of the country’s current political and economic circumstances, both legitimate and 
criminal (Deibert, 2008; Roht Arriaza, 2008). As an example, General Efraín Ríos Montt was president of 
Guatemala in 1982 and 1983 when the civil-war era genocide and massacres of indigenous non-combatants 
were at their worst, was elected in May 2007 to the Guatemalan congress (GHRC, 2007). He was formally 
accused of genocide in 2011 (McDonald, 2013) and was tried for the crime in 2013 (Castillo and Salay, 
2013). All though he was convicted, his conviction was overturned by the Constitutional Court of 
Guatemala and he is at the time of this writing awaiting re-trial (Castillo and Salay, 2013). 
 
Guatemala has long been known as a transit point for cocaine moving from South America to the U.S. 
(New York Times, 2009). Drug capos and their subordinates have been known to influence local and 
 
 
72 
 
 
sometimes national elections by killing off or intimidating rival candidates for office to ensure their own 
candidates are elected (Rosenberg, 2007). Profits from drug trafficking are high and the costs of bribing 
officials are low, creating an environment in which it is advantageous for cartels to operate and giving them 
incentive (and ability) to further manipulate the political environment to meet their needs (Keefer and 
Loayza, 2010). 
 
The State lacks either the will or the ability (or both) to investigate or prosecute current or past crimes by 
these powerful actors (Roht Arriaza, 2008; Deibert, 2008; New York Times, 2009). The prosecutorial and 
enforcement branches of the state also lack the funding to successfully carry out their missions, as 
Guatemala has the second-lowest tax base in Latin America (after only Haiti) (GHRC, 2007). Human rights 
advocates, investigative journalists, and those who aid them in attempting to mitigate organized and official 
crime are met with threats and intimidation (GHRC, 2007). Many people in Guatemala readily believe that 
their government is involved in intimidation and murder to silence those with information about crimes 
committed by officials, as in February, 2007, when national police officers who confessed to the murder of 
diplomats from El Salvador were themselves murdered by masked gunmen inside a highly secure prison 
(GHRC, 2007), or when people took to the streets in 2009 to demand the resignation of President Alvaro 
Colom after lawyer Rodrigo Rosenberg predicted his own demise and accused the president of 
orchestrating his murder in a posthumously-released video made in the days before his death (New York 
Times, 2009). However, government officials themselves, up to and including then-president Colom, have 
reported receiving personal death threats from drug cartels (Llorca, 2009). 
 
The clandestine forces that exert such control throughout Guatemala are difficult to differentiate; drug 
cartels, street gangs, corrupt state police, human and weapons traffickers, and corrupt public officials form 
a complicated web of control and competition among them that undermines the legitimate actions of the 
state (GHRC, 2007; New York Times, 2009). Guatemala is not unique in this regard, as drug trafficking 
organizations are known to link with other anti-government organizations such as insurgents in Colombia 
and Afghanistan (Keefer and Loayza, 2010). Guatemala’s rate of violent deaths is among the highest in the 
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region (GHRC, 2007; New York Times, 2009) and perhaps in the world (Rosenberg, 2007), but fewer than 
2% of homicides are prosecuted, and fewer still lead to convictions (GHRC, 2007; Rosenberg, 2007; 
Scholfield, 2008). This inability of the state to adequately prosecute crimes has led extrajudicial killings – 
in particular the lynching of suspected criminals in rural (and increasingly, in urban) areas – to be widely 
accepted or even viewed as necessary by many Guatemalans (GHRC, 2007; AP, 2009 (3)). The newspaper 
reports on the day following a nationally televised lynching that took place during the course of this study 
contained a great many photos. One image showed a smiling woman running away from the flames as an 
accused murderer who had just been doused in gasoline burned to death on the ground behind her. 
Significantly, news helicopters, reporters and photographers on the ground had time to and were able to 
gain access to the event in progress while local and state police either could not or would not stop the 
hours-long beating and eventual murder of the suspect.  
 
Beyond clandestine powers, narco-traffickers, corrupt officials, and the remnants of violent military and 
paramilitary groups, street crime remains a serious threat to Guatemalans (Rosenberg, 2007). The 
willingness of the population to elect former general Otto Perez Molina – who was personally in command 
in some of the areas where the worst atrocities against civilians were committed during the civil war and 
who advocated the current use of the army to crack down on street crime –illustrates how serious the crime 
situation has become (Rosenberg, 2007). 
 
In 2008, Guatemala had a 26,000-strong national police force, compared to 120,000 private security 
personnel in a country of 13 million people (Deibert, 2008), or two national police officers per thousand 
citizens, compared to nine per thousand among private security. Guatemalans of means simply hire their 
own private security because they lack faith in the state to provide adequate protection (GHRC, 2007). 
Businesses in the capital of Guatemala and other major Guatemalan cities frequently have guards armed 
with shotguns immediately in front of or inside their buildings. Institutions like banks may be expected to 
hire additional security, but hotels, pharmacies, grocery stores, shopping malls, and small shops also 
frequently and prominently display armed security. However, private security forces have strong ties to 
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organized crime, including drug traffickers (Deibert, 2008). Organized crime has an interest in undermining 
the state in Guatemala (Deibert, 2008) so that it may continue to operate with impunity, which 
consequently undermines the state’s ability to work in any area, including electricity-based rural 
development or to provide adequate security for organizations who would otherwise develop the rural 
electrification projects that are the subject of this research. Government officials who have tried to rein in 
the power of organized crime, as by deploying troops to areas controlled by narco traffickers, have been 
murdered or died under mysterious circumstances, while the government has neither adequately 
investigated circumstances nor prosecuted those involved (Deibert, 2008). As long as the government is not 
in fact in control of parts of the country, it cannot participate in development activities or support or protect 
outside agencies that could otherwise expand electrification and other development programs in those 
areas. 
 
The historically powerful actors within Guatemala are alternately in competition or collusion with the 
increasingly powerful Mexican drug cartels. Since the election of President Felipe Calderon Hinojosa in 
Mexico in 2006 (U.S. Department of State, 2008), the Mexican government has waged a high-profile and 
violent war against drug traffickers (Llana, 2009) who have traditionally operated with impunity. Drug 
cartel-related crime continues unabated since the election of Enrique Pena Nieto, President of Mexico since 
2012 (CIA, 2013). The Mexican drug cartels are increasingly in control of the trafficking of cocaine from 
South America into U.S. markets, displacing Colombian organizations that have been weakened in part by 
U.S. aid to Colombia to combat them (Llorca, 2009) and, increasingly, the import of methamphetamines 
into the U.S (Llana, 2009). The battles between the rival gangs have typically been bloody but casualties 
were largely limited to gang members (Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2008). Since the Mexican government 
crack-down began, increasing numbers of bystanders and soldiers or law enforcement personnel have been 
victims of violence (Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2008). The increased pressure on the drug gangs has 
caused some of them to relocate parts of their operations both north and south of the Mexican borders, to 
southwestern U.S. states (Associated Press, 2009 (1)) and to Central America, especially Guatemala 
(Llorca, 2009; Associated Press 2009 (4)) and Honduras ( Associated Press 2009 (4)). Guatemala’s weak 
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justice system and police force are plagued with corruption and ill-equipped to contain the heavily-armed 
and well-organized Mexican criminal organizations (Llorca, 2009). 
 
Los Zetas are a quazi-independent mercenary gang that started as the militant branch of the Gulf Cartel 
(Deibert, 2008; Llorca, 2009) but have since established themselves as a power in competition with their 
former bosses. They, and other Mexican drug cartels, operate within or have taken control of territory 
inside Guatemala in the departments of Alta Verapaz, Huehuetenango, Izabal, Zacapa (Deibert, 2008), and 
others. Los Zetas successfully recruit hit men and other “workers” from young men among the rural 
populations in Guatemala (Llorca, 2009) who have few opportunities in their home communities. Peten is a 
particular hotbed of drug and human smuggling activity (Deibert, 2008), and as such was largely excluded 
from this study due to concerns about physical safety and security. 
 
The clandestine organizations that run the organized crime syndicates are separate from, and in many ways 
more of a threat to the stability and power of the state, than are the violent but loosely organized street 
gangs or the Mexican drug cartels, although the clandestine powers sometimes “use the gangs as muscle” 
and are increasingly allied and entwined with the cartels (Deibert, 2008). Government and international 
resources are increasingly spent on fighting crime while people literally starve (Bonello, 2011). 
 
Physical insecurity and lack of state control have far-reaching effects on Guatemalan society in general and 
on rural development specifically. These, together with current poverty and the legacies of racism and 
state-sponsored violence, form much of the context in which this study must be understood. However, 
Chapines are proud and resourceful, with a cultural heritage that can be traced back millennia and which 
has withstood conquest, colonization, dictatorships and war. The current-day threats continue to inhibit 
“progress” and economic and human development, but el pueblo of Guatemala – the folk, the people as a 
nation – does not show evidence of succumbing to these new pressures; they will continue to survive. 
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3.5. Hypotheses 
This section describes the a priori hypotheses tested and research questions addressed in this study. These 
questions and hypotheses are founded in my findings from academic literature, conversations with 
development professionals, and personal observation, as described throughout this section. Many refer to 
“success,” which is defined in Chapter 2. Hypotheses are stated for topics about which an outcome has 
been observed or assumed in prior observation or research. Research questions are posed about topics about 
which previous observations have been inconsistent or are absent. The hypotheses and research questions 
are grouped into three categories, defined further below: economics and utility; institutions and 
relationships; and characteristics and consequences. 
 
3.5.1. Economic value and utility 
Reasons suggested for success and failure of rural electrification programs are often related to money, as 
described in this section and in Chapter 2. In this section, I present hypotheses and research questions 
related to economics, together with a review of previous research that has lead to these hypotheses and 
research questions. Similarly, I present background on system uses and success, with accompanying 
hypotheses and research questions examined in this study. 
 
Following are the research questions posed with regards to economic value and system utility:33 
– Are there people who are earning more or saving money by using the system instead of 
traditional power sources?  
– Are there people who have lost income opportunities or are incurring greater expenses 
because of the system? 
– What do people use their systems for, and how do different uses lead to different success 
rates, independently of economic impact? 
 
My initially hypothesized answers to these questions at the outset were straightforward: 
                                                          
33  Please see Chapter 5 for discussion of the outcomes of these research questions and hypotheses. 
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– Most users would save money relative to previous energy sources, and those who did 
would have higher success rates than those who did not save money. 
– Some few would earn money with their systems, and those would have the highest success 
rates. 
– Vendors in the communities would lose income due to decreased sales of candles and gas 
for lamps. Greater negative economic impacts would lead to lower success rates. 
– Systems used for direct income generation and for cell phone charging would have 
higher success rates than those not used for one of these purposes. 
 
The underlying hypothesis addressed in this section is that systems will be more successful if they provide 
measurable value – monetary or otherwise – to their users. In this section, I review previous findings on 
changes in energy costs and new economic opportunities enabled by rural renewable energy systems in 
general and rural PV systems specifically. I also consider the potential for the loss of income to some 
members of a community as a result of a PV donation, and review the common non-economic applications 
of PV systems in the developing world. 
 
3.5.1.1. Energy costs: PV may be cost-effective relative to other energy sources in rural areas 
In general, the use of solar PV in rural locations displaces the use, and therefore the cost, of traditional light 
sources such as candles and kerosene lamps. These savings can more than offset the cost of system 
maintenance (Lysen, 2013; Kolk et al., 2012; Nygaard, 2009; Grimshaw and Lewis, 2010; Acker and 
Kammen, 1996; van der Plas and Hankins, 1998; Duke et al., 2002). Numerous studies have shown this to 
be true in regions around the world (Deichmann et al., 2011; van der Plas and Hankins, 1998; Breyer et al., 
2009; Acker and Kammen, 1996; Ley, 2006). 
 
Decentralized renewable generation can be more reliable and cost-effective than extending the existing 
electric power grid over long distances or difficult terrain (Kolk et al., 2012; Narula et al., 2012; 
Deichmann et al., 2011; Urban et al., 2009; Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti, 2002; Huacuz, 2005). Some 
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households in the developing world have grid access (having either an actual grid connection to the home 
or having power lines passing almost over their homes) but still choose to have solar home systems 
installed because it is less expensive than buying some or all power from the grid (Acker and Kammen, 
1996). Renewables further offer the advantage of not being subject to fuel price volatility (Deichmann et 
al., 2011; Fuss and Szolgayová, 2010; Koo et al., 2011). However, it must be noted that increased access to 
electricity does not necessarily serve to alleviate poverty (Casillas and Kammen, 2010) 
 
Initial capital costs of PV are high. However, the cost of photovoltaic panels has been decreasing (NREL, 
undated) – especially as driven by competition from inexpensive Chinese panels (Nygaard, 2009). In 
individual markets, increasing penetration of solar home systems drives competition and generally reduces 
prices (Nygaard, 2009). Renewable energy technology costs in remote applications have decreased over the 
past decade (Alazraque-Cherni, 2008). 
 
In some circumstances, the potential for energy savings has been large enough to allow solar home system 
implementation to expand on a purely market-based model, as described in this section. In Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Cameroon, Bangladesh and other less 
developed countries, renewable energy systems are successfully marketed and sold to rural households 
without subsidy (Lysen, 2013; Kolk et al., 2012; Acker and Kammen, 1996; Duke et al., 2002). Cash sales 
of solar home systems to rural households offer the advantages of having low transaction costs and offering 
users a variety of options (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). Independent of travel costs, Kenyan solar home 
system owners were grateful for the decreased need to travel provided by their PV systems; they no longer 
needed to take trips to recharge batteries or buy kerosene (Acker and Kammen, 1996). However, 
purchasers of novel solar home technologies face substantial risk: a large upfront investment must be made 
by those with little or no experience upon which to base expectations of maintenance costs or savings in 
costs of kerosene or candles (Acker and Kammen, 1996).  
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Offering a variety of sizes of expandable solar home systems for cash can make them more affordable and 
accessible to the rural poor than can microcredit programs (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). However, access to 
microfinance can improve access to solar home systems by those who cannot pay cash upfront (Lysen, 
2013; Lahimer et al., 2013;  Nygaard, 2009; Nieuwenhout et al., 2001; Khan and Khan, 2009), though cash 
purchase options may be preferred even by users with access to microcredit (Breyer et al., 2009).34 
 
Microfinance can be problematic: it increases transaction costs significantly when dealing with dispersed 
and small borrowers and vendors (Lysen, 2013; Duke et al., 2002). Microfinance conditions, such as proof 
of a reliable income source, are too stringent (or inflexible) for many agrarian households which see the 
bulk of their annual income at the harvest (Mulugetta et al., 2000). Credit programs for the rural poor are 
not favored by lending institutions (Chaurey and Kandpal, 2010) because of high transaction costs, lack of 
collateral and costly credit appraisal procedures (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). Guarantors such as 
governments are generally needed before lending institutions will provide credit to the rural poor for solar 
home systems (Nygaard, 2009; Nieuwenhout et al., 2001; Acker and Kammen, 1996). Other factors that 
have led to the success of some credit programs are decentralized service availability and bonuses offered 
to personnel when loans were fully repaid (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001).   
 
Thus, the published literature suggests that renewable energy in general and, in some cases, stand-alone 
solar electric systems in general have the potential to decrease energy costs. I hypothesize that where users 
are saving money, their systems will be more successful than where they are not.  
 
3.5.1.2. Economic opportunities: PV may generate income for users, but there are few opportunities 
Income-generating opportunities can be realized with renewable energy systems that would not be available 
otherwise (Casillas and Kammen, 2010; Deichmann et al., 2011; Mondal et al., 2010; Kirubi et al., 2009; 
Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti, 2002), sometimes at lower cost than alternative energy sources (UN, 2012). 
                                                          
34 Although not a subject included in this thesis, financing opportunities are hypothesized to increase users’ abilities to pay for 
maintenance and therefore increase system success. See Chapter 8 for details. 
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Microenterprises such as solar battery charging stations can be profitable uses of renewable energy in rural 
locations (Acker and Kammen, 1996). However, direct income generating activities (electric sewing 
machines or grain grinders, for example) are relatively rare (Chaurey and Kandpal, 2010; Nieuwenhout et 
al., 2001). The indirect effects of having better quality of light for more hours appears to be more 
substantial (Kirubi et al., 2009): stores can be open longer, manual sewing can be done for more hours, and 
household activities can be delayed until later hours to allow more time for income-generating activities 
during the day, as examples (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). On the island of Sagar Dweep in West Bengal, 
India, where 56% of the population engages in non-agricultural income generation (in “trade and 
business”), solar energy systems allow these income generation activities to continue for more hours per 
day than previously (Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti, 2002). Rural renewable energy systems that present 
income-generating opportunities tend to be more successful than those that do not (Karekezi and 
Kithtyoma, 2002; Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti, 2002; Troy, 2002; Acker and Kammen, 1996). 
 
A donated renewable energy system may itself be viewed as an economic opportunity to a user via resale. 
The academic literature does not explicitly consider this opportunity. However, it has been observed by 
development professionals. For example, in Mexico, very large numbers of solar home systems were 
donated to households without training or explanation (Ley, 2006). The components of these are now 
available for purchase throughout Central America and Mexico, but few of the original recipients make 
direct use of the donated systems. Because of the definition of success used in this thesis (see Chapter 2), 
systems that have been sold are considered to be failed systems. Although I do not pose research questions 
or hypotheses specifically related to asset liquidation as an economic opportunity, I view it as a gap in the 
published literature and consider it qualitatively in this research (see Chapter 5).  
 
Where income generation from rural PV systems is possible, it is hypothesized to lead to greater system 
success. However, these cases are expected to be few. 
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3.5.1.3. Loss of income 
If solar home systems are successful in reducing energy costs to users, the vendors of their previous energy 
sources (e.g., candles and kerosene) will necessarily lose revenue from those users. Aside from the 
normative statement that former vendors of kerosene “should” be included in the solar supply chain (Lysen, 
2013), the literature does not address the issue of these lost revenues. I pose the question of whether this 
reduction in income is observable, potentially filling this gap in published literature.  
 
3.5.1.4. PV uses 
Beyond the economically productive uses noted above, solar electricity is widely used for lighting in 
developing countries (Lysen, 2013; Harish et al., 2013; Wong, 2012; Durlinger et al., 2010; Solanki and 
Mudaliar, 2010; Acker and Kammen, 1996; etcetera). Mobile phone charging and radio are important 
applications of rural PV (Lysen, 2013; Komatsu et al., 2011; Grimshaw and Lewis, 2010; Breyer et al., 
2009). Television and electric irons are also desired by users, but solar home systems are generally not 
sized to power them (Lysen, 2013). In general, “technology push” approaches to rural electrification are 
less successful than installing solar PV to meet a specific need (Mondal et al., 2010). 
 
Studies suggest that users are generally more satisfied with their systems if their expectations of the limits 
and abilities of their systems – the systems utilities – are reasonable and realistic (Brent and Rogers, 2010; 
Nieuwenhout et al., 2001; Ley, 2006). Users complain that solar home systems do not provide sufficient 
power to meet their needs, particularly during rainy seasons, or are disappointed that they cannot afford 
sufficient PV for cooking or ironing; this dissatisfaction is evidence of a failure to set realistic expectations 
before installation.35 This theme of “managing expectations” of system utility was reiterated often by 
project developers in formal and informal conversations that took place during the course of this research. 
 
                                                          
35  Source for this paragraph is (Acker and Kammen, 1996) except where otherwise noted. 
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I hypothesize that the uses for solar energy in rural communities found in the literature will be similar to 
those found for solar energy systems included in this thesis. I further hypothesize that systems used to meet 
needs that can be met without electricity will be less successful than those used for applications that 
demand electricity.36 
 
3.5.1.5 Conclusion: economic value and utility 
Clearly, the issues surrounding the economic benefits and other tangible uses are many. Hypotheses beyond 
those listed at the beginning of this section are addressed in Chapter 8, Conclusions, Section 8.8, Areas of 
Further Research. However, the utilitarian aspects of these projects are not the only influences on system 
success. The following section considers the institutions and relationships surrounding projects. 
 
3.5.2. Institutions and relationships    
Rural renewable energy systems exist within social and institutional contexts, from international 
agreements to local family ties. The success of these systems influences and is influenced by the 
relationships among the people and the institutions surrounding them, including system governance and 
relationships with donors. Following is a review of what has been written about some of these topics, as 
well as related hypotheses and research questions explored in this thesis. These are broken into four 
categories, as follows.  
 
Project governance: 
– What are the governance structures related to the systems?  
– Does it matter whether committees are formed to manage projects or savings? Does their 
 legal establishment lead to greater success, or do those established by intra-community 
 trust work as well? 
 
 
                                                          
36 For example, systems used to charge cellular telephones, which cannot be charged otherwise, are hypothesized to be more 
successful than those used for lighting exclusively, which can also be accomplished using candles. 
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Project origin and training: 
– If people are the originators of their projects (they ask, rather than the donor offers), will 
they tend to care for them more because they are more in line with beneficiary needs? 
– Are projects more likely to fail if people are not trained in their maintenance and 
administration when systems are installed? 
Ownership, accountability and donor relationships: 
– If people are required to contribute financially or in kind to their systems, will they have  
  a stronger sense of ownership and take better care of them? 
– Do donors and beneficiaries maintain a relationship? Does it matter? 
Unintended consequences: 
– Do unintended negative social consequences due to donated systems decrease the 
likelihood of project success? 
 
Overall, the many overlapping and interdependent institutions and relationships that surround rural 
renewable energy systems form a complex web of motivations, decisions and ultimately actions that can 
lead to the success or the failure of these systems. Neglect for non-technical aspects of the system (i.e., 
social and institutional issues) during design can lead to system failure (Brent and Rogers, 2010). The 
underlying hypothesis addressed in this section is that the institutions and relationships surrounding 
donated solar electric systems influence project success. In this section, I review the previous findings that 
have contributed to these research questions and hypotheses on the topics of general and project 
governance and management, how projects originate and the training given to beneficiaries, issues of 
ownership and donor relationship. I also consider the potential for conflict to arise as a result of these 
donated systems. 
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3.5.2.1. Governance and management 
This subsection reviews current knowledge on the governance of communities in the context of rural 
electrification, and the management of rural renewable energy systems. I include topics of regional and 
national governance, as well as community and project leadership. 
 
Regional and national governments are part of the context of governance for rural stand-alone solar electric 
projects and can influence project success. Low electrification rates are often due to poor organization in 
the government agencies responsible (Nygaard, 2009). National energy policy often focuses on access to 
electricity (Acker and Kammen, 1996); all members of a community are normally considered to have 
access once electrification activities have been undertaken, regardless of whether all members of the 
community are able to avail themselves of the energy. However, national governments can achieve 
synergies in their development goals by coordinating them (e.g., electrification together with health or 
education goals) (Chaurey and Kandpal, 2010). 
 
Remote government agencies can have both positive and negative impacts on rural renewable energy 
systems. Some governments, including Mexico’s, have included solar photovoltaic systems in their rural 
electrification plans (Ley, 2006; Acker and Kammen, 1996). The impact of this inclusion will depend upon 
how and if the plan translates to action. In other cases, government involvement can have negative impacts 
by increasing uncertainty or system costs directly: transparency in grid extension planning and execution is 
important to the success of remote or stand-alone electric systems (Chaurey and Kandpal, 2010; Acker and 
Kammen, 1996). Lack of transparency adds to the risk and uncertainty of investing in stand-alone or small 
community autonomous electric systems (including investment in maintenance of donated systems), and 
discourages long-term investment “in case” the grid arrives unexpectedly. 
 
Community-level governance structures – both traditional governance and governance related specifically 
to rural electrification projects – have the potential to significantly affect system outcomes. Project 
developers may emphasizes community-level governance of projects, including charging tariffs or 
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collecting savings for future maintenance needs, the involvement of both men and women in all aspects of 
projects and technical and institutional training to ensure the sustainability of the projects (Fundación 
Solar, 2003 a, b, c, d; Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). Many factors must be considered when creating 
institutions for the governance of rural renewable energy systems. For example, women and men have 
distinct uses for the electricity that is brought to their communities, so successful governance requires the 
participation of both (Pless and Appel, 2012; Fundación Solar, 2003 a, b, c, d). Those who have 
historically been leaders in a community are not always those chosen to lead an energy project, especially if 
the donor is perhaps overly-involved in forming a new leadership committee. Lack of trust between 
traditional community leadership and formal project governance can lead to system failure (Brent and 
Rogers, 2010). 
 
Anecdotally, very few locations exhibit a “culture of savings” in which saving for the future costs of the 
system is intuitive. This may make the creation of institutions to govern project finances advantageous or 
necessary. As an example, in a survey of solar home systems in Guatemala, the observed 45% failure rate 
was blamed in part on the fact that few recipients of the donated systems saved any money for battery 
replacement, despite being instructed that they should start saving immediately (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). 
In contrast, some communities in Guatemala have created solar funds: members pay small monthly 
amounts into accounts with good transparency, and those funds are used to replace batteries – a frequent 
need in solar home systems (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001), and such organizations with established 
maintenance funds aid in system success (Frame et al., 2011) 
 
Centralized systems that connect to many households, such as small hydroelectric plants, require better 
administrative structure, transparency and trust than do stand-alone solar systems (Fundación Solar, 
2003c), such as those included in this study.  
 
Thus, previous research suggests that a governance structure for a donated renewable energy system, 
whether newly established or integrated into existing leadership responsibilities, is important to projects’ 
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success. Anecdotes from Guatemala suggest that some donors or project developers see the legal 
establishment of these structures as important (Ley, 2006). However, the weak legal framework in 
Guatemala (described in Section 3.2., above) leads me to question the relevance of the legal standing of 
these governance entities.  
 
3.5.2.2. Project origin, user training 
This subsection reviews the roles of community members and donors or developers in initiating projects, 
and the effects of user training and socialization on system success.  
 
Project origin is important to overall system success. Development projects initiated by beneficiaries may 
be more successful than projects originated by donors, and projects initiated by donors with whom 
beneficiaries have a long-term relationship are more successful than projects originated by donors who are 
new to beneficiaries (Alther, 2008). In particular, success is suggested to be greater for project 
implementation programs having an in-country partner (if the sponsoring agency is foreign) to facilitate 
communication across languages and cultures, sending appropriate price signals to end users, using valid 
planning and analysis tools and techniques, and connecting power projects to other development efforts 
(Taylor, 1998). 
 
Regardless of the originator, involvement of all stakeholders from the outset may ensure a more successful 
development program (Agbemabiese, 2009). Project developers should work closely with potential 
beneficiaries to ensure the technology meets actual beneficiary needs (Breyer et al., 2009). 
 
After a project is proposed, beneficiaries should be involved in the planning and implementation stages 
(Alther, 2008). Raising beneficiary awareness – a process described as “socialization” or “sensitization” – 
and user participation in decision making can contribute to project success (Chaurey and Kandpal, 2010; 
Alther, 2008; Frame et al., 2011; Agbemabiese, 2009; Kirtikara, 1997). 
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Donations of solar home systems to communities often include only initial hardware costs, leaving little or 
nothing for ongoing operations and maintenance costs (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). Donated solar home 
systems often fail because it was not initially realized that they would need ongoing maintenance 
(Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). Indeed, some donor projects allocate up to ninety percent of funds to the 
technology, leaving almost nothing for the training of local people (Acker and Kammen, 1996). In a 
specific example of a solar homes project in Zimbabwe, sponsor and government resource constraints 
prevented adequate training in the operation and maintenance of solar home systems (Mulugetta et al., 
2000). While the user is key to sustained operation in a donated system, the sponsor is the enabler; without 
adequate resources and training, users may be unable to maintain their systems regardless of their 
intentions (Ley, 2006). 
 
However, as a part of planning and implementation, many projects include technical or administrative 
training for beneficiaries. Such training can contribute to the overall sustainability of projects (Chaurey and 
Kandpal, 2010; Breyer et al., 2009; Kirtikara, 1997; Alther, 2008; Frame et al., 2011; Agbemabiese, 2009), 
especially as repair services can be slow, expensive or entirely unavailable in remote areas (Nieuwenhout et 
al., 2001; Mulugetta et al., 2000). In some cases, adequate training has led individuals to engage in 
maintenance or installation of PV systems on a commercial basis (Taylor, 2005; Acker and Kammen, 
1996). Frame et al (2011) state that ongoing or “refresher” training is important to system success (Frame 
et al., 2011). In practice, training sessions after project initiation appear to be so infrequent that a sample 
could not reasonably be generated to test this hypothesis. 
 
Projects initiated by those who know the potential beneficiaries well – preferably the beneficiaries 
themselves – may see better success than those initiated by outsiders to the community. Whether initiated 
by community members or outsiders, planning and implementation processes that meaningfully involve all 
stakeholders are expected to have better outcomes. Training of beneficiaries in the care of their systems, 
and sometimes in management or administration, may also help projects succeed.  
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3.5.2.3. Project ownership and relationships with donors and developers 
This subsection reviews relationships between donors or developers and community members, and explores 
the issue of project ownership and its influence on system success.  
 
The provision of labor or money by the recipient community engenders a sense of commitment, 
responsibility and ownership (Ley, 2006; Nieuwenhout et al., 2001), and a sense of ownership in turn leads 
users to care more for their systems and see greater system success (Frame et al., 2011; Alther, 2008, 
Karekezi and Kithyoma, 2002). These two assumptions – that beneficiary contribution increases a sense of 
ownership, and ownership leads to project success – seem to be accepted as self-evident in much of the 
literature and discourse on the subject and, as such, are rarely stated explicitly: studies may explore ways of 
increasing beneficiaries’ ownership of projects but may not examine why ownership is important. In this 
thesis, I hypothesize these assumptions to be true but, unlike many studies, I test their validity rather than 
accepting them as self-evident. 
 
Questions of ownership of rural renewable energy systems are closely tied to the relationship between 
beneficiaries and donors: who owns the project and who, therefore, is responsible for its maintenance? The 
availability of the donor to aid or advise in maintenance is also important. Lysen (2013) explains succinctly 
that “the institutional setting of the project and the long-term commitment of the stakeholders are vital for 
the success of the PV project” (Lysen, 2013). 
 
Lack of long-term commitment to systems by donors can lead to project failure (Karekezi and Kithyoma, 
2002; Taylor, 1998; Kirtikara, 1997). A key to system success is the ability to contact the donor or other 
outside party for technical support (Frame et al., 2011). However, developer contact and support after 
implementation is challenging in rural developing-world communities (Breyer et al., 2009). The need for 
this ongoing relationship may in part be due to the lack of influence the user may have on the vendor 
responsible for installation and possibly maintenance (Mulugetta et al., 2000): vendors may be motivated to 
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maintain relationships with donors who may give them repeat business, but not find responding to needs of 
poor and remote customers worthwhile. 
 
Despite the advantages of an ongoing relationship between donor and beneficiaries, some communities will 
be slow to participate in projects due to a lack of trust between the community and the donor (Brent and 
Rogers, 2010; Ley, 2006). For example, in Chel, Guatemala, years were spent by development 
organizations just building a relationship with the community to enable the construction of a small 
hydroelectric system that the development organization and the community agreed was needed at the outset 
(Ley, 2006).  
 
An ongoing donor and beneficiary relationship may lead to greater project success, if there is adequate trust 
and responsiveness by both parties. The expectations of one another of the parties in this relationship will 
largely determine beneficiaries’ understanding of system ownership. A strong sense of ownership, in turn, 
may lead to greater system success. 
 
3.5.2.4. Unintended social consequences 
Outcomes associated with development interventions are not always positive. Donated projects or systems 
may become a source of conflict or exacerbate conflict or inequity within a community. Solar home 
systems programs are generally targeted to the poor, but often the users have higher than average incomes 
relative to their peers (Nygaard, 2009; Acker and Kammen, 1996; Nieuwenhout et al., 2001), and a solar 
home system may be a highly visible status symbol (Acker and Kammen, 1996). This is a potential source 
of conflict as electric light creates a very visible distinction between those who have it and those who do 
not.  
 
The absence of clearly defined rules may create tensions within a community where they did not exist 
before the project was implemented. Uncontrolled access to (and therefore competition for) the same 
electricity can lead to disputes between beneficiaries (Brent and Rogers, 2010).  
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Religious conflict is also possible. Part of one community in Guatemala rejected solar energy on the 
grounds that it was hurtful to the sun, and their Mayan religious beliefs hold the sun as sacred; the Christian 
segment of the community, however, embraced the project (Azuria, 2006). Through inclusion of religious 
leaders in further discussions, practitioners of the traditional Mayan religion there eventually came to view 
the project as beneficial as well. 
 
Although not widely discussed in the literature, donated solar energy systems may result in negative social 
consequences. I hypothesize that projects that do not create or exacerbate these conflicts, or projects 
implemented with steps to mitigate social conflict, will ultimately be more successful than those that do not 
acknowledge the potential for conflict as a result of the donation. 
 
3.5.2.5. Conclusion: institutions and relationships 
The institutional contexts of donation programs and projects may profoundly influence system outcomes. 
Some of the issues examined in this research include management and governance of projects, beneficiary 
and donor involvement in project initiation, and user training at the time of implementation. The 
relationship between donor and beneficiary is considered important, and is closely tied to near-ubiquitous 
assumptions about the importance of beneficiary ownership on system success. Finally, the potential for 
conflict as a result of the implementation of donated systems is considered. Results related to these 
hypotheses are detailed in Chapter 6. 
 
3.5.3. Characteristics and consequences 
As detailed above, the people and communities of Guatemala are varied. In this section, I proposes research 
questions related to the characteristics of the people and communities included in this research, and about 
the characteristics of the physical systems that are installed, and review related literature. Further, I pose 
questions related to the success of systems when the systems effect some physical change upon their 
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environments. Also included in this section is a review of literature related to these questions and 
hypotheses. 
– How is project success influenced by the characteristics of the communities in which 
projects are situated? 
– How is project success influenced by user poverty, ethnicity, religion and age? 
– What other characteristics of users influence success? 
– Are systems with high quality parts and robust, standard design more successful than 
those using inexpensively replaceable parts and locally adapted design? 
– Are systems maintained under a highly structured regime more successful than those in 
which maintenance is improvised as needed? 
– Have local ecosystems, environment or landscapes been adversely affected by the 
systems’ presence? 
 
The underlying hypothesis of this section is that the characteristics of communities, systems and users 
influence project success. In the field of rural electrification, few authors have specifically addressed the 
characteristics of user and their communities that can lead to successful system outcomes, with many 
studies limited to looking specifically at users’ economic situations as their predominant characteristics.  
For this reason, I have few hypothesized answers for the many research questions I pose on the topic. 
Conversely, the issue of the physical characteristics of the PV system itself – the system specifications, 
installation and components – is addressed decisively, suggesting clearly the hypothesis that better-quality 
systems will lead to more successful outcomes, as described below. In subsection 3.5.3.1, I review 
literature related to the characteristics of communities in which donated rural electrification systems are 
found and the characteristics of system users. In the subsequent subsection, I address issues related to the 
components and design of the physical systems. Finally, in subsection 3.5.3.3, I consider the consequences 
of these systems on the ecosystems where they are installed and the health of community members, and the 
relationship between these consequences and system success.  
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3.5.3.1. Characteristics of users and communities 
The characteristics of users and communities are hypothesized to influence the success of renewable energy 
systems. The most obvious characteristics are much broader than those included in this study: located in 
rich nations versus poor nations; urban versus rural; included under various forms of national governance. 
The scope of this study narrowly examines communities that are rural, incontrovertibly poor, do not have 
access to the national electric grid, and are located in the Republic of Guatemala.  
 
Literature related to the specific characteristics of the Guatemalan context is discussed in section 3.3, 
above. From this literature, I have derived few hypotheses but many questions about the influence of user 
and community characteristics on system success. The questions associated with this topic are, by design, 
extremely broad and are intended to allow inferences from data gathered rather than the testing of specific 
hypotheses. 
 
3.5.3.2. Characteristics of system equipment and installation 
The quality of the design, installation and equipment used in a rural renewable energy system can affect the 
system’s success in a number of ways (Duke et al., 2002), as described further below. In general, there is 
consensus that higher quality components37 lead to better system success (Chaurey and Kandpal, 2010; 
Breyer et al., 2009; Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). Low quality equipment has led to the direct failure of solar 
home systems (Duke et al., 2002). When projects fail, confidence in the technology may be lost – even 
when the failure was due to the implementation process rather than the technology itself (Ley, 2006). This 
loss of confidence may be seen in users, sponsoring organizations, governments or the media. However, I 
have found little systematic research on the quality of systems in the field. 
 
                                                          
37 “Components” are defined in this research as the physical equipment necessary for an energy system to function. These may include 
(but are not limited to) equipment such as solar panels, wind turbines (the blade and generator assemblies that convert moving air 
into electric power), diesel generators, wires and batteries. The definition of components also includes items such as water pumps, 
lighting fixtures and electrical outlets: equipment that enables someone to make practical use of the energy. 
 
 
93 
 
 
Persistent maintenance problems – even those that the users have the expertise and resources to correct – 
can “sour” people to their renewable energy systems. The presence of low quality components can lead to 
decreased consumer confidence in solar home systems in general (Duke et al., 2002). In a Guatemalan solar 
home system project, ballasts for fluorescent light bulbs often burnt out and were replaced once, but solar 
home systems were often abandoned if the replacement also burnt out quickly (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). 
In another example, in Kiribati, an extensive solar home systems program was largely unsuccessful (with a 
90% failure rate) in part because householders bought cheap components to save money in the short term 
(Nieuwenhout et al., 2001).  
 
However, where choice is available to householders, users of solar home systems will select components of 
varying size, cost and quality (Acker and Kammen, 1996; Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). Product quality can 
vary widely among vendors, with some providing very low quality (and sometimes “pirate”) equipment 
(Duke et al., 2002; Mulugetta et al., 2000), which may be more relevant to solar home system markets than 
to donated programs implemented by more knowledgeable development agencies. Solar home system 
owners are often unaware of the brand of even their own module, and so cannot make quality comparisons 
between brands (Duke et al., 2002).  
 
Solar PV panels themselves are the least problematic of components in solar home systems; their output 
degrades slightly but predictably after initial installation if the modules are “good brands” (Acker and 
Kammen, 1996; Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). Instead, batteries, charge controllers, lights and other balance of 
system components are likely to fail more quickly (Ley, 2006; Kirtikara, 1997; Acker and Kammen, 1996) 
In a study of solar water pumping systems in Thailand in which one third of projects failed, only 1% of 
those failures were due to the solar PV panels themselves; other failures were related to control equipment, 
pumps, water leaks, or problems with the water supply (Green, 2004). Similarly, the use of appropriate 
“deep cycle” batteries (rather than cheaper automotive batteries) leads to greater battery longevity, lower 
overall cost, and greater system success (Nema and Sayan, 2012; Ley, 2006; Acker and Kammen, 1996).  
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The value of a charge controller in a system is somewhat contested: field data does not show the presence 
of a charge controller to extend battery life at all because they are so often bypassed or disconnected by 
users with inadequate training (Green, 2004; Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). Rather than using the charge 
controller, users tend to rely on visible signs of battery drain (dimming lights, for example) before 
disconnecting the load from the battery (Acker and Kammen, 1996). This leads batteries to be too deeply 
discharged and therefore damaged. Despite manufacturers’ claims, higher-cost, higher quality charge 
controllers have not been shown in the field to increase battery life over simple and inexpensive charge 
controllers (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). However, it remains “widely believed” that charge controllers are 
an important part of a robust system (Messenger and Ventre, 2010; Ley, 2006; Acker and Kammen, 1996). 
The inclusion of a charge controller is only one aspect of system design. High quality, robust design is 
important to stand-alone PV systems (Díaz et al., 2011; Ley, 2006; Flowers, 1997), though both 
standardized and dynamic approaches to design of rural PV systems can be effective (Chaurey and 
Kandpal, 2010). Appropriate analysis tools, including computer models, are necessary to make workable 
projects (Flowers, 1997). However, I have not found studies that assess the design process ex post, nor that 
compare the success of projects that used different design processes. 
 
Along with design quality, installation quality is important and can depend on the installer. Installations of 
solar home systems can range from individual household purchasers to internationally certified vendors and 
installers, and the resultant quality and success of the systems can vary as a consequence (Duke et al., 2002; 
Mulugetta et al., 2000; Acker and Kammen, 1996).  
 
Some installation techniques can give varied results, even if the quality of the installation is consistent. 
Mounting PV panels directly on rooftops offers the advantage of a stable and inexpensive installation 
(Acker and Kammen, 1996). The disadvantages of having panels mounted directly on rooftops include 
increased temperature by not having an air space between the panel and the roof to keep the panel cooler 
(PV is more efficient at lower temperatures) (Messenger and Ventre, 2010; Acker and Kammen, 1996). 
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Thus, while installation in accordance with industry norms is normally preferable (Shepperd and Richards, 
1993), there may be advantages to tailoring installations to its environment. 
 
There seems to be little research on the effects of national equipment or installation standards in developing 
countries, but it has been observed that the presence or absence of national equipment standards had little 
impact on the overall success rate of installed solar home systems (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001).  
 
Thus the quality of components chosen and the quality of the design and installation of rural electrification 
systems can influence system outcomes. Good quality components in general should lead to better system 
outcomes, although the presence of some components (such as charge controllers) may have questionable 
influence. Similarly with design and installation: more robust design and better quality installation may 
lead to greater system success, although adaptations to meet local conditions may be appropriate. However, 
poor quality must never lead to threats to human health and safety. Issues regarding health and the natural 
environment are the subject of the following section. 
 
3.5.3.3. Health and environmental consequences 
The characteristics of the physical systems and the ways in which they are implemented can have 
consequences on the health of users and the environment that surrounds the systems.  These consequences 
may be positive or negative, as described in this section. 
 
Renewable energy technologies have the potential to improve human health in general (Winkler et al., 
2011; Balkema et al., 2010) and specifically by reducing the air pollution resulting from combustion of 
traditional fuels (Bruce et al., 2011; Martinot et al., 2002). Indoor air pollution from the use of traditional 
fuels at the household level is significant, affecting especially women and children (Bruce et al., 2011). 
Kerosene and diesel generators also pose significant fire risks (Acker and Kammen, 1996). Electricity may 
eliminate some of the possible ill health effects of traditional fuels, including poor air quality, as mentioned 
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above, as well as paraffin poisoning in children and severe burns (Kornbluth et al., 2012; Bruce et al., 2011; 
Acker and Kammen, 1996; Foster and Tre, 2000; Nieuwenhout et al., 2001).  
 
However, the indoor air quality issues resulting from combustion for lighting are logically smaller than the 
effects of stoves using traditional biomass for heating and cooking; PV electricity is not a realistic option 
for cooking in rural developing world applications.  
 
Security and the perception of security are improved or perceived to be improved for families with access 
to electricity (as through solar home systems or grid extension) because they can install security lights that 
let them see outside without leaving the safety of the home, and bright indoor lights are perceived to 
discourage would-be intruders (Ahmad and Byrd, 2013; Acker and Kammen, 1996). 
 
As noted above, rural solar energy systems do not generally displace fuel wood use, and as such do not 
meaningfully contribute to a reduction in deforestation and related local environmental damage. More 
general environmental effects may be mitigated by the use of PV when the electricity generated is used in 
place of kerosene, paraffin and other petroleum products.38 One concrete environmental benefit may be the 
reduction in the use and disposal of dry cell batteries, but this benefit is reduced by the burden of disposing 
of solar batteries (Acker and Kammen, 1996).  
 
Rural stand-alone solar electric systems may benefit human health by reducing instances of burns and 
poisoning, but may do little to improve indoor air quality or local deforestation. Potential adverse health 
and environmental effects caused by improper solar battery disposal are seemingly not addressed by the 
literature.39 User perceptions of environmental impacts – good or bad – may do more to influence system 
success than the actual (and apparently small) changes to the local environment. 
 
                                                          
38 See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the uses of stand-alone solar electric systems. 
39 See Chapter 7 for results related to user experience with battery disposal. 
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3.6. Conclusions 
An underlying hypothesis of this research is that the factors that lead to the success and failure of rural 
development projects in general, and rural stand-alone PV projects in particular, are interrelated. The 
technical question that asks whether a system meets industry codes and standards makes sense only in the 
context of the industry as an institution. Environmental damage caused by systems may have either 
physical or temporal downstream effects on another group that will suffer from that damage. Although 
categorized for clarity, the hypotheses and research questions posed by this work are better viewed as a 
network than as a list. 
 
The fundamental questions asked are simple. What does it mean when a project is called successful? What 
are the contributions towards this success or lack of success of economics, institutions, communities and 
individuals?  The answers to these questions are not so simple. Chapter 4, following, discusses the 
methodology used to address these questions. 
 
 
 
98 
 
 
Chapter 4. Methodology 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I explain the methodology used in this research, provide supporting background 
information, and note the limitations of the selected methodology. 
 
I use a mixed methods approach to gathering both qualitative and quantitative data, and to analyze that data 
to test my hypotheses, seek answers to my research questions, and to explore for answers to questions 
suggested by the information itself. Literature reviewed in Chapter 3 does not highlight a consistent 
methodological approach used by researchers in this field of study. It does, however, highlight categorical 
shortcomings: most assessment of rural renewable energy systems is done shortly after implementation by 
the entity responsible for the implementation; independent research on the topic tends to be very narrow in 
focus (not simultaneously considering technical, economic, social and environmental issues); “the experts” 
are the primary sources of information rather than system users; and perhaps most importantly, success is 
rarely well defined. 
 
The methods I used to gather information for this study including a review of available literature, 
institutional document analyses, surveys and semi-structured interviews and direct inspection of energy 
systems. Interviews and surveys were conducted predominantly with members of communities in which 
stand-alone PV systems had been installed, and with project donors and developers who represented both 
NGO’s and various levels of local and national government. These are described below. 
 
In this chapter, I first describe my methodologies for data gathering and data analyses, followed by 
considerations and limitations of sampling. Section 4.4 includes details of the design, validation and 
limitations of the survey instrument. In section 4.5, I review the differences between types of projects that 
are included and not included in this research, enumerating specifically the categories of projects 
referenced throughout this research. Finally, I describe biases that are inherent to this type of research and 
how I have taken them into consideration in my work. 
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4.2. Mixed methods approach 
I designed this research with the intention of collecting and analyzing both qualitative and quantitative data 
in real-world situations. This research is certainly not a double-blind control study; such an approach would 
be prohibitively expensive, requiring many years of study and the installation of stand-alone solar electric 
systems in many communities. This approach is not merely impracticable, but in fact impossible if I wish to 
capture the nuances of the responses of systems and users to unpredictable events such as weather disasters, 
which cannot be designed as a part of an experiment. Instead, this study is designed instead to obtain both 
qualitative and quantitative information from observations of actual systems and donation programs 
implemented in existing communities. 
 
As such, I used what Creswell (2008) describes as a mixed methods approach using concurrent procedures. 
A mixed-methods approach “is one in which the researcher tends to base knowledge claims on pragmatic 
grounds” (Creswell 2008), where the problem is more important than specific methodology, and the 
researcher uses a variety of available approaches to understand the problem. I chose this method as I sought 
to gather both qualitative and quantitative data simultaneously. Qualitative and quantitative data can then 
be analyzed both independently and jointly, creating a more complete picture of the results. I chose this 
approach to data gathering and analyses because I felt that quantitative data, absent a context that can only 
be assessed qualitatively, would provide results that are less useful for informing future research or future 
rural electrification efforts. As an example, quantitative data may show that Ladino populations in 
Guatemala have higher levels of success with their rural stand-alone solar electric systems than do 
indigenous populations. Without an analysis of the qualitative factors that lead to this differential, the 
resultant policy recommendation may well be that electrification efforts should be focused on Ladinos to 
the exclusion of the indigenous. Even a more nuanced quantitative analysis which showed that the 
communities with the highest success rates were Ladino communities and that these communities had 
higher incomes would fail to address why either income or project success was higher in one population 
than another, and as such fail to inform policy beyond “expect projects in indigenous communities to fail.” 
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The inclusion of qualitative analysis allows for meaningful interpretation of quantitative results as well as 
providing tremendous insight on its own. Some quantitative questions, such as whether there is a 
correlation between success and the distance between a user and a shop where he or she can buy a 
replacement battery, become more meaningful when qualitative questions such as amount of time taken by 
an individual to cover that distance and the mode of transportation used. A person with access to a truck, 
for example, can cover much larger distances than a person who must go on foot. Some questions simply 
cannot be answered quantitatively but clearly have implications for policy recommendation and 
development strategy, such as whether and how an energy system caused conflict in a community. 
 
4.3. Sampling universe 
One of the initial goals of this research was to compile a relatively complete database of donated stand-
alone PV systems in rural Guatemala from which to select a statistically meaningful random sample. I did 
not accomplish this, which has ramifications for quantitative analyses of the data gathered.  
 
No database of all donated PV systems installed in Guatemala existed prior to the start of this research. The 
Village Power Database, a database that was comprehensive of large donor programs (although by no 
means exhaustive), was previously held by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). 
Responsibility for it was later transferred to the Global Village Energy Partnership (GVEP). However, 
neither organization can now account for the whereabouts of even historical versions, though current 
project developers still claim to report information relevant to the database. 
 
A GVEP representative suggested I seek it from Fundación Solar, a major energy-related NGO in 
Guatemala. Fundación Solar, like other NGO’s I contacted which are participating in energy development 
in Guatemala, neither had a copy of the Village Power Database nor a database or listing of solar energy 
projects in which Fundación Solar had itself participated. Information about the locations and scopes of 
programs in which Fundación Solar and other NGO’s had participated was limited to select case studies 
 
 
 
101 
 
 
published as white papers and the memories and occasional files of current employees. I found no evidence 
of project-specific institutional memory in the NGO’s; project histories remained with the individuals 
involved in the projects and were not usefully archived when individuals left the organizations. Some 
individuals in NGO’s expressed a desire that I examine particular projects in which they had been involved, 
and were more accommodating in providing information for research on those projects than on others. Any 
statement about their motivations in project selection would be purely speculative. 
 
Many other systems were donated by smaller organizations such as churches and foreign charities and 
development organizations (ranging from the Catholic Church to Engineers Without Borders USA). 
Because the Guatemalan government requires no reporting for installations of fewer than 5 kW,40 no 
database of these independent projects exists and an inclusive survey of them would require physical 
inspection of every community in Guatemala, which may still omit projects if they have been sold or 
removed. Other remote PV systems have been installed by NGO’s with non-energy-related objectives, such 
as Fundación Defensores de la Naturalesa which has installed PV as part of ranger stations and similar 
projects inside ecologically protected areas where bringing the electric grid is impracticable or undesirable. 
Again, such organizations with which I spoke had no records of projects that specifically contained PV 
systems. Finally, PV is installed under a donor model by multiple organizations within the Guatemalan 
government, including under two different departments within the Ministry of Energy and Mines, the 
national disaster coordinator CONRED, sporadically by the Ministries of Health and of Education, and 
possibly others. Systems installed by CONRED and under the Directorate General’s office of the Ministry 
of Energy and Mines provided the most complete records I encountered in attempting to build a database of 
systems, but even these were fraught with errors and omissions. CONRED’s records of its systems were 
consistent with what I found in the field. However, as this study was meant to include donated systems in 
general rather than solely government-sponsored systems, the MEM and CONRED data were useful but 
not sufficient. 
 
                                                          
40 Information here is from an interview with Byron del Cid, Ministry of Energy and Mines. 
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Ultimately, I did not compile the data from these sporadic sources into a single database because I do not 
believe that the information was, in aggregate, either useful or reliable. The database of systems compiled 
for this research contains only those that I elected to include in the study, using the methodology for 
community selection described in subsection 4.4.1. Subsection 4.4.2 describes my methodology for 
selecting individuals within communities, for protecting their identities, followed by my rationale for 
excluding “expert opinions” in favor of community-level responses. 
 
4.3.1. Sampling methodology: selection of communities 
The sample of communities included in this research can be described in part as a convenience sample and 
in part a purposeful sample, the rationale for and description of which are included in this section. The 
communities visited included those suggested by governmental and non-governmental organizations with 
ties to stand-alone rural solar electric projects in Guatemala, those included in government databases, and 
those observed during otherwise-planned travel. This sampling methodology limits the applicability of 
these results, but was necessary given concerns for safety, resource constraints and the lack of information 
generally available on such projects in Guatemala. 
 
No global (if incomplete) database or collection of databases existed to which I could add and from which I 
could draw a sample. Had a reasonable sampling universe been created, the sample of systems still could 
not have been random. Parts of Guatemala were excluded from the study out of safety concerns for both 
researcher and informants. Large (and increasing) parts of Guatemala are de facto controlled by drug 
cartels and other criminal syndicates. For example, based on the “common knowledge” in Guatemala that 
large parts of the department of Peten are effectively lawless, I excluded all systems in Peten from this 
research excepting one, which was geographically adjacent to and part of a project based primarily in an 
adjoining department. While Peten was the only departm1ent categorically excluded from the study, I 
avoided smaller areas based on local knowledge or personal observation. Although some systems in this 
study are located in territory only marginally governed by rule of law, these results should only be 
considered valid for locations where NGO or government workers can travel freely. 
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Physical and economic constraints limited the communities visited in two ways. First, communities 
included tended to be in clusters under the same programs. This provided the advantage of being able to 
compare programmatic approaches, and allowed more communities and systems to be included than would 
have been possible if a substantial travel distance was always required between them.  
 
Second, accessibility was a substantial consideration for inclusion. Some communities with donated 
systems are more than a day’s hike from the nearest passable road, forcing anyone traveling there to camp 
in unknown terrain or beg lodging from strangers. Some are simply inaccessible except by helicopter 
during the rainy season, and while traveling by helicopter would allow much more access to some of these 
locations, it is very expensive and creates additional social barriers with communities being visited.41 Thus, 
any community to which I could not walk from a road, conduct observations, and return to the same road 
during the daylight hours of one day was excluded (walking and even driving after dark are generally not 
safe). Because of this, no community that was more than 2 ½ hours walk (for me – local people typically 
travel faster) from a road was included. The majority of communities included were visible from graded or 
paved roads, or accessible by dirt road in four wheel drive vehicles.  
 
The sample was further biased towards accessible communities because I included systems that I noticed 
during otherwise-planned travel. Many of these systems were privately purchased by homeowners (and 
thus not included), but some were part of donation programs.  
 
Rather than claiming that the people included in this research are representative of all Guatemalans, or even 
all rural Guatemalans with donated PV systems, I postulate that the information gathered from the people 
generous enough to donate their time about their specific circumstances can give insight into general causes 
of success and failure of stand-alone PV systems in rural Guatemala. Others studying rural electrification 
                                                          
41 I accompanied a news reporter to several communities via helicopter and we were well-received in communities that expected us. 
However, an unplanned landing in a community brought out seemingly all of the men and boys of the town, armed with machetes. 
The reporter explained that rural, indigenous communities associated helicopters with the military and massacres during the civil 
war. See Section 3.4 for details on Guatemala’s civil war and its lasting effects. 
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using PV have used such convenience samples and gained insightful, albeit not statistically analyzable 
results (Acker and Kammen, 1996). 
 
Thus, the validity of the results is limited to areas governed by rule of law, those reasonably accessible by 
bus, four wheel drive truck, or other vehicle, and predominantly those well known to current development 
professionals. 
 
4.3.2. Sampling methodology: selection of respondents and their systems 
The vast diversity of people in Guatemala cannot be overstated. People of interest for this research are 
those who are poor, rural and who have or have had donated PV systems in their communities. This is still 
a large group of people, however. 
 
Both indigenous and Ladino people were included, but Guatemala’s third notable ethnic group, the Afro-
Caribbean Garifono population, was not.42 Individual respondents were chosen based on their willingness 
to participate, and were young and old, male and female. Though all were poor, some were clearly poorer 
than others.  
 
The PV systems in this study include solar home systems, systems for school or community use, those for 
tourism and other income-generating activities, systems for disaster preparedness and relief, and those used 
primarily for communications, and mirror the “typical” solar home systems described in Section 1.1. 
 
This research does not present a random and therefore theoretically representative sample of rural stand-
alone PV system users within the selected communities. I used both convenience and purposeful sampling 
methodologies in selecting respondents to be interviewed. Because I did not announce my visits in advance, 
the first requirement for inclusion was, perhaps obviously, that a community member had to be present and 
                                                          
42 The Garifono ethnic group is considerably smaller than either the Ladino or indigenous populations, and have apparently been 
involved in few PV donation projects. 
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unoccupied enough to be willing to talk to me. Refusal to participate was very low, although respondents 
were not offered any compensation or promise of future compensation to participate. 
 
Because the research might seem intrusive and people were sometimes distrustful, the first interview in 
many communities was with a community leader of some sort. This need not have been an elected official, 
but often someone would be assertive enough to approach me when I arrived in a manner that suggested 
authority. In some communities, people were unwilling to talk to me until they had received explicit 
permission from a community leader. In a few cases, women were unwilling to talk to me because they 
were unable to secure their absent husbands’ approval. In some cases, the community leader elected to 
accompany me throughout the community. This had the potential to create bias in three ways. First, the 
leader may suggest approaching households based on his own agenda or lead me to households with which 
he is more familiar. Second, respondents may feel pressured to answer questions one way or another based 
on the other person’s presence. Finally, respondents may have felt safer or more comfortable answering 
when an individual they trusted was present. 
 
Another public figure who I often approached to request an interview was a local shopkeeper. He or she 
was already in a position where visitors to the shop window were expected, and the shop window provided 
a safe barrier between me and the respondent. Conducting this initial interview with a public figure such as 
a leader or shopkeeper also gave other community members the opportunity to learn that I was asking about 
their PV systems, and to make themselves available (or not) before I arrived at their own doors. 
 
When completing these initial interviews, I normally asked the respondent for the suggestion of a neighbor 
with whom I might speak, or I approached a household, school or other building where I observed a solar 
panel. I very deliberately sought to speak with owners of functional systems and of systems that no longer 
functioned, or with households who neighbors informed me had formerly had systems. The intent in 
seeking both respondents who had working systems and those whose systems no longer work was to ensure 
that my sample contained both successful and unsuccessful systems. Functionality is not identical to system 
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success, as I argued in Chapter 2, but was a convenient proxy that could be assessed very quickly. In some 
communities, I also spoke with respondents who were in the community at the time of implementation but 
who did not participate in the project. I was able to speak with few of these, for two apparent reasons. First 
because users and former users reported that all or nearly all community members accepted the donations, 
and second because I conjecture that those who were not participants were also likely marginalized within 
their communities and neighbors were therefore less likely to direct me to them when asked. 
 
Intentionally, I did not document the presence or absence of other individuals – community leaders or 
others – during the interviews because third parties very often came and went during the course of the 
discussion. While isolating the respondent out of earshot of other community members would have ensured 
confidentiality within the community, it would have been inconvenient (if the interview had to be moved 
every time someone approached, or if I had to interrupt the interview to ask who a newcomer was or note 
that someone had left) and may have made respondents uncomfortable and unwilling to talk to me. The 
legacy of the Guatemalan civil war, as described above, includes a very low level of trust of outsiders and I 
believe people were more comfortable with their neighbors and family members readily available, if not 
immediately present. 
 
This study included 201 interviews with community members or groups of community members from 65 
communities in 26 municipalities in 12 departments in Guatemala, not uniformly distributed. Among these, 
two communities involved a single interview about a PV system formerly used to support the construction 
of a now-functioning hydroelectric project and one was a single interview with the manager of a revenue-
producing project owned by a church (and thus considered donated by the church and communal to the 
church members). Single interviews in seven communities were with regards to an interconnected early 
warning system for floods and severe weather events, and multiple interviews in four communities were in 
reference to a single tourism project. Others involved multiple interviews in communities that had or had 
had stand-alone PV systems installed in their communities for solar home lighting, communal productive 
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uses, or school or clinic communal use. Please see Appendix C for a summary of respondents and their 
locations.43 
 
Interviews continued in the community or series of closely-connected communities within the same 
municipality and involved in the same program until answers converged: if the first two or more 
respondents all had the same answer for a question or type of question, that question was generally 
excluded from subsequent interviews in the same community. Though this approach further decreased the 
utility of quantifiable results, it allowed interviews to focus on topics specifically of interest to respondents, 
or about which there was disagreement within the community or little information had yet been gathered. 
As such, data may be presented as both raw data (actual responses) and extrapolated data (answers 
consistent within a community extrapolated to other members of the same community who were not asked 
or did not respond). 
 
Care must be used in interpreting the results of this study within the context of this sampling methodology. 
Creating non-random samples within communities for the sake of breadth and depth of information (how 
does a non-user’s perspective differ from the perspective of someone with an operable or an inoperable 
system?) precludes drawing conclusions about the specific success rate within the community. For 
example, saying that 50% of systems that were included in this research in a particular community were 
successful does not imply that 50% of systems in the community in general were successful. These 
analyses contain qualitative assessments of program success, and qualitative and quantitative evidence of 
factors that differentiate successful systems from those that did not succeed. 
 
4.3.3. Confidentiality and anonymity 
Respondents who lived in communities which had benefited from donated stand-alone solar electric 
systems were the primary source of data for this research. As they were poor, many were illiterate and 
many had been victims of or were close to victims of violence during the civil war, I considered them to be 
                                                          
43All personal and place names given are aliases to protect the confidentiality of sources. 
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a sensitive population. As such, this research was subject to the scrutiny of The Johns Hopkins University 
Institutional Review Board.44 Respondents were assured that the information they provided would be kept 
confidential, available only to those involved in the research. Communities were excluded if I did not feel I 
could maintain this confidentiality.45 Their anonymity could not necessarily be guaranteed because of the 
nature of some of the questions asked. For example, I asked if respondents had leadership roles in the 
project. If a respondent said that he or she had held a specific post in managing the project, his or her 
identity would be easily surmised by anyone familiar with the project in that community. However, I 
attested (and the IRB agreed) that no threat was posed to these respondents if their identities were learned. 
 
Community members were interviewed individually or in small groups. In the case of a group interview or 
when other community members were present during an individual interview – which was very often the 
case – other community members within earshot were not asked to maintain confidentiality.46 
 
4.3.4. “Expert opinions” 
In addition to community members, I interviewed project donors, developers and administrators 
representing various levels of the Guatemalan government, foreign governments and private NGO’s.47 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the meanings of success and failure can be vastly different for project 
developers than for the users of systems. This research focuses on success and failure from the points of 
view found in the communities. Experts in the field of rural electrification using PV in rural Guatemala 
have in general gained their expertise by being directly involved in the process. They may bring expertise 
on the process from the point of view of project developers, but bring less on community members and 
                                                          
44 See Appendix D for IRB documentation. 
45 See Section 6.9.1 for a description of a series of communities that were excluded because of a pending legal action, and I feared that 
any data I collected would be subject to subpoena.  
46 Enforcement or monitoring of confidentiality within the community was impossible; I chose not to create the pretense of 
confidentiality among community members within earshot rather than assure anyone that such confidentiality – well outside my 
control – would be maintained.  
47 These respondents were not guaranteed confidentiality except in cases where the information they provided could potentially cause 
harm if attributed to a specific individual. This includes primarily information related to narco activity in the vicinity of energy-
related projects, but also includes criticism of other individuals or organizations that could harm the speaker’s reputation or future 
employability. 
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their relationships to their renewable energy systems. Though development professionals provided 
substantial information through in-person interviews, the true experts on what community members 
perceive and experience are the community members themselves.  
 
4.4. Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire was designed originally to relate all outcomes directly to system success, asking the 
simple question of whether a particular factor contributed to system success or not. However, even in pre-
testing this approach proved too simplistic to analyze the data meaningfully. The primary shortfall was that 
the definition of success is more nuanced than was originally anticipated when the questionnaire was 
written. Additionally, I found other outcomes and information to be meaningful beyond the yes-or-no 
question of whether a factor correlated to success. Almost all “basic” questions were followed with 
questions requesting further comment or clarification. Thus, the mappings included in this chapter reflect 
how questionnaire data was viewed for analysis rather than how the questions necessarily originated.  
 
Figure 1 shows the relationships among the principle lines of inquiry of this research. The remainder of this 
section follows the outline of the figure, reviewing questions related first to the definition of success, then 
to economics and utility, followed by institutions and relationships, and finally community, user and system 
characteristics and the unintended physical consequences of system implementation. The “outcome” of any 
individual system or the systems in general included in this study cannot necessarily be summarized 
succinctly in a few words. Rather, the outcome referenced is the amalgamation of the results included in 
each of the categories below. Success is distinct from the other results in that other outcomes are compared 
to outcome “success” where possible, though not necessarily to each other. For example, energy cost 
savings and community ethnic makeup are each evaluated against success, though not necessarily against 
one another. Subsequent figures relate individual question topics to the results included in Chapters 5, 6 
and 7. Importantly, as explained in the results chapters, specific outcomes and the answers to individual 
questions do not necessarily fit into a single category illustrated in the hierarchical figures. Although these 
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simplified structures aid in categorizing results, they neglect the many and complex interrelationships 
between and among results that are explored in detail in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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being taken to repair it. The other determinant of system functionality was a physical inspection of the 
system consistent with standard stand-alone PV system evaluation procedures.48 
 
4.4.1.2. Perception 
The only a priori definition of success that was included in this research was the user’s perception of 
whether his or her system was successful. This question proved inadequate during survey validation as few 
respondents were willing to state that they found their systems unsuccessful. As such, respondents were 
asked as follow-up questions how they defined project success, and which aspects of their projects they 
found unsuccessful. 
 
4.4.1.3. Optimality 
Optimality is a component of success that was difficult to assess. Although the question, “is this energy 
system optimal to meet your needs” could be translated into Spanish and perhaps into the Mayan languages 
of some of the respondents, I did not feel that it would be a meaningful question to the population being 
interviewed. As such, I asked indirect questions to attempt to assess the concept of optimality. I asked these 
at different points during the interview, in different contexts. The primary question was whether users were 
satisfied with their energy from the system and, if not, why not. A second question was whether users 
would replace their energy system with an analogous stand-alone PV system, if the original system were 
damaged or destroyed and if they had the means to do so. Again, respondents were invited to expand upon 
their answers and explain the advantages or disadvantages they saw to PV as compared to other forms of 
energy. A third question asked whether the system was relevant and important to them in their daily lives, 
based on the logic that something that was not fundamentally useful as an energy source could not be 
considered an optimal energy source.49 Finally, users were asked what else they would like to be able to do 
with the energy that their PV systems were unable to accommodate. Ultimately this question was not 
                                                          
48 See Appendix B for complete assessment protocol, developed by Sandia National Laboratories. 
49 I reiterate here that energy is a means, not an end. 
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included in defining whether a system was optimal for a respondent, but offered insight into the needs that 
the development community was meeting and was leaving unmet.50 
 
4.4.2. Economics and Utility 
The details of how economics and utility were analyzed are enumerated in Chapter 5. Figure 3 shows the 
breakdown of information sought for major research questions and hypotheses on topics of economics and 
utility into components that can be examined individually, as described in this section.  
                                                          
50 An example examined in more detail in Chapter 5, is that of blenders. Many women interviewed said that they would like to be able 
to power electric blenders with their energy systems, presumably reducing their kitchen labors in preparing food. However, I have 
not heard of any donor program that has the specific goal of providing blenders or the electricity to power them. The desire for a 
blender was not included in the analyses of whether a system was optimal and subsequently successful, but it highlights a gap 
between donor expectation and beneficiary need, which is a meaningful conclusion of this research. 
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Figure 3. Economics and utility hierarchy 
 
4.4.2.1. Utility 
Utility in this research refers to uses of rural stand-alone PV systems for other than income-producing 
activities, which are considered separately with economics. Specifically, domestic uses (such as household 
lighting) and community uses (such as television for distance learning in a school) were considered at the 
outset of this research. I asked questions to learn how energy use changed: if legacy energy source use 
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decreased and if new energy demands were added. I also addressed the question of whether the quality of 
energy, especially lighting, was different using PV versus traditional energy sources. I added the question 
of utility in weather-related emergencies as these emergency situations emerged as a common and 
important theme among respondents. Weak infrastructure and government support services often leave 
communities without outside assistance during the severe weather events that are common in hurricane-
prone Central America. Further, a subset of systems included in this research was designed specifically to 
assist in disaster preparedness and relief, opening the question of whether stand-alone PV systems are 
helpful in weather-related emergencies in general.  
 
4.4.2.2. Productive uses 
“Productive uses” in the context of this research includes specifically and only those activities performed 
with the PV systems that generate income. To assess these, I asked whether existing income-earning 
opportunities were enhanced (could more money be made from an activity that previously provided an 
income?) and whether new income-earning opportunities were created. I further assessed whether these 
income opportunities relied directly on the energy system (for example, if someone purchased electric-
powered carpentry equipment) or if the energy system was an indirect contributor (for example, if a store 
owner sold more pre-paid phone cards because people in town were now able to charge cell phones).  
 
4.4.2.3. Energy service cost changes 
I assessed changes in energy costs both directly and indirectly. Users were asked whether they paid more or 
less for energy services when the PV system was in place than when it was not. They were also asked about 
prior and current consumption (in quantity as well as cost) of specific energy sources such as candles, 
batteries, kerosene, firewood and other energy sources common to rural Guatemala or suggested by 
respondents. Questions about energy cost changes included the added expenses associated with the PV 
systems, such as any tariff or any maintenance expenses. Importantly, respondents were also asked about 
increases in energy cost due to increases in energy use: users with newly available electrical energy may 
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increase their overall energy consumption by adding televisions or cell phones, which cannot be powered 
by traditional candles or kerosene. 
 
4.4.2.4. Loss of income 
A hypothesized contributor to the failure of rural renewable energy systems was the loss of income 
associated with them, if sellers of traditional sources like candles lost business when the systems were 
installed. Respondents were asked whether there were economic losers at the community level, and those 
respondents who themselves sold traditional energy sources were asked if they saw any decrease in income 
and whether they saw a net decrease or increase in income resulting from the systems. 
 
4.4.3. Institutions and relationships 
The details of how institutions and relationships were analyzed are enumerated in Chapter 6. Figure 4 
shows the breakdown of information sought for major research questions and hypotheses on topics of the 
institutions surrounding these systems and the relationships that are formed and changed as a result into 
components that can be examined individually, as described in this section. 
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Figure 4a. Institutions and relationship hierarchy 
 
Figure 4b. Institutions and relationship hierarchy 
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4.4.3.1. Extra-community relationships 
The relationships of interest here are the relationships between members of the community and outside 
individuals and institutions: donors, developers, vendors, installers and government entities at the 
municipal, department and national levels. The relationships between two communities that both have PV 
systems and the relationships between communities in which one community benefited while the other did 
not are important, but they are outside the scope of this research.  
 
The distinction between the donor, perhaps a large multinational institution that provides funding, and the 
developer, perhaps a smaller in-country NGO that planned and implemented the project with the 
developer’s funding, was not clear to many respondents. As such, while I had originally formulated 
questions about the nature, quality and longevity of the relationship with each individually, I merged these 
questions so that they related to both developer and donor.  
 
Similarly, the vendor and installer were frequently the same entity and the distinction was not apparent to 
respondents when different individuals or agencies assumed those roles. Users were asked about the quality 
and longevity of the relationship – and the vendor’s responsiveness to concerns and warrantee claims, and 
also what role the developer or donor had played in acting as a liaison between the community and the 
installer or vendor where the vendor had been unresponsive or unscrupulous in its dealings with the 
community.  
 
Relationships with “government” were assessed using a few specific questions as to whether local, regional 
and national government officials were supportive of the donated projects, but conversations with regards 
to government were largely open-ended as experiences differed enough to preclude many consistent 
questions.  
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4.4.3.2. Intra-community relationships: conflicts and networks 
I made no attempt to quantitatively define social conflicts or networks based on their severity, quality, or 
other characteristic that required a judgment of human attitudes or behaviors. Instead, I asked 
straightforward questions to which respondents could answer “yes” or “no” as to whether the donated 
systems had caused any sort of social conflict. If the respondent answered in the affirmative, I sought more 
details in an open-ended format. I further asked whether respondents had observed two specific types of 
social conflict: whether the system was in conflict with anyone’s religion or had caused religious conflict; 
and whether the donations had caused or exacerbated inequality in the community. The former was asked 
just as the more general social conflict question was asked. To explore the question of equity, I first asked 
whether all members of the community had had equal access to the project. If the answer was no, I invited 
more open-ended responses to the nature of that inequity, and then asked whether the unequal access 
caused any conflict within the community. This approach unfortunately excludes cases of inequity being 
exacerbated between project beneficiaries (i.e., a “rich” beneficiary somehow gains more from an 
equivalent system than does a relatively poor beneficiary of the same system), but I chose to exclude 
explicit questions of previously existent community equity as questions that may make respondents 
uncomfortable. If respondents themselves brought up the topic, I encouraged them to share as much as they 
were willing. 
 
If any form of conflict was reported and explained by respondents, I asked whether and how the conflict 
had been resolved. 
 
In exploring the theme of solar energy in disaster preparedness (see Section 4.4.6, above), I asked whether 
the donation of the systems had helped them to build social networks that aided them in the event of a 
weather-related or other disaster. I asked whether any such social networks were created as a result of the 
institutions build around the donation projects (e.g., by being a part of an energy committee, neighbors had 
gotten to know each other better or become more willing to help one another), or as a result of the solar 
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systems themselves (e.g., neighbors grew closer or more supportive just by spending time together by 
electric lamplight, where previously they stayed home in the evenings).  
 
Beyond the general hypothesis that systems which created conflict would be more likely to fail, this line of 
questioning was in largest part exploratory, seeking potential outcomes and relationships between outcomes 
that I did not anticipate. 
 
4.4.3.3. Intra-community institutions: system governance51 
Many aspects of the institutions and relationships within a community may change unintentionally with the 
donation of solar energy projects. In this section, I address questions of deliberate changes to community 
institutions and relationships: the administrative and governance structures created to manage the systems. 
Specifically, I ask about respondents’ perceptions and understandings of the following: 
 
– Structure, charter 
I hypothesized that the presence of an administrative entity to manage donated systems at a community 
level would be associated with more successful systems, and asked, as a research question, whether the 
type or structure of the administrative entity would be related to success. I asked respondents whether any 
administrative structure existed to govern or manage their systems. I asked for a description of the type of 
structure, the participants, and how participation was manifested (i.e., rotating leadership positions, votes in 
general assemblies, etcetera).     
 
Of particular note, I asked whether a charter had been written, and whether ongoing administration was 
consistent with that charter. In more open-ended questions, I asked respondents to describe the participation 
of the project developer in the creation of the administrative entity and its charter: was it required by the 
                                                          
51 Language associated with governance and administration was not foreign to many respondents because of the programs under which 
many of these systems were implemented. Reglamento interno, roughly translated as “charter,” estados de cuenta, or “financial 
statements” and similar language was introduced by the development entities that encouraged or mandated the establishment of 
governance structures as a condition of system installation. Thus it was not only possible, but in fact common that an illiterate farmer 
who had never had a bank account knew the definition of “financial statement.” 
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developer; was the developer helpful in its creation; did the developer set out rules that the charter must 
contain, or merely aid in the creation of rules appropriate to the community? 
 
Although not included in the original questionnaire as designed, I modified questions slightly to glean 
information about governance structures that had been established initially but were no longer in place, a 
circumstance that was much more common than had been anticipated during questionnaire design. As such, 
in communities where governance structures had existed but had been dissolved, I asked questions of how 
long the structure had been in place, why it was dissolved, and why it was not re-started if the 
circumstances that led to its dissolution had changed. These questions did not contribute to knowledge 
related to any particular hypothesis, but lent insight into the functioning of communities and their attitudes 
towards their PV systems. 
 
– Responsibilities, decision-making, participation 
To test the hypotheses that active participation in ongoing decision making leads to greater system success, 
I asked questions about the levels and types of involvement. Most importantly, I asked whether the 
respondent participated in governance and decision-making at the community level, involving systems 
beyond the one in his or her own home, currently or previously. In follow-up questions, I asked who was 
eligible or welcome to participate, including whether a respondent’s lack of participation was voluntary or 
whether he or she had been excluded.  
 
I sought information about the way respondents participated: as leaders, as members-at-large, or in other 
capacities. In more open-ended questions, I invited respondents to comment on the leadership of the system 
of governance and leaders’ responsiveness to user concerns. 
 
– Legal establishment, sanctions 
I asked questions about respondents’ understanding of the legal status of the institutions created to manage, 
govern or administer the systems in their communities. I specifically did not confirm with government 
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institutions outside the community (regional or national government offices, for example) whether 
respondents’ understanding of the legal status of the administrative entity was correct.  
 
Specifically, I asked whether respondents believed the entity to be legally established and, if so, if they 
knew what type of legal structure it was (COCODE, comité, etcetera).  
 
I also asked whether the structure had the authority to impose sanctions against participants who failed to 
live up to their obligations (for example, failure to pay a tariff), and whether these sanctions were enforced. 
This line of questioning was intended to explore whether the perception of legality of a governance 
structure led to higher probabilities of success of systems, whether the imposition of sanctions also led to 
greater success, and whether the perception of legality increased the likelihood that sanctions would be 
effectively enforced. 
 
– Reporting, accountability 
I had no specific hypotheses about whether confidence in an administrative entity would make that entity 
more effective or lead to greater system success. In part, this was because measurements of “confidence” 
are methodologically beyond the scope of this research. Some degree of accountability of the governing 
body to its constituents can, however, be assessed through straightforward questioning. I asked whether 
respondents knew how monies collected were spent, whether they were sufficient to cover the expenses 
associated with the systems, and whether they knew how any deficit was covered or where any additional 
monies went. Further, I asked whether the governing entity produced financial statements that detailed how 
much money was collected and how it was spent and, if so, the frequency with which these statements were 
produced.  
 
– Tariffs 
Tariffs and tariff structures are included with institutions and relationships in this section because they 
reveal more about these institutions and the relationships in the community than they do about the 
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economic burdens they impose. The tariff cost is included in questions of economics when users were 
asked how much they pay for energy; in this section, I describe questions posed about the institutions that 
determine and enforce the tariff and the relationships between people involved where money changes (or 
fails to change) hands.  
 
Specifically, respondents were asked whether they were asked to pay a tariff for the use of their systems. 
They were also asked about the tariff: how the amount was determined, who collects it, what the timing of 
payments were, whether there is transparency in how the monies are handled, and whether the tariff 
accomplished its intended purpose of providing the financial resources to maintain the systems.  
 
They were also asked whether they or anyone else in fact complied with the tariff as structured. Open-
ended follow-up was sought in this regard, to assess the degree to which there was confidence in the 
institution that established and maintained the tariff, as differentiated from an inability to pay because the 
cost was too high or other motivations to comply or not comply. 
 
4.4.3.4. Geopolitical context 
The geopolitical context in which these systems, programs and institutions are set are complex. Information 
about these did not come directly from the communities and respondents in the form of answers to specific 
questions. Instead, much of what was included in the description of this context comes from reviews of the 
academic literature, as well as of the popular press (which provides more current, if less rigorously verified, 
information). Employees of the government of Guatemala, local NGO’s, and others in the development 
community shared insights, as did respondents in their answers to other questions and in the topics they 
chose to discuss in the more open-ended parts of the interviews and members of the public at large with 
whom I came in contact.52 These contexts, and the associated sources of information, are detailed in 
Section 3.4. 
                                                          
52 For example, I did not conduct an interview with a waitress at a restaurant in one municipality, but her warning to stay away from a 
particular area because of drug activity was considered valid enough to shape my travel plans. I did not verify her account (beyond 
the nods of a few people within earshot) nor do I attest to know which areas near her restaurant are specifically under the control of 
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4.4.3.5. Training and socialization 
In support of the hypothesis that greater levels of training and socialization would lead to greater success, 
questions of socialization meetings and training sessions were addressed simply. I asked whether and how 
many such meetings and trainings occurred, who was eligible to attend, whether the respondent had 
participated, and then asked in a more open-ended format what topics were covered.  
 
4.4.3.6. Planning and implementation 
The original questions I had structured about community involvement in planning and implementation were 
straightforward and structured like the training and socialization questions described above. However, these 
questions yielded less information, so I instead invited unstructured commentary on the respondents’ 
knowledge of the initiation of the project and its funding, their involvement in any changes to the project 
between the time it was proposed and what was finally implemented, and their involvement in the 
implementation process 
 
4.4.4. Characteristics and consequences 
The details of how system and user characteristics and unintended consequences were analyzed are 
enumerated in Chapter 7. Figures 5a, b, c and d show the breakdown of information sought for major 
research questions and hypotheses on topics of characteristics and consequences into components that can 
be examined individually. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the narcos, but I consider the information generally valid enough to inform my understanding of the geopolitical context of the 
northern departments in Guatemala. In another example, someone who I had hired as a driver boasted that there were no indigenous 
communities in his department.  
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Users were asked whether they had replaced any of the original components or altered their systems in any 
way. If original components had been replaced, the quality of the replacement components could be 
assessed, though not that of the original components (unless the user kept the old component, as they 
sometimes did). The initial system installation quality could often be assessed even if the user had altered 
the system. Users rarely removed bypassed components or old wires so the original design (as installed) 
was generally evident.  
 
Also included in the category of system physical characteristics is the physical maintenance performed on 
the system. Large failures in maintenance could be evident in system technical inspections.53 However, 
whether more routine maintenance was performed as scheduled was assessed by asking users whether and 
what types of maintenance they performed. Straightforward questions of whether users performed 
maintenance on an ongoing basis were inadequate. I also asked users to enumerate the types of 
maintenance activities they performed and the frequency with which they performed them. 
 
Finally, in this category falls system longevity. The ages of the systems were assessed based on questions 
to users and, where available, project documentation from developers or personal communication with 
developers about specific projects. 
 
4.4.4.2. Community and user characteristics 
The distinction between community and user characteristics is, in many ways, arbitrary. As an example, I 
have chosen for expedience to categorize a community as belonging to a particular ethnic group, rather than 
an individual respondent. There is no theoretical basis for this distinction, nor is it meant to imply that 
ethnicity is not an individual as well as a community characteristic – the decision was solely for reporting 
purposes. As such, in this section I enumerate both the community and user characteristics that are 
analyzed in this research. 
 
                                                          
53 For example, if users failed to add water to the battery as needed, this was evident by the low water level visible in the battery. 
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In addition to ethnicity, I assessed community isolation, focusing on the technology in question. The 
proxies for the concept of isolation were distance to urban centers or larger communities where 
replacement parts and service for the system might be obtained, and the size of the community itself. The 
former was assessed based primarily on respondents’ answers to questions about their own knowledge of 
where replacement parts might be obtained and how long it took them to get to that location and how they 
traveled. Distance in kilometers and time needed for me to reach a community were both inadequate 
measures to assess isolation from a technological perspective for several reasons. First, depending upon 
terrain and means of transportation, it might take a vastly different amount of time for one respondent to 
cover the same distance as another. Second, the relevant distance to be measured is not the distance to the 
nearest location where replacement batteries, for example, are available; the user may not know of or be 
welcome in the nearest location so the relevant distance is the distance to the nearest location that the user 
would him- or herself visit. 
 
Community history was assessed in largest part indirectly. I considered asking respondents directly whether 
their community was burned or whether massacres took place to be too presumptuous, and likely to 
obstruct further communication with the respondent. As such, I relied in largest part upon the literature on 
the history of Guatemala and the communities’ locations relative to the events in that history to serve as a 
proxy for the “community history.” Respondents who were willing to volunteer information about their 
experiences were of course not discouraged, but I did not initiate that discussion with direct questions or 
prompting. 
 
The level of poverty in a community was similarly assessed based on communities’ locations relative to 
known areas of poverty in Guatemala. However, I relied on direct observation as the most reliable source of 
information about a community’s general or approximate level of poverty. Specifically, I observed 
buildings: extreme poverty was assumed where the exterior walls of houses were made from bundled 
cornstalks, contrasted with the relative affluence of a house with drywall on its interior walls. I made 
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similar observations about large possessions: ownership of a cow,54 a truck or a horse was assumed to 
indicate relative wealth. I did not ask respondents explicit questions about their earnings or possessions for 
a variety of reasons, including that people frequently lie about income, that those engaged in subsistence 
farming often use barter rather than cash (making cash income less meaningful), and that those engaged in 
occasional or day labor may not have a clear recollection of the sources and amounts of their incomes.   
 
I attempted to assess the level of non-economic development in communities. For this, I used recent 
development projects as a proxy. However, for reasons described in the subsequent section, this approach 
did not yield reliable information about communities’ levels of development. 
 
Considerations of respondents’ and users’ genders were not addressed in specific survey questions or 
observations, and I had no a priori hypotheses about where gender differences would emerge. Instead, I 
made note of differences in responses to other questions when these differences emerged along gender 
lines. Husbands’ tendencies to answer for their wives or to take over interviews that I began with women 
were complicating factors in drawing conclusions based on the genders of the respondents. Family 
demographics were delicate to assess, so I only asked about the composition of the household – in 
particular about children in the household – during conversations in which I felt the respondent was 
particularly comfortable.55 
 
Finally, I had hypothesized that active involvement in the project would lead an individual user to have a 
higher probability of success. To assess “involvement,” I asked specific questions about attendance at 
training sessions, participation in project planning, ongoing involvement in decision making, and current or 
                                                          
54 Culturally as well as economically, a cow is considered a status symbol in Guatemala, to the degree that a cow is colloquially called 
a ganado, which translates approximately to “prize” or “earnings.” 
55 Rumors persist among rural and especially indigenous communities about foreigners who attempt to kidnap babies for sale into 
adoption markets, and rumors persist among foreign development and expatriate communities about community members lynching 
well-intentioned tourists and healthcare workers who took too much interest in their children. Although all are poorly documented 
and almost certainly exaggerated if not outright false, I believe the potential harm done to the confidence between myself and the 
respondent outweighed any benefit of categorically documenting the numbers and ages of people living in households. 
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former leadership status with the project. These were taken in aggregate to judge the degree to which a 
respondent was involved in the project. 
 
4.4.4.3. Unintended consequences 
Any development project can have negative or positive consequences that were unforeseen or unintended at 
the outset of the project. Perhaps the most common is the creation or exacerbation of conflict within a 
community. This is addressed in Section 4.4.3, above. Another potential negative consequence is the 
possibility of decreasing economic opportunity, which is addressed in Section 4.4.2, above. 
 
I assessed the potential for negative environmental consequences based both on respondents’ judgments 
and my own, relying here on “expert opinion,” unlike in much of the rest of this study. I asked respondents 
directly whether they felt there were negative consequences to their environments as a result of the solar 
projects. I also asked how users disposed of components – especially batteries – that were no longer 
functioning. I used this as a proxy for environmental damage because the lead from batteries improperly 
disposed of presents a local danger to human and ecological health. Note that this research does not attempt 
to weigh any environmental damage caused by PV systems at the site of installation against any mitigation 
of damage when compared to alternative energy sources. 
 
Additionally, I asked respondents to suggest other negative consequences that did not fall in to the 
categories of social conflict, economic losses or environmental degradation. 
 
4.5. Questionnaire validation 
In the creation of this questionnaire, I developed questions based upon my hypotheses and research 
questions, as described above, and added questions that I felt would add depth or context. The 
questionnaire was translated by Debora Ley of the Environmental Change Institute at the University of 
Oxford, who is a native Spanish speaker with eleven years of experience working in rural energy in Mexico 
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and Central America. With her assistance, I arranged the questions to flow conversationally rather than 
structuring the questionnaire to follow my hypotheses and research questions rigidly. 
 
I initially validated this questionnaire in the community of Nueva Alianza, in the department of 
Quetzaltenango, Guatemala. Nueva Alianza is a rural community that has been very actively involved with 
the development community and has succeeded in getting assistance to start projects in water purification 
and bottling, pig and chicken farming, macadamia nut and coffee growing, biodiesel, ecotourism, and other 
development projects. I chose to validate my survey in this community for several reasons. First, I knew 
them to have both successful (hydroelectric) and unsuccessful (biogas) energy projects, which allowed me 
to test questions from both perspectives. They were also native Spanish speakers, which removed the 
confounding factor of translation from Mayan dialects. Because of their work with the development 
community and their ecotourism project, they are not mistrustful of foreigners and as such, many people 
were willing to speak with me. Finally, they give tours of their community and projects as a part of their 
ecotourism activities; they permitted me to pay for a tour and participate in that tour for the most part in the 
form of interviews with community members. This allowed me to take the extra time necessary to rephrase 
questions and refine the questionnaire while speaking with them without detracting from their livelihoods. 
 
Several downsides emerged from using Nueva Alianza as the location where I validated the survey and 
practiced interview technique. The first is that the energy systems in their community, including the lone 
PV system, were communally owned and operated by the community’s governance. As such, I was not able 
to prepare as well as I would have liked for responses related to systems wholly owned and operated by 
individuals. Second is that their governance structure was fully developed and operational. This reinforced 
an inaccurate assumption I had about the prevalence and strength of institutions to govern rural energy 
projects. Another substantial disadvantage to validating the questionnaire in Nueva Alianza was that 
everyone with whom I interacted spoke the language used by the development community. Because of the 
ubiquitous involvement of community members in the development projects in the community, they shared 
common definitions of terms like “project” and “donor,” definitions that were not as consistently 
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understood in communities that had less consistent contact with the development community. Finally, the 
advantage to me of a Spanish-speaking community was also a disadvantage: I did not have the opportunity 
to validate the survey’s translation into the Mayan languages spoken by some of the communities included 
in this research. 
 
Even after validation, as the research progressed, some questions had to be refined, expanded or abandoned 
because they did not measure what they were intended to measure, or because they were understood 
inconsistently by respondents. Many of the refinements were subtle, changing just a word, where other 
changes were more profound. For example, a question that was expanded was whether anyone in the 
community saw a decrease in income because of the project. Originally, there was no follow-up question if 
the response was “no.” However, I added a follow-up question to the negative response listing specific 
examples of how income might decrease: do local shops sell fewer candles or flashlight batteries, or less 
kerosene? This question allowed me a more nuanced understanding of the economic effects (or lack 
thereof) perceived by respondents. 
 
As an example of a question that was abandoned, respondents were asked what other recent donor or 
development projects, besides their PV systems, had been implemented in their communities. This question 
was intended to serve as a proxy for the level of development of the community: without my pre-defining 
what “development” was (stating specifically schools, potable water, improved roads, etcetera), I wished to 
know what development had taken place. This question was effective at assessing level of development in 
the community where the questionnaire was vetted, but I now believe this was an artifact of that 
community. Nueva Alianza was very involved with “projects” developed with outside donors and identified 
these strongly with community development and progress. However, in other communities, especially those 
with less ongoing involvement with donors, the concept of a “project” was more nebulous. Community 
members didn’t necessarily identify projects the way I do. Some might include road improvement 
undertaken by the government, while others would limit their definitions of projects to those implemented 
by NGO’s. The question of projects being “recent” added to the ambiguity in answers and decreased the 
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effectiveness of the question at assessing the information I sought. If a school was built in a community ten 
years prior, it is not clear whether that is a recent project. It also illustrates a fundamental shortcoming of 
the question: a community that is at a higher level of economic or other development may have less need of 
donor projects. 
 
Although survey methodology normally strives for the greatest possible consistency, I gained more 
information by deviating from my script and focusing on questions that were particularly relevant to a 
specific community or seemed to be on topics of greatest interest to a particular respondent. The sampling 
methodology itself makes broad statistical inferences problematic; questions that were not asked 
consistently further confound statistical analyses. This approach resulted in varying numbers of responses 
to each question. However, respondents provided more information and seemed more candid when my 
questions were conversational rather than scripted. 
 
In conclusion, the survey instrument used to gather data for these analyses was developed from my original 
hypotheses and research questions. It was translated by a native Spanish speaker with experience working 
with this and closely related populations, who further assisted me in arranging the questions into a 
conversational format that would be more comfortable for the population being interviewed.56 Although I 
tested and validated the questionnaire with members of a rural Guatemalan community, I continued to 
adjust questions throughout the early period of the study despite that such changes render changed 
questions statistically invalid. These changes were designed to provoke more insightful responses from 
people included in the study as I learned more about how they responded. 
 
The primary sources of information for this research were the responses of community members to the 
questionnaire as described above, and their comments and responses to further questions included in the 
semi-structured interviews of which the questionnaires were a part. Further information was gathered from 
peer-reviewed literature, project documents obtained from project developers and donors, news media, 
                                                          
56 Surveys were administered in indigenous communities where Spanish was not commonly spoken with the aid of a translator of the 
same ethnicity but not native to the specific community. 
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unstructured interviews and conversations with development professionals and government officials in 
Guatemala, and direct observation and conversations with residents of the regions in which I conducted this 
research. Overall, factual reliability was considered less important than the perceptions of community 
members,57 who were the true “experts,” rather than developers or social scientists, in clarifying how the 
communities understood, used, and integrated their solar PV systems into their lives and societies. 
 
4.6. Project inclusion and exclusion 
In this section, I detail the types of projects considered for inclusion in this research, and my rationale for 
the exclusion criteria used. In section 4.6.2, I differentiate market-based and donation-based dissemination 
of PV systems in rural areas, followed by discussions of donation types. Section 4.6.3 looks in detail at the 
conditions present in market-based dissemination. Finally, I define the five specific categories of donation 
and donor-ownership programs included in this research. 
 
In rural electrification, policy makers often focus on coverage or availability of, rather than use of 
electricity sources (Foster and Tre, 2000). The number of communities with grid access or households with 
PV in a region determines the region’s rate of electrification, regardless of reliability and whether those 
with access are willing or able to pay the price for electricity. This may mean that Guatemala’s published 
rural electrification rate of over 50% (Ahmed et al., 2005) far exceeds the actual availability of electricity. 
 
Included in this “coverage” area are communities with donated stand-alone PV systems, implemented 
under many institutional and economic arrangements. The systems included in this study are all donated 
under one of the schemes described in this chapter. The identified strengths and weaknesses of these 
arrangements, and the problems with systems encountered under each, must be considered specific to the 
programs studied. However, just as similar problems are hypothesized to be seen across varying regions, 
many of the problems in these programs are hypothesized to be found in other arrangements.  
                                                          
57 For example, whether project governance structures were legally established was considered less important than whether 
respondents believed they were; community members often confounded the name of the project developer with the donor, a 
confusion which was not considered material to this research, etcetera. 
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4.6.1. Systems included and not included in this research 
Institutions and arrangements for the implementation of rural renewable energy systems can be placed in 
five basic categories, with different implications for managing and maintaining the project for each 
category: donations, cash sales, fee-for-service, consumer credit (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001), and equipment 
loans. The systems included in these analyses include donations and equipment loans, described in detail 
below.  
 
None of these models involve incurring debt to the donor, as some partially subsidized programs do. 
Excepting a small number of government owned and managed systems, these do not involve ongoing 
subsidy for system maintenance or expansion from the donor. Either of these financial links between donor 
and beneficiary may substantially impact project success, but that hypothesis is not tested by these 
analyses. 
 
As this is a cross-sectional study of projects that are already in place, and focuses on actual projects rather 
than project documents or developer-reported history, it is difficult to differentiate theory failure – in which 
the project fails despite being implemented as planned because underlying assumptions are wrong – versus 
implementation failure – where the ultimate process or product is not what was planned (Bertrand, 2005). 
In this section I present the information that was available on both theory and implementation, based in 
largest part on the knowledge of the users themselves, although the limited information obtained from 
project donors and developers is also included. The emphasis on community-level knowledge (rather than 
“expert” knowledge) is deliberate. Chapter 6 explores further users’ participation in and understanding of 
designing and implementing projects. 
 
In this section, I discuss the most common arrangements for the implementation of PV for rural 
electrification and the strengths and weaknesses that have been identified with each, focusing on the broad 
categories of market-based dissemination of PV and PV donation programs. In the final section of this 
chapter, I present the programs and projects included in this research.  
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4.6.2. Market-based versus donation-based programs 
The difference between systems acquired under a market-based model and those acquired as part of 
donation programs is not obvious. Heavy government or donor subsidy does not necessarily imply a 
donation program, as when government focus is on PV market building rather than on rural electrification 
per se. Similarly, heavily subsidized micro-credit programs for PV still may rely on market mechanisms to 
select, distribute and install hardware; an equal subsidy of a direct PV donation program where users are 
required to provide some monetary contribution can be undertaken entirely by the donor, without need of 
local markets or distribution mechanisms – and with no decision from potential beneficiaries except saying 
“yes” or “no” to participation. 
 
For this research, the donation model is differentiated from the market model on the basis of decision 
making, rather than an arbitrary level of beneficiary contribution (most beneficiaries of donated systems are 
expected to contribute money, labor, or other in-kind contribution, but the level of contribution varies 
widely). If the decisions of end users are largely limited to opting in to or opting out of a program 
sponsored by an outside entity, that program is considered a donation program in this research. The donor 
decides the availability of the technology and the merit of would-be users as potential beneficiaries 
(whether or not beneficiaries initiate the interaction with the donor). 
 
On the other hand, market-based programs are those in which end users and PV providers interact to 
negotiate price, timing, technology, and means of payment. Users decide whether and when to enter into 
the negotiation, the amount of their incomes they are willing to invest, and the types of technologies they 
will use, subject to the availability of credit or capital, hardware, and installation expertise. Though either 
credit or hardware may be subsidized or restricted to particular groups, users make purchasing decisions 
based on their own resources and values, they themselves dictating the timing and degree of their 
participation in programs that are considered market-based for purposes of this study.  
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4.6.3. Donations and donor ownership 
This study focuses on the category of systems that I call “donations,” where donors or people outside the 
community make decisions about what hardware will be installed and who will be eligible to participate, 
and decide what the contributions (if any) of the end users will be. In addition to equipment donations, 
another type of system – not encountered in the literature – is a loan program. Money is not loaned to users 
to purchase systems and users are not charged for the use of their systems, but another entity (in the cases 
included in this research, the Guatemalan government) owns all or part of the hardware. Beneficiaries are 
allowed free use of the system, subject to conditions stipulated by the equipment owner, described in detail 
below. 
 
4.6.4. Privately purchased stand-alone PV systems 
Market-based dissemination of PV in rural Guatemala is significant. The institutions and circumstances that 
drive markets, however, are very different than those that drive donations. This section examines market 
models of PV dissemination as a point of comparison to the donor model included in this research. 
 
4.6.5. Private ownership through markets 
The scope of this research is limited to donated systems, not those installed under market-based 
arrangements or institutions, which is an important limitation of this work (see Section 8.7). Markets are 
widely used to disseminate PV technology in rural applications, but are more appropriate to some 
circumstances than others.58 Because of their importance as an alternative to and their interaction with 
donor programs, I present here a brief description of market-based programs, which deals largely with 
household-level rather than community-level systems. 
 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, successful markets for solar photovoltaic systems in rural developing 
world locations are found to rely upon the available supply of hardware and the human capacity to manage 
it; the creation of demand by recognition of solar energy as a viable and desirable alternative to more 
                                                          
58 For example, solar home systems owned by individual households might be an appropriate market for stand-alone PV systems, but 
community-owned schools and clinics may not. 
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traditional energy sources; the availability of financing to enable people to meet the high capital costs of 
solar energy systems; a supportive role from donor agencies; and the active role of governments in enabling 
market conditions. 
 
4.6.5.1. Supply: technical knowledge and physical availability 
As found in this study and discussed in Chapter 7, the qualities of the design of the photovoltaic system and 
of its components have an impact on the durability of systems. Systems with low quality components can 
fail sooner and, when the components are not replaced, remaining components may be sold or simply 
abandoned. Users sometimes opt for low cost, low quality components when replacements are needed in 
either purchased or donated systems, and these replacement components can lead to system failure even 
when initial component quality is high. 
 
Availability of replacement components of any quality depends largely on the presence of markets as 
institutions: suppliers of equipment, knowledgeable installers and technicians, and networks connecting 
these to customers and potential customers. In market-based systems, training and the building of human 
capacity on a local level are necessary. This stands in contrast to donors, who are typically “outsiders,” who 
may meet adequate quality standards by bringing in experts or materials from other countries or regions.  
 
4.6.5.2. Demand: for home and business 
For a market-based expansion of rural PV systems to occur there must be “demand pull” more than 
“technology push” (Mulugetta et al., 2000): rural consumers must recognize the economic benefits of 
purchasing systems and have confidence in their abilities to recoup their investments. However, potential 
purchasers of these unfamiliar technologies face substantial risk: a large upfront investment must be made 
by those with little or no experience upon which to base expectations of maintenance costs or savings in 
costs of kerosene or candles (Acker and Kammen, 1996). Consumer risk aversion, itself a rational response, 
may lead to the economically “irrational” rejection of a technology that can save consumers money over 
traditional lighting. Familiarity with the technology through use by donors or neighbors can build or erode 
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confidence, depending on the performance of early adopters’ systems. Circumstances favorable and 
unfavorable to consumer demand for PV are discussed in this section. 
 
Factors that can contribute to household demand include economics and social acceptability. Solar home 
systems can decrease household energy costs by saving users money on traditional fuel sources such as 
candles and kerosene for lamps, and more potential users may purchase systems if their neighbors also have 
them.  
 
As with any society, rural populations in the developing world are not homogenous. High upfront costs of 
solar photovoltaics can mean that the “middle class” and relatively affluent segments of categorically poor 
and rural communities are those who are most able to purchase solar home systems. In marked contrast, the 
intentions of donation programs are generally to benefit the poorest segments of society. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 5 it may be that donation programs benefit the same relatively affluent users as do 
market-based programs. 
 
The availability and use of solar PV may play a small role in defining the rural middle class as small 
business owners and shopkeepers use the systems to increase their income potential. Energy is widely seen 
as a critical component in increasing income in developing communities, but evidence of direct income 
generation as a result of household-scale PV systems is conspicuously lacking. The high capital cost of 
solar home systems leads them to be designed to meet specific loads with little or no excess capacity. 
Unless systems are designed to meet the demand for energy of specific productive uses, normal household 
applications will consume all of the energy produced and stored. 
 
4.6.5.3. System financing  
Despite the long-term economic benefits, high upfront capital costs are a barrier to market-based 
dissemination of solar home systems. Some purchasers can afford cash sales of systems through formal 
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market channels or less formally through the purchase of previously owned systems.59 Cash sales have the 
advantages of low transaction costs and eliminating the need for a seller or financier to establish the 
“creditworthiness” of a purchaser who may have little or no formal credit history. 
 
Micro-financing is another option that can be used for market-based dissemination of solar home systems 
in rural communities. Individual and collective micro-credit arrangements, often organized by outside 
institutions, can allow system purchase by households that otherwise would not have access to sufficient 
capital. However, those with the most reliable income streams or largest assets may be considered to be 
most able to repay a loan: micro-financing, then, does not eliminate the bias towards the relatively affluent 
in the market-based dissemination of PV in rural communities (Corsair and Ley, 2008). 
 
Informal financing mechanisms such as loans between neighbors or family members are the primary 
financial tools of the rural poor. However, hybrid ownership schemes and private financing by vendors and 
government- or NGO-subsidized loans are options for overcoming the significant burden of initial capital 
cost and the capital cost of battery replacement (see Chapters 3 and 5 for detailed descriptions of some of 
these financial tools). Subsidized credit again blurs the line between donation and the free market. 
 
Another market-based option for solar electricity is the “fee-for-service” model.  Fee-for-service models 
governing solar home system ownership and maintenance are often operated much like traditional utilities. 
One entity owns and maintains the equipment, while users pay for the use of the electricity, based on a per-
fixture cost, a fixed monthly cost, or a per-kWh cost. Users benefit by not needing access to capital, while 
system owners can earn profits from their investments. However, this model is subject to high transaction 
costs, and the poorest potential users may again be excluded because they are unable or perceived as unable 
to pay for the service.  
 
                                                          
59 See Chapter 8 for a discussion of “secondary beneficiaries,” or those who benefit from the low-cost purchase of systems donated to 
another party. 
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High capital costs remain as perhaps the most significant barrier to market-based dissemination of solar 
home systems. Means to overcome this barrier exist, but they tend to favor the affluent and middle classes 
in rural communities60 – not the poorest who are often the target beneficiaries of donation programs.  
 
4.6.5.4. Donor and market interaction 
Donor programs have both positive and negative impacts on the supply, demand and financing of rural 
solar energy systems in developing countries. Donors may help build markets by creating a local demand 
for products and expertise. They may contribute to building human capital by training local people in 
maintenance and installation, and by connecting local vendors with supply networks. Donors are more 
likely to conform to industry standards and norms for quality and safety, because of their knowledge, 
mandates and available budgets. 
 
However, donation necessarily distorts market prices, devaluing the product donated with what is 
effectively competition at a price of zero. If donors import all materials and expertise, they damage rather 
than build the institutions and markets that can help sustain the systems that they are donating. 
 
Donors play a substantial role in the creation and support of viable photovoltaics markets in rural areas by 
creating demand, providing training and sometimes financing systems, but the donor community must 
recognize its impacts on these emerging markets to avoid undermining them. Ruining the livelihood 
prospects of a small PV vendor is not likely to be consistent with any donor’s mandate.  
 
4.6.5.5. Governments’ roles in markets 
Energy policies, import tariffs, taxes and subsidies of various energy sources can change the economic 
viability of PV: whereas PV may be the least-cost alternative in one country, just across the border in 
another country with analogous resources, it may be significantly more expensive than the alternatives due 
                                                          
60 See Chapter 5 for further discussion of this topic. 
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to government policy. Further, unintentional ambiguity and outright corruption can affect prices if 
equipment must be imported. 
 
Government decisions about national utility grid expansion can also affect PV markets, as solar home 
systems are generally installed in locations where other electricity sources are not expected in the 
foreseeable future because of the long payback period necessary to make them economical. Because of this, 
uncertainty in the location and timing of grid extension can make solar home systems a higher risk 
investment. 
 
Governments can opt to make market-building a priority in the area of PV for rural electrification (see 
Chapter 3 for two examples in Latin America). Their efforts to build and reinforce supply, installation and 
micro-credit institutions can increase the prevalence of purchased solar home systems in rural areas even 
after periods of subsidy or institutional support have passed. Like any donor, governments must ensure 
their goals are well defined; for reasons discussed throughout this section, expanding electricity coverage 
by means of market-based dissemination of PV may not contribute to other government goals like poverty 
reduction. 
 
4.6.5.6. Conclusions about market-based PV dissemination 
This research does not deal with the success of privately purchased PV systems in rural Guatemala, and 
more research is needed on the topic. However, market-based mechanisms – under suitable conditions of 
supply, demand, and financial resources – seem to be a viable option for expanding the availability of solar 
energy for rural development, though caution must be used when assessing whether the market contributes 
to development goals as the poorest segments of rural developing world population are least likely to 
benefit. The donor community plays a significant role in helping to establish demand and providing needed 
training. Governments play an important role in creating and enforcing standards that ensure quality, and in 
creating market conditions favorable to the technology.  
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Since end users themselves – not an outside donor – decide whether solar energy meets their social and 
economic goals, differences in success rates between the market and donor models may be driven in part by 
whether users or donors make the decision to install PV as a means to reach those goals, a hypothesis 
which merits further study but is outside the scope of this research. 
 
4.6.6. Forms of donations and donor-ownership included in this research 
Systems included in this research are from one of the following basic categories, defined below as they 
apply specifically to this study: government owned and managed; government loaned or donated for rural 
development; disaster relief; post-conflict development; and miscellaneous others. 
 
In aggregate, all systems included in this study were donated or loaned to their users, by the definitions 
used in this research. The actual ownership structure, accountability of donor to beneficiary and beneficiary 
to donor, responsibility for maintenance, administration and governance, and many other factors vary 
widely. The influences of these variations on system success are examined in the Results chapters that 
follow. 
 
Category No. and % of systems 
Government owned & managed 9, 7% 
Government loan or donation 53, 42% 
Disaster relief 21, 17% 
Post-conflict development 20, 16% 
Other 24, 19% 
Table 1. Breakdown of systems by category 
 
4.6.6.1. Government loaned or donated systems for rural development 
The Ministries of Health and of Education have been involved sporadically in projects to electrify rural 
health clinics and schools using stand-alone PV systems, as reported by members of communities whose 
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schools or clinics have such systems or that are near communities that do. These systems provided lights in 
community buildings that are normally used only during the day. Neither the institutions that installed them 
nor the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM), which might be expected to take responsibility for such 
rural electrification projects, provided training, maintenance or follow-up for any of these systems. They 
were given to “the community” or “the school” without the requirement (or the assistance needed) to 
establish any administrative or ownership structure. 
 
An unrelated PV rural electrification program run by the office of the Directorate of the Ministry of Energy 
and Mines is intended to bring power to communities that are anticipated to get access to the national 
electric grid within the five years following installation. In selected communities, MEM donates a battery, 
lamps, and balance-of-system components to households, but does not donate the panel. The panel is 
loaned to the user, remaining property of MEM, and must be surrendered by the beneficiary at MEM’s 
discretion. When functioning as designed, the program allows communities to have access to limited power 
from solar home systems for a few years, and then requires them to give the panels back to MEM once they 
are connected to the national grid. The panels are then placed in another community that is expected to be 
reached by the grid within five years. The longevity of quality PV panels (most have warrantees of 20 to 25 
years) makes this a practicable solution. The high cost of the panels compared to the other components of 
the system makes this an economically logical solution: it is worth the labor costs to re-collect the panels, 
but not used batteries or installed wiring. Employees of MEM report having used this model to install 
systems in new communities. 
 
There is a condition under which MEM will reclaim a panel before the grid has reached a household. If the 
entirety of the system is not maintained, MEM may reclaim a panel and use it for another household or in 
another community. The logic behind this is that the panel is no longer providing value to someone who 
does not have a working battery or lights, so it should go to another family that will value it enough to 
maintain its electric system. This seems to be perceived as a concrete threat by users, but is rarely carried 
out. 
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When the program is operating as designed, MEM has a fairly current idea of the status of all of its 
systems, as they are expected to visit each beneficiary community every six months. In fact, MEM lacks 
the resources to make these semiannual visits even to relatively accessible communities, and some 
particularly remote communities have not been visited in years (also indicating that beneficiary 
communities do not necessarily get access to the national grid within the timeframe anticipated at the time 
of installation). Other communities in which MEM systems are located are not safe places for MEM 
employees to travel: parts of Guatemala are under the control of drug cartels and other criminal elements 
that do not wish to have government interference of any sort. Any government activity, not just the activity 
of law enforcement, is seen as a threat. Thus even the lists of communities and the counts of systems held 
by MEM are not entirely accurate because they have not been updated. 
 
4.6.6.2. Government owned and managed systems 
This is a small category in this study, consisting of a group of only nine projects owned by the National 
Coordinator for Disaster Reduction (Coordinadora Nacional para la Reducción de Desastres, or 
CONRED). These projects are unique in this study in that they were installed for disaster reduction efforts, 
but local community members benefit much like beneficiaries of donated or loaned systems. The primary 
intended use of these systems is for radio communication with other communities and with centralized 
coordinators, with one exception of a system used to provide lighting to a community building in the event 
of a disaster. 
 
The radio systems are all installed in people’s homes. Seven are part of a larger flood early warning system 
for the Coyolate Watershed. In this early warning system, CONRED selected communities based on 
location within the watershed and accessibility to CONRED representatives. In each of these communities, 
someone in the community (usually the leader) volunteered to be a “collaborator” and have a PV-powered 
radio communications system installed in his or her home. Collaborators in the upper watershed measure 
rainfall and report it daily (or during unusual events) via radio to a centralized location staffed by 
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CONRED employees. Mid-watershed collaborators monitor a simple stream gauge and report stream levels 
daily, or immediately if they exceed a predetermined level. Lower watershed collaborators receive reports 
of river levels and alerts when a flooding event is likely. In the event that a flood is coming (as determined 
by mid- and upper watershed conditions), the lower watershed collaborator is responsible for notifying his 
or her community and communities in the immediate vicinity. These alerts give residents several hours 
advanced notice to elevate possessions above the expected water level during small events, or evacuate 
during extreme events.  
 
CONRED dispatches its employees to provide maintenance to the systems, including replacement of 
batteries or other components as needed. Users have minimal maintenance responsibilities, generally 
limited to the addition of water to the batteries as needed and cleaning dust from the PV panel. 
 
Radio systems use very little energy. While PV systems are extremely modular and scale well, there are 
practical limits to how small a system can be. PV markets in Guatemala typically sell crystalline panels that 
range from 35 W to 100 W, though low-quality thin-film panels are available in smaller sizes. A single 35 
W or 45 W panel with a single deep cycle battery, the smallest system that can be practically installed and 
the system type installed in this program, provides more than enough energy to run the radio systems. It is a 
“known secret” that the households avail themselves of the excess energy even though such use is not 
officially sanctioned.   
 
Because users have an obligation to communicate with CONRED daily, and because such communication 
depends upon systems being operable, the agency knows where the systems are located and whether they 
are currently functioning. While budget constraints do not allow for perfect system maintenance, the 
systems are categorically well maintained. 
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4.6.6.3. Home systems donated for disaster relief 
Hurricane Mitch in 1998 was devastating to many poor indigenous communities in the highlands of Alta 
Verapaz, according to local residents and NGO’s. A substantial effort was made towards helping them 
recover from the disaster, coordinated by one of the world’s largest humanitarian relief organizations.61 The 
program was multifaceted. Among other things, rural farmers were provided with seeds to re-plant 
traditional crops that were wiped out by mudslides and heavy rains during the storm, as well as seeds for 
new cash crops to diversify their income sources. Estufas mejoradas, small and simple concrete wood-
burning stoves that demand a fraction of the firewood needed for cooking on traditional fires, were 
provided to affected households. And the multinational relief organization contracted with a local NGO 
specializing in renewable energy to provide solar home systems to people in the beneficiary communities. 
 
Notably, this was a relief operation – focusing on the immediate aftermath of the disaster, with a short 
timeframe and quick results demanded – not a development operation with sufficient time and funds 
allocated to meet a mandate of permanently changing a population’s circumstances.  
 
In relief operations, humanitarian organizations may be able to guess the needs of a population fairly 
accurately. Food, water, basic shelter, cooking fuel, acute medical care and assistance locating family 
members are arguably self-evident needs of people who are abruptly displaced due to a catastrophe. Things 
like electric lighting and seeds for cash crops may be intended to have longer-term impact, and may not 
qualify automatically as needs for all people affected by disasters. 
 
Conceiving, planning, developing, implementing, and following up upon a project that involved installing 
solar home systems in “dozens”62 of communities and hundreds of households within a one-year timeframe 
was difficult. The local NGO claims now to have objected initially and throughout, asking for more time, 
which they were neither promised nor given (although it must be noted, they accepted the project under the 
                                                          
61 Information is from interviews and conversations with Iván Azuria of Fundación Solar, the local NGO involved, and residents of 
the region 
62 Project documents were unavailable and neither community members nor the member of the NGO interviewed recalled the exact 
number of communities or households included. 
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conditions given). “Socialization” or integration of the energy systems into the communities was notably 
lacking. One socialization component that was missing was an assessment of the long-term needs of the 
communities in question. Another component that was truncated due to time and funding limits was 
training: both technical and administrative training sessions were few and brief.  
 
Consistent with the program’s original plan, users were 100% owners of their systems with full 
responsibility for their operation and maintenance as soon as they were installed. 
 
Successes and failures related to the solar home systems included in this project are detailed in the Results 
chapters that follow. The overall program had varying degrees of success with its different components. 
The improved stoves that were installed seemed to remain in use at the time of these interviews. On the 
other hand, there were reports of crop failures when some of the donated seeds were planted. The specific 
causes of these cases of mixed successes were not assessed in this research.  
 
4.6.6.4. Home systems donated for post-conflict development 
The civil war, described in detail in Section 3.4, left an indelible mark on Guatemala, but its impacts were 
felt more strongly by some populations and in some areas than others. In the northern highlands where 
largely indigenous populations were controlled, re-settled, and sometimes massacred by government 
troops, the current level of poverty is unsurprisingly high. As part of the Peace Accords signed in 1996, the 
government agreed to provide development assistance to these populations. As part of this development, a 
solar home system program was initially created for widows and orphans and then expanded to include all 
members of selected communities. 
 
Although the program was part of the Peace Accords and so technically the responsibility of the 
Guatemalan national government, significant funding came from outside sources, and the program was 
administered by Fundación Solar, a Guatemalan NGO that had a presence in the immediate vicinity. Under 
the guidance of this NGO, community members who wished to participate formed representative 
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organizations. A project head in each community became that community’s representative in an area-wide 
organization. The purpose of this organization is both to act as the users’ collective voice when dealing 
with outside parties, and to provide system management and maintenance. All beneficiaries signed 
agreements stating that they would pay into the maintenance fund, and in return they would be eligible for 
service and replacement of components as needed. 
 
As such, the program provided technical and administrative training to designated individuals rather than to 
entire communities. Although users themselves were sole owners of their systems, institutions were put in 
place to assist both technically and economically with maintenance. 
 
4.6.6.5. Other systems 
Other donated stand-alone PV systems in Guatemala have been included in this study. Two such systems 
were donated as part of the development of hydroelectric projects. Because of the low infrastructure 
demands, PV can be installed quickly and used to enable development of the larger energy project. It can 
be used to power or charge telephones as a means of communication, for example. Both panels were put to 
other uses after the hydroelectric projects were completed.  
 
Several communities near Lake Izabal have or had women’s weaving cooperatives that use PV lighting 
installed by an NGO to allow women to work later in the evenings. One of these is included in this 
research.  
 
A coordinator who works with several NGO’s assisted me in seeing two tourism development projects 
involving lighting as part of a community-owned rustic eco-hotel. Another project was related to an 
archaeological dig.  A North American archaeological team has been excavating Mayan ruins on the border 
between the Departments of Petén and Alta Verapaz for “many” years. At one point, three communities 
surrounding the site demanded that they be included in the benefits of excavations on land that was 
historically theirs and of artifacts that belonged to their ancestors. Apparently without objection, the 
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principle archaeologist assisted them in creating a tourist stop on La Ruta Maya, the tourist corridor in 
Guatemala that highlights the natural landscape and the ancient cultures of the Mayan population, which 
made the archaeological site accessible to the public while bringing income to the communities. The 
interest of this research in the project are the PV systems that are used to power lights in buildings intended 
for visitors and the two-way radios that the guard/guides use to communicate in their work.  
 
Separately, a PV system had been donated by an NGO to help rangers manage LaChua Park, but had been 
removed after the national electric grid arrived, so little information about it was available. 
 
Finally, a system powering a rural health clinic and school was included. A series of three PV arrays, 
totaling a remarkable 700 W, powered a DC refrigerator intended for use with solar power, a TV and VCR 
used as a telesecundaria, or secondary school taught via video cassette because no teacher is available, and 
lighting for both the clinic and the school. The original sources of funding were from multilateral agencies, 
and part of the system was installed under the same program as the above-mentioned solar home systems 
for post-conflict development. The source of ongoing funding for maintenance of the energy systems and 
clinic and school equipment was not made clear. However, that the community played an active role in that 
maintenance was very evident. On several occasions, the men of the community had carried the refrigerator 
seven miles from the health clinic to the nearest road that could be accessed by a vehicle so that it could be 
sent to a major city for maintenance. Fortunately, the foot track has been widened to a road passable by a 4 
wheel drive vehicle and the community members have been shown how to remove the compressor (the part 
most likely to need maintenance) from the refrigerator, each by itself eliminating the need for six strong 
men to spend hours hauling a refrigerator over a rutted dirt track. At the time of my visit, the compressor 
was in the U.S. being repaired by the manufacturer, with the local NGO involved in the original installation 
acting as intermediary as courier services do not reach such rural locations. 
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These “other” projects and communities vary widely in their contexts and designs. Common factors among 
them are that all were developed by non-governmental entities, and all were owned or managed by a group, 
not by individuals. 
 
This collection of “other” systems includes all those that do not fit into the previous categories of 
government loaned and donated, government owned and managed, home systems for disaster relief and 
home systems for post-conflict development. These groups of systems represent a broad cross-section of 
the programs found in Guatemala. 
 
4.7. Research bias 
Biases are inherent in any study. Even randomized controlled trials – the “gold standard” of evaluation of 
interventions, of which this study is not – can show biases, can be of limited validity in field situations 
where causal chains are long (Victora et al., 2004) and can be impracticable or even unethical (Smith and 
Pell, 2003). Self-selection of participants and low rates of participation in novel programs or using novel 
technologies diminish the validity of even these “ideal” evaluations (Naudet and Delarue, 2008). 
 
Three main biases are found in this study, all of which must be considered in interpreting data and drawing 
conclusions. These are researcher bias and informant bias, discussed below, and sampling bias which is 
discussed in detail in section 4.3. 
 
4.7.1. Researcher bias 
I have attempted throughout to maintain objectivity to the best of my ability. However, researchers 
themselves are products of their cultures and begin with their own understandings and interpretations 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). Further, researchers will be “undeniably affected by what they hear and 
observe in the field, often in unnoticed ways” (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Thus, I seek to be aware of my 
own biases. The researcher’s values may influence the way data is gathered and interpreted (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). For example, I know myself to be an advocate of the use of photovoltaics in general, so I 
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am careful to closely review any conclusions I draw that view them categorically favorably. During the 
course of the study, my skill with the Spanish language (and specifically with the dialects favored by rural 
Guatemalan campesinos) improved considerably. Thus, in later interviews, I was better able to understand 
responses and to ask more probing questions. As such, interviews towards the end of the study are more in 
depth in some ways. However, follow-up questions and requests for clarification were important tools to 
reduce translation bias throughout the study.  
 
For field observations and recording, “what may be generated as ‘data’ is affected by what the (researcher) 
can treat as ‘writable’ and ‘readable’” (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The problem of interpreting data in the 
form of words is compounded by the issue of translation by a non-native speaker. Literal translations of 
words can fail to carry the context in which they are spoken, and may lead to wrong or nonsensical 
interpretations. Spanish as a language compounds this problem because there are so many dialects: words 
and their meanings can vary dramatically in geographically close areas. As an example, to go somewhere 
en pelota in Mexico City means to go “as a group,” in Guatemala it means to go “naked,” and can translate 
literally to “in a ball.” I have addressed this linguistic bias by asking respondents for clarification when I 
was unsure of their meanings, reassessing responses in some earlier interviews to reflect my expanded 
understanding of Chapin Spanish, and by conferring with native Spanish speakers to clarify potential 
misunderstandings. 
 
4.7.2. Informant bias 
Despite telling informants otherwise, many informants seemed to view anyone conducting interviews about 
their solar energy systems as donors or potential donors. Sometimes this was stated fairly explicitly, such as 
one respondent who referred collectively to me, the NGO that installed the system, and the donor 
community in general as “you.” Some who had sold their systems made an explicit point of saying they 
would not sell their systems again if someone were to donate new ones, suggesting that I may be able to aid 
them in that bid. Others asked for contact information for organizations that might be able to donate 
systems for their neighbors or as expansions of their own. 
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As such, some responses may have been targeted towards a potential donor, rather than being completely 
candid. For example nearly all respondents who had received some sort of training associated with their 
systems stated that the training was useful, but that it was not sufficient. I speculate that these answers were 
truthful – that they had found the training useful, but could have benefited from more – but that they may 
have been colored by the hope that I could be instrumental in providing additional training to the 
community. They would have responded in the affirmative that the training was useful so that it would not 
seem a waste to provide further training, but that it was not sufficient, to motivate the desire to provide 
more. This was reinforced by the fact that topics about which informants wanted more training were not 
necessarily related to the energy projects, and informants were sometimes very vague about what type of 
training they would want. This seems to suggest that people recognize education as valuable to them in 
general rather than as specifically related to energy, and the belief that I may be able to provide it. 
 
Above all, I was a foreigner and an outsider to whom they were speaking. Some responses involved 
“impression management” – the desire to be seen in a particular way by myself or others present (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). People were understandably reluctant to admit ignorance, sometimes giving a “yes” or 
“no” answer to a question and only admitting that they did not understand what was being asked when 
asked to expound upon their answer. Because of the culture of low trust (found especially among the 
indigenous), people may have been guarded with their answers regardless of who conducted the interviews. 
Women in particular were shy of speaking, some allowing their husbands to conclude an interview that 
they had started, and some declining to be interviewed because their husbands were not home (I did not 
record the number or location of these instances). Some felt the need to establish superiority over (or 
perhaps equality with) the stranger who was asking questions, such as the man who asked me if I even 
knew how to make tortillas (I admitted with humility that I did not), or the man who asked 
confrontationally but fairly if my work was intended to benefit myself or him and the members of his 
community (I replied that it was my hope that it would most benefit future projects in Guatemala). Overall, 
I found few contradictions in responses that suggested that respondents wished to deliberately misrepresent 
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themselves, and strove to create an atmosphere in which they would have little or no reason to do so by 
telling them that they would not gain from any particular responses, refraining from presenting my opinions 
and by asserting my ignorance as appropriate: I wished respondents to feel comfortable that they had 
superior knowledge of the answers I was seeking. 
 
Ultimately, the cultural and economic gap between my respondents and myself remained. This was not an 
ethnographic study in which I had the luxury of spending long periods of time with the same people until 
both I and they became comfortable enough to at least in part forget our differences. However, I feel that 
there was little deliberate biasing of answers on the parts of informants and that people provided sufficient 
clarification when asked to eliminate most unintentional biases. I have noted in the results sections the 
potential impacts of biases, as appropriate. 
 
4.8. Conclusions 
This chapter describes the context in which the research has taken place and results must be understood, 
and the methodology used to conduct the research. What describes success and the effectiveness of 
methodologies may be very different among other subjects, with different energy technologies, or with 
different means of disseminating the same technology. The results that follow – the factors that drive 
success and failure – must also be understood in the contexts described here. This chapter suggests many 
areas for future research to understand how these contexts affect the success of rural electrification 
programs, including addressing questions omitted from this research due to methodological issues, and 
considering the research questions included here in other countries or regions, with other remote renewable 
energy technologies, and among systems disseminated by market mechanisms, rather than donors. 
 
Guatemala was selected for this research as an example, not an archetype, of a location in which rural 
stand-alone PV systems have been known to fail. The country’s history of violence and repression has 
created circumstances that may differ from other poor but more politically stable countries and countries 
that have experienced their own unique but turbulent histories. Specific impacts of this history on rural 
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electrification may include, but are not limited to, increased poverty, itself a hindrance to “modernization” 
of all sorts; impermanence in the locations of physical communities, which discourages infrastructure 
investment and maintenance; and racial discrimination, which marginalizes the groups that may be most in 
need of assistance in electrification. Cold War rivalries influenced Guatemala’s development, with 
powerful outside actors alternately supporting and undermining Guatemalan national governments to 
further their own ideologies and economic interests; some electrification plans may never have come to 
fruition when a government was toppled, but other electricity development schemes may have been funded 
by foreign entities to serve their own interests.  
 
Violence, poverty and racism continue to inhibit development in Guatemala, with drug trafficking and 
other organized crime playing an increasing role in destabilizing official and volunteer efforts to provide 
access to improvements in quality of life and economic opportunity. In this context, long-term development 
goals such as electrification take low priority. 
 
The sources of information for this research were primarily interviews with the beneficiaries of donated 
stand-alone solar systems and their immediate neighbors. They provide information and perspectives that 
may vary greatly from the ideas, ideals, and expectations of donors, developers and other “experts.” 
Interviews with respondents were structured based on a script of questions, but were conversational in tone 
and frequently deviated from that script. This means of interviewing rendered the statistical analyses often 
used in survey research inapplicable. 
 
No sampling universe from which to draw a random sample of communities could be created for this 
research. As such, communities were chosen using both purposeful and convenience sampling based on 
their accessibility, the political stability of the region in which they were located, and information available 
from governmental and non-governmental organizations. Respondents within a community were selected 
similarly by a combination of convenience and purposeful sampling.  
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Interview questions were developed based on hypothesized linkages and research questions. Interviews 
included structured survey questions as well as open-ended questions and conversation to learn more than 
was normally expressed in brief answers to specific questions. 
 
Only donated systems were considered in this research. The market-based dissemination of PV technology 
in rural Guatemala was seen to be significant,63 but is not included in this study. As described in this 
chapter, market-based distribution influences and is influenced by distribution under donation models, 
especially as robust for-profit markets increase the availability of the technical expertise and physical 
components needed to sustain donated PV systems, but system donations can undercut demand for or 
prices of systems for sale.  
 
“Donation” is differentiated from “sale” here not by a specific level of monetary or in-kind contribution 
from users, but instead based on the decision-making process: for donated systems (which may require 
some beneficiary contribution), donors make the decisions about who is eligible to participate and what the 
system will consist of, while for purchased systems (including those purchased in the informal economy or 
made available under programs where hardware, financing or installation is subsidized), end users decide 
their own levels of participation based on their needs and available resources.  
 
Forms of donation and donor ownership included in this study include systems donated or loaned by the 
Guatemalan government for general development purposes, those owned and managed by a government 
entity, solar home systems donated for disaster relief, solar home systems donated for development in 
communities most affected by the Guatemalan civil war, and sundry other systems that do not fit into these 
categories. These different donation models sometimes lead to very different outcomes, as explored in the 
Results chapters which follow. 
 
                                                          
63 Compilation of data on market-based systems is difficult because systems tend to be installed individually rather than in groups, 
increasing their geographic diversity, because vendors may be sensitive to the confidentiality of their relationships with clients and 
thus unwilling to provide information on installations, and because the small-scale PV business in Guatemala is dynamic, with 
vendors going out of business and new vendors appearing frequently. 
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Chapter 5. Results concerning system uses and system economics 
 
5.1. Introduction to the results chapters 
The following three chapters report results concerning the factors that influence or are otherwise associated 
with system success, as defined in Chapter 2. The contexts of and underlying reasons for many of these 
factors are also explored. 
 
Recapping the definition of success adopted in Chapter 2, a successful system is one that meets 
requirements concerning operability, perceptions and optimality requirements:  
– Operability. The system either was functioning on the day of the interview, or concrete 
steps were being taken to have it repaired in the foreseeable future, or it was removed 
because its use was intended to be temporary until another energy source (typically an 
electric grid) replaced it. Operability was an a priori part of the definition, but that 
technically inoperable systems could also be successful emerged as a part of this 
research; 
– Perceptions. The user considers it successful, feels that it has met his or her expectations, 
and finds it important in daily life or for specific events. The hypothesis that users could 
simply be asked whether a system was successful proved inadequate, and other measures 
of satisfaction and utility give more depth and meaning to user responses. 
– Optimality. Assuming the resources were available, the user would not choose a different 
energy source if the PV system were lost or damaged. A system may be tolerable to users 
in that it functions and is consistent with what they were promised upon installation, but 
willingness to trade it for a “better” alternative suggests that it is sub-optimal and does 
not meet the user’s needs. 
 
The results that make use of the above definition of success are divided into three chapters: Chapter 5, 
concerning system economics and uses; Chapter 6, concerning the institutions and relationships that 
surround, change and are changed by the donation of PV systems; and Chapter 7, concerning the 
characteristics of users, communities and physical systems. Note that these factors are not necessarily 
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exogenous influences upon a system’s success, but can be affected and changed by the donation and 
success of the system. Therefore, each chapter documents results concerning this two-way relationship – 
both how those factors might influence the success or failure of a donated system, and also how the system 
has in turn altered its context.  
 
The current chapter examines the economic circumstances surrounding donated stand-alone PV systems in 
Guatemala, including positive and negative local income changes and the appropriateness of rural 
electrification as a development intervention among the very poor. In it, I also consider the non-economic 
utility of these systems and whether different uses lead to different success outcomes. The questions 
addressed have been defined in Section 3.5.1 of the literature survey. The results documented here are 
based on the results of applying the portion of the questionnaire relevant to economics and use, and the 
statements and observations made by respondents during unstructured portions of interviews.  
 
Chapter 6 explores the institutional contexts of these systems, and the relationships that surround them. 
This includes the effects of national political stability and rule of law and local governing institutions. 
Beneficiary involvement with project initiation, planning and completion, any training and socialization 
that were a part of implementation are illustrated, and negative social or cultural outcomes resulting from 
the projects, along with their association with and effects upon project success. 
 
In Chapter 7 I define the characteristics of users, systems and the communities in which they are located, 
along with exploring the unintended consequences and conflicts that arose as a result of the physical 
systems. The influence (and lack of influence) on success (as defined in Chapter 2) of these characteristics 
is explored, based on responses of system users to relevant questions and physical inspections of the 
systems.64 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 See Appendix A for the survey instrument and Appendix B for the inspection protocol followed in technical inspections. 
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5.2. Introduction to results: economics and utility results 
This subsection provides an overview of the contents of this chapter, including poverty alleviation as a goal 
of renewable energy systems, changes in income or expenditure on energy services for individuals and 
communities, and system uses independent of economic factors. 
 
“El pisto,” a slang term that means “the money” in Guatemala,65 was the most common response to 
questions of why systems were not functioning. Economic considerations were a recurring theme with 
users of successful and unsuccessful systems, and with non-users as well. The interrelationship of stand-
alone PV systems and economics in rural Guatemala are explored in this section, followed by an 
examination of the way these systems are used by beneficiaries and the influence of those uses on system 
success.  
 
Both a priori hypothesized and unexpected results emerge from considering the utility of stand-alone PV 
systems to their users. This chapter considers the tangible gains and losses – and users’ perceptions of gains 
and losses – that have resulted from the donation of these systems in rural Guatemala.  
 
Higher economic value to system users was hypothesized to increase the likelihood that the project will 
succeed. Projects that present income-earning opportunities or that directly save money should succeed at a 
higher rate than those that have little or no economic potential. Conversely, projects that remove income 
earning opportunities should be less likely to succeed. However, the following results show that the 
answers are not as clearly definable as these hypotheses suggest.  
 
Responses to questions throughout the survey often came back to money (see Appendix A for a complete 
list of survey questions). An inability to maintain the system, travel to meetings to participate in training 
and decision making, replace failed components with quality parts, and to participate at all while their 
neighbors were excluded all came back to money. I asked direct questions about the economic costs of 
                                                 
65 “Pisto” was translated for me by a native Spanish speaker from northern Mexico as an alcoholic drink, and is found in on-line 
translation engines as ratatouille or a Spanish vegetable casserole. Care must be used in understanding colloquial terms in appropriate 
context. 
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using the system, in addition to money savings, money earning opportunities, and project funding. 
Specifically, I did not ask quantitative questions about users’ incomes except how they were affected by the 
systems themselves. Survey research suggests that respondents frequently refuse to answer or give 
“socially desirable” (i.e., false) answers to questions that they consider sensitive (Fowler, 1995, p.28) or 
mistakenly omit informal or irregular cash transactions (Fowler, 1995, p.10), which is consistent with 
previous experiences I have had in asking income-related questions while conducting surveys in rural 
Guatemala. Therefore, I deemed such direct questions to be of little or no value. 
 
The utility of the system in less monetary terms was hypothesized to be relevant to system success, and is 
discussed in this chapter. A specific use, the response of PV systems to weather-related and other disasters, 
emerged as an interesting theme, although I had no a priori hypotheses about this, as discussed further 
below. 
 
These results are explored in detail in this chapter. Section 5.3 briefly summarizes previous findings on 
economics and utility in rural energy and related contexts and summarizes the working hypotheses that 
arose from this review of existing literature. 
 
Section 5.4 explores the concept of poverty alleviation, very often an explicit or implicit goal of donor 
programs, and the effects on poverty of systems examined in this study on system users. Here I also present 
results showing how community members saved, lost or earned money as a result of donated systems, and, 
as importantly, their perceptions of these economic effects.  
 
Non-monetary uses of donated systems are explored in section 5.5. These include household and 
institutional uses, and examine the changes or benefits users experienced when they obtained PV systems. 
The specific use of systems in emergency situations is described in section 5.6. 
 
Finally, section 5.7 reviews the relationships I found between economics, utility and system success, and 
the relevance of this work as it relates to previous research on the topic. 
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5.3. Hypotheses and research questions 
As described in detail Chapter 3, rural renewable energy projects are believed to save users substantial 
money on things like candles, dry-cell batteries, kerosene, and recharging car batteries – all frequent energy 
expenditures in rural developing world communities. These savings can more than offset the cost of system 
maintenance (Acker and Kammen, 1996; van der Plas and Hankins, 1998; Duke et al., 2002; Corsair, 
2005).  
 
Rural renewable energy systems that present income-generating opportunities tend to be more successful 
than those that do not (Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti, 2002; Troy, 2002; Acker and Kammen, 1996). 
However, direct income generating activities (electric sewing machines or video houses, for example) are 
relatively rare in rural developing world applications (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001), as was also observed in 
this study. 
 
Thus previously published studies suggest that users will benefit economically from having access to rural 
stand-alone PV systems, but that the economic benefits will not be large or quickly realized. This research 
shows that many users do benefit economically, though sometimes in unexpected ways, while other users 
feel little or no economic effect, and some are in fact worse off economically because of donated systems, 
as discussed throughout this chapter. There is little published about the potential negative economic 
outcomes resulting from donated PV systems, or about relationships between how a system is used (other 
than for economic gain) and its potential for success. This literature, together with anecdotes from 
professionals and volunteers working in development and my own previous observation, suggest several 
research questions and hypotheses, as detailed below. 
 
This research began with three basic research questions about economics and utility as they relate to system 
success (repeated from Section 3.5.1 of literature survey): 
1. Are there people who are earning more or saving money by using the system instead of traditional 
power sources?  
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2. Are there people who have lost income opportunities or are incurring greater expenses because of 
the system? 
3. What do people use their systems for, and how do different uses lead to different success rates, 
independently of economic impact? 
 
As discussed in the literature review (Chapter 3), my initially hypothesized answers to these questions at 
the outset were straightforward: 
– Most users would save money relative to previous energy sources, and those who did would have 
higher success rates than those who did not save money. 
– Some few would earn money with their systems, and those would have the highest success rates. 
– Vendors in the communities would lose income due to decreased sales of candles and gas for 
lamps. Greater negative economic impacts would lead to lower success rates. 
– Systems used for direct income generation and for cell phone charging would have higher success 
rates than those not used for one of these purposes. 
 
The underlying assumption driving these questions and their hypothesized answers was that the provision 
of donated stand-alone PV systems would decrease the level of poverty of the beneficiaries. However, the 
results of this research turned out to not support this assumption and the resulting hypothesized answers: 
donated PV systems may leave unaffected or even exacerbate poverty, as discussed throughout this chapter. 
 
Specifically excluded from this research are questions of financing. The only financial tools considered to 
enable users to meet the costs of system maintenance are savings cooperatives or maintenance 
organizations put in place by donors or project developers. Questions were not asked about access to credit, 
savings outside these cooperatives and other means of access to capital. However, such access could be 
important in maintaining systems (Collins et al., 2009), and should be the subject of future research.  
 
The results of my examination of these questions and hypotheses are discussed throughout this chapter.   
The first two questions, which concern the positive and negative (respectively) cost and income impacts of 
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energy, are addressed in the next Section (5.4). The third question, which is about how people use the 
systems and derive utility from it, is the focus of Section 5.5. 
 
5.4. Economic value and poverty alleviation 
“We had savings, we weren't spending much on gas, candles, bulbs. We didn't have so much 
smoke and health improved...”  
- community member, describing her household’s  
circumstances while she had a functioning solar home system 
 
The economic outcomes of stand-alone PV systems installed in the communities studied varied based on 
the type of ownership, the programs under which they were installed, and the characteristics of the 
communities and beneficiaries themselves. These outcomes are described in detail throughout this chapter. 
 
This section is organized as follows. Section 5.4.1 examines the definitions of poverty and poverty 
alleviation. In section 5.4.2, the economic concept of “willingness to pay” is explored in the context of 
extreme poverty, along with the effects on poverty of changes in energy expenditures (5.4.3 and 5.4.4) and 
improvements in livelihoods (5.4.5 and 5.4.6) resulting from energy-related development opportunities. 
Sections 5.4.7 and 5.4.8 examine lost income and perceptions of lost income that results from donated 
systems, followed by explanations of income effects in the specific cases of systems that are sold by 
beneficiaries and community-based systems. 
 
5.4.1. Poverty alleviation  
I reference “poverty” and “the poor” frequently throughout this work. However, “the poor” is not a 
homogeneous group. Social and economic strata exist in even the poorest of communities: someone living 
on $2 per day may seem from the researcher’s perspective to be nearly as poor as someone living on $1 per 
day, but the former is in fact twice as wealthy. Additionally, even at approximately equal income levels, 
different groups can have very different outcomes in analogous circumstances. This topic, in particular the 
166 
 
difference in outcomes between Ladino and indigenous respondents, is examined in more detail in Chapter 
7. 
 
Many development projects either explicitly or implicitly include poverty alleviation among their goals. 
Few if any would view creating ongoing dependence as an intended outcome, but would instead include 
decreasing need – and thereby decreasing dependence – as part of the very definition of development. In 
this section, I examine the concept of poverty alleviation as it relates to development through rural 
electrification, and examine the outcomes observed in this research. 
  
Poverty alleviation can occur either because the cost of providing energy services is reduced (substituting 
cheaper electricity for more expensive candles for example), because productivity and income is increased 
(e.g., longer store hours are made possible, increasing store revenues, or in the long term, electricity results 
in better educated workforce), or a mix of both. In general, expenditure reduction was more commonly 
observed than an increase in income among the projects surveyed here. 
   
Despite the stated or implied economic goals of the projects, for many respondents involved in this study 
there were virtually no long-term economic changes that resulted from the implementation of the system. 
Systems installed in schools and health clinics were rarely used since these buildings were often designed 
with adequate natural light for their normal daytime use. Those users who failed to maintain their solar 
home systems saved money on lighting for as long as the systems functioned. After the first failure (such as 
a dead battery), they resumed using the traditional lighting sources available to them in the absence of PV: 
long-term poverty conditions remained unchanged.  
 
5.4.2. “Willingness to pay” and “ability to pay” 
“We would go to bed early” when the family couldn’t afford candles before the solar home system was 
installed, said a participant in the post-conflict development program. Rather than the statement being in 
praise of the system that now allowed him to have light every night, it was a complaint about the lack of 
flexibility he now has in paying for his lighting sources as a participant in the maintenance organization. He 
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told me if “you” (me, the project developer specifically, the development community and Gringos in 
general) intend to donate something, it should be donated outright without monthly payments attached. 
Before the solar home system, he and his family bought candles as needed. Sometimes they cut ocote66 if 
they could not afford candles. But more often, as he told me, they went to bed early. With PV, he does not 
have the choice to not spend on lighting when money is tight. He accepted a commitment to pay into a 
collective maintenance organization when he accepted his solar home system, and upholding that 
commitment was sometimes burdensome. 
 
His was one of the cases in which the respondent claimed to spend more on the solar home system than 
they had on previous lighting sources. Not only was the quantity of money demanded greater, but the 
schedule of payments lacked flexibility as well. The payment was due every month, whether he had found 
work that month or not, whether he had brought in his crops or not, whether he had any source of income or 
not. When he bought candles, he bought them on his own terms. 
 
The day I spoke with him, he teetered slightly as he stood, and leaned far too close when he spoke (even by 
Guatemalan standards), and smelled of alcohol. His dog bit me on my way out of his house. As such, it was 
clear that he had resources enough to buy alcohol and feed a dog; however, his family’s food supply was in 
piles on the dirt floor: black beans still in the pod and corn still on the cob, all awaiting the hand labor of 
his wife and daughters to separate food from chaff. It was clear that his resources were limited enough that 
he still relied largely on subsistence agriculture for food. 
 
Did the fact that his family made their monthly payments regularly in fact mean that they could afford to? 
This section examines that question. 
 
Among failed systems surveyed in this research, demonstrated willingness to pay for lighting was less than 
the amount needed to save for the maintenance of the system. More than 10% (5/46) of respondents with 
failed systems who provided sufficient information indicated that their households sometimes relied on 
                                                 
66 Ocote is a resinous pine used for torchwood. 
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ocote (which people typically cut themselves rather than purchasing); ocote is seen as a less desirable 
alternative to candles because of the thick smoke and poor quality of light it produces. Some simply went to 
bed early. Thus, for some, their demonstrated willingness to pay for lighting was also less than the cost of 
the candles required to meet all of their lighting needs. 
 
Since electric lighting was seen as a superior light source by all respondents who commented on lighting 
quality and may have more value than light from the less expensive candles and ocote combination, one 
could say that people were unwilling to make the trade-offs required to purchase the preferable light 
sources; however, respondents seemed to view light as a basic necessity. Why would people be unwilling 
to make trade-offs to purchase a basic necessity? Perhaps the answer is that they are unable. 
 
In all communities included in the post-conflict development, disaster relief and government loan 
programs, beneficiaries of solar home systems initially formed collective savings funds on the advice of the 
donating organization. Many of these maintenance organizations were abandoned after a short time.67 
When asked why these funds had not been used to maintain the systems, some responded that the funds 
were redistributed to the people who contributed them in the face of some pressing need, like a crop failure. 
Thus, people who were willing to pay for a system under what they consider to be normal circumstances 
may in fact be unable to pay in the long term because of occasional, more urgent needs. This was especially 
true in communities involved in the disaster relief program. None of those communities had functioning 
collective maintenance savings at the time of these interviews. 
 
Energy poverty – being unable to afford energy needed – is often defined based on the percentage of 
income spent on energy (Foster and Tre, 2000). This common definition is inadequate both because the 
cutoff is necessarily arbitrary, and because reasons for spending more or less income on energy vary. A 
household that spends a large percentage of its income on energy may do so because its income is so small, 
or may do so because it has disposable income that it chooses to use on energy-intensive activities (Foster 
                                                 
67 The reported length of time that savings or maintenance cooperatives were in place varied among respondents within communities 
to the degree that I cannot say with any certainty how long they functioned. Typical estimates were between a few months and a few 
years. 
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and Tre, 2000). Defining ability to pay (ATP) is inherently subjective. By one definition, if a household can 
pay for an essential service (in this case, energy for lighting) without the expense causing them to be unable 
to pay for other essential services (e.g., food, water, medicine) or liquidating productive assets (land, tools), 
then the household can be said to have the ability to pay for that service . However, judgment of what items 
can be included in the category “essential services” and the minimum amount that can be spent to meet 
these basic needs must be defined to measure against this test. The idea of “need” differs dramatically 
across different cultures, across different households within the same culture, and even among individual 
household members (Muela et al., 2000); the concept is inherently subjective (Muela et al., 2000). 
 
By one definition, if an increase in the cost of a service results in a bigger proportional drop in usage for the 
poor than it does for the rich, this is an indication of the lack of ability to pay (Donaldson, 1999). This 
analysis requires that there are measurably different income strata within the population in question, and 
that the cost of a service changes – two conditions that are not met in this study. 
 
Willingness to pay metrics have historically been used to define fees for essential services in developing 
world applications (Russell, 1996; Guyatt et al., 2002). The willingness to pay for a good or service is a 
function of income and personal preferences; it measures how much of one commodity a consumer will 
purchase, at the expense of all others and within the limits of his or her income. This approach treats all 
commodities equally. If people spend all of their income on medical care but do not buy food or diamond 
rings, it is because they prefer medicine to food and jewelry. Willingness both to go without rings and to 
risk death from starvation in order to avoid death from an illness would be reflected as consumer choice in 
WTP analysis. 
 
This approach is inadequate when the consumers in question are very poor because it assumes WTP 
reflects ATP, and that consumers are able to allocate their income in a way that provides for their own 
concepts of basic need. However, the poor may leave some basic needs unmet (like food) in order to meet 
an immediate need (medicine for an acute illness, for example) or may liquidate their productive assets to 
meet the immediate need, leaving them unable to meet future needs (Russell, 1996).  
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A household may mobilize more of its resources – sacrifice more of its basic needs – under some 
circumstances rather than others. In an example from highland Kenya, the cost to a household of 
purchasing insecticide-treated bed nets, critical in the fight against malaria, was equivalent to the cost of 
sending three children to primary school for a year (Guyatt et al., 2002). A household that demonstrates a 
willingness to pay for bed nets cannot necessarily be said to have an ability to pay for them. If they must 
choose between sacrificing health and sacrificing a child’s primary education, they are unable to meet all of 
their basic needs. In other cases, much may be sacrificed to treat an illness in the household’s primary wage 
earner, where a child may be allowed to die if faced with the same illness (Muela et al., 2000). Home 
lighting is perhaps more easily sacrificed than other basic needs: food is more important than light. “What 
do we need electricity for? So we can watch our children starve to death at night?” lamented a Guatemalan 
mother (Manz, 1988, p 43). This does not necessarily suggest that lighting is not an essential service any 
more than the examples above suggest that primary education or the life of a child is not essential. 
 
Respondents who did not participate in savings cooperatives generally claimed that they could not afford to 
put money into maintenance funds established at the projects’ inceptions, and consequently had no savings 
to replace the battery when needed. They were unable to explain why they were able to pay as much as Q70 
per month or more in other lighting expenses (candles, gas for lamps, and batteries for flashlights) both 
before and after the useful life of their system (as limited by the unreplaced battery), but unable to save 
Q20 per month while the system was operable. While this may seem internally inconsistent, the types and 
timing of payments may dictate affordability as much as the magnitude of the payment. When purchasing 
candles or other lighting alternatives, households can adjust their consumption to match their available 
resources. The “average” or “typical” consumption they reported may represent what households use under 
stable conditions. This would overstate their annual expenditures if many nights they use fewer than they 
“typically” do because resources are scarce but do not consume substantially more than usual when 
resources are abundant.  
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Poor households accrue and hold both debt and savings, much of it in the form of small loans exchanged 
between neighbors (Collins et al., 2009), showing that they are familiar with mechanisms that might allow 
them to pay for battery replacement. Whether they choose not to use these basic financial tools to pay for 
home lighting because it is not a high enough priority or they cannot use them because the quantities of 
money are beyond what is available to them is not clear. 
 
Lack of access to capital made battery replacement, the largest expense in maintaining a solar home 
system,68 difficult or impossible for many. Those who dealt more in cash economies (for example, shop 
keepers or those who raised cattle rather than engage in subsistence farming) were better able to secure the 
capital to replace batteries and other system components, but my sampling methodology precludes making 
statistical inferences for the population. Collective savings and maintenance organizations that would have 
made access to capital easier were created under most donations programs included in this study, but many 
were quickly abandoned by users, as discussed further below and in Chapter 6.  
 
The types and timing of payment may dictate the affordability of a thing, even if real costs are the same. 
The costs of some essential services can be paid with goods or labor, or over time (Russell, 1996; Muela et 
al., 2000; Collins et al., 2009). Very low incomes are often earned sporadically, and this uncertainty in 
income is as much an economic obstacle as is its low level (Collins et al., 2009). Among subsistence 
farmers, the flexibility to pay in food or labor, or to pay when the crops come in rather than at a fixed point 
in time can put an otherwise unaffordable basic service within economic reach (Russell, 1996; Muela et al., 
2000; Collins et al., 2009). This is especially true as poor households in both developed and developing 
countries tend to hold a large percentage of their net worth in physical assets rather than cash (Collins et al., 
2009). A neighborhood store owner may be willing to extend credit to or accept alternative payment from a 
household, but a remote battery vendor is unlikely to accept a promissory note or a pig as payment, so the 
greater expense of purchasing candles and kerosene for lighting may be more affordable than maintaining a 
                                                 
68 Replacement of the PV panel itself is more costly than replacement of the battery. However, PV panels are designed to last 20 to 25 
years, and failure of the panel was not found to be a technical cause of system failure in this research. As such, panel replacement is 
excluded from all economic analyses. 
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solar home system. Tiendita owners were not asked about credit offered to community members, and only 
one volunteered that he had a structured program to do so. 
 
In some cultures, community members’ social networks provide gifts and loans that make up a large 
portion of people’s ability to pay when large basic-needs expenses come up (Russell, 1996; Muela et al., 
2000). Social networks may be more willing to help with some types of basic needs expenses than with 
others (Russell, 1996; Muela et al., 2000). This suggests, in this case, that neighbors might be more than 
willing to lend someone money for an emergency doctor’s visit, but unwilling when the cost is a 
replacement battery for a PV system. Small loans may also be more common. Neighbors might regularly 
loan each other a few Quetzales69 to buy candles, but would be unable to amass sufficient capital to help 
buy a battery that cost less than the sum of the candle loans. 
 
One approach to overcoming the obstacle of capital expenditure is a fee-for-service model. Charging for 
basic services based on a service provider’s judgment of an individual’s ability to pay rather than on a 
formula standardized for a population, or having fees that are negotiable on some other basis, can also 
make basic needs affordable , although allowing individual providers to make these subjective judgments 
can also be problematic. Guatemala’s long history of civil conflict has led to low levels of trust within 
communities and between communities and outsiders, as detailed in Chapter 6. This factor may be an 
insurmountable obstacle when allowing local service providers to determine rates subjectively. 
 
Having procured something at a highly subsidized rate can make people less willing to pay a higher price 
for the same thing later (Guyatt et al., 2002). This reflects a change in willingness to pay but not necessarily 
in ability to pay. People may simply be less willing to sacrifice other basic needs more than they feel they 
have to, with that limit having been established in the earlier program. 
 
And finally, misunderstanding of the processes or technologies involved can make an essential service 
unaffordable. Most households in the post-conflict development program paid 20 Quetzales per month into 
                                                 
69 The conversion rate was approximately 8 Quetzales = 1 $US at the time of this research. 
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a maintenance fund managed by a committee in a nearby municipality. Yet, there were inoperable systems 
in one community that needed only basic and relatively inexpensive maintenance to make them usable, 
which should have been within the resources and capabilities of the maintenance committee. All members 
of this community interviewed believed they were paying a fee for the use of the system, either as a rent or 
repayment of a loan made by the NGO that donated the system. They were not aware that their consistent 
monthly payments entitled them to technical help and replacement hardware. Thus, the cost of ownership 
for members of this community was far more than it needed to be. People either spent their own resources 
to buy replacement components like batteries (or in one case, an entire new solar home system) or were 
deprived of the benefits of the system due to an inability to both pay the 20 Quetzales to the committee and 
save independently for future maintenance. In other instances, beneficiaries have been mistaken about 
which component was failing, and therefore spent resources needlessly replacing a functioning piece of the 
system. Various solar home system users reported that their lamps, wiring, or charge controllers had failed 
or were failing, when knowledge of general system operation and specific technical inspections revealed 
that the cause of inadequate system performance was that the battery needed replacement.70 
 
Solar home systems often reduce the resources households must spend on lighting energy, but not always. 
Saving for future expenses seems to be an unrealistic expectation for the poorest communities in this study. 
This might be explained by an extremely high discount rate held by those in extreme poverty: money today 
is worth infinitely more than money at any point in the future if the money today is necessary for survival 
to see that future. High capital costs and inflexibility in payment terms puts battery replacement out of 
reach for many users with low and fluctuating incomes or who participate in non-cash economies. 
Misunderstanding of technical or administrative aspects of a project can reduce users’ abilities to pay by 
driving up maintenance costs.  
 
 
 
                                                 
70 Respondents often volunteered during my technical inspections which components they believed were faulty; I failed to record these 
elements of conversations that took place during the physical inspection and cannot quantify how often users were mistaken about 
causes of system inoperability. 
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5.4.3. Changes in energy expenditures 
Respondents in communities with solar home systems reported that most individual users who managed to 
keep their systems operational, either by their own devices or through continued involvement of donors, 
realized the financial benefit of reduced lighting costs and, for a few, increased income opportunities. 
Specifically, only 9% (4/44) of respondents who provided information about their cost savings and income 
generation opportunities reported spending more money on energy while they had operable solar home 
systems than they did prior to the acquisition, as shown in Table 2. One of the four reported his energy 
expenditures increased because, having experienced some electricity in his home, he wanted more and 
bought a diesel generator to supplement his household’s power. 
 
With PV   
Spend Less or the Same 91% (40/44) 
Spend More 9% (4/44) 
Community System (N/A) 16 respondents 
Table 2: Change in energy expense with PV system 
 
Information included in compiling Table 2 included comments volunteered by users: at some point during 
the interview, the respondent explicitly stated that his or her household spent less on energy with the 
system in place. Interview subjects were also asked explicitly if it was more expensive to provide 
household energy with the system in place than without it.  
 
Respondents were asked to estimate their typical expenditures on candles, kerosene, batteries and other 
purchased energy sources prior to the receipt of their solar home systems, and were asked to estimate their 
expenditures on these same energy sources at the time of the interview, if the solar home system was still 
operational, or during the time it was operational. Respondents were also asked what tariff, if any, they 
were expected to pay. Where respondents gave sufficient information, the difference between energy 
expenditures without the system was compared to energy expenditures (including tariff) with the system in 
place to determine whether the system represented an increase or a decrease in energy cost. 
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Finally, comments associated with questions of whether and how respondents or community members saw 
increases or decreases in income as a result of the system were used to categorize changes in expenses if 
respondents specifically commented that any additional costs or decreases in income were offset by 
increased income allowed by the system. 
 
Thus, very few respondents who provided sufficient information saw increases in energy expenditures as a 
result of the donation of PV systems. At least one of these four began spending more because he chose to 
expand his energy services well beyond his previous uses by acquiring a diesel-powered generator. Some 
beneficiaries in the government loan program and the government-owned and -managed flood early 
warning system program chose to acquire energy-consuming devices like tape players and televisions, 
although they did not report these resulting in increased costs. These additional loads are in excess of the 
systems’ design specifications and therefore are likely to shorten battery life. More frequent replacement of 
batteries adds to the overall cost of the system, and it was not clear that users understood that they were 
undertaking additional costs by breaking “the rules” against such appliances that were issued when the 
donation was made. The other three who reported increased energy expenditure, however, are users who 
incurred an economic burden as a result of a donated solar home system. This raises questions about the 
presumed ubiquitous effectiveness of donated PV in poverty alleviation.  
 
5.4.4. Cost savings and poverty alleviation 
Households often have an energy use portfolio, rather than relying on a single source (Foster and Tre, 
2000). In the U.S., many households make use of both electricity and natural gas or fuel oil. In developing 
world applications, many households use combinations of traditional biomass, candles, petroleum-based 
fuels (gas, kerosene, diesel, etc.), and others, sometimes including electricity (Foster and Tre, 2000). To 
understand the impact of energy use on poverty, one must look beyond electricity since many of these 
sources can be substituted for one another (Foster and Tre, 2000). This research focuses only on electricity 
and the fuels it directly displaces, an acknowledged limitation of this work. 
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Stand-alone PV systems have been donated by non-governmental organizations, loaned to users by the 
government to provide electricity until the national grid can be expanded to reach a community, and sold at 
highly subsidized rates to users with the expectation that they will repay a fixed portion of the cost. 
However, it is not only the third category (excluded from this research) in which the users incur ongoing 
expenses for their systems. Lighting systems’ batteries71 and light bulbs must be replaced periodically, with 
charge controllers and lamps being replaced less often.  
 
The programs included in this study target the rural poor. Where are these users expected to get the money 
to pay for maintenance? Does this new cost burden exacerbate poverty, even as it brings “development” to 
a community? 
 
The disaster relief, post-conflict development, and government loan programs set up collective 
maintenance funds into which users were expected to contribute on a monthly basis and then draw upon as 
needed. This eliminates the need for seemingly impossibly large expenditures of capital when maintenance 
is needed: the money is already in the bank. Other programs encourage users to save money for future 
expenses without creating a structure under which to do so. These savings programs met with varied 
success, as described below. 
 
Solar home systems provide some or all of a household’s indoor lighting needs and therefore displace 
previous household lighting costs. Without solar lighting, households must spend money on candles, 
kerosene, batteries, or other energy sources if they are to meet their lighting needs. Thus, economically 
speaking, a household is better off with the solar home system if the amount it must save for future capital 
costs is less than its previous expenditures on lighting energy.  
 
Respondents reported that savings programs in this study typically collected 20 Quetzales, or around 2.50 
$US per month (respondents reported an average of 18.6 Quetzales per month, with mode and median of 20 
Quetzales). Even when paying into these savings programs, most households with whom I spoke were 
                                                 
71 Deep-cycle batteries recommended for solar home systems have an expected life of 3 to 5 years if well maintained. 
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economically better off with their solar home systems. Some households still used candles, gas lamps, and 
batteries for flashlights while they had working PV systems. Flashlights were used for travel outside the 
home at night, and combustion sources of lighting were used if the battery got low (as in the winter when 
there was less sun) or in rooms without electric lights. Among respondents who remembered and were 
willing to discuss their energy expenditures, the median expenditure on other energy sources prior to 
implementation was about 70 Quetzales (8.75 $US) per month, and 3 Quetzales (0.38 $US) while the solar 
home system was in use. Thus, paying 20 Quetzales to a maintenance fund or saving it personally, plus 3 
Quetzales in other energy sources allows a savings of 47 Quetzales per month over previous energy 
expenditures. Since the prices of traditional energy sources continue to increase according to respondents, 
savings will increase over time. 
 
However, this does not tell the whole story. Seven of the 42 respondents to questions about their energy 
costs saw these costs increase with the addition of a solar home system, if they were assumed to save or pay 
20 Quetzales monthly for future battery replacement. Either their initial energy costs or their decrease in 
energy costs were less than 20 Quetzales. That is, 31% of unsuccessful systems were uneconomical while 
only 9% of successful systems theoretically cost their users more than traditional energy sources. 
 
Users of successful systems spent an average of 105 Quetzales per month on energy sources before the 
installation of their panels, where respondents with unsuccessful systems spent an average of 65 Quetzales. 
The average savings seen by the successful system owners as a result of their systems was 99 Quetzales, 
compared to 48 Quetzales for their less successful counterparts. Thus successful users spent more on 
energy beforehand, suggesting they had greater access to resources independent of the project, and saved 
more money (percentage-wise and in total Quetzales): the “wealthy” among the poor were made better off 
by the addition of this resource, but the poorest may not have been. Donated solar home systems may aid in 
rural economic development, but that does not necessarily equate to the alleviation of extreme poverty. 
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5.4.5. Income opportunities 
Income-generating opportunities provided by rural renewable energy systems are said to correlate to the 
success of the system (Troy, 2002). However, direct income generating activities (electric sewing machines 
or video houses, for example) are relatively rare in rural developing world applications. Modest economic 
gains were observed in a few cases in this study (too few to perform quantitative analyses), but not the 
remarkable changes that have been reported anecdotally in Guatemala and in other developing countries. 
Punta de Manabique is one of the economic success stories once celebrated in Guatemala, but was excluded 
from this study as described below. 
 
Following the discussion of the Punta de Manabique project is a description of the ways respondents saved 
or earned money by using their systems and a discussion of the economic gains some respondents 
leveraged by liquidating their assets.  
 
Punta de Manabique: exemplar of income opportunities with rural PV72 
The peninsula of Punta de Manabique in Izabal, Guatemala acts as a barrier “island” protecting the 
mainland from the storms that come in from the Caribbean. The peninsula has been declared a special 
protected area because of its rich biodiversity and fragile ecosystem. The traditional inhabitants of the 
peninsula recognize the value of their environment and make conscientious and sustainable use of their 
resources in their industries. These are primarily fishing, charcoal-making and ecotourism.  
 
Because of the physical geography, the fragile ecosystem and often tempestuous weather, providing 
electricity to these communities by extending the national electric power grid is impracticable if not 
impossible. However, the communities living on the peninsula recognized the economic potential of even 
small amounts of electric power. A consortium of international donors provided stand-alone PV systems to 
two communities and a wind-PV hybrid system to a third. Among the stand-alone PV systems, the first 
community, the economy of which had traditionally depended upon charcoal production, had recognized 
that it was over-using its ecosystem by cutting down trees for charcoal faster than they could re-grow. They 
                                                 
72 Sources for this case study include (Ley, 2006) and interviews with U.S. and Guatemalan development workers involved in the 
project, except where otherwise noted. 
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sought to diversify their income sources and reduce their reliance on removing trees for their livelihoods by 
instead using their unique ecological surroundings to encourage ecotourism. The addition of the stand-
alone PV system allowed the community to add light and refrigeration to its tourism center and 
substantially increase its profitability by increasing the comfort of its visitors. 
 
The second community was a fishing village. They too had actively sought to make use of their 
environment without depleting it to diversify and enhance their income sources. In addition to selling raw 
fish to the mainland as they always had, the women of the community began to make value-added products 
like fish sausage, which was in demand at mainland hotels and restaurants. However, they were limited in 
their profitability by the short lifespan of unrefrigerated fish. Traditionally they purchased ice on the 
mainland and brought it by boat to their community on the sea-side of the peninsula, but ice itself is short-
lived in the tropics. Like the ecotourism community, they requested and received a refrigerator where they 
were able to store their products. In this way, they suffered less loss of product and were less subject to 
daily price fluctuations: they could decline to sell fish for a day or two if the price was lower than they were 
willing to accept. Outside of the fishing season, the women of the community began using their 
refrigeration to make and sell ice cream locally. While they recognize that the money they earn from ice 
cream is small, they see it as an opportunity to use their resource, the refrigerator, to continue their income 
stream year-round. Since the women made use of the refrigeration system to bring money into the 
community, they were entitled to at least a share of the profits. Many of the women went to the mainland at 
the end of the first year and bought themselves shoes. They were the first shoes many of these women had 
ever owned. 
 
The communities on the peninsula of Punta de Manabique illustrate the potential for direct and substantial 
income generation by use of stand-alone PV systems. These communities and systems are not explicitly 
included in this study because of issues of rule of law, discussed further in Chapter 6: organized crime co-
opted control of the peninsula and have since denied access (by acts or threats of violence) to government 
and NGO employees and other strangers. The current status of the systems is unknown to the local NGO 
that had been involved in implementing and maintaining the projects, and any repairs to the systems that 
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are beyond the knowledge of local community members will necessarily go undone. As such, Punta de 
Manabique is an exemplar not only of the potential for PV to benefit rural communities economically, but 
also an example of how making money with a system is not enough to make it successful. 
 
5.4.6. Observed income opportunities 
In communities connected to small hydroelectric systems, new industries are created and people make 
capital investments. In Guatemala, I observed a carpentry shop, innumerable stores with refrigeration, 
pharmacies, grain grinders, a bakery, and a pinchazo (a tire repair shop) that resulted directly from the 
implementation of the new energy system. However, stand-alone PV systems generally did not offer the 
same opportunities. Microhydro systems are sized based on the generation capacity of the water source, 
where small PV systems are sized based on pre-determined electricity demand. Thus, a hydro-connected 
community can “grow into” its energy source, while PV systems offer no room to grow. 
  
Income-generating activities that are facilitated by solar home systems can theoretically increase recipients’ 
ability to pay to maintain their systems. However, I observed a very small range of economically 
productive activities undertaken in the home after dark.  
 
Owners of local tienditas that were part of homes that benefited from donated solar home systems reported 
being able to stay open later and generate more sales because they had electric light. Since these shops 
operate in isolated, subsistence-level communities, I question whether sales have actually increased as a 
result of longer hours or if the same sales have been spread over more hours in the day. Without changes in 
disposable income among members of the communities in which the tienditas are located (which is 
possible because of the donation of solar home systems to other community members, as described in 
section 5.4.4), the total amount of money spent at the tienditas seems unlikely to change. Sales may shift 
from a shop without lighting for nighttime business to one with PV lighting, if more than one tiendita is 
present in a community, but allowing a store to stay open later does not increase the amount of money that 
community members living in poverty or extreme poverty have to spend. However, respondents who were 
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beneficiaries of donated solar home systems and ran tienditas out of their homes reported increased income 
because they stayed open longer hours. 
 
Some tiendita owners reported saving money by communicating with suppliers via cell phones charged by 
their solar home systems. Tiendita owners who were the beneficiaries of solar panels were more likely than 
their neighbors to have performed capital-intensive maintenance like battery replacement.73 It is not 
immediately evident that the additional income generated by staying open a few hours later at night and the 
money saved by communicating with their suppliers via cell phone are the only reasons for their greater 
success rate. As small business owners, they may have more experience managing money, better enabling 
them to save for anticipated expenses. They generally seem to have greater and more regular cash income 
than their neighbors due to the nature of their business, as contrasted with the subsistence farmers and 
occasional laborers who are their clientele. Tiendita owners may have access to credit, developed through 
relationships with the suppliers of the goods they sell, or they may have better access to the stores that sell 
solar home system components through more frequent trips to urban centers. These questions, little 
explored in this research, merit further study.  
 
Cell phone coverage was nearly ubiquitous in the communities in Guatemala included in this study. Few or 
no vendors sold cell phones in rural communities, but many tiendita owners sold saldo¸ or credit for pre-
paid cell phones (by far more common than monthly cell phone plans in Guatemala). Cell phones were 
owned by few community members before the installation of donated solar home systems, and those who 
had them often had to walk to the nearest electrified community, sometimes several hours away, to charge 
phone batteries and purchase saldo. Once cell phone charging was made available in the community by the 
donation of solar systems, more people came to own and use them, as discussed further in section 5.5. 
Except when asked, few tiendita owners mentioned the increase in saldo sales as part of their increased 
income that resulted fairly directly from the donation of solar home systems. However, since saldo use 
increased and most was bought locally, owners of tienditas in communities with donated solar home 
systems very likely saw increased income because of it. Notably, the increased income to shopkeepers 
                                                 
73 Anecdotally, tiendita owners performed or anticipated performing maintenance much more often than other solar home system 
users, but sampling methodology precludes quantifying how much more likely. 
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because of the sale of prepaid cell phone credit whether or not the shopkeepers themselves had functioning 
PV systems. 
 
Other direct income-generating activities enabled or aided by stand-alone PV systems were a fish farm, 
owned and operated by the local Catholic diocese for the benefit of its parishioners, a homeowner who 
collected a small fee for charging her neighbors’ cell phones, a women’s weaving cooperative lit by PV, 
and three tourist sites.74 The success of these productive applications varied. The PV at the fish farm was 
operable and considered useful by respondents familiar with it. The women’s weaving cooperative included 
in this study was also satisfied with its lighting (suggesting that the cooperative was earning enough to 
maintain the system), but an analogous co-op facility in a nearby community was abandoned and in 
complete disrepair.75 
  
The PV system in one tourist facility was viewed as successful by respondents, but it was not helping them 
generate income, as described below. I conducted eight interviews with members of three communities 
with regard to this system. Six interviews were with individuals. For the seventh and eighth, both 
conducted in the same community, I interviewed a group76 claiming to represent a large portion of that 
community and a smaller group of passers-by who joined an interview I began with a community member 
in a public place. All respondents concurred on the basic facts of the history of the project. A foreign 
archaeologist (for whom I was given three different names) had come some years before to excavate a 
Mayan ruin in Cancuén in the department of Petén. Although he employed some local labor, three nearby 
communities united to request (or demand, as seemed to be the implication) of the archaeologist that they 
benefit from this excavation taking place on land that was historically theirs – de facto, though the 
communities did not have legal deeds to the property – and that resulted from the ancient works of their 
ancestors. All concurred that the archaeologist readily agreed, and some seemed surprised by this. To that 
                                                 
74 A fourth tourist site is included in this study but is not considered to be related to income-generation; it was a PV system in a 
national park to aid rangers in their duties. 
75 The abandoned system is not included in this study because I had helped to maintain it during my preliminary fieldwork (albeit 
obviously without success!). Since I had influenced the system in the course of this research, its inclusion is potentially biased. 
76 Between eight and fourteen men participated in the interview. I am not sure of the exact number as they came and went during as 
their interest and time permitted. 
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end, the archaeologist aided in creating a legal association made up of members of the three communities 
and a tourist attraction at the site of the archaeological dig. 
 
Among other things, the creation of the tourist site included the erection of a ranger station, a restaurant, a 
kitchen and a latrine, the formation of a corps of rangers who were responsible for protecting the area and 
acting as tour guides, and the establishment of a boat launch in one of the communities to move tourists 
from the highway on one side of the river to the site on the other. To aid the rangers in managing the site, 
an NGO (there is some discrepancy among respondents as to which one) provided two PV panels and 
several two-way radios. The first panel and stationary radio is located at a privately owned store in the 
community most easily accessible from major roads in the area. The owner of this store also owns the 
motorboat used to transport tourists from the community to the site. He charges for this service and profits 
from it as an individual rather than these profits benefiting the three communities through their association. 
He uses this radio to contact the guide station at the site, where a second PV panel and stationary radio are 
located, and inform them that tourists are coming.  
 
At the site, the guides collect a fee from visitors. This fee benefits the association rather than any 
individual. The guides are paid from these revenues and from sales of food or beverages at the restaurant. 
The guides also have portable radios to aid them in policing and managing the site. All concurred that, at 
the time of the interviews, the association and its members were not seeing economic benefit from the PV 
systems specifically or from the creation of the tourist site in general because the economic downturn had 
resulted in such a steep drop in tourism that revenues were not sufficient to cover expenses. 
 
Members of two of the three communities differed from the third on the question of whether anyone was 
making money because of the systems. The store owner who dispatched the boat had use of the electricity 
from his PV system, even when not using the radio. As such, the store had lighting and members of other 
communities stated or alluded to the fact that he made additional money from his store because of this. 
They also seemed to resent the monopoly that the store owner had on transportation to the site. They 
believed he was making money as a result of that enterprise, and guides stated that tourists were surprised 
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and sometimes resentful when they were asked to pay a site fee after disembarking as well as the 
transportation fee. I can directly substantiate this as I was under the impression that admission to the site 
was included in the fee I paid for transportation, and was myself surprised at being asked for a second 
payment. The store owner, with whom I spoke before I spoke to other community members or guides, did 
not mention that he personally profited from the boat transportation nor that he gained any economic 
advantages over anyone else in the three communities as a result of the donated PV system. 
 
Among the other seven interviews, there was some discrepancy among responses to questions of who, if 
anyone, made money when tourists were present. Those involved in the project, such as guides and 
governing members of the association, presented a very egalitarian picture of a project that would benefit 
when tourists were present. The two group interviews painted a different picture. These respondents 
complained that many community members were de facto excluded from the project, even if they had 
nominal rights to participate. There were few guide positions available, and the guides were among the 
only ones to benefit economically through their salaries. When the restaurant was open, the guides’ wives 
were called upon and paid to cook and serve, increasing the benefit to those households alone. These 
interviews suggested that the majority of people in the three communities did not see direct economic 
benefits from this project, even under ideal conditions. However, they viewed the project as successful in 
that it functioned as planned, and they felt they benefited from it because the association formed to manage 
the project had been able to bring other donation projects to the community – notably, every household in 
the community had recently received a donated water tank. 
 
Two other communities in the general vicinity of the archaeological site had constructed tourist facilities 
appealing to ecotourism and relying upon the remarkable jungle in the area. One had received a single PV 
system, but the panel had been stolen. A second site had received two systems. One panel had been stolen 
so the second was kept in storage where it produced no energy. These two systems were not successful by 
any measure and were not in place long enough to assess what, if any, economic benefit they may have 
brought to community members. 
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Too few and varied direct income-generating PV systems are included in this research to draw definitive 
conclusions about the degree to which income generation itself drives system success. Three tourist sites 
where panels had been installed with income generation as a primary objective did not see their incomes 
increase, but one was successful nonetheless. Systems that were installed for household lighting – with no 
income generating opportunities included in project objectives – increased income for those who had 
tienditas in their homes. This research shows that donated stand-alone PV systems can increase income 
opportunities in rural Guatemala, but I cannot draw conclusions from these limited data to qualify or 
quantify conditions under which income generation is likely nor whether income generation improves 
project success rates. 
 
5.4.7. Loss of income 
Any aid intervention has the potential for negative unintended consequences, including consequences to 
local economics. If a good is available without cost from a donor, why would anyone continue to pay for it 
from a previous source? There are of course reasons that they might, but an economic argument can be very 
powerful, perhaps especially to people already living near subsistence level. Money that might otherwise 
have been spent on candles in the community may be spent instead on battery replacement with a remote 
vendor. Other unanticipated negative effects are possible in any donation situation. In this section, I discuss 
those observed and not observed during the course of this study. 
 
5.4.8. Perception of lost income in the community 
Respondents generally did not have the perception that solar photovoltaic systems in their communities 
cause anyone to lose income. Among interview subjects who responded to the question, 80% believed that 
no one in their communities lost income because solar energy systems had been installed in their 
communities, as indicated in Table 3. In some cases, this was unambiguously true. For example, almost all 
schools with donated solar panels had previously used only natural light. No money was being paid for 
lighting energy either inside or outside the community before PV lighting was added, so no one would 
logically lose income. 
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Community income effect   
Income is lost 5 13% 
Unsure 3 8% 
No income is lost 32 80% 
Total 40   
Table 3. Perception of community members' loss of income resulting from PV 
 
However, in communities where solar home systems were installed, most households continued to use 
other energy sources in addition to their solar home systems, such as batteries for flashlights used outdoors, 
or candles or kerosene when the solar battery was low, but they used less of these other lighting sources 
while they had functioning panels. Eight respondents answered the specific question of why they 
complement or complemented their PV systems with other energy sources. Two said they used traditional 
energy when cloudy weather prevented their batteries from fully charging. Seven mentioned needing 
batteries for flashlights outside their homes.77 These were common themes mentioned implicitly or 
explicitly in more open-ended discussion and in answers to other questions by many respondents. 
 
Kerosene is sometimes purchased from a tiendita in the community and sometimes purchased in larger 
communities or cities. Candles seem to be purchased in the community in which they are consumed. 
Despite respondents’ own reported reductions in candle use and, in the case of tiendita owners, their own 
reductions in candle sales, most people did not believe that this represented a loss of income for anyone in 
the community. “People from other communities come to buy candles,” said one tiendita owner. “Candles 
are also used in ceremonies. They are always bought,” said another respondent. Others pointed to the 
occasional need for candles due to electrical system failure (such as a drained battery) as evidence that 
candle sales did not decrease; although users claimed that they spent less money on candles while they had 
functioning solar home systems, they did not equate this decrease in spending on their own parts to 
decreases in income on the part of candle sellers.  
                                                 
77 One respondent gave both reasons. 
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Tiendita proprietors pointed to their increases in sales during the nighttime hours to show that their net 
income was positive, not negative, as a result of system installation. A member of a community powered by 
a small hydroelectric power plant (and as such not included in this study) observed that those who used to 
sell candles now sell light bulbs. Though not explicitly stated by respondents speaking of stand-alone PV 
systems included in this study, the sale of light bulbs and distilled water (for batteries) may offset or be 
perceived to offset lost income due to decreased candle sales. However, shops in communities powered by 
PV systems may have less access to needed DC light bulbs; the shopkeeper in the community powered by 
the micro-hydroelectric system sold universally available AC lamps.  
 
Respondents were generally disinclined to make directly negative comments about the systems or projects. 
Follow-up questions on many topics in this study revealed that superficially positive responses covered 
decidedly negative thoughts or experiences. In the case of lost income, however, people’s responses were 
consistent. Those who said that no one suffered economically as a result of system installation in general 
did not change their minds when asked about specific potential income losses like reduced candle sales. 
Although increases in income were modest at best (as detailed above), donated PV systems were not seen 
to negatively impact the community financially. 
 
5.4.9. Liquidation of the asset 
A donated renewable energy system may itself be viewed as an economic opportunity to a user via resale. 
In Mexico, very large numbers of solar home systems were donated to households without training or 
explanation (Ley, 2006). The components of these are now available for purchase throughout Central 
America and Mexico, but few of the original recipients make direct use of the donated systems (Ley, 2006).  
 
In my research, beneficiaries in the communities included in the disaster relief category were left after one 
year with full ownership of and responsibility for their solar home systems, without further follow-up or 
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assistance.78 The next contact they had about their systems was from a “system recycler” who convinced 
people that their systems would soon be valueless so they should sell them immediately and cheaply. 
Respondents reported that many of their neighbors, recognizing their own inabilities or unwillingness to 
maintain their systems or with mistaken expectations about their systems, leveraged the financial value of 
their donated systems by selling them to the recycler. This same recycler would return to the communities 
repeatedly during the first few months or year after installation.79  
 
While certainly not the intent of the donor organizations that implemented them, this was inarguably a 
short-term financial gain to the user though arguably a long-term financial loss.  
 
5.4.10 Economic effects of community-based systems 
Systems installed for the benefit of the community, including those used for schools and health clinics, 
offered no direct economic advantages to beneficiary communities.80 Seventeen respondents reported that, 
as their systems were used on a community basis (for schools or health clinics, for example) rather than by 
their households individually, the systems had no economic impact on them personally. No community-
based system included in this research replaced a prior energy source: schools and clinics were used only 
during daytime hours previously, or systems were installed for a new purpose (a vaccine refrigerator was 
installed in one community), or systems were installed when schools were built. Therefore, the systems 
cannot be said to have saved users money compared to a previous energy source.  
 
 
 
                                                 
78 This paragraph is drawn from information provided by respondents and affirmed by a representative of Fundación Solar, the local 
NGO involved in project implementation. 
79 Only five of the twenty respondents in the disaster relief category reported that they themselves had sold their solar home systems. 
However, the sample was strongly biased towards households with systems still in place. Respondents unanimously agreed that 
“many” or “most” beneficiaries in their communities had sold their systems. Details of the contexts of these sales are found in Chapter 
6. 
80 The provision of electricity to a community institution is not inherently assumed to improve that institution’s ability to provide 
health or education services; this study also does not assume that improved education and health necessarily lead to greater economic 
opportunity or productivity. Though both assumptions are arguably reasonable and anecdotally appear to be widespread in the donor 
community, this study does not assume that electrifying community institutions improves community economic prosperity. In fact, 
anecdotes observed during the course of this study lead me to question whether and how solar electricity on a school building has any 
relationship to student learning; this topic should be studied further. 
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5.4.11. Summary: Economic outcomes and success 
Household users were generally better off economically after they received donated systems than before, on 
average incurring lighting expenses with the system that were equivalent to approximately one-third of 
their previous lighting expenses. This averaging obscures the economic reality that about 10% of the users 
saw their lighting energy costs increase. Systems included in this study that were considered unsuccessful 
belonged disproportionately to users whose costs increased. Clearly users who both saw their costs 
decrease and who considered the solar lighting to be as good as or better than their previous lighting 
sources had strong economic and utilitarian incentives to keep their systems operational. Those who took 
on an additional economic burden when they accepted a donated solar home system may have been 
unwilling or unable to pay this higher cost to meet their basic lighting needs. 
 
However, among unsuccessful systems, 69% of former users theoretically should have seen cost savings by 
maintaining their systems rather than letting them fail and reverting to former energy sources. There are 
many reasons for this, as discussed in subsequent chapters. Among strictly economic reasons, access to 
capital when needed was a substantial barrier: though the net present cost was lower, that did not in any 
way guarantee that the avoided lighting costs would be available as cash when system maintenance was 
needed. In theory, representative organizations which collect monthly tariffs should lessen the economic 
burden on individual users. Although the total amount of money may be the same, monthly payments are 
perhaps easier to make than is gaining sufficient access to capital to replace a battery. 
 
The real cost savings afforded by donated stand-alone PV systems did not represent a sufficient condition 
for system success; many economic “winners” failed because capital was inaccessible or for non-economic 
reasons. However, there is a clear general trend of higher success rates where systems brought economic 
advantages to their users, despite the few cases in which systems succeeded despite higher economic costs. 
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5.5. System utility 
“…to charge the cell phone. You can’t do that with a candle!” 
Owner of a successful solar home system 
 
This section examines the uses donated PV systems and the implications of use type on system success. 
Systems in this study were intended to provide illumination, to power communications systems, or to 
power equipment in school or clinic settings. However, these cover a wide variety of applications. All 
respondents reported using their systems in some capacity to provide illumination. Other uses are 
considered in this section. Specific economic impacts of system use are discussed above and not included 
in this section. 
 
5.5.1. PV as an alternative to prior energy sources 
5.5.1.1. Illumination 
Illumination was an application of PV electricity that was used by 100% of respondents in this study. For 
some, it was the only application. However, it did not always replace a previous illumination source, as 
described in this section. 
 
Respondents in home and community applications used fluorescent light bulbs, which were chosen by the 
donor or designer for their low energy use. Lighting fixtures used DC electricity and specially-designed 
light bulbs which cannot be replaced with traditional low-cost, low-efficiency incandescent bulbs. Solar 
home systems typically included three lighting fixtures per household, though not all were functioning in 
all households at the time of my visit. Illumination using PV electricity provides better quality of light than 
combustion light sources like candles, gas lamps, and ocote, according to respondents. Parents view it as 
advantageous for their children’s studying. 
 
Not all lighting applications replaced prior forms of artificial lighting. Electric light in schools was not used 
during school hours. School buildings are built with adequate natural lighting and classes meet during the 
day. School lighting was used for community meetings and celebrations at night, during emergencies if the 
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school was used as an evacuation shelter, as detailed below, and by the teacher if she or he lived in a room 
in the school building. Since teachers are hired by the government and normally are not native to the 
communities in which they teach, having teacher’s quarters in the school building is not uncommon. 
Anecdotal reports suggest that providing basic comforts and conveniences like electric light to teachers and 
medical professionals may encourage them to stay in remote communities rather than seeking to apply their 
skill sets in more urban environments. Whether this approach is effective or not is not is outside the scope 
of this study. 
 
Many users described solar electricity as luz (light) and differentiated that from grid-based electricity. Some 
users seem to understand PV as capturing actual sunlight and storing it in a battery, and then releasing the 
light through their lighting fixtures. None of the general users described receiving the highly technical 
training that would be necessary to explain the processes that convert light through forms of electrical and 
chemical energy before converting it back to light energy, nor would that training have been likely to aid 
users in sustaining their systems. Some respondents trained as technicians or with understanding of 
electricity independent of the PV project had a more nuanced understanding of the technology. 
 
Because all systems included in this research included illumination as one of their applications, it is not 
possible to draw any conclusions about the effect of lighting as an application on system success. Nor was 
there a significant difference in perceptions of light quality between users with successful systems and 
those with unsuccessful systems: all respondents who remarked on light quality praised PV lighting as 
superior to combustion lighting sources such as lamps, candles and torches. 
 
5.5.1.2. Cellular telephone charging 
Cellular telephone charging was an important use of solar home systems. Most other household 
applications have alternative sources of power: batteries can power radios and candles bring light. Larger 
applications such as refrigerators cannot generally be powered by solar home systems. However, there are 
few locations in Guatemala that do not have cellular service, telephones themselves are relatively 
inexpensive, and saldo is easy to find and can be bought in increments starting at less than 1 $US. A 
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cellular phone is useful in emergencies and can be used to keep in contact with family members who live 
outside the community. Since there is no charge for incoming calls, even someone without the resources to 
purchase saldo can benefit from a phone if wealthier friends and family initiate the calls – all dependent 
upon keeping the phone battery charged. 
 
Fifty-three percent of respondents with successful systems reported using them to charge cell phones, while 
only one third of their less successful counterparts reported this as something they did or had done with 
their systems. Two possible explanations are suggested: one is that people are more motivated to maintain 
their systems when they have cell phones or other uses (like television) that cannot be met with alternative 
energy sources. The other is that those with the access to resources to purchase telephones are also more 
likely to have access to resources to maintain solar home systems.  
 
Among the communities included in the disaster relief program, only one community member who 
responded to questions about energy use reported that cell phone charging was one of the applications for 
his household. By comparison, about half of respondents in the post-conflict development project listed cell 
phone charging as one of their uses or former uses. These are communities that are demographically similar 
(indigenous communities with similarly low income levels), suggesting that neither poverty nor “culture” 
precludes cell phone use. Cell phone service was available in or near communities in both programs at the 
time of this study. However, respondents reported that most systems in the disaster relief program only 
lasted a few years after implementation. It is not clear whether cell phone service was available in the area 
at the time the project was put in place. Additionally, since the time that most systems in this group were 
functional was also a time of great economic need and volatility for the beneficiaries, the purchase of a cell 
phone was likely not a high priority for most community members. In contrast, members of the post-
conflict development group are poor but seemed to be in a relatively stable situation, perhaps affording 
them the opportunity to accumulate small luxuries such as phones without any substantial changes in 
standard of living. 
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Because of the very low incidence of phone charging in the disaster relief group, I revisit the correlation 
between success and cell phone charging while excluding those systems. Among solar home system users 
in other categories in this study, 55% of respondents both with successful and with unsuccessful systems 
mentioned cell phone charging as an application in their homes. The hypothesis that the need for electricity 
for cell phone charging will increase the likelihood of success of stand-alone PV systems is not supported. 
Since, outside the disaster relief group, at least one beneficiary still had a working system in each 
community, it is possible that many people with cell phones rely on a few solar panels to charge them. 
While I saw evidence of some households charging multiple phones (some for a fee, others free of charge), 
I did not quantify this. 
 
5.5.1.3. Radio and television 
Radios are widely used in the rural Guatemalan communities visited for this research. A reliable electricity 
supply is not needed for radios, however, since most can be powered by batteries, which are readily 
available at local tienditas. As with cell phones, having a radio does not predict system success: among 
respondents to this question, 23% of users with successful systems used them to power radios, while 22% 
of respondents with less successful systems mentioned radio as one of the uses of their system while it was 
functioning.  
 
Twenty-five percent of users with successful systems who responded to this question had or previously had 
black and white televisions, as did 14% of users with unsuccessful systems. However, the reasons for 
considering these systems unsuccessful are notable: they are not non-functional systems, but these users 
expressed dissatisfaction with the amount of energy provided. They would prefer grid electricity in order to 
power more and larger appliances (such as color televisions). Also notable is the distribution of respondents 
with televisions. One is a telesecundaria, so the television was bought as part of the donation. One 
television owner is located in a post-conflict development community, one has flood early warning system 
power, and the others are all in government loan communities. Among the government loan communities, 
most with TV’s are Ladino, and the government loan population in this study is on average wealthier than 
the indigenous post-conflict development and disaster relief communities. Television users are willing and 
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able to keep their systems functioning, but this does not imply success. Some are able to afford more 
electricity-consuming devices, and find PV unsatisfactory because of its inability to power them.  
 
Among the government owned and managed systems that were intended only for powering two-way radios 
to warn of weather-related and other disasters, all respondents used excess energy for domestic applications 
including lighting, and one admitted to having a television connected to her PV system. The government 
representative in charge of the network of systems to which she belonged knew she owned and used the 
black-and-white television. She openly admitted to using the TV, but insisted that she used it for only one 
hour each day to watch her favorite telenovela, the Latin American answer to North American soap operas. 
Hers was a successful system by the definition used in this research: it was functional, she thought it 
successful, and her household would not have selected a different form of energy if it had been available. 
Her system’s success made her exceptional among television users – most had unsuccessful systems based 
on the criterion that they considered them sub-optimal – and made her exceptional among those at her level 
of poverty – her home and her family’s livelihood suggested that she was among the poorest respondents in 
this study, and wealthier respondents appeared more able to keep their systems functional. The reason for 
her success is related to the program under which it was installed, as detailed in Chapter 6, showing that, 
like economics, utility is not a sufficient criterion for system success. 
 
5.5.2. Desired applications 
When asked what they would like to be able to do with electricity that their systems could not support, 
users said they wanted television, which is feasible to connect to a larger solar home system if few other 
applications are used and it is not run for many hours out of the day. Whether users who wanted television 
but did not have it were unable to acquire it because of the capital requirements or availability of DC black 
and white televisions, because they heeded the advice of the project donor or developer,81 or because their 
systems were smaller than average and could not support a TV is not clear. Television is clearly a luxury 
item, and as such differs from other unmet desires, which all relate to women’s household work. 
                                                 
81 Standard solar home systems in Guatemala are not designed to accommodate television loads, though they can be made to do so. 
Designers and installers recommend against it to manage users’ expectations and to maintain system loads within design 
specifications. 
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Many users wanted refrigerators. Solar home systems are not sized to power home refrigeration, and 
relatively large systems must be constructed to power small, high-efficiency DC refrigerators for rural 
stand-alone applications such as those included in this study. Only one system in this research included a 
refrigerator, and it was intended for vaccines and other medical supplies in a rural health clinic. 
 
Self-reports of what one would do given the opportunity may differ from actual behavior. However, in rural 
Guatemalan communities observed at the time of this study that were connected to micro-hydroelectric 
systems, tiendita owners and many private residences had acquired refrigerators. As such, I believe that at 
least some users of solar home systems would acquire refrigeration if they were able to power it.  
 
Only two respondents used their systems to power blenders and none used them for irons, but these were 
common unmet needs. The desire for blenders and irons highlights a clear disconnect between the attitudes 
of donors and beneficiaries. Donors may state explicitly as goals the desire to reduce the physical or 
temporal demands of household labor on women, and many projects such as community laundry basins and 
piped or pumped water are implemented with this goal. However, I have never heard of donor programs to 
provide irons or blenders or the electricity to power them even though the women included in this study 
clearly wanted them and viewed them as tools to save time on household tasks. A blender is presumably 
considered a less valid means for improving standard of living or development opportunities among project 
donors and developers than is, for example, water pumping, even though the primary outcome of both may 
be to decrease demands on women’s time and labor.  
 
5.5.3. Utility and success 
I cannot draw clear relationships between the non-economic uses of systems and their success based on the 
data s for this research. Some applications, such as lighting and radio, are ubiquitous or nearly ubiquitous – 
and easily used without access to PV – and therefore cannot be contrasted between successful and 
unsuccessful systems. Other applications, like television, lead to success or failure only on optimality 
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criteria: poorer users are delighted that they are able to watch TV at all, where wealthier respondents saw 
systems as insufficient because they were forced to watch black-and-white television rather than color. 
 
Other applications, such as cell phone charging, had no bearing on system success. I hypothesize that the 
need for cell phone charging correlates to a greater probability of success of at least one PV system per 
community or social group, but this hypothesis is not addressed in this research. 
 
5.6. PV systems in weather-related disasters 
“…Everyone should use renewable energy. If they had, they wouldn’t have suffered.” 
- Resident of a community that used biodiesel to survive 
and thrive during a hurricane and its aftermath 
 
Violent conflict, civil unrest, severe weather, earthquakes, landslides, and other natural and man-made 
disasters have plagued Guatemala’s recent history, as detailed in Chapter 3, so these are among the contexts 
in which the rural stand-alone PV systems included in this study are situated. Some of the systems were 
implemented specifically for weather-related and other disaster preparedness and response; others were 
implemented as a response to a disaster. I had no a priori hypotheses about stand-alone PV systems in 
disaster situations, but it emerged as a relevant theme, so I posed questions to system users about PV, PV-
enabled technologies, and energy-related social networks during disaster situations.  
 
“Disasters” are not simply weather-related events; even unusual or severe events are not necessarily 
hazardous to people. A hazard is “an interaction of man and nature, governed by the coexistent state of 
adjustment” in human and natural systems (Kates, 1971). For example, a severe snowstorm in a community 
that is acclimated to such storms may be inconvenient, but not disastrous. The same storm in a community 
with little or no experience in or preparedness for blizzards may result in significant loss of life and 
property: it may be a disaster. The definition of a “disaster” is so subjective that members of the same 
communities frequently gave different responses when asked if the community had suffered weather-
related disasters. 
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While users saw various advantages and disadvantages to renewable energy systems, a common theme was 
a preference for a diversity of options: being grid connected with PV for back-up, having flashlights on 
hand, or having candles as well as a PV panel provides the best opportunity for a safe and successful 
outcome in a disaster situation. All PV users appeared to have access to other forms of energy – at a 
minimum, candles were available in every community – but this diversification of sources was not included 
in the development plans described by either donors or beneficiaries interviewed for this research. PV was 
expected to replace previous sources of energy, and having to rely on previous energy sources in either 
day-to-day or extreme situations seemed ubiquitously disappointing but only sometimes unexpected. 
 
5.6.1. User responses 
Although hydroelectric projects are not explicitly a part of this research, I visited several rural communities 
that used them, and their responses are notably different from PV users’ responses. These differences in 
responses give context and meaning to responses of those included in this study and are therefore briefly 
discussed here.  
 
Among respondents who answered both questions of whether their communities had experienced weather-
related disasters and whether their PV systems helped them to cope better with such disasters, 76% said 
they had experienced disasters. Among those who had experienced disasters, 92% of those whose systems 
are considered successful for these analyses stated that having their PV systems help them cope with these 
disasters, compared to only 50% of people with unsuccessful systems who believe that PV helps them 
better cope with weather-related disasters. Thus a system that helps its users cope with natural disasters is 
more likely to be successful than one that is not, though causation may go either way. Obviously a system 
that is destroyed by a weather-related disaster is neither successful nor able to help users during that 
disaster. Another explanation may be that those who expect their systems to be helpful to them during 
weather-related disasters may go to greater lengths to maintain them as part of personal or systematic 
preparedness plans. 
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The question of the utility of PV during natural disasters was phrased two ways to all respondents: does 
having a renewable energy system (the PV system) make it easier to cope with natural disasters; and is the 
renewable energy system better able to withstand natural disasters than your previous energy system? 
Negative responses to follow-up questions for both fell into one of two categories. People disliked PV or 
electricity in general because they perceived it as dangerous in the presence of lightning, flooding, or rain, 
believing that a storm could either damage the system or harm people (see Chapter 7 for details of the 
impacts of safety standards); or people were dissatisfied that their batteries didn’t charge adequately in 
cloudy weather, leaving them without power in weather emergencies. Some users disconnect their systems 
during storms to protect against lightning strikes. Users in some flood-prone areas move their batteries to 
higher shelves in the house during flooding; users of a system at a tourist site remove the entire system 
(panel, battery, and balance of system) during the off season to protect it from flooding that can sometimes 
rise to the level of the roof of the tourist center. 
 
Positive responses included statements about the utility of having light during emergencies (such as being 
able to see water levels rising, being able to evacuate to lit shelters, keeping better track of children and the 
elderly), some giving specific emphasis to the quality of light produced by electricity versus combustion 
light sources. Some preferred it to grid electricity (even though the grid had not reached the communities 
where the panels were installed) because the grid is notoriously unreliable and perceived as unsafe during 
storms. A commonly stated advantage of panels over candles and gas lamps is that wind and moisture can 
extinguish flames, or can blow candles over and cause fires. 
 
5.6.2. Biodiesel: a case study in the use of renewable energy in disasters 
By far the most successful use of renewable energy in a disaster situation that I observed involved 
biodiesel. The community involved was the first visited for this research, and the location where the 
questionnaire was tested and refined. It is a fairly advanced community, with a small hydroelectric plant, 
two solar panels, and numerous income-generating projects including a coffee plantation, macadamia nut 
growing and processing, an eco-lodge for tourists, and a water purification and bottling plant. “A foreigner” 
had donated the equipment and provided training to produce biodiesel from waste cooking grease. After 
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several failed attempts, the community produced its first successful batch of biodiesel on the day the area 
was struck by a major hurricane. The community and its surroundings were cut off from “the outside 
world” in the aftermath of the storm, since roads and bridges in and out of the area were impassible. They 
had no access to traditional petroleum-based diesel fuel, which was normally used to run their small 
industries. During the aftermath of the storm, the community used its biodiesel to continue to operate fairly 
normally. The water bottling project also used biodiesel in its trucks, which it sent to surrounding 
communities. In this way, nearby communities also had access to potable water despite the destruction or 
interruption of their water supplies by the storm and their lack of access to help from the government, aid 
groups, or metropolitan areas.82 The community has since expanded its biodiesel production (although the 
community must still supplement with petroleum diesel on a regular basis) and is working with a local 
university to grow an appropriate feedstock since available cooking grease is no longer sufficient and 
purchasing waste grease has become expensive.  
 
Since this was the only biodiesel project I viewed during the course of this study, it is not possible to say 
whether biodiesel itself, the characteristics of this community, or some other factor led to its success in a 
disaster situation. However, community members themselves spoke highly of their biodiesel and 
subsequently donated hydroelectric energy production. They viewed these renewable energy sources as 
enabling them to operate independent of donor aid in the aftermath of the disaster, and in fact to become 
donors to neighboring communities by delivering bottled water. Although the answer is outside the scope 
of this research, the circumstance beg the economic question of whether the donation of robust renewable 
energy systems in advance of a disaster costs less to the government or donors than rescue and relief efforts 
after the fact. A member of the community itself answered the human aspect of that question: …Everyone 
should use renewable energy. If they had, they wouldn’t have suffered. 
 
5.6.3. Disaster early-warning systems 
As described in Chapter 3, CONRED (Guatemala’s national disaster coordination agency) installed a series 
of solar-powered two-way radio systems in a watershed to enable early warning of flooding conditions. 
                                                 
82 This aid to neighboring communities subsequently increased their business as they became paying customers for the water after the 
disaster was resolved. 
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Collaborating community members in the upper watershed measured rainfall and those in the middle 
watershed measured the rivers’ water levels, and the government used this information to assess risk of 
flooding in the lower watershed. When flooding is predicted, the expected timing and magnitudes of the 
floods are relayed to downstream collaborators, who in turn warn their own and surrounding communities 
to enable households to take appropriate precautions by securing possessions and livestock and, in severe 
cases, evacuating low-lying areas. The radio systems have offered other benefits beyond the initially 
intended flooding early warning program: they have been used in non-weather emergencies and lives have 
been saved by communities’ being able to radio for help in cases of childbirth complications and other 
health emergencies. One community used its radio to communicate with medical professionals about a 
spate of digestive complaints. The medic immediately recognized the symptoms as cholera, and was able to 
help the community address the illness. The respondent firmly credited the availability of the two-way 
radio for preventing a few isolated cases of cholera from becoming a local epidemic with potentially 
devastating loss of life. 
 
Users (“collaborators”) take a strong interest in their systems and are eager to see them continue 
functioning, both for their intended purpose of securing life and property in disaster situations and for the 
added convenience they offer to households that are then able to use excess electricity for electric lighting 
and other luxuries or conveniences. However, it is easy to be supportive of a program that brings benefits 
with very minimal costs: CONRED is 100% responsible for system maintenance. CONRED’s institutional 
involvement and responsibility for maintenance may have a stronger bearing on the remarkably high 
success rates of these systems than the value people place on them in disaster contexts, as can be seen by a 
comparison with other systems that were used in disaster-related contexts, below. 
 
These systems have aided downstream communities in preparing for minor flooding and communities 
throughout the watershed in local emergencies. They were not used during one major hurricane because the 
government had cut funding to the program at the time, leaving many systems operable but with no 
coordination or support staff – no one was available to provide information or answer calls for help. 
Another major storm has not threatened the watershed since funding was reinstated. The success of these 
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systems, then, is limited neither by technology nor by user interest and participation, but by level of 
institutional support. 
 
5.6.4. Enabling of other technologies 
According to respondents, PV enables other technologies that are useful during emergency situations. In 
addition to light, which was described as useful both during weather-related emergencies (for shelter and 
awareness) and in medical emergencies (to monitor sick patients or to allow pharmacies and health centers 
to remain open at night), communications technologies were emphasized as important in disasters.  
 
However, systems that were not installed with disasters in mind also provide benefit in this regard. Cell 
phone charging allows community members to communicate with people outside their immediate area, 
even if access is cut off. While people in un-electrified communities may bring their phones to neighboring 
towns to be charged under normal circumstances, disaster conditions may be prohibitive of such travel; 
local charging allows people to stay connected. Respondents with PV systems use radios and sometimes 
black and white televisions, and these communications media provide information to isolated communities 
during disasters, and early warning of imminent storms. I am reluctant to credit PV for the availability of 
radios, however. Readily available C-cell batteries could run most radios that I saw in communities if no 
other electricity supply was available. While purchasing batteries is expensive relative to running a radio 
using a PV system, PV systems do not enable radio use per se.  
 
Entire communities need not be electrified to reap these benefits. One or a few households with electricity 
can provide cell phone charging and radio information for the whole community, as is the case with 
CONRED-owned and –managed systems. 
 
Communities electrified by small hydro facilities generally benefit more from the electricity during 
emergencies, if the system is not itself damaged in a storm, than do users of stand-alone PV systems: more 
water means more power is generally available from a hydro than from a PV system, which allows use of 
more technologies. The medic in the clinic in one community with hydro power spoke of the reduction in 
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deaths from respiratory illnesses since the inception of the hydro, which he attributed to two things: 
decreased indoor air pollution from the use of electric lights instead of combustible lighting sources,83 and, 
more importantly, his ability to use a nebulizer for patients presenting severe asthma or other respiratory 
illness symptoms. The greater availability of electricity also allows the use of televisions and computers, 
with some people in remote communities having internet access using cellular technology. Both TV and the 
internet facilitate the flow of information into a community. In one hydro-connected community, leaders 
attached loud speakers to a radio to broadcast news to the entire community during disaster situations. 
 
5.6.5. Electricity and water 
When discussing weather conditions, nearly all hydroelectric users with whom I spoke claimed that rain 
was beneficial to their systems – increased rainfall leads to increased stream flow, which in turn leads to 
increased hydroelectric production up to the capacity of the plant. PV users universally responded to the 
contrary: the clouds that bring rain also reduce sunlight reaching their panels, which leads to lower 
availability of power. This seemed to lead to system failure based on unmet expectations. Some operable 
systems failed to meet optimality or perceptions criteria for success in part because of user frustration that 
energy was least available in darker times of year, when it was needed most. 
 
However, water and electricity can be a frightening combination to some. Some women (but no men) 
expressed fear of electrocution by their PV systems when rain was falling or during flooding events. In fact 
lightning strikes during rainstorms did more damage than rain; users in some communities knew of systems 
that had been damaged or destroyed by lightning strikes, but none spoke of anyone being physically 
harmed by their PV systems, in the presence of rain, lightning or otherwise. The fear certainly cannot be 
called unfounded as water does increase electrocution risk and very few systems were installed with 
recommended safety features such as grounding rods (see Chapter 7). The fear itself proved more harmful 
than the electricity; one respondent suffered a “year-long nervous breakdown” as a result of her family’s 
PV system being struck by lightning, even though no one was hurt and the only damage was to the system 
itself.  
                                                 
83 This hydroelectric system did not eliminate the use of traditional biomass for cooking and heating, which are arguably much greater 
sources of indoor air pollution than candles and gas lamps or even ocote torches. 
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This fear of electricity and water reported only by female respondents contrasts sharply with the preference 
for electric light over candles or gas lamps during a storm, reported only by male respondents. To them, the 
electricity was safer because candles and lamps can blow over and start fires, or simply blow out. 
 
Since people in hydro-connected communities are more removed (physically and, in general, in terms of 
day-to-day operations) from the electricity generating equipment, they expressed less concern or fear about 
the safety of electricity during storms, although a few respondents (all women) remained uncomfortable 
with the electricity-water combination present in a storm. 
 
5.6.6. Summary: rural energy systems in weather-related disasters 
Electrification helps rural communities in weather-related disasters only if the electrification system itself is 
robust enough to very literally weather the storm and if people are confident in it. The production of 
biodiesel allowed one community to switch its usual role of beneficiary to that of donor to its less-fortunate 
or (perhaps more accurately) less-prepared neighbors. Contrarily, an ungrounded PV system that was struck 
by lightning damaged a user’s mental health and greatly lessened her neighbors’ confidence in PV, 
especially during severe weather. Although relatively infrequent in any particular community, Guatemala is 
affected by severe storms every year, resulting in property damage, displacement of populations, and loss 
of life. If rural electrification systems are not designed to withstand these severe weather events, they are 
not a help and may become a hazard to the populations they are intended to benefit.  
 
5.7. Conclusion 
Economic opportunities are strong drivers of system success, but economic value in real dollars is 
insufficient to ensure success itself. Institutions and relationships among beneficiaries and between 
beneficiaries and outside parties, discussed in detail in Chapter 6, have strong bearing on the opportunities 
to capture economic benefits. The conspicuous lack of financial institutions available to beneficiaries 
contributes to the lack of access to capital which makes system maintenance prohibitive even in the face of 
real economic opportunity. 
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Correlations between utility and system success are not apparent based on this research. However, system 
uses and users’ perceptions highlighted when discussing system utility bear strongly on the definition of 
success, (see Chapter 2). One system may be successful for a particular user because it provides a basic 
need or luxury that was unavailable previously, whereas an identical system may be a failure to another 
user who wants or expects more than that basic functionality. 
 
Uses of energy in communities powered by hydroelectricity highlight a dramatic limitation of PV systems: 
the former are sized to capture as much of the available resource as possible – allowing users to expand 
their energy consumption to meet their self-defined needs – and the latter are sized to meet a specific set of 
needs, most often defined by the donor, and allow little if any expansion in utility. Because this study did 
not include hydroelectric projects explicitly, these are anecdotal results only that merit further study. 
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Chapter 6. Results concerning institutions and relationships 
6.1. Introduction to results concerning institutions and relationships 
In this chapter, I consider how the success of rural PV projects in Guatemala are affected by ownership, 
accountability, management structure, level of participation, and other management- and governance-
related issues, and how, in turn, these institutions and relationships are affected by the introduction of those 
projects. The questions of interest were defined in Chapter 3.84  
 
Unlike grid electricity users, stand-alone PV users generally are expected to provide maintenance for and 
management of their own means of electricity production. Excepting the government-owned and -managed 
systems that are in place to serve a specific purpose on the government’s behalf (PV-powered flood early 
warning systems, for example), I know of no donor model or lending programs that provide ongoing funds 
for maintenance of systems owned by users, and some programs – like the government loan program 
included in this research – will even re-claim a panel if the beneficiary fails to maintain the system. Users 
must either be a part of a collective organization to share the responsibilities of project management, or 
they must themselves provide all necessary management, technical skill, capital, and transportation to keep 
the lights on. The operation of a single PV system may be simple, but the responsibilities of being one’s 
own electric utility may be complex. These responsibilities exist within the institutions and relationships 
described below. 
 
The startling implication of these results is that the ability of a system to provide electricity is only part of 
its value to users, as described throughout this chapter. Users invest in and receive benefit from the social 
networks and institutional structures that surround their systems, much in the same way as they invest in 
and receive benefit from the PV hardware itself. Very analogous groups of users can see very different 
success rates with their systems, based not on any fundamental technical, economic or cultural differences, 
but because the institutions and relationships that users build or with which they engage as a result of these 
systems vary dramatically. This observation, not reflected in the hypotheses and research questions, is a 
recurring theme in the remaining sections of this chapter. 
                                                 
84 See Appendix A for the relevant survey instrument. 
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In this chapter, I first summarize previously introduced hypotheses and research questions concerning 
institutions and relationships and system success, and differentiate between those issues that will be 
included versus those included in Chapter 5, Results: Economics and Utility or Chapter 7, Results: 
Characteristics and Consequences. I consider the impacts on system success of project origination and user 
training, issues of ownership and accountability, and ongoing relationships between donors and 
beneficiaries. Finally, this chapter examines the role of institutions and relationships in the unintended 
consequences of these projects, some of which may increase system success rates while still being arguably 
“bad” outcomes, and the impact of unethical and criminal behavior on the part of members of extra-
community institutions. 
 
6.2. Hypotheses and research questions 
As described in Chapter 3, the institutions and relationships – the social networks and formal and informal 
structures within the community, as well as the government, donor and development organizations involved 
– that surround, create and result from the implementation of rural stand-alone PV donation programs can 
influence system success, though this is one of the least studied aspects of such programs.  
 
The institutions and relationships linked to community energy systems are closely tied to the characteristics 
of and consequences to users, non-users and their communities, as discussed in Chapter 7. As examples, the 
quality of materials used to construct systems is driven by institutional structures that dictate their purchase 
and installation, and intra-community conflict is influenced by the characteristics of a community and of 
the program that installed its energy systems, as discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
This research began with the two fundamental research questions regarding institutions and relationships 
and four hypotheses regarding answers to those questions (first presented in section 3.5.2 of Chapter 3).  I 
repeat those questions and hypotheses below, discussing them in more detail than in Chapter 3. 
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Research question 1: What are the governance structures related to the systems? Does it matter whether 
committees are formed to manage projects or savings? Does their legal establishment lead to greater 
success, or do those established by intra-community trust work as well? 
This question is fundamentally about project governance. Are projects governed by institutions or 
organizations, or is “governance” of the project left to the individual? How aware of project governance are 
individuals, and how involved are they? The question of legality relied on the implicit assumption that 
respondents would know whether their committees were legally established or not, and that that knowledge 
would be consistently represented by members of the same community. This assumption did not hold true. 
As described in Section 6.4, below, laws and de facto rules of conduct are not necessarily coincident. 
 
Hypothesis 1: If people are the originators of their projects (they ask, rather than the donor offers), they 
will tend to care for them more because they are more in line with beneficiary needs. 
This hypothesis is one of project origin. Prospective users may become aware of PV systems and then 
request them, or they may learn of them only when a donor offers. The diffusion of information about a 
novel technology is an important part of its dissemination and adaptation (Acker and Kammen, 1996). 
Word-of-mouth is a common means of dissemination of information about solar home systems in Kenya, 
surpassing by increasing margins the effects of advertising (Acker and Kammen, 1996). As such, users who 
see solar panels in neighboring communities, and see the value that they bring, may request them of 
potential donors. Because they initiated the request – they recognized their own need and had the agency to 
pursue filling the need – they are hypothesized to be more successful in using and maintaining systems as 
designed. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Projects are more likely to fail if people are not trained in their maintenance and 
administration when systems are installed. 
Implicit to this hypothesis is the idea that the donor is the only source of training or information about a 
donated PV system: at the outset, beneficiaries do not know how to maintain a physical system, nor do they 
have the economic management skills to save for replacement. This underlying assumption, postulated at 
the outset of this research, is not necessarily true. A few beneficiaries had had some training as electricians 
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in other contexts, purchasers of systems improvised maintenance without any training,85 and managing 
household or community-level finances requires a basic level of knowledge or skill in administration – 
independently of donated PV systems. As such, the focus of this hypothesis shifted to the question of 
whether active participation in training led to system success, and whether beneficiaries found the training 
that was provided useful and sufficient. 
 
A related hypothesis originally considered for this research was that projects were more likely to succeed if 
a designated, trained maintenance person lived in the community or a nearby community. However, the 
data collected in this study do not allow for testing of this hypothesis, as described in Section 6.6.2, below. 
 
Hypothesis 3: If people are required to contribute financially or in kind to their systems, they will have a 
stronger sense of ownership and take better care of them. 
It seems to be held as self-evident by those who work in development that user contributions to projects 
increase their value to beneficiaries and improve success rates. In an extreme case, one government official 
was quoted when speaking of development projects at the end of the civil war (Manz, 1988, p.43): We must 
force the Indians to work on our projects or else they will never appreciate what we are doing for them. But 
they are so stupid. Even when they have slaved away building a playground, they still, the very next day, 
steal the tires we used for swings to make themselves sandals. 
 
Though I did not find the same overt condescension in any of the development professionals interviewed as 
a part of this research, the attitude that a project will be valued if users contribute persists. What is 
suggested by the above-quoted government official and by the beneficiaries in this research who sold their 
solar home systems is that the value of the project intended by the donor or developer is not necessarily 
related to the work contributed by recipients. Indeed beneficiaries contribute in work or funds in order to 
gain access to a resource, but they will then use the resource in the way that brings them the most value. 
The beneficiaries in these two examples did not request swings or solar panels but accepted them as 
                                                 
85 Users of systems that were privately purchased are not included in the data analyzed for this research; however, those with whom I 
spoke during the course of this study were demographically similar to the beneficiaries of donated systems. The ability of the system 
purchaser to improvise maintenance here implies that at least some beneficiaries would have the same capability. 
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potential resources. These resources they converted into things they needed more: shoes and money for 
food. Thus the focus of the hypothesis must shift from whether the system is “successful” by the definition 
used in this research to whether the beneficiary found value in what was donated. 
 
Research question 2: Do donors and beneficiaries maintain a relationship? Does it matter?  
The question of whether donor and beneficiary maintain a relationship became more nuanced throughout 
the course of this research. Other questions arose:  
– What is the nature of that relationship?  
– What role does accountability between beneficiary and donor play? 
– How long was the relationship maintained? 
 
Hypothesis 4: Unintended negative consequences due to donated systems decrease the likelihood of project 
success. 
Sometimes overlooked by donors desiring to improve the lives of the rural poor, donated systems have the 
potential to negatively affect a community. Specifically, technologies may conflict with religious beliefs, 
cause changes in cultural norms, or cause or exacerbate social inequity. These consequences are 
hypothesized to decrease system success. In contrast, unexpected outcomes may be beneficial, as well. If a 
donated technology creates cohesion in a community or strengthens bonds within families because they 
spend more time together as a consequence of the technology, these positive unintended consequences may 
improve probabilities of system success. 
 
These hypotheses and research questions, as well as my own implicit assumptions that I discovered during 
this study, are discussed throughout this chapter.   As I describe below, what I found in my field 
investigations confirmed some hypotheses, but contradicted others.   
 
6.3. Technical versus institutional issues 
Although this chapter is intended to focus on institutions and relationships to the exclusion of technical 
issues, the distinction between the two types of issues is not as concrete as might be expected, as explored 
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in this section. I start by illustrating this point with an example of a community and project observed in this 
research. 
 
Don Alcalde86 is town mayor in a community included in the post-conflict development program. Don 
Alcalde identified a problem with batteries on systems in his community as a technical one. He said they 
arrived sometimes working, other times not. Originally, when the community was working with the donor 
on a regular basis, the vendor was honoring its one-year guarantees on the batteries. However, since the 
donor turned the management of the project over to community committees, the vendor is not as 
responsive. If they complain of a problem, the vendor is slow to respond, often so slow that the guarantee 
expires before a battery can be replaced.  
 
As Don Alcalde identified, this can be considered a technical problem. Good quality solar batteries will last 
three to five years if well maintained, and should last around two years if marginally neglected as long as 
they are not abused or subject to extreme climatic conditions. Batteries that systematically last less than one 
year fall well short of their design lives. 
 
However, this case illustrates several institutional problems. First, the vendor was responsive to the donor 
but not to the community after the donor decreased its level of involvement. Vendors may have a vested 
interest in working with donors who give them repeat business for major projects, but little incentive to put 
effort into working with communities which are difficult to access and give only paltry and sporadic 
business. If the donor does not maintain a relationship with the community, the donor will not know that 
this is the vendor’s response in the long term. Further (although I do not believe this to be the case here, 
given my acquaintanceship with and knowledge of this donor), donors may not care what happens after 
their mandate of installation is complete; if a vendor is giving the donor the best deal for installation, the 
donor may care little about the consequences after its involvement is over.  
 
                                                 
86 Names of communities and people are changed to protect confidentiality. 
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The second institutional problem may have to do with the community-based committee. Though 
community members report their problems to the committee, and the committee either does or is believed 
to give its best efforts towards resolving problems and working with the vendor, the committee does not 
have experience in negotiating the warrantee replacement process at the outset of the project. Most things 
of this nature require paperwork and record-keeping. Most donors probably keep records of bills of sale and 
dates of installation, where community members often have low levels of literacy and rely very little in 
general on written records – and therefore may be less likely to keep receipts and paperwork. Often, 
dwellings in rural Guatemalan communities have dirt floors and offer little protection from the elements; 
these are not conditions conducive to the preservation of paper even if households made a priority of it. A 
hypothetical vendor may see more legitimacy in the warranty claim for the replacement of, for example, 
“one of seven Trojan deep-cycle batteries installed by your company on 15 December of last year” than for 
“the battery I got when everyone got them, before last Christmas I think.”  
 
Guatemalan donors and in-country project developers all speak Spanish, as do representatives of PV 
enterprises in Guatemala. In indigenous communities, people may speak Spanish as a second language, 
creating difficulties in communications between the vendor and the community representative. 
Beneficiaries may not understand what is covered by a warrantee and therefore may make claims that the 
vendor is not contractually obliged to honor; the vendor may not understand the community’s claims and 
believe that a legitimate claim is in fact spurious. 
 
A third problem in this case has to do with the specific vendor involved. He and his company had been 
working in Guatemala for many years and had an ongoing relationship with the donor involved, and had 
been certified for quality by the U. S. government for its work with solar photovolatiacs in Guatemala (Ley, 
2006). I was unable to locate him to interview him about donor project installations in which he had been 
involved. The “off the record” responses I got to inquiries among people in the donor community was that 
he had either gone underground or fled the country. Despite his prior reputation for quality, he had begun 
charging customers for first quality components but installing cheaper, inappropriate components instead. 
Using batteries as an example, he would bill for name-brand solar or marine deep cycle batteries, but install 
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car batteries with their original labels covered. It was suggested that he made some enemies while he made 
a lot of money. This is clearly a technical problem of component quality, but it is also clearly a problem of 
the institutions – the vendor and the lack of oversight provided by the developer – and the people involved. 
 
In this case, the overlap of technical and institutional issues is clear. The basic technical problem of low 
battery quality is rooted in the decisions of the vendor, the relationship between system users and 
community leaders, communication between community leaders and the vendor, and the nature of the 
ongoing relationships of the project developer with both the community and the vendor. 
 
6.4. Institutional structures in Guatemala 
In this section, I present the background of some of the institutional structures found in Guatemala that 
directly influence rural electrification. These institutional structures form the context in which my 
hypotheses and research questions about institutions and relationships are framed. 
 
Although speeding is a punishable offense under the law, it seems to be “common knowledge” that 
exceeding the legal speed limit by five miles per hour on a U.S. freeway will not result in legal 
consequences; in fact, it seems rare that people travel at or below posted speed limits under normal 
conditions on U.S. Interstate Highways. In contrast, exceeding the speed limit by the same amount in a 
designated school zone may result in a traffic ticket. If these anecdotal observations hold true, they suggest 
that an understanding of de facto, informal rules is at least as important as understanding the letter of the 
law in travel on U.S. roadways.  
 
In Guatemala, murder is of course illegal. However, only about two percent of murders are prosecuted.87 
During the course of this research, a law was enacted in Guatemala City requiring motorcycle and scooter 
riders to wear bright, reflective vests with the bike’s license plate number clearly readable on the back. 
While I do not have any formal statistics on compliance, I can recall seeing only two of the hundreds or 
perhaps thousands of motorcycle riders I saw in Guatemala City who were not wearing the required vests in 
                                                 
87 See Chapter 3. 
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the months immediately after the law was enacted. The fact that the more serious crime of murder was 
under-prosecuted did not translate to the expectation among motorcycle riders in the capital that the 
presumably more trivial law would similarly be unenforced. 
 
An underlying assumption of this research is that the same distinction between de jure and de facto rules is 
present in Guatemala in general. Understanding the letter of the law is less instructive in these analyses 
than an understanding people’s perceptions and knowledge of the law is enforced. Because of this, I 
include no formal study of Guatemalan civil or criminal law in this study of Guatemalan institutions. 
 
6.4.1. Legal and informal governance structures 
Guatemala is governed under a centralized government (U.S. Department of State, 2009 (2)). It is divided 
into twenty-two departments, which are further divided into municipalities. A municipality consists of a 
single city or defined community which is the seat of governance, and the population surrounding it (U.S. 
Department of State, 2009 (2)). Communities within municipalities are less well defined, both 
geographically and politically. A “community” may consist of some houses within a cluster, while 
neighbors interspersed may belong to a different community. Agrarian households without near neighbors 
may be ambiguously considered part of a nearby community for some purposes but not for others. Clusters 
of houses around a water source, a road or some other geographic division that are some distance from 
other clusters of houses may declare themselves independent communities with new names, without any 
formal legal process.88 
 
Community-level governance in Guatemala is also irregular. Communities, however they are defined, may 
or may not have mayors, who, where they exist, have varying degrees of influence. 
 
                                                 
88  I observed this twice during the course of this research, both related to the provision of grid-based electricity. The first instance 
involved a homeowner who had privately purchased a PV system. The national electric grid had reached the easily-accessible parts of 
his community, while the cluster of houses on a hillside was excluded because of the cost and technical difficulty of running electric 
wires over the terrain. Because the purchased system was outside the scope of this research, I did not explore this further within his 
divided community. The second instance involved a cluster of houses with government-loaned panels, set aside from the main 
community that had access to grid electricity. I was unable to explore the phenomenon here because I found myself followed by 
members of the Zetas drug cartel and left the area as soon as I became aware of their presence. The apparent phenomenon of grid 
electricity driving the redefinition of community merits further study, but is outside the scope of this research. 
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Anecdotally, Junta Directiva89 (JD) is a common term for governance committees in rural Guatemalan 
communities, whether associated solely with a specific project or as a governance structure of the 
community. The term does not imply any specific makeup or form of governance, but is simply any “group 
that directs” a project or activity. On the other hand, a Comité Comunitario de Desarrollo (COCODE) is a 
legally-recognized community-level governing body, the activities of which are limited to development 
work. It is legally limited in its ability to collect tariffs and handle money, which limits its effectiveness in 
governing ongoing projects, however successful it may or may not be in bringing new development 
projects to a community. A comité is a legally-defined community-level management organization with 
specific powers and limitations, but the term is used colloquially to refer to less formal committee 
structures as well.  
 
6.4.2. Institutional contexts 
As described throughout this section, donated stand-alone PV systems in rural Guatemala exist within 
specific institutional contexts, many of which vary by program, project, community or even household 
included in this research. While the national Government of Guatemala is nominally the same, the way it 
relates to specific constituencies and they relate to it can vary, as observed when comparing outcomes 
among Ladino and indigenous respondents in Chapter 7. The national government also holds varying 
degrees of de facto control over territories that are nominally part of Guatemala, with parts of the country 
effectively controlled by narco cartels,90 as described in Chapter 3 and in section 6.9, below. Further, the 
branch of government with which respondents interacted in relation to their systems varied, including 
donations by Ministries of Education and Health, the government loan program through the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines, the emergency response systems with CONRED, locally elected representatives to 
national or regional government, and the nominal general support for the post-conflict development and 
disaster relief programs. In most cases, the government was not the sole donor or project developer, and 
worked through NGO’s. These organizations form part of the institutional context for systems included in 
                                                 
89 These definitions are gleaned from informal conversations with community members and development professionals. Specific 
citations of legal statues establishing COCODE’s, comités and other forms of governance are less pertinent to this research than 
respondents’ understandings of them. 
90 Maras (street gangs) are reported to have de facto control over sections of cities, but as these syndicates apparently operate only in 
urban areas, they are assumed to have little or no influence on rural energy outcomes, and as such are not further considered. 
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this research as well. I examine the results of the hypotheses and research questions presented in section 
6.2, above, in the contexts of the individual institutional structures relevant to the projects included in this 
research. 
 
6.5. Project governance 
In this section, I consider the first research question, concerning project governance, presented in section 
6.2. Projects were variously said to be governed by Junta Directivas, COCODE’s and comités, or were 
“governed” by their users individually. I had initially hypothesized that the presence of a formal system of 
governance or project administration would correspond to greater project success. However, I was unable 
to test this hypothesis as both successful and unsuccessful systems were included from communities in 
which these governance structures were present, and in communities in which these governance structures 
were absent. 
 
One of the most important functions of community-level governance of projects – and a function found 
ubiquitously in project governance structures encountered in this research – is managing economic 
resources to enable repair and replacement of components as needed. Globally, even households that exist 
on as little as $1/person/day or less rarely spend every dollar earned immediately on food or other very 
basic necessities, instead managing their money often by accumulating savings, paying down loans, or 
engaging in other formal or informal financial transactions . Thus the concept of a savings cooperative or a 
group lending program is not foreign, although its formalization may be less common. As savings was a 
function found in all governance structures included in this study, I cannot assess whether there is a 
relationship between system success and this function. 
 
Similarly, the effect of the legal standing of a governance structure on success cannot be ascertained. Most 
respondents (81%, or 29/36) believed their governance structures to be legally established; I did not consult 
official records to corroborate this.  
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Because of research methodology, I am not able to compare the influence on system success of the various 
governance structures. Rather than examine the presence or absence of project-related governance as a 
driver of success, I looked instead at the participation of individual respondents in these governance 
structures. Among users of unsuccessful systems who stated that a governance structure existed for their 
PV project and answered the question of whether they personally participated, 56% (10/18) said yes. 
Similarly, 53% (9/17) of respondents with governance structures and successful systems were participants. 
Thus, active participation in available governance structures does not appear to influence project success. 
 
Qualitatively, I may be able to draw some inferences by comparing the disaster relief program with the 
post-conflict development program. The disaster relief program had a categorically low success rate. The 
developer for that program reported that they aided beneficiary communities in convening “energy 
committees,” and 79% (11/14) of respondents who answered the question of whether a governing body for 
their energy systems existed were familiar with the committees.  
 
Although communities in the disaster relief program initially formed these governance structures under the 
guidance of the NGO, they were all dissolved within a few months or years after their establishment. When 
asked why they were dissolved, users seemed more at a loss to provide reasons that they should have been 
maintained. Any money that had been collected by the committees was returned to those who contributed it 
and, although it was not explicitly stated, the desire for access to the capital tied up in maintenance savings 
funds seemed to be the primary driver of their dissolution. Users saw no point to saving collectively when 
they could save as well individually, and saw no benefit to an energy committee once the savings were 
gone. One user described having dissolved the energy committee and returned its funds to users “because 
the crops failed.” When asked why they did not re-start the savings fund once their economic situation 
became more stable, he merely shrugged. 
 
In contrast, in the post-conflict development communities, a multi-level and highly organized governance 
organization was responsible for system maintenance, and for interaction with the donor, developer and 
vendor, as necessary. Communities elected representatives who served on the governing board of the 
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project, representing both the community to the board and the decisions of the board to the communities. 
These representatives collected the monthly tariffs from their communities and delivered them to the board. 
Trained maintenance men were employed by the board to resolve technical problems for all beneficiaries 
who were current in their payments. The board’s initial agreements with the vendor and project developer 
allowed some (though not all) parts under warrantee to be replaced if they were defective or malfunctioned 
prematurely.  
 
This system was not perfect, of course. Respondents in one community dutifully paid their monthly tariff 
because they had agreed to do so, but thought they were re-paying a loan for the system rather than 
ensuring themselves access to maintenance, and as such maintenance issues in that community sometimes 
went unresolved.91 In another example of a problem within this governance structure, one of the former 
board members is rumored to have looted the maintenance fund and attempted to use the money to go to 
the U.S. illegally. Although several respondents alluded to this, no one was willing to explain it in detail on 
record. I am under the impression that the would-be thief did not make it out of Guatemala and that all or 
most of the money was returned; I do not know what consequences, if any, he faced. 
 
However, overall, the governance structure in place in the post-conflict development communities seemed 
to enable maintenance activities and facilitate contact with the developer and vendor, both of whom were 
able to aid the communities in keeping their systems operational at least to some degree. The formal 
structure seemed to create a social pressure to live up to the obligation undertaken by beneficiaries of 
making payments for system maintenance. The representative nature of the structure – not every household 
was required to be actively involved or particularly knowledgeable about either the maintenance or the 
administration of PV systems – reduced the knowledge and time burdens on heads of household. 
 
The disaster relief program and the post-conflict development program were both implemented among 
similar populations – indigenous, very poor and rural – under the direction of the same NGO,92 but had 
                                                 
91 The community representative who introduced me to interview subjects took this as an opportunity to clarify that they were, in fact, 
entitled to maintenance support. 
92 Fundación Solar 
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very different outcomes. The persistence of a governance structure in the post-conflict development 
communities is a major differentiator, which seems to accompany project success. However, even if the 
governance structure did lead to success, other factors including relative geographic and social stability 
(systems were not installed in the immediate aftermath of a disaster), the longer implementation timeframe, 
and the continued relationship with the NGO may have aided in or been prerequisite to the persistence of 
successful governance structures. 
 
A final observation with regards to success and community-level project governance comes from the 
national government-run flood early warning systems program. These systems were governed entirely by a 
body outside the community, but were categorically the most successful systems included in this research. 
Thus these data do not appear to support the hypothesis that the creation of community-level governance 
institutions leads to project success, though the persistence of consistent governance, whether legally 
established or not, and whether within the community or by an outside party, may increase the chances that 
projects will be successful. 
 
6.6. Project origin and training 
“Any engineer can construct an irrigation system, but using the system to grow food is another matter 
altogether.” (Maren, 1997). 
 
The physical installation of a system does not imply that the system has been “implemented” in the society 
and culture into which it has been inserted. This section examines the roles of beneficiaries in project 
origination, whether and how they were “socialized” to accept and use the systems, and the degree to which 
they received training to build the skill sets needed to manage and maintain the systems once the donor or 
developer left the community. 
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6.6.1. Project origination  
As stated in Hypothesis 1 in section 6.2, I hypothesized that projects would be more successful in 
communities which originated projects than those in which the projects were proposed or imposed by 
outside parties. As explained in this section, this hypothesis is not supported by these analyses. 
 
Respondents were asked whether they were informed and consulted throughout the planning process, 
independently of involvement in implementation. Seventy of the seventy-nine (89%) responses to that 
question were affirmative or “more or less”: people were informed and consulted throughout the planning 
process. One did not know. Unexpectedly, the eight negative responses (which ranged from “not much” to 
“not at all”) are not clustered. They are in seven communities spread across six different departments, 
represent five different categories of projects included in this study, and were all in communities in which 
other users had responded to the contrary.  
 
The affirmative responses that include some explanation specifically mention activities pertaining to 
requesting the project (if the project was initiated by the community), or they generally mention “meetings” 
or “socialization.” Meetings and socialization, often conducted by the donor or developer, may take place 
after the project has been decided upon by people outside the community and funding has been confirmed. 
Thus the planning process in which the communities may have been involved was the planning of the 
implementation of projects that had been decided on their behalf. Those answering in the negative may 
have been alluding to the fact that they were excluded from the process of planning whether the project 
would happen at all.  
 
I hypothesized that those not involved in the planning process would be more likely to be owners of 
unsuccessful systems, but this research does not support that hypothesis. Respondents who claimed to have 
been little involved in the planning process were categorically not the owners of unsuccessful or non-
functioning systems. One respondent commented that he opted not to participate because there had been no 
socialization before he was asked to sign up: he did not have enough information to make an informed 
decision. Among the seven negative respondents who did participate, five had successful systems, and the 
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two unsuccessful systems were functioning but are considered unsuccessful for purposes of these analyses 
because respondents considered them insufficient to meet their needs.  
 
Respondents who stated that they were not involved in the planning process seem to have been no less 
informed or involved than their neighbors, but instead seem to have had higher expectations of the 
appropriate level of involvement. The respondent who declined to participate clearly recognized that 
participation created obligations for beneficiaries. Those who did participate appear to have recognized that 
as well, as they were willing and able to take the actions necessary to keep their systems functional.  
 
Fundamentally, asking respondents how involved in planning they felt appears to be a poor measure of 
their actual level of involvement, but rather is a stronger indication of their desire to be involved and 
informed; those who most wanted to be involved and informed may have simultaneously been those who 
participated most and those who felt their level of participation was least adequate. The relationship 
between level of participation in planning and system success cannot be assessed from these data as the 
survey question did not measure level of involvement as was intended. Some of the stories of how 
beneficiaries came to participate follow. 
 
6.6.1.1. Disaster relief systems 
A few people who looked like me showed up with a solar home system project unsolicited, according to 
one respondent in the disaster-relief program.93 This response gave very little information about the facts of 
the project origin, but it provided considerable insight into the relationship between the donor and that 
particular beneficiary. Some projects arrived from “outsiders,” people with no ties to the communities and 
probably foreigners. The beneficiary’s knowledge and memory of the developers was so superficial that he 
remembered only that they were fair skinned compared to most Guatemalans. From conversations with one 
NGO employee who was active in the development of the project, my impression is that the relationship 
was mutual. The NGO had the time and resources to do little more than install panels, not build 
relationships. 
                                                 
93 I was asked to confirm that I was not in fact a person who had been there when the project was initiated. 
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The disaster-relief program, as described above, was implemented in a very short timeframe. The push to 
rebuild within the one-year funding timeframe meant that “outsiders” were making decisions without 
thoroughly understanding community needs and wants. It is possible that the communities would have 
come to the conclusion that electric lighting was one of their basic needs, but they were given the 
opportunity only to say yes or no to a project conceived without their input. In some cases, the decisions of 
the development organizations were good: the new stoves were still in use and valued by the communities 
nearly ten years after implementation. In other cases, the decisions were not as good: the solar home system 
component of the project was a near complete failure.  
 
Ten of the 20 respondents in the seven communities interviewed about the disaster relief program 
remembered the name of either the multinational development organization that managed the project in its 
entirety, or the name of the local NGO that implemented the PV part of the project.94 Most remembered 
little else. Five mentioned other aspects of the project, like the provision of seeds and building of improved 
stoves. Only one believed that the community had initiated the project, and one said that they negotiated to 
have panels included in the project after the multinational had provided crop seeds and improved stoves. 
 
Only four of the twenty systems met the definition of success in these analyses, despite efforts to find 
working as well as non-functioning systems in the relevant communities: systems that were still 
functioning were in such a minority that they were challenging to find. Two respondents were non-
participants in the program: they were offered the opportunity to participate but declined. Respondents with 
successful systems, unsuccessful systems, and non-participants gave equivalent answers to the question of 
project origin. Most remembered little, but did not view it as something the community initiated. In this 
case, system success was not influenced by users’ perceptions of whether they (as opposed to someone 
else) initiated the project. 
 
 
                                                 
94 “Cáre,” or Care International, and Fundación Solar, respectively. 
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6.6.1.2. Post-conflict development 
The first phase of the post-conflict development project was for widows and orphans of the civil war. Some 
respondents reported that the community initiated the request in the names of widows and orphans, while 
others gave the impression that the first phase of the project was initiated by people outside the community. 
Everyone who mentioned the second phase agreed that the community or its representative (the mayor) 
initiated the request for solar home systems for everyone else in the community after the widows and 
orphans had received theirs. Responses of those with successful systems did not differ in this regard from 
those with unsuccessful systems: again, there is no apparent relationship. 
 
6.6.1.3. Government loan/donation program 
Of the thirty-five interviews regarding projects in the government loan program, eleven respondents said 
they requested it, and eight said the municipal mayor (who is located in the central municipality, not the 
communities in question) requested it on their behalf. Nine reported that someone outside the municipality 
initiated the project. The remainder did not know or answered ambiguously.   
 
As with other groups of projects described in this chapter, responses were not necessarily consistent: within 
the same community, different respondents attributed the initiation of the project to different actors. 
Looking at this subset of 21 interviews (interviews with people in communities that were not unanimous 
about project origin), we see the results presented in Table 4. 
 
Count of successful and unsuccessful 
systems 
Who initiated 
Self Mayor Other 
No success 2 (40%) 2 (40%) 1 (20%) 
Success 5 (31%) 4 (25%) 7 (44%) 
Table 4. Successful and unsuccessful systems, based on project initiator 
 
Because of the small number of systems included in this subset and the sampling methodology, valid 
statistical inference is not possible but trends might be observed. There is no clear relationship between 
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success and the perception that the project was initiated by users, by their representative, or by an outsider. 
Thus, independent of the actual originator of the projects, user perceptions of their own agency in acquiring 
the systems once again does not appear to influence success. 
 
6.6.1.4. Other systems 
For the most part, the remainder of projects included in this study were initiated by someone other than the 
user. The EWS projects and the community school and clinic projects were initiated by the government, 
with the former being categorically successful and the latter being categorically unsuccessful. Other 
productive uses projects, such as tourism projects, are normally directed from the outside: rural community 
members usually do not have the knowledge and experience to cater to tourist demands at the outset of the 
projects. These were neither categorically successful nor unsuccessful, and do not lend insight into the 
impacts of donor (as opposed to beneficiary) project initiation. 
 
Thus, this research does not support aforementioned Hypothesis 1: users’ perceptions of their participation 
in the origination of their projects are not shown to influence project success.  
 
6.6.2. User training 
As stated in Hypothesis 2 in section 6.2, I had hypothesized that systems would be more successful among 
respondents who were trained in the maintenance of their systems. Among users with unsuccessful systems 
who responded to the question of whether training systems had been offered, 45% (23/42) said yes. Among 
users with successful systems, 64% (27/42) answered in the affirmative. Thus training does appear to be 
linked to system success. A closer examination of the data brings a more nuanced picture of this apparent 
link. 
 
6.6.2.1. Unsuccessful training in disaster relief communities 
Iván Azuria of Fundación Solar (Azuria, 2006) was actively involved in the implementation of the solar 
home system portion of the disaster relief program included in this study. He stated that Fundación Solar 
provided training to community members at the time of project implementation. Thirteen of the fourteen 
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respondents from these communities who answered the question agreed that training was provided. 
However, these systems were nearly ubiquitously failures.95 Comments on training from the respondents in 
these communities were illuminating. Among the ten users who commented on the sufficiency of the 
training, eight said the training they received was not enough. One said she was told during training that 
she should expect her panel to last four years; since panels of the kind installed in these communities 
typically last 20 to 25 years, I find it exceedingly unlikely that this was the information given by Fundación 
Solar. It is far more likely that she misunderstood something said in the training, illustrating clearly that the 
training she received was not sufficient for her. Respondents in this program suggested that they did not 
understand their systems well enough to be successful with them in the long term, which is part of the 
reason they were easily convinced or coerced to sell them, as explored in detail in section 6.9.2. “If it (the 
training) had been enough, we wouldn’t have sold,” reported one. 
 
Removing the systems in the disaster relief program from the data, the apparent association between 
training and success is stronger. Among respondents with unsuccessful systems, only 24% (7/29) knew of 
or participated in any training related to the system, compared to 63% (26/41) of respondents with 
successful systems.  
 
6.6.2.2. Participation in training 
Only the post-conflict development program established structures in which local participants were 
designated as “maintenance men” and given specific training with that in mind. As this is only one of many 
categorical differences between this program and the others included in this study, it is not possible to say 
whether the local maintenance man influenced system success.  
 
Among all systems included in this research, many respondents said the training wasn’t universal, 
pertaining only to committee members, maintenance men or select members of the community: 42% (8/19) 
of respondents who commented specifically on who was invited to attend training sessions said that the 
training was reserved for a select group. Less clear was whether the training sessions were open to women 
                                                 
95 Sampling methodology prevents me from reporting percent of successful systems in any program, but among the 18 respondents 
from these communities, I was able to find only four with successful systems despite actively seeking them. 
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in the communities. One woman stated that she attended training sessions only when her husband was 
unavailable. In a different community, a woman reported that women were not invited. In other 
communities, people stated that “everyone” participated, sometimes explicitly stating that women were 
included. Indigenous women and older or more marginalized men, some of whom understand less Spanish, 
may have been de facto excluded from training because of a language barrier. 
 
A participant in a community in the disaster relief program observed that, while women were invited, they 
rarely participated in meetings or training associated with the project. He stated that their household work 
tended to take higher priority for them. He also commented on the cost of attending training, as sessions 
were held in centralized locations and people from other communities might have to take buses to attend. 
The juxtaposition of these comments suggested to me that women either had less access to funds for travel, 
or that they prioritized other expenses over attending meetings. These attitudes towards women were 
consistent with the generally machista culture I observed in Guatemala. “Everyone” in many cases meant 
“all men;” in communities who included women in project activities, respondents often spoke of it as if it 
were unusual. 
 
6.6.2.3. Training content and participation 
When asked about the content of the training, those who attended largely responded vaguely “maintenance” 
or “use.” Those who were more specific generally remembered the most critical and frequent maintenance 
activity: check the water level in the battery regularly. Most knew that they should use distilled water 
purchased at a gas station.96 Some also mentioned cleaning panels or battery terminals, with a few noting 
specific issues like “the safety of the children” and not confusing positive and negative terminals. One 
remarked that members of his community were instructed not to chop a battery with a machete.97 
 
                                                 
96 Many users who followed the training and tried to purchase distilled water were convinced by vendors that they should use a 
commercial electrolyte, calling it colloquially “Red Bull for batteries.” Trainers had not specifically told users that this was an 
unnecessary expense as distilled water would function equally well. The idea that a North American energy drink would be well 
known enough to have meaning as an analogy in rural Guatemalan villages, while striking, is not explored in this research. 
97 In an example of why local knowledge is critical to appropriate training, this was advice that the user regarded seriously but is 
something that never would have occurred to me to mention. 
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Training was clearly not understood by all, since some respondents were mistaken about very basic 
information, as illustrated by the woman who expected her panel to last only four years. People in other 
communities who received training under the same program did not share that misunderstanding; while the 
trainers may have been giving the correct information, they did not ensure that it was received, understood 
and remembered by all attendees. 
 
Users in the disaster relief and post-conflict development programs reported receiving some training in 
accounting and management as well, in the interest of forming maintenance or administrative committees. 
The utility of this training is difficult to gauge. In the post-conflict development program, both 
administrative and technical training were aimed at project leadership committee members, so most users 
were little aware of it. In the disaster relief program, collective maintenance or administrative committees 
were rapidly abandoned either because they were viewed as pointless, or because maintenance moneys 
initially collected were returned to contributors when crop failures left people hungry one to two years after 
the initiation of the projects. 
 
Training content was not considered sufficient by many, but why users considered it insufficient is unclear. 
Among users who commented on the sufficiency of the training, 68% (8/13) who were owners of 
unsuccessful systems said that they believed that they needed more training or were unsure if they needed 
more training; 63% (9/15) with successful systems said the same. This suggests that the perceived 
sufficiency of the training is not necessarily related to the level of training actually needed for successful 
systems. Possibly, those who perceived their training as insufficient were merely those who were more 
interested in the topic or those who wished to have sufficient training to learn a job skill in the area rather 
than merely being able to maintain their own families’ systems. Those not satisfied with the training 
wanted training to be available to more people or more understandable, wanted more information on the 
topic of solar energy and system maintenance, or wanted a review of the original training as people had 
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forgotten needed information in the years since the original training. Three wanted training on topics other 
than solar energy, with one happy to attend training on any topic offered.98 
 
It seems “common sense” that providing documentation of necessary maintenance activities would increase 
the value of training by serving as a reminder of topics covered. However, the literacy rate in Guatemala is 
officially 69% (CIA, 2009), but anecdotally much lower in rural communities – calling into question the 
utility of written documentation. Some organizations instead use pictorial instructions or combined pictures 
and words to educate rural populations in Guatemala.99 To my knowledge, the effectiveness of this sort of 
documentation has not been rigorously tested and has been called into question by some development 
professionals.100 While outside the scope of this research, this topic should be studied further. 
 
In summary, Hypothesis 2 detailed in section 6.2 is partially supported by this research. Users of successful 
systems were more likely to have been aware of training opportunities at project inception or 
implementation, regardless of whether they personally attended these training sessions. The perception that 
the training was sufficient was not a driver of system success. 
 
6.6.3. Summary: project initiation and user training and success 
Both the most successful program – the early warning systems – and the least successful program – disaster 
relief – included in this study were initiated by someone outside the community. Some beneficiaries in the 
other programs played a role in initiating their communities’ participation in already existing programs and 
these data do not allow conclusions to be drawn about the influence of that initiation on success. 
 
People generally considered themselves to have been involved in the planning process if there were any 
meetings before installation, even if they were not invited to participate until the major decisions had been 
                                                 
98 This comment suggests many questions about the development paradigm under which systems like these are donated, but is a topic 
outside the scope of this research. 
99 For example, I observed a poster in a health clinic that used both pictures and words to convey its message about AIDS prevention. 
100 Anecdotal. 
228 
 
made. Reported involvement in project initiation cannot be related to system success from these data as the 
question of perceived involvement did not measure actual involvement in the planning process. 
 
Most beneficiaries knew about training taking place, even if they themselves did not attend or were not 
eligible to attend. Those whose systems were successful were more likely to have known about training 
opportunities. This suggests that publicizing training within the community is important to system success. 
Perceptions of training being “sufficient” were not drivers of system success. 
 
6.7. Ownership, accountability and donor relationships 
Questions about the relationship between system ownership and success emerged as a result of this 
research. It is accepted as fact that beneficiaries who invest in and have ownership of projects will maintain 
them, while projects that are wholly donated or belong to someone else will be neglected.101 While I began 
this research with this implicitly assumed to be true, this study does not support this assumption. Instead, it 
suggests that users who are accountable to “someone else” for the operability of their systems have higher 
success rates than those who are accountable to no one but themselves, as described below. 
 
 The question of who owns a project that has been donated to a beneficiary is not necessarily 
straightforward. In some cases it is clear: some systems are agreed to be the property of the user; others are 
unambiguously the property of “someone else” such as a government agency. However, hybrid ownership 
arrangements exist and in some cases ownership is ambiguous or contested, as described in this section. 
 
In this section, I explore the effects of accountability, ownership – and, importantly, perceptions of 
ownership – under the various projects included in this research, as well as other projects I observed but 
were not explicitly part of the data collected.  
 
 
 
                                                 
101 Found in guidebooks for development professionals such as “Solar Photovoltaics for Development Applications” (SAND93-1642),  
(Shepperd and Richards, 1993) and many others. 
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6.7.1. User contribution and ownership 
In development, it is apparently ubiquitously believed that a contribution by beneficiaries to a donated 
project will increase beneficiaries’ sense of ownership of the project and therefore lead to better project 
success and outcome. Though I have heard debate about the appropriate level and type of contribution to 
expect, the consensus seems so complete on the underlying assumption that developers seem to forget that 
an assumption is being made: that a feeling of ownership in fact leads to success.  
 
However, I examine here the hypothesis that a user contribution to a stand-alone solar electric system in 
rural Guatemala will lead, whether directly or indirectly, to system success. Contrary to “common 
knowledge,” the hypothesis is not supported by this research. 
 
Among users who responded to the question of whether and what sort of contribution they agreed to as part 
of the implementation of their systems, 20% (8/40) of users of successful systems said they made no 
contributions, and 19% (8/42) of users of unsuccessful systems said the same.  
 
Viewing user contributions of money specifically, only 10% (4/40) of users of successful systems 
contributed capital, compared to 19% (8/42) of users of unsuccessful systems. Looking at capital, materials 
and transportation cost contributions combined, the picture is much the same: 20% (8/40) of users of 
successful systems were asked to contribute capital, materials or paid transportation, 26% of users of 
unsuccessful systems were asked to make those contributions. While the number users asked to contribute 
money is too small to draw definitive conclusions, they certainly do not support the firmly held belief that 
paying for something will make users take better care of it. 
 
Some respondents reported that they contributed labor during the installations of their systems: 53% 
(21/40) of users of successful systems and 36% (15/42) of users of unsuccessful systems reported that they 
or other members of their communities worked to varying degrees on the installation of their systems. The 
contribution of labor may have been more of an investment than monetary contributions to the 
beneficiaries, supporting the idea that beneficiary contribution leads to success. However, it is perhaps 
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equally possible that those who contributed labor learned more about the systems initially and were 
therefore more able to maintain them over time. 
 
Other small contributions were asked of beneficiaries, including meals for installers and, in one case, the 
beneficiary’s vote in an upcoming election. Three respondents each among successful and unsuccessful 
systems stated that they were asked to contribute but did not specify the contribution. 
 
This remarkable result merits further investigation: between those who were successful and those who were 
not, users were asked to contribute to their projects in about equal numbers (~80%). However, those that 
succeeded were more likely to have contributed labor than those that did not succeed, and the unsuccessful 
projects were more likely than the successful project to have provided a monetary contribution. 
 
6.7.2. A question of accountability 
This research is not structured such that it can explicitly and quantitatively test the hypothesis that 
ownership in some way leads to success. However, the pervasiveness of the belief and evidence suggested 
by this research make clear the urgent need to test it. 
 
Some inferences may be drawn about the question, even if no statistical data can be analyzed (each is 
discussed in more detail in subsequent below that deal with ownership types). Both the most successful 
series of projects – the early warning systems – and the least successful – the government-provided systems 
for schools and clinics – were unambiguously perceived by their users to be owned by “someone else.” The 
reasonably successful post-conflict development program and the categorically unsuccessful disaster relief 
program involved systems that were owned entirely by the users. These dichotomies alone suggest that 
ownership, if it is a driver of success at all, is so weak compared to other factors that it is not clear whether 
ownership by users helps or hinders project success. 
 
In contrast to ownership, a clear theme that emerges from this research is accountability. Users in both of 
the more successful examples above maintained a relationship with the donor that was imposed by the 
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donor, whether welcomed by the communities or not. The donor or perceived owner in both of the less 
successful programs never questioned users about the states of the systems after initial installation. 
Accountability to other members of the community, as was the case with microhydro projects I observed 
during this research but which are not considered explicitly in the data, similarly seemed to accompany 
project success. 
 
In weighing ownership and accountability as drivers for care or maintenance of a thing, I applied the 
concept to myself and a substantially expensive item that I use: an automobile. If I rent a car and purchase 
the accompanying insurance, I have no motivation whatever to care for it. There are no consequences to me 
if the car is damaged: financial, social or otherwise. However, if I drive my own car, the consequences of 
damage fall only to me: I have to choose between paying out of pocket, submitting an insurance claim if 
the damage is covered, or living with a dent in my car until I can afford to fix it. When money is tight, the 
last option is the one I choose, or I can simply sell the car with the damage. If I borrow a car from someone 
I know, I am incredibly careful with it. Here, I am faced with personal, social and financial consequences if 
I damage the vehicle: I will feel bad for having abused the confidence of the person who loaned me the car, 
I face potential loss of trust or other social capital with the car’s owner, and I will have to pay monetarily 
for the damage, whether directly or through my insurance premiums. Inaction – fix it later when I can 
afford it – is proscribed here where it is my choice when my own car is the one damaged. 
 
Thus in examining my own case, I realize that ownership is not the strongest motivator for maintaining this 
substantially expensive and arguably necessary (or at least incredibly convenient) item. If the consequences 
to me are trivial, I may not make any effort to care for it at all. If the consequences are a loss to me alone, I 
will remedy the problem if I have the wherewithal, or do without if necessary. It is when I have the greatest 
degree of accountability that I am most motivated to take care: when I have fewest choices in remedying 
the situation, when the financial cost is highest, and when it hurts my relationships with others. 
 
In examining the ownership structure of each of the categories of systems in this study in the remainder of 
this section, I examine the issue of users’ accountability as well. I do not propose that respondents’ 
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motivations mirror mine, but I propose that knowing the ownership status of a system gives much more 
information when the consequences to the user of system failure are also known. 
 
6.7.3. Uncontested beneficiary-owned projects 
Both the post-conflict development program and the disaster relief program included in this research 
involved donating systems in their entirety to beneficiaries. These two projects had very different 
outcomes, with the development projects succeeding at a much higher rate than the relief projects.  
 
In visiting the communities that participated in the disaster relief program, the most startling observation I 
made was that there was a remarkable dearth of panels visible on houses that had been beneficiaries of a 
solar home system donation. Respondents in these communities were unanimous in stating that many or 
perhaps most of their neighbors had sold their panels within one to two years after installation, and many 
within the first few months.102 The specific circumstances that surround the buyer for most or all of these 
systems are detailed in Section 6.9. Here, I note only the influence of ownership on the situation. 
Community members owned their systems outright without obligation to anyone, legally and ethically 
allowing them to sell the panels or complete systems.  
 
The choice to sell was enabled by their perceptions of ownership. If the systems were owned by “someone 
else,” selling them would be stealing, legally, and presumably ethically in the communities included in this 
research as well. Systems or partial systems that have been sold do not meet the definition of success in this 
research, so this is one way in which ownership may actually depress success rates. 
 
Even users who own their systems can have a sense of accountability, which might influence both selling 
and maintenance decisions. Fundación Solar was involved in implementing both the disaster relief and 
post-conflict development programs. In both programs, Fundación Solar helped beneficiary communities 
set up savings and maintenance cooperatives to govern the projects. In the post-conflict development 
program, all beneficiaries were initially invited (or nominally required) to join a multi-community 
                                                 
102 Respondents were unable to suggest clear or consistent numbers or percentages of systems that were sold. 
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governance and maintenance structure. Most, but not all communities remained involved and most, but not 
all members of involved communities are associates of the organization. Conversely, the governance 
structures established in the relief program were dissolved shortly after inception, as discussed in section 
6.5. Rules continued to exist in the former case but not the later, and the near universal participation in the 
post-conflict development program suggests a degree of social pressure to conform. One of the few people 
who did not participate in the governance structure in the post-conflict development communities was the 
lone respondent in these communities who was not aware of the project in advance of its implementation, 
suggesting that he was already marginalized or isolated and therefore perhaps less subject to the social 
pressures that might encourage adherence to the rules surrounding the systems. 
 
Further, the NGO that was the primary implementer of the solar home systems in both projects has a long-
standing presence in the region of the post-conflict development projects, but not where the relief projects 
are located. Although few individuals in either program claimed to have access to the NGO, members of 
the NGO claim that they have maintained an informal communication with the governance/maintenance 
body of the development projects. There is then an informal and weak accountability to the NGO, just in 
that the project is at least casually watched, although the NGO has no right of sanction against the project if 
they do not approve of circumstances or decisions. An elder in one of the communities suggested that the 
community had hopes of further projects with the NGO. From this I infer that they would be motivated to 
impress upon the NGO that they are capable of maintaining projects to the NGO’s standards. 
 
A broader definition of success might be needed to judge whether systems owned wholly by users were, in 
fact, successful. As described above, respondents who felt they had 100% ownership of their systems and 
had no accountability to others as far as the systems were concerned sometimes sold the components of 
their systems. They obviously valued the cash income from the sales over the utility of the systems 
themselves. Having an asset to liquidate when they needed cash might be a highly successful outcome for 
some users – especially among the very poor who may have used this money for food and other more basic 
necessities – whereas it falls outside the definition of success used in this study, which is fundamentally the 
provision of adequate electricity into the indefinite future. 
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Although respondents in these two programs have equal legal ownership of their systems, they have 
different degrees of accountability to the developer. They also have very different degrees of success. 
 
6.7.4. Hybrid ownership 
The Ministry of Energy and Mines was involved in a hybrid loan/donation program, as described in 
Chapter 3. In brief, MEM installed solar home systems in communities that were expected to be connected 
to the national electric grid within the subsequent three to five years. Batteries and lamps are owned by 
users, and users are responsible for their upkeep and replacement. Therefore the economic burdens of 
ownership fall to the user, just as they would with a donated system.  However, the panel – without which 
the rest of the system is useless since few beneficiaries could reasonably be expected to replace it – is 
owned by an outside party (MEM) with the prerogative to take it away. Although the responsibilities of 
ownership are the same for these beneficiaries as for the beneficiaries of donated systems, they are 
accountable for the state of the system. They may have to answer for its status as often as twice per year, 
and if it is not maintained, they may lose a critical piece. 
 
Respondents reported that MEM representatives visited irregularly rather than biannually as initially stated, 
and sometimes gave advice to households with inoperable systems rather than repossessing them. The 
director of the MEM program103 expressed a seemingly genuine desire to help beneficiaries make use of 
their systems rather than punitively repossessing them. However, most respondents seemed to regard the 
threat of losing their panels seriously. 
 
In other cases, beneficiaries are reported to consider themselves owners of the panels as well. No 
community reported that Ministry representatives consistently visited them twice per year, and some had 
not seen representatives since the projects were installed.  Though no one would admit to it personally – 
nor would they direct me to the neighbors about whom they were talking – some respondents reported that 
they knew of people who had sold their panels. In another community, the Ministry requested the panels 
                                                 
103 Byron del Cid, Director, PV Rural Electrification Program, Ministry of Energy and Mines 
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back from all beneficiaries when the national electric grid reached them. The community members refused 
because there were to be no consequences to the people who had sold their panels before the grid arrived. 
Though I spoke with only one household in this community (as it was grid connected and thus outside the 
scope of this research), they insisted that “all” of their neighbors had done as they had and kept their panels. 
The MEM representative who I asked about the unreturned panels told me that the cases were referred to 
the Guatemalan civil courts, but that the court system was so inadequate that the cases may never be heard, 
or would be considered many years in the future. I was left with the impression that the value of a used PV 
panel was less than the cost of taking action to reclaim it from an unwilling user or former user, but that 
this fact was unknown to communities where no one had yet refused to surrender a panel when it was 
demanded. 
 
In this case, ownership is ambiguous. Some respondents firmly believed that the panels associated with 
their systems were their own, while others expressed concern about maintaining their systems so that the 
Ministry did not repossess the panel, which it owned. Though the Ministry had the legal right to repossess 
panels, it seemed to have no power to do so without the consent of the beneficiary. 
 
Some communities in the hybrid program were very analogous to the communities in the full donation 
programs described above. Both types of households would equally lose the benefit of their systems if they 
were not maintained, but those with the threat of punishment – of having their system taken from them – 
succeeded at seemingly much higher rates. Startlingly, it was not the mere loss of the benefit that was the 
motivating factor: there was some other value that users gained from not having their systems repossessed. 
It may have been pride or social standing that was at risk: users would be embarrassed in front of their 
neighbors and the government agency if their systems were taken away. Or there may be some perceived 
value in having as opposed to using a solar home system.104 
 
                                                 
104 As an analogy, I own sterling silver flatware, almost all of which I have received as gifts rather than purchased myself. I use it not 
more than two or three times per year – and then when my usual stainless would function equally well – and store it to avoid tarnish 
rather than having it on display. In addition to its use as silverware, I maintain a certain pride of ownership due to a family culture that 
values such things, and view it as a highly portable asset that could be liquidated in an emergency. Its value to me exceeds the utility 
of the teaspoons or the cash value of the silver: there is value in possession. 
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This hybrid ownership program provides two primary insights. The first is that the accountability that users 
felt towards MEM seemed to motivate them to keep systems in working order. The other is that the degree 
of accountability and perception of ownership differed in some communities, even though they were 
participants in the same program governed by the same rules. 
 
6.7.5. Absent owners 
Both the most successful and the least successful systems in this study were perceived by their users to be 
owned by “someone else,” namely various Guatemalan government agencies. 
 
As detailed in this section, the success of systems owned by “someone else” depended largely on the 
accountability users felt towards the owner. If users felt that they would be punished by the owner (by 
having the system removed, for example) if they failed to maintain it, or if users felt they could rely on the 
owner to offer some sort of support or advice for system maintenance, systems often succeeded. On the 
other hand, if systems were owned by “someone else” and maintenance was seen to be the responsibility of 
the absent owner, systems failed.  
 
6.7.6. Implications 
The remainder of this section reviews the implications of system ownership on the success of the different 
categories of systems included in this study. 
 
Some cases agree with conventional wisdom on user ownership: “un-owned” systems can be un-cared-for 
systems. The fourteen government-donated school and clinic PV systems were chosen as a convenience 
sample rather than a purposeful sample: I did not seek out successful or unsuccessful systems of this type, 
but included those that I could locate in the areas in which I was traveling. Among these fourteen, only 
three are considered successful by the definition used in these analyses. Most were not functioning, and 
there was the common expectation that “someone else” was responsible for their upkeep. Employees of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines, which is generally responsible for rural electrification using PV, were not 
aware of their existence or locations, so clearly did not take responsibility for their upkeep. The ministries 
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of health and education, which users reported as the originators of the projects, did not offer resources to 
users to maintain the systems, and so presumably expected either the communities or the energy ministry to 
maintain them. Community members or parents of school children did not express the expectation that they 
themselves should contribute to the upkeep of the systems, and no institution or organization had been 
formed to ensure savings for maintenance.  
 
The only category of systems that was 100% successful in this research was the series of flood early 
warning systems (EWS) owned by the Guatemalan government’s disaster preparedness division, 
CONRED, as described in Chapter 4. Users had no ownership and almost no responsibility for 
maintenance. Although not 100% of systems were functional at the time of my visit, those that were not 
working had been reported to the maintenance group and were in queue to be repaired. Collaborators had 
played no role in planning or implementation, except to agree to participate. Users had responsibilities 
associated with having the systems, and gained community-wide benefits as well as personal benefits from 
having the systems in place.  
 
These systems were owned by someone outside the community to whom users were accountable on a daily 
basis. This both allowed users to report problems immediately (or the absence of their daily reports alerted 
the system owner to problems) and required them to account for the states of the systems. Batteries in these 
systems lasted less time than would be expected for the type and quality installed (typically one to two 
years for batteries with expected lives of three to five years). This is likely due to battery over-discharge 
and failing to re-fill it with distilled water (one user collected rainwater for the purpose), and may illustrate 
a downside to the arrangement: without any incentive to maintain the battery and knowing that it will be 
replaced promptly under any circumstances, users are not motivated to maximize battery life, even if they 
are educated in how to do so. 
 
The relationship with the system owner seems to drive success in cases of absent owners. Is “someone 
else’s” system also “someone else’s” problem, or are those deriving benefit also accountable to and 
supported by the absent owner?  These examples show once again that it is not legal or de facto ownership 
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that drives system success, but instead the institutions and relationships that support or fail to support 
system users. 
 
6.7.7. Ownership and maintenance responsibility 
Maintenance responsibility was generally thought by respondents to belong to system owners, except in the 
two cases described in this section. The first is under the hybrid ownership paradigm of the MEM-
sponsored systems. The Ministry owned the panel and the user owned the balance of system components, 
including the battery. Users were responsible for the maintenance of the systems, including the PV panel, 
and the Ministry was unwilling to replace it if it degraded or was damaged.105 For practical purposes, this 
still means that the system owner has responsibility for maintenance: the regular maintenance required for a 
PV panel is trivial and major maintenance is trivially rare, while battery and light bulb replacement are 
ongoing maintenance issues. 
 
The post-conflict development project represents the only other divergence between users’ sense of 
ownership and their responsibility for maintenance. The successful governance structures that persisted in 
the post-conflict development communities, described below – and in which most beneficiaries still 
participated – were responsible for system maintenance. Users who paid their monthly tariffs felt entitled to 
avail themselves of the services of the organization, but expressed the sentiment that their physical systems 
were their own and not collectively owned.  
 
6.7.8. Institutional arrangements between donors and beneficiaries 
The relationship between project donor or developer and beneficiaries differed among the categories of 
systems included in this study. On an ordinal scale, program success correlates to the length and frequency 
of donor involvement: projects that are dropped in place by donors who then disappear tend to fail, where 
regular or frequent donor contact tends to bolster project success. This correlation cannot be quantified for 
these analyses because sampling methodology does not allow me to calculate the percentage of systems 
                                                 
105 Conversation with Byron del Cid, Ministry of Energy and Mines. 
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that are successful or unsuccessful under a particular category or program; this observation is discussed 
qualitatively in this section.  
 
Projects owned and managed by the government in support of an early warning system required (and 
achieved) an ongoing relationship between the households where the systems were located and the 
government agency. This ongoing relationship ensured that the government knew when system 
maintenance was needed. The “donor” in this case also took responsibility for system maintenance; the 
system was not a financial, an administrative or a technical burden to the user. Users at the same time had a 
high degree of accountability to the donor for the few responsibilities they had – and to the communities 
depending on their information to prepare for flooding events. These systems were categorically the most 
successful observed during this study. Although sampling methodology was not appropriate to calculating 
percentages of systems operating in each category, every government-owned and managed system included 
in these analyses was operable or concrete steps were being undertaken to repair it. This category had both 
the strongest relationship between the project developer and beneficiaries, and the best success rate seen in 
this research. 
 
The most categorically unsuccessful projects were those implemented under the disaster relief program, in 
which the donor and developer were required to complete all work within a one-year time span, from 
conception to implementation. Beneficiaries and the project developer concurred: there was minimal 
contact between developers and beneficiaries before and during implementation, and when the projects 
were installed and the relationship ended. This lack of relationship worked to the disadvantage of the 
beneficiaries. Users in different communities had very different understandings of the value, capabilities 
and limitations of their systems, some of them necessarily incorrect. Beneficiaries and developer both 
attested that limited socialization and training had been provided, and the developer maintained that the 
training was consistent between and among communities. Had there been an ongoing relationship with or 
follow-up by the donor or developer, misconceptions and problems could potentially have been resolved 
before systems were irreparably unsuccessful (most often because they were sold, in this case). Note that 
the ongoing relationship is not necessarily a financial relationship: the provision of information might be as 
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important as the provision of funds for system repair. This seemingly obvious differentiation is more 
nuanced than it might initially appear. An ongoing relationship with a project developer or donor is 
necessarily a financial relationship on the part of the developer, as the developer must devote resources to 
employee time, volunteer logistics, communication with the community, or other expenses. The 
beneficiary, on the other hand, may view a financial relationship as being limited to whether the developer 
provides material or monetary support directly to the project or beneficiary. This topic merits further study, 
and is outside the scope of these analyses. 
 
The post-conflict development program was more successful, and was implemented over a longer period of 
time with more ongoing involvement from the project developer than was the disaster relief program. The 
same Guatemalan NGO (Fundación Solar) assisted members of a group of communities to apply to the 
program that allowed the development of their solar home systems and helped to create a highly-organized 
collective maintenance organization made up of representatives of each community involved. The gradual 
addition of communities and households within communities to the program allowed the NGO to maintain 
contact with the original beneficiaries for a longer period of time than would typically be budgeted for such 
a project by staying involved with and introducing new communities into the collective maintenance 
organization. Even after the end of the formal relationship, representatives of the NGO continue to advise 
the local collective maintenance organization occasionally while they continued to work on unrelated 
projects in the area. Fundación Solar has had a presence in this area of Quiche for over a decade, usually 
through the local presence of one or more employees originally from the area. Though seemingly not as 
successful as the government loan program described subsequently, this category of systems was relatively 
successful. 
 
In the government loan program, representatives of the Ministry of Energy and Mines maintained the right 
to inspect the systems they installed at any time because they maintained ownership of the panel, the most 
expensive part of the system. Although the Ministry did not have the resources to visit each community 
semiannually as intended (and some communities had not been visited by the Ministry in many years at the 
time of my visit, if they had been visited after installation at all), there was an ongoing relationship between 
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beneficiaries and project developers. Beneficiaries in some communities expressed a sense of 
accountability to the Ministry, understanding that misuse or neglect of the system would result in loss of 
the panel. Although this program with its ongoing relationship between donor and beneficiary is estimated 
to have a better success rate than any other program studied except the government-owned and managed 
program, stronger relationships between individual communities within this program and the Ministry did 
not correlate to better success rates in those communities: the communities that qualitatively seemed to 
have very high rates of operability were the same communities that claimed never to have had their systems 
inspected by the Ministry.106 There are several possible explanations for this. One is that the Ministry may 
have made more effort to visit communities that were likely to have problems or the communities 
themselves may have requested more assistance from the Ministry. Another possible explanation is that the 
least-visited systems in this program that were included in this study were coincidentally also those held by 
the wealthiest beneficiaries.  
 
The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health donated systems for rural schools or clinics and 
provided no follow-up on those systems. Beneficiary communities generally did not have the knowledge or 
the means to maintain these systems, nor did they have the ability to contact the project developer. 
Community members attributed responsibility to “the government,” the Ministry that installed the systems, 
or the Ministry of Energy and Mines, but not to the community itself. 
 
When asked specifically about their personal relationships to the project developer, among respondents 
who answered, there was not an appreciable difference between those with successful systems and those 
with unsuccessful systems (56% and 60% respectively at least knew how to contact the project developer). 
This is likely an artifact of sampling methodology rather than evidence that the ability to contact the project 
developer is unimportant: both successful and unsuccessful systems were sought in communities included 
in this study, and responses within a community were fairly homogeneous. 
 
                                                 
106 The communities in question, located in Cancuen, were, relative to the population included in this study, very affluent, which these 
analyses show to be linked or seemingly coincident with success (see Chapter 5). 
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Thus, for reasons of beneficiary accountability, ongoing donor support and perhaps other reasons, closer 
relationships between beneficiaries and donors led to better system outcomes. 
 
6.7.9. Summary: Ownership, accountability and donor relationships and success 
In this section, I summarize the results related to ownership, accountability and donor relationships. I begin 
with an example that typifies these results. 
 
Don Típico is a homeowner in a community included in the disaster relief program. According to both the 
NGO and Don Típico, a local NGO implemented the project using hardware from a local vendor and 
performed trainings both on the physical maintenance of the systems and on administration and financial 
management. The community created a maintenance cooperative under the NGO’s guidance, but at the end 
of the one-year project timeframe, everyone involved in project development left and never followed up.  
 
Don Típico reported that their savings cooperative quickly fell apart, a fact echoed by everyone interviewed 
from the towns that benefited from this project. Systems fell into disrepair mainly due to lack of battery 
maintenance, which may be because users did not know how to maintain their systems or because they 
lacked the funds to do so (see Chapter 5). The majority of beneficiaries sold all or part of their systems.107  
 
Don Típico readily affirmed that he and other beneficiaries had received both technical and administrative 
training. He affirmed that the training had been useful to him. When asked if the training had been 
sufficient, he replied “if it had been enough, we would not have sold them and we would still have light.” 
 
Fundamentally, those who own their own systems must manage them according to their own priorities. 
They face the consequences of their decisions, but do not face artificial or external sanctions for them. 
Paradoxically, system owners accept the loss of system use because they do not choose to maintain it, but 
                                                 
107 Due to the sampling methodology, I am not able to say what percentage of beneficiaries sold their panels. However, in each of the 
communities that were electrified under this program, it was difficult to find households that had not sold. In one community, other 
community members reported that the only family who had not sold was unavailable at the time of my visit.  
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users of systems owned by others seem less likely to accept the loss of the physical system hardware by 
making the same choice against maintenance. Either would be left in the dark.  
 
Institutional relationships between beneficiaries and donors or developers appear to be related to system 
success, independently of the above-mentioned issue of accountability. Communities with the least 
successful systems had short relationships with project developers that terminated after rapid 
implementation processes. The longest relationships – notably ongoing relationships without formal 
termination – seemed to lead to the highest system success rates. This relationship need not be one of 
continuous donation (i.e., the donor need not pay for maintenance or replacement of system components), 
but the exchange of information, ongoing accountability, and anticipation of future work with the same 
donor may be factors that lead users with established relationships with donors to have more successful 
systems. 
 
The definition of success in this research is narrow: it requires the beneficiary to continue benefitting from 
electric power. As such, ownership or the perception of ownership, which affords the prerogative to sell, is 
a source of system failure. Whether users see themselves as owners or not, the institutions and relationships 
surrounding systems – from perspectives of both support and accountability – are far stronger drivers of 
success than is ownership itself. 
 
This research does not show whether tangible contribution by beneficiaries creates ownership or the 
perception of ownership. However, it clearly does not support the hypothesis that beneficiary contribution 
to the project – especially cash contribution – leads to greater system success. While more investigation is 
needed to more fully explore this relationship or lack thereof, the prevalence of this underlying assumption 
in development work in general makes this an important result of these analyses. 
 
6.8. Unintended consequences 
In this section, I detail the results related to Hypothesis 4, detailed in section 6.2, regarding the effects of 
unintended consequences on system success.  
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Anecdotes from development professionals suggest that donation programs can cause conflict within a 
community, especially if community members are given unequal access to the project or the project is 
insufficient to meet the needs of everyone involved. Among projects with which I am familiar but that are 
not included in this study because they fall outside its scope, two communities that participated in a PV 
battery charging program in Nicaragua experienced problems when the first phase of the project included 
only one third of households. The households were chosen by community leaders to include their families 
and friends rather than on any objective criteria. The issue was “resolved” when a hurricane destroyed all 
of the systems that had been installed. In communities in both Nicaragua and Guatemala, micro-hydro 
systems have been installed by donors who failed to consider class stratification within the communities. 
Ability to pay an access charge or to contribute requisite labor hours to participate in the project has 
increased the divide between the “haves” and the “have-nots” in communities that may be easily considered 
homogeneous by outsiders. In a Guatemalan community where a substantial contribution of either labor or 
money was required to connect to the microhydro, one woman in a particularly poor household lamented 
she could not participate because God had cursed her with only daughters; she had no sons to either 
contribute the labor or earn the money.108 
 
A grid-powered electric system (also not included in this research) that was to pump water to a clothes-
washing station for members of two communities who previously washed laundry in an ecologically 
sensitive lake in Guatemala suffered repeated failures due to social issues. Initially, competition between 
communities for use during peak hours caused a great deal of conflict, as did use of the water for other-
than-intended uses (leaving insufficient water for laundry), and the presence of men who used the site 
socially to interact with (and frequently interrupt) women doing laundry. Though these problems were 
thought to have been resolved by setting up a system of rules to which all agreed and providing training, 
only a few years passed before the system was again non-functional because the pipe from the water source 
to the laundry basins had been chopped with machetes past the point of repair. While this might be said to 
                                                 
108 Project leaders stated that women could contribute time to lighter labors than men, but few chose to do so. This respondent was 
either unaware that she or her daughters could work, or found it unacceptable, or the nominal inclusion of women was poorly 
actualized. 
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be a technical failure (lack of piping) or an economic failure (insufficient money was available to replace 
the pipe), the problem is inherently social. Even if the resources to replace the pipe were available, the 
motivation to do so is small until the underlying problems that led to the vandalism are resolved. 
 
I hypothesized that negative unintended consequences would decrease the likelihood of success of rural 
stand-alone PV projects. When asked about negative impacts of the systems included in this research, most 
respondents said there were none. Of the nine respondents who said the system did have negative impacts, 
none were claiming that the system caused bad things to happen, but stating that the systems did not 
produce enough electricity to meet their needs and wants. Answers to more specific questions lead to the 
conclusion that donated stand-alone PV systems can have negative impacts on a community level follow. 
 
6.8.1. Cultural and religious conflict 
With a single exception,109 no respondent reported knowing of any religious conflict associated with 
systems in this study. This may be an artifact of people’s general reluctance to talk about religion in public 
forums, particularly with outsiders and perhaps more so with people in the development community (Lunn, 
2009). Anecdotes from project developers and observations of other energy systems suggest that it is a 
small – though not trivial – problem in Guatemala, where Catholics, Evangelicals and practitioners of 
traditional Mayan religions live side by side. 
 
I found evidence of religious conflict associated with projects not included in this investigation because of 
resource constraints or because they fell outside the scope of the study. An interview with a project 
developer before the outset of the study indicated that it may be an important factor (Ley, 2006). She 
confirmed the facts of the case during a 2008 interview:  
 
A U.S. government agency and a Guatemalan NGO were collaborating on the installation of solar home 
systems in a rural Guatemalan community with strong ties to a Mayan religion. Modern Mayan religions 
are descendent from pre-colonial religious beliefs. These religions are not homogeneous in their belief 
                                                 
109 One respondent said the donated system was used only for religious festivals, which was not corroborated by other community 
members. 
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systems or leadership (there is no Mayan equivalent to the Catholic Pope). However, a shared belief across 
most or all is a deification of or deep reverence for the sun.   
 
At the outset of the project, community civic leaders were included and consulted in planning, but religious 
leaders were not. The leader of the Mayan religious group in the community objected to the project when it 
was presented to him with the rest of the community. He argued that a thing such as a solar panel would 
hurt the revered sun, and he and his followers refused to participate. The issue became divisive in the 
community, with some strongly lobbying for the project and the benefits electricity would bring and others 
lobbying against on religious grounds. 
 
Dialogue between the NGO, community civic leaders, and community religious leaders eventually led the 
religious group to allow and participate in the project, but not before religious concerns were addressed and 
the physical relationship between panels and sun was clarified. The underlying issue was much less that PV 
is fundamentally spiritually offensive to Mayan religion than that religious concerns were excluded from 
the origination and planning of the project. The religious leader’s exclusion meant that initially he did not 
have grounds to judge whether the project was a threat to his religion, and this exclusion was unequivocally 
a threat to his religious leadership. 
 
The then-head of the Guatemalan NGO involved in the project has since researched, written, and presented 
on the intersection of Mayan cosmovision and western technology (Azuria, 2006). From a developer’s 
point of view, better understanding of this will lead to more successful projects (whether by using 
technologies acceptable to the community or by working in communities where the available technology is 
acceptable) and fewer negative consequences (like conflict within a community and project delays that 
divert developer resources from other projects). However, I believe this case demonstrates that developers 
without profound understanding of the religion or religions of the communities in which they work can 
help mitigate potential conflict by addressing the question to community members at the outset: if this 
community is to be electrified, what are community members’ beliefs about the available options, and what 
information do they need to make informed decisions? The result may still be that the developer’s ideas (or 
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those of some but not all of the community) are unacceptable, but inclusion in decisions and understanding 
of options may minimize the possibility of rejection based on lack of information or exclusion, and lessen 
conflict within the community. 
 
Conflict is not limited to religions outside the western mainstream. Another example of religious division 
in a project analogous to those included in this investigation (and visited during the course of this research) 
is the case that I’ve called the Catholic Hydro. Padre, a Catholic priest from the U.S., moved to a poor, 
remote, and indigenous area of Guatemala in the 1970s. Since then, his efforts have been focused on 
helping people maintain their linguistic and cultural identity while simultaneously embracing his religion 
and the modernization allowed by development projects under his direction. He performs mass in the local 
Mayan dialect and has translated substantial portions of Catholic texts. While I do not know that he has 
encouraged it, he has not objected to traditional religious practices such as the ritual sacrifice of chickens 
and turkeys at the outset and completion of Church development projects. “JR,” a layman Catholic from the 
U.S. who moved to the diocese shortly after the priest and has been living there almost continuously since, 
assured me that the priest has an extremely loyal following. 
 
JR serves as the technical expert and labor foreman on many of Padre’s development projects, including the 
micro-hydroelectric project in a previously unelectrified town in the diocese. Since the initial construction 
of the hydro, the national electric grid has reached the community, but few of those connected to the hydro 
have chosen to switch to the grid. In detailed interviews with four community members and casual 
conversation with others in October 2008, only one stated that he believed there was conflict related to 
religion because of the project. When asked for more information, he declined to elaborate. The three 
others formally surveyed said there was none, and no one else mentioned it. 
 
In a formal interview, JR explained the history and details of the project and his role in it, but did not claim 
any religious conflict existed because of it. After the interview was over and the recorder was off, he 
mentioned again that about one third of the community was connected to the hydroelectric project – and 
noted without elaboration that about one third of the community was Catholic. 
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Religious differences apparently kept the Evangelical Christian majority in town from benefiting from the 
electricity produced by the hydroelectric project before the grid arrived. Whether that was self-selection, a 
desire not to be associated with or indebted to the Catholics, or whether it was exclusion on the part of the 
Church or some combination of the two is not evident. Further, it is not clear whether the tangible benefits 
of being connected to the hydro (such as reduced energy cost) outweigh the disadvantages (electricity 
availability varies with stream flow, and is normally insufficient for some productive-use applications like 
carpentry tools) or if loyalty to the priest or church keeps Catholics from switching to the national electric 
grid now that it has arrived. 
 
Although these two examples point to the potential for religious conflict in rural PV projects, it was not 
found in any community included in this study. It may not be negligible as a cause of failure of rural 
renewable energy systems, but it is not a strong driver for the failure of systems surveyed. 
 
6.8.2. Inequity and conflict within communities 
Donated solar PV systems have the potential to either increase or decrease inequity within communities, as 
explored in this section. Because the poor spend a disproportionate share of their income on energy 
sources, the poorest of the poor may benefit most from a reduction in energy cost, thereby reducing 
inequity within a community. Contrarily, if the cost structure110 associated with maintaining or subscribing 
to an energy system are prohibitive to the poorest members of a community, then inequity is increased as 
the poorest are forced to continue to use sources that are, in the long term, more expensive. 
 
I visited two sub-communities that were geographically removed from the majority of houses and buildings 
in the main community. In these, the national electric grid had reached the community and been extended 
to households close to the road or center of town, but more removed households were excluded. In each of 
these, I spoke with only one outlying sub-community member, who expressed frustration, and the tension 
between the outliers and the main groups was evident. Although the power company was blamed for the 
                                                 
110 See Chapter 5, for a discussion of access to capital and other potential financial barriers to system ownership. 
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decision of which households would be electrified and which would be excluded, people in the outlying 
households suggested that they had been abandoned by the community at large once the grid had reached 
the majority. 
 
In one of these communities, one household had privately purchased PV and was looking for donations to 
bring PV to the rest of the community, seeming confident both that the power lines would not reach them in 
the foreseeable future and that the main community leadership would not take an active role in advocating 
for them. In the other case, the outlying cluster of households had assumed an independent identity and a 
new name (not legally recognized), and requested and received panels under the Ministry of Energy 
program. The two households I visited that were in this situation had successful systems (the system 
purchased by the household is not included in the data in this research because it does not meet the 
selection criteria, but was remarkable that despite its age and very poor quality, it was still producing 
power), suggesting that the lucha fought by these splinter groups inspired them to work harder for the 
success of their electric systems. I wished to explore this hypothesis further by speaking to other 
beneficiaries in the group of households that had received panels in the second case, but I had come 
unfortunately to the attention of the drug cartel that controls the area and judged discretion to be the better 
part of research in this case. The hypothesis that an excluded group can have better than average success 
merits exploring in future research. 
 
Almost a quarter of respondents (16/68) who answered the question as to whether everyone in the 
community had equal access to the project said no. However, answers to follow-up questions were more 
nuanced. Fifteen respondents said that some households who were eligible voluntarily chose not to 
participate, with most simply saying “they didn’t want to,” sometimes without elaboration.111 Mistrust of 
the donor was a common reason reported for self-exclusion: people hear promises that never come to 
fruition from prospective donors, and so must choose carefully whether they wish to contribute energy, 
time, labor, or money to any particular project. Five mentioned cost as a barrier, some phrasing it as an 
                                                 
111 Some respondents gave multiple answers. 
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exclusion (“if you couldn’t pay (the 30Q contribution), you didn’t get panels”) and others phrasing it as a 
choice (“not everyone wanted to pay”).    
 
In other cases, seven respondents reported that some households had systems while others in the same 
community did not because houses without systems were built or occupied after the donor made the initial 
lists of beneficiaries. Many of these were said to be the households established by young couples who had 
newly moved out of their parents’ homes. However, in the disaster relief program, two respondents 
reported that people whose homes had been destroyed by the hurricane were excluded because there was no 
home on which to put the panel. 
 
No community reported that the original donor had included more households after the initial list was 
made, or that the same donor had developed a second round of projects for new residents. Communities 
that asked donors to do this reported being ignored, with a single exception: in one community, MEM 
failed to bring sufficient hardware for all of the families it had originally listed. Members of the community 
went to the capital and petitioned MEM, which ultimately brought the remaining systems. 
 
The consequence of donors not implementing additional systems in communities in which they have 
previously worked is a generational inequity that develops over time. As children grow up, most will leave 
their parents’ homes and start households of their own. These new households lack the advantages of the 
solar home systems donated to their elders. One of the children of the original system beneficiary can 
continue to benefit if he or she takes over the parents’ household, but the systems are too small to provide 
light to more than one house, even if the houses were very close together (and thus suffered fewer line 
losses).  
 
Exclusions such as these that were either considered the fault of the donor or the option of the non-
participant did not appear to cause conflict among community members. Two respondents who themselves 
opted not to participate did not express resentment and claimed that their self-imposed exclusion posed no 
problems for the rest of the community, even if it meant that they themselves went without light. However, 
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in some cases, potential users were actively excluded from the project at the community level. Specific 
examples follow. 
 
In one community, poorer households were excluded because families had been away working the sugar 
cane harvest at the time the donor made the initial lists. Respondents expressed resentment, but it was 
unclear whether the object of the resentment was the group of beneficiaries within the community, the 
donor, or life’s injustices in general. It was not reported to and did not appear to cause or exacerbate 
conflict within the community. 
 
Some people were actively excluded from projects, and the circumstances surrounding the exclusions were 
not fully disclosed. In one community, a man I call Señor Iresponsable vaguely said that he did not 
participate because the then-community leader knew he would lose the panel, so he was not included. He 
said this as if affirming the leader’s claim that he was not responsible enough to keep a system, but did not 
wish to elaborate. A woman in the same community stated that a second round of battery donations (which 
contributed substantially to the success of the systems) favored some community members over others, 
which either caused or exacerbated tensions. 
 
In another community, Señora Fuera, a woman excluded from a weaving cooperative that had solar 
lighting, said with apparent bitterness that the women in the co-op knew she was too busy and so they 
didn’t bother to ask her to participate. The head of the weaving cooperative saw me talking to the excluded 
woman and, appearing angry, interrupted to end any conversation between us. The conflict between these 
two women (and perhaps others) was clear, but is unlikely to have been caused or substantially aggravated 
by solar energy. 
 
In both of these communities, the exclusion of these community members did not adversely affect project 
success: the weaving cooperative seemed highly successful in all regards, including the energy system, and 
the rate of success of systems in Señor Iresponsable’s community seemed to be on par or a little better than 
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the rates in other communities that received panels under the same program.112 It is possible that exclusions 
actually increase the percentage of successful systems in a community. If Señor Iresponsable in fact had a 
lower probability of caring for his system, then his inclusion would have lowered the percentage of 
successful systems there. If the inclusion of Señora Fuera would have caused conflict within the 
cooperative, it and its energy system might have failed.  
 
Since the excluded parties seem to be members of poor or otherwise marginalized minorities, they may not 
have the power to disrupt the functioning of the program or systems, regardless of their resentment. Though 
these exclusions might increase the number of successful systems relative to the number installed, the 
social cost of doing so may be very high. The societal impact of increased inequity is outside the scope of 
this study, but cannot be ignored. 
 
6.8.3. Inequity and conflict between communities 
Because this study examined only communities in which stand-alone PV systems had been installed, 
nothing can be concluded about any tensions that may have caused between beneficiary communities and 
nearby communities which were excluded from the project. However, one project observed in this research 
did create tension between members of adjoining communities, as follows: 
 
One project was related to an archaeological dig that was simultaneously an active scientific excavation and 
a tourist destination. The inter- and intra-community conflicts and alliances that have arisen from this 
arrangement, which were mitigated at the time of my visit perhaps only by a downturn in tourism that left 
little to fairly or unfairly divide, are worthy of study unto themselves, although outside the scope of this 
research.  
 
“Several” years ago, three communities surrounding the archaeological dig petitioned the primary scientist 
in charge of the excavation. They claimed that the dig was a part of their cultural heritage and found it 
unfair that he, a foreigner, should benefit from it and they should not. According to community members, 
                                                 
112 Because of sampling methodology, precise rates of success by community or by program cannot be assessed.  
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he readily assented and helped establish the tourism aspect of the site. It was structured such that the 
scientists could continue their work unabated while the community members served as park rangers for the 
site, transported tourists by boat from a location easily accessible by road to the site on the other side of the 
river, and opened a small restaurant to serve tourists. The scientist paid for or arranged for funding of the 
initial capital investments while the community members contributed labor and later paid the salaries of 
rangers and other participants through admissions fees and revenues from the restaurant. The interest of this 
research in the project are the PV systems that are used to power lights in buildings intended for visitors 
and the two-way radios that the guard/guides use to communicate in their work.  
 
Conflict and resentment developed quickly within each community as only a few community members 
were selected to serve as guides and rangers, and therefore received financial compensation for that aspect. 
The wives of the rangers were those called upon to cook for tourists, as the need arose, further reinforcing 
the income streams to few households at the expense of others. 
 
However, resentment between communities was apparently greater than any in-community conflict. This 
resentment stemmed from transportation to the site. A road easily navigable by vehicle ended at one of the 
communities. A store owner near the entrance of the community had a stand-alone PV system installed on 
his home/shop. Nominally, this was to power the radio to alert the rangers and guides that visitors were on 
their way, and it was used in that capacity. However, it was also used by the store owner to power his 
household and shop. People in other communities expressed resentment that he should be the only private 
individual to benefit from a solar panel intended to help three communities. This shopkeeper charged 
visitors for a boat ride to the archaeological site. According to members of other communities, his was the 
only boat and motor available for this purpose, so he held a monopoly on site access. Once being dropped 
off by boat at the archaeological site, tourists are asked to pay for admission to the site. Rangers expressed 
frustration that the boat owner consistently failed to make this clear, leading tourists to believe that the boat 
fare also included site admission. Upon arrival, tourists are immediately frustrated at being “charged twice” 
for access. 
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Overall frustration among members of these communities was high. First, an economic downturn had 
reduced tourism to the degree that there were few proceeds to distribute among all participants. Second, 
community members who were not employed by the project resented that their neighbors benefitted where 
they did not. And third, all respondents from the two communities that did not have boats to transport 
tourists expressed resentment that one individual, the boat and shop owner, benefitted so disproportionately 
to everyone else involved both through fares collected for transportation to the site and through personal 
use of a PV panel that was intended to benefit the community. 
 
The PV systems themselves, both that attached to the shop and those used in the ranger station and other 
tourist buildings, are considered successful for purposes of this research: they function, the solar energy 
equipment specifically is seen as successful by its users, and the systems are sufficient to meet the needs for 
which they were installed. However, whether this tourism project – well intended to allow indigenous 
people to benefit from their cultural heritage even as the archaeological excavation benefitted the scientists 
involved – should be considered successful is questionable, and beyond the scope of this research. 
 
6.8.4. Creation of social networks 
Thirty respondents answered questions about the creation of social networks within the community: 
whether and in what way the projects may have influenced these networks. Twenty-six said that social 
networks had been created or strengthened as a result of the solar PV systems. These responses were evenly 
divided between one of two (or fell into both) general categories: the availability of light is useful to 
individuals within the community, and this in turn creates opportunities for improved social networks 
within the community; and the process of creating or administering the project or the use of the light 
contributes directly to a sense of unity or an ability to work together.  Specific examples of the latter 
include using the light to enable community meetings at night, the ability to work together to seek more 
development aid, and creating the impetus to form other institutions like an “emergency committee” to help 
in the event of future natural disasters, but more often included generalities about a less tangible sense of 
unity. “It wasn’t like this before (the PV project), everything has changed. We were very divided and now 
we work more united. There is strength.” 
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Eight of the thirteen responses that dealt with the creation of social networks as a result of individual 
benefit and nine of the thirteen responses that spoke directly of unity were from users of successful 
systems: these data do not show that one perspective is more related to system success than the other. 
Among the four respondents who claimed no social networks were created as a result of the projects or 
systems, two were users of successful systems and two were not.  
 
This result – an apparent lack of relationship – stands in stark contrast to observations I made of micro-
hydroelectric systems in the same areas of Guatemala while conducting this research. Even the smallest 
hydro systems I observed did not serve a single load, but were connected to microgrids or to the national 
electric grid. The result of this physical interconnectedness seemed to be an institutional and social 
interconnectedness in many cases. It is not possible for an individual to make maintenance decisions 
without affecting his or her neighbors, as is the case with stand-alone PV systems. This research does not 
explore in depth the institutions that surround rural hydro systems in Guatemala, but even cursory 
observation of them shows that they are necessarily quite different. Physically independent systems offer 
the opportunity for independent operation and independent decision-making. Collective institutions 
surrounding energy systems are often a choice for PV system owners, but they are a necessity for 
microhydro users. 
 
The institutions surrounding rural stand-alone systems in Guatemala may offer little insight into the 
institutions involved in other forms of rural electrification that require physical electrical connections 
among users. This distinction is important because it suggests that these results regarding institutions and 
relationships are specific to stand-alone systems and should not be inferred to be generalizable to 
interconnected rural renewable energy systems. 
 
6.8.5. Summary: Unintended consequences and success 
Unintended consequences can decrease or even increase system success in sometimes surprising ways, and 
may cause harm to communities or individuals without decreasing system success rates. Potential negative 
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environmental and health consequences of improper battery disposal are an example of the later: systems 
do not fail more often, but a child getting lead poisoning is certainly not a desired outcome. This is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
 
In energy projects not included in this research, religious affiliation has been responsible for exclusion from 
participation, which may or may not influence success rates. However, religious conflict was not reported 
by users in this study, and as such cannot be considered to influence system success here. 
 
Inequity within communities can be exacerbated when some community members are included and others 
are excluded from projects. This exclusivity may increase the success rates of systems within a community 
if those who are least able to maintain their systems (through lack of financial resources, community 
support, or other reasons) are excluded while those best able to sustain their systems are included. This 
outcome calls into question an original implicit hypothesis of this research that higher rates of system 
success equate to more successful programs. Donor mandates and project goals must determine whether 
improving success rate by exclusion is a desirable outcome. 
 
Depending on the outcome considered, unintended consequences may be positive or negative overall, and 
may increase or decrease the likelihood of systems being successful. Negative outcomes such as increases 
in inequity or environmental contamination do not necessarily decrease the probability that systems will be 
successful. 
 
6.9. Institutional ethics 
I had no a priori hypotheses about the ethics of institutions and the decision makers within them. However, 
they emerged as an important result with regards to the institutions and relationships that surround donated 
PV systems in Guatemala.  
 
Unethical or questionably ethical actions taken by donors, developers and vendors can ultimately lead to 
system failure, to the detriment of intended beneficiaries. While examples of this have been included in 
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previous sections of this chapter – vendors who install cheap components while charging for first quality, 
for example – the cases reported here more fully illustrate questionable business decisions and their 
consequences. 
 
6.9.1. Power inequity between parties 
The solar energy systems considered in this study are all donated or partially donated. However, this does 
not preclude the need for business transactions and binding contracts. People’s failure to live up to their 
legal or ethical obligations can have an adverse effect on the success of donated solar energy systems. 
 
Some legally binding contracts are written to one party’s advantage over another’s. In an agreement among 
equals, this can be attributed to the better negotiating skills of the party on the winning side. However, not 
all agreements are between parties with equal legal knowledge or representation. I had planned to include a 
series of communities with solar panels installed under a specific program in this study, but they ultimately 
had to be excluded. The proximate cause of their exclusion was that members of some of these 
communities were rumored to be using their machetes to chase off strangers who were interested in their 
solar panels. However, the situation that brought people to wield weapons against anyone with an interest 
in solar energy is complex. 
 
I was invited by the head of the local NRECA113 office to assess the success of a program that included six 
communities. Four they viewed as successful or satisfactory; two were viewed as utter failures. They 
invited me to examine the program and assess the differences that allowed some communities to succeed 
but allowed others to fail. The national head of the organization was very accommodating to me and my 
research. He readily answered questions and instructed his staff to allow access to records of this project 
and others in which the organization had been involved. 
 
                                                 
113 The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) is a U.S.-based organization that was established in the 1930’s to 
help U.S. farmers and other rural consumers gain access to electricity (NRECA, undated). It has expanded its activities to other 
countries, including Guatemala. However, in this capacity it works more as a foreign development organization facilitating donations 
and loans, rather than organizing rural communities to form electric cooperatives as they did in the U.S. 
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From the perspective of the organization, the project was straightforward and was to have been 
economically sustainable. The organization coordinated the donation of all of the hardware needed to 
install solar home systems in six communities. Community members agreed to pay for the installation of 
the systems. The organization acted as intermediary to arrange a loan from a commercial bank for the 
amount needed to cover installation. Because of its central location in the capital, the organization chose to 
work with an NGO local to those communities, with the expectation that someone local would be better 
able to arrange installations, collect loan payments, and otherwise interact with the communities.  
 
Reportedly, two of the communities had not been making their loan payments. In accordance with the 
original agreement, the local NGO was to go to the communities and repossess the systems of anyone 
delinquent in their payments after a contractually-mandated period of time, but the panels remained in 
place and the installation loan was in default. 
 
The head of the international organization said that their mistake had been in their choice of a local NGO. 
He described the organization as “eco-terrorists,” among other colorful things. The NGO had had final 
word in selection of communities that were to benefit from the project; they had ignored the head of the 
international organization when he told them repeatedly that some of the communities chosen did not have 
the minimum economic resources necessary to repay the loan. They, perhaps more than the community 
members who were not making payments, were to blame for the default of the loan and the unknown state 
of repair of the systems.  
 
The organization was the keeper of the original contracts that the community members signed. The 
contracts were approximately two pages long, written in a formal, legal style. One contract existed for each 
beneficiary family. Some of the contracts were signed by beneficiaries with their names. For others, they 
were sealed with a right thumbprint, which is accepted as a binding signature for those who cannot write 
well enough to sign their own names (I believe it is legally binding, but I do not know whether by statue or 
by common law). 
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This contract is well within the limits of Guatemalan law. The parties are defined and the rights and 
responsibilities of each party are enumerated. It has legal signatures from all involved. The international 
organization wrote all of the contracts, and its signatory was the person responsible for explaining the terms 
of the contract as they were written to the other parties. The members of the local NGO are middle-class 
Guatemalans and seem to have reasonable understanding of legal and financial operations, but no one 
among them is an expert in these fields. Some of the community members couldn’t read what they signed 
at all. 
 
The head of the organization provided the contact information for the local NGO in question, assuring me 
that they would help with the logistics of visiting the communities. 
The same factual history and timeline of events was repeated by members of the local NGO, who agreed to 
meet with me, but regarded me with a great deal of suspicion because they associated me with the 
international organization. They offered a somewhat different perspective on the history.  
 
The leaders of the NGO had personally guaranteed the loans using their own creditworthiness and their 
personal assets as collateral. The community members had agreed that they would make payments, but 
some stopped when their systems developed technical problems, believing they shouldn’t have to pay for 
something that doesn’t work.  
 
According to the members of the NGO, their credit was ruined and their assets were threatened. They had 
agreed to this arrangement because they claimed that the international organization told them they had 
nothing to worry about, that their participation in the financial transaction was a formality.  
 
They also stated that the international organization should simply forgive the loan. The loan, however, was 
a debt to a commercial bank – arranged by the international organization – not a debt to the international 
organization itself. Thus the international organization did not claim to be unwilling to forgive the debt; it 
claimed to be unable. 
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In keeping with the contract, efforts were made to re-claim panels from people in communities that were 
not making loan payments. 114 Presumably the panels were to be sold to pay off the debt incurred, or 
perhaps installed with another household that would assume the debt. The local NGO shared (as the 
international organization did not) that those who tried to collect the panels were escorted out of the first 
community they visited by men with machetes. Subsequent visitors were met with similar receptions. 
Community members clearly felt they had ownership of the systems, regardless of what the legal contract 
says.  
 
The international organization – the most powerful party – had controlled the construction of the 
agreement. The local NGO felt its role had been misrepresented by the international organization. I did not 
visit the communities to discover whether they felt the same. The organization assumed no risk itself in the 
arrangement; once the loan was in place and the systems installed, it had no legal obligations to the project.  
While the actions of the international organization are apparently legal, I question the ethics of the 
agreement as it was implemented. I do not propose malice, but instead suggest a degree of negligence. The 
individuals from the local NGO who risked their own assets did not understand those risks, and claim to 
have been deceived about them. Again, I did not visit the communities, but I postulate that if the literate, 
middle class members of the NGO did not fully understand the agreement, community members with very 
basic (at best) formal education would have little chance of understanding a two-page contract written in 
legal jargon.  
 
Both the NGO and the international organization were interested in the results of my investigation, to be 
used to reinforce their claims in the legal battle in which they were engaged at the time. Although 
community members with machetes made it impracticable to include those communities in my 
investigation, I excluded even communities which are operating successfully (and non-violently) under this 
program. I did not believe I could guarantee the confidentiality to my interview subjects if there could be 
some threat of the information they provided being subpoenaed.115 
                                                 
114 Apparently members of the NGO, though perhaps members of NRECA. I got conflicting stories from NRECA and the NGO. 
115 Anonymity of responses was not possible for some community members, such as those who might describe their leadership roles in 
the community or with the project, or those who had unique uses for energy, such as store owners.  
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Solar home systems whose ownership status is ambiguous cannot perhaps be said to be successful or 
unsuccessful. Some of the systems are known not to be working; that was the original reason for non-
payment. Those who are chasing out people with an interest in their solar home systems are unlikely to 
invite outsiders in to repair them. The systems that are functioning, owned by people who are themselves 
current with their payments and are enjoying the benefits of electric light, cannot be called successful if 
their impact is that their owners have to draw their machetes in solidarity with their neighbors. 
 
It is possible that many of the systems in those communities were operable and served users’ needs. 
Perhaps they view themselves, and by proxy their systems, as successful because they have managed to 
keep them without paying for them when someone tried to take them away. Perhaps they view the entire 
project as unsuccessful because they are forced to physically defend what they feel is their own property. 
Regardless of the success of these systems from the point of view of beneficiaries, they are a sore failure to 
the process of PV for rural electrification in Guatemala as the situation is an object lesson in mistrust: 
actors from the community level to a multinational organization which have the same apparent goal of 
energy for rural development and who agree on approach and conditions still expose themselves to perhaps 
unacceptable risk by working together. 
 
6.9.2. Deceptive business practices 
Solar home systems were installed in a series of communities as part of a larger hurricane reconstruction 
program, which failed on a number of levels. It is described in detail in Chapter 3, and its economic, social, 
training, and institutional failures are discussed throughout this study. An exacerbating factor in the failure 
of the individual solar home systems to serve their intended purpose of providing household electricity was 
an unscrupulous PV vendor. 
 
The solar part of the program was implemented too quickly, according to a representative of the NGO that 
developed the project.116 The NGO was given a one-year timeframe to bring the project from 
                                                 
116 Information from the developer’s perspective was provided by Iván Azuria of Fundacíon Solar. 
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conceptualization to completion. The vendor chosen by the NGO to provide and install the solar home 
system hardware had a long history of working in PV in Guatemala – including with this NGO – and was 
considered reputable. The vendor knew that the NGO had to complete its work in a very restricted 
timeframe; consequently, there was to be no follow-up more than a few months after the final installation. 
 
Beneficiaries of the disaster relief program were trained on a basic level about their systems. They were 
told what maintenance would need to be performed, what would need to be replaced, and when these things 
would happen. People in these communities participated in the training sessions and found them useful. 
However, they did not find them sufficient; of the seven respondents in the disaster relief program who 
answered the question, six believed that they did not receive enough training. That they were insufficient is 
reinforced by two factors. First, people within a community had a shared understanding of what they were 
to have expected from their solar home systems, but that understanding sometimes differed between 
communities. Second, some of what they believed was wrong. For example, the good quality solar panels 
that were installed for this project carry 15 to 25 year warrantees, but some beneficiaries believed that the 
panels would wear out and be useless in 3 or fewer years. 
 
Some of their mistaken understanding seems to have come from the person to whom many beneficiaries 
referred as “the recycler.” Within a few months after the completion of the project (after which no follow-
up from the NGO was expected), the recycler came to the communities. People interviewed gave a variety 
of answers when asked how long after installation, which may be attributable to people’s vague 
recollection of a date to which they may have ascribed little significance, and to the fact that he visited and 
re-visited these communities multiple times. 
 
The recycler offered to buy solar home system components from beneficiaries. Some sold only their panels, 
while others sold batteries and charge controllers as well. His first offer, which was accepted by many 
beneficiaries, was 100 Quetzales (about 13 $US) for systems that can be sold retail for as much as 500 $US 
in Guatemala. To convince people to sell their systems cheaply and quickly, he told them that their panels 
would last only a few months or years, or that their entire system would be worthless in a year once the 
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battery died, so they would do well to sell to him immediately. He returned to the communities multiple 
times, each time offering a higher price than the previous. The highest price anyone reported commanding 
for his system was 500 Quetzales – about 65 $US.  
 
A then-employee of the NGO that developed the solar home system part of this program claimed that the 
recycler was an employee of the original vendor. The timing of the start of the “recycling” efforts and the 
recycler’s apparent ready knowledge of what was installed in the community implicate the vendor; 
however, new solar panels in communities located beside a highway are publicly viewable (though some 
communities were then less accessible than they are now), and solar home system design is fairly standard. 
Between the time that this project was implemented and the time of this study, the vendor has been accused 
of various other unethical (and sometimes illegal) business practices, and is no longer active in the 
Guatemalan PV markets. The vendor may be implicated in the PV “recycling” effort based as much on his 
reputation as on known circumstance specific to this project, but circumstantial evidence suggests his 
unscrupulous business practices were a major cause of failure for systems donated for disaster relief. 
 
It is a beneficiary’s prerogative to sell that which has been donated to him or her. And these beneficiaries’ 
readiness to sell suggests that even a small amount of money was worth more to them than electric lights 
and radios in their homes. However, this buyer deceived the sellers outright, and pressured them to sell 
without access to independent information. If the buyer was also the original vendor, then his inside 
information gave him more opportunity to exploit the vulnerabilities of this population, especially their 
misunderstood needs and lack of training. 
 
6.9.3. Organized crime 
The absence of consistently applied rule of law was hypothesized to be an exacerbating factor in system 
failure. However, among the stand-alone PV systems included in this study, none had been damaged by 
vandalism. A panel that was part of a tourism project and a large array that powered a school were stolen, 
but no home included in this study had lost panels to theft. Thus, though unethical and possibly illegal 
actions by vendors and developers (described above) may have contributed to system failures, petty 
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criminal mischief had little influence on community-owned systems and none on systems held by private 
families. Organized crime, however, was seen to force an end to follow-up by vendors, developers or 
project maintainers – presumably increasing the failure rates of the systems in affected areas – as described 
in this section. 
 
The Guatemalan Ministry of Energy and Mines had previously installed solar home systems as part of the 
government loan program in the areas now controlled by Los Zetas. The relative success of those systems 
is unknown. I attempted to view some of the systems but was followed by men believed to belong to Los 
Zetas to one of the communities. When leaving the community, the same truck was waiting for us and 
“escorted” us out of the rural area back to the main road. The community we visited was said to be located 
very near a clandestine air strip used for drug trafficking,117 one of the countless temporary and permanent 
air strips used for drug trafficking in Guatemala. After a single interview, we left the community and did 
not return to it or three other communities in its immediate vicinity that had government-installed panels. 
 
When I reported this back to my contact at the Ministry the response was that the Ministry was unaware but 
would likely avoid the area, effectively abandoning any follow-up on the systems. Leadership changes 
pending at the time of this study within the branch of the Ministry responsible for these projects may mean 
that follow-up has been or will be attempted, but I find it unlikely as long as narcos are de facto or 
perceived to be in control of the area. I cannot assess the success of these systems, but the exclusion of the 
donor – whose relationship with beneficiaries I found to be relevant to system success – leads me to 
hypothesize that they are less successful than they could be absent the presence of narco trafficking 
interests. 
 
Another case of rule of law (or absence thereof) potentially driving system success is that of Punto de 
Manabique, a peninsula on the Caribbean coast of Guatemala that acts as a barrier “island” protecting the 
                                                 
117 Per waitstaff and local patrons in a restaurant, hotel employees and a washer woman in a nearby larger town, whose anonymity is 
important enough to leave the town nameless. 
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mainland from tropical storms and hurricanes.118 The unique ecological characteristics and biodiversity of 
the area have earned it the status of “protected area” in which logging and other intensive land use activities 
are prohibited. Several stand-alone solar PV systems were installed in the communities within the protected 
area. These included a solar-wind hybrid system that was damaged during a recent hurricane, and two 
solar-powered refrigeration projects.  
 
One of the solar-powered refrigeration projects, which was part of a larger ecotourism project, was burned 
to the ground by narco traffickers. Apparently, narcos were interested in keeping tourists out of the area, 
which has long been used as a corridor for shipping drugs by sea. I remain unsure of the motivations since 
those close to the project and in the community are understandably unwilling to talk about it – if they even 
know what the true motivation was. Both ethical considerations (putting community members at risk) and 
considerations of personal safety kept me from visiting the community or asking too many questions of the 
NGO’s and government agencies involved. Clearly, drug trafficking has again been an obstacle to 
successful stand-alone PV systems in Guatemala. 
 
An article in Guatemala’s largest newspaper La Prensa Libre (15 February, 2009, cover story, no byline) 
reported that the land within the protected area was being misused by loggers and cattle ranchers, and 
named five prominent families who were alleged to be involved.  It is a known secret that “ganadero” 
(cattle rancher) can be a euphemism for drug trafficker. The backlash resulting from this article was dire; 
members of the five families mentioned were rumored to have been killed as accusations and 
counteraccusations were made about who leaked the information; other non-community members 
interested in the project received death threats if they visited or were believed to be planning to visit the 
area.  
 
The status of the hurricane-damaged solar-wind hybrid system is apparently unknown outside the 
community. People from the NGO’s have either not gone to check on repairs or are unwilling to admit they 
have been out to the peninsula. Another of the PV systems was on a scientific research station which has 
                                                 
118 Information about the Punto de Manabique projects comes from two developers, one local to Guatemala and another from a donor 
nation, who helped implement or had recently been responsible for the projects. For their protection, they remain anonymous. 
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probably not hosted many scientists recently since the NGO that runs it is not currently making trips to the 
peninsula. The community-based systems may or may not be functioning currently. Members of the 
communities on the peninsula have been moving to the mainland in significant numbers since the narcos 
have been buying their property by offering money if they sell or threatening them with death if they do 
not, a dilemma colloquially referred to as plata o plomo, literally translating to “silver or lead.” 
 
Drug production and trafficking are able to thrive in specific social, political, and historical contexts 
(Keefer and Loayza, 2010) like those found in Guatemala. Those involved in drug trafficking are motivated 
to reinforce those systems that enable their work, often reinforcing the very characteristics of a country that 
hinder development (Keefer and Loayza, 2010) It is to be expected and unexceptional then that drug 
trafficking is an obstacle to the long-term success of rural stand-alone PV systems in Guatemala, but the 
evidence I have to support the conclusion is weak at best: it is based on innuendo and hearsay.119 
 
6.9.4. Summary: Institutional ethics and success 
Beneficiaries of donated stand-alone PV systems in Guatemala are categorically at a disadvantage 
compared to donors, developers, vendors and criminal syndicates in terms of power, economic resources 
and knowledge. This disparity presents the opportunity for outright abuse or simple negligence in meeting 
the needs of beneficiaries by the more powerful institutions. In extreme cases, beneficiaries must 
sometimes resort to “desperate” measures such as physically threatening people with machetes in order to 
assert their own agency in such inequitable relationships. Both the misuse of power on the part of more 
powerful institutions and the extreme responses sometimes manifested by beneficiaries detract from the 
success not merely of individual PV systems, but of the programs that install them and the goals of rural 
electrification in general. 
 
6.10. Conclusions 
The institutions and relationships that surround, create and result from the implementation of rural stand-
alone PV donation programs can profoundly influence system success.  
                                                 
119 Several individuals involved in development in rural Guatemala related stories of their own or their peers’ experiences with narcos 
to me. The specifics of these cases are omitted for their protection. 
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Rural electrification in Guatemala takes place against a backdrop of weak legal institutions which enforce 
laws inconsistently, and de facto rules that are enforced socially and, sometimes, by the criminal syndicates 
that are in control of parts of the country. At the community level, governance of donated stand-alone PV 
systems is based on trust and community networks as there is little expectation of legal recourse in the 
event that rules are broken. As such, the legal establishment of such structures has little bearing on their 
success. 
 
The presence of governance structures seems to relate to project success, although individuals actively 
involved in project governance do not seem to have more successful systems than their neighbors. The 
relationship between governance structure and success is complex, however, as governance structures were 
implemented with hardware in nearly all cases; those that maintained these structures also maintained their 
systems. 
 
Both the most successful and the least successful systems observed in this study were in programs initiated 
by an outside party, rather than by the community itself: this research does not support the widely-held 
hypothesis that a project initiated by the beneficiary would be more successful than one imposed or 
suggested by outsiders. However, those with successful systems were more likely to have known of 
available training at the time of implementation, supporting the hypothesis that training provided by the 
donor is important to system success. The level of contribution that users were expected to make at the time 
of donation seemed to have no relationship to system success. 
 
The most remarkable results presented in this chapter have to do with system ownership. The underlying, 
near-ubiquitous assumption that systems will be more successful if users have ownership of them was 
clearly not supported by this research. Two potential reasons that full system ownership may actually 
decrease system success rates are these: owners have the prerogative to sell their systems, and owners have 
the prerogative to delay maintenance until such a time (if ever) that it suits them. Further, those with 
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successful systems were no more likely than those with unsuccessful systems to have contributed capital as 
a condition of participating in the project.  
 
In contrast, those who do not own their systems outright but are instead accountable to the system owner 
for its state of repair appear to be more motivated to succeed: selling and delaying maintenance on 
something that is not yours but for which you are responsible are not options. 
 
Independent of any sense of accountability to the system owner or donor, longstanding relationships 
between beneficiaries and project donors or developers lead to categorically more successful systems. The 
full mechanisms of this are not clear from this research, but the exchange of information – advice on 
system maintenance and where to purchase replacement parts – may play as significant a role as does the 
exchange of capital – when the donor continues to pay for repair and replacement. 
 
Negative unintended consequences can actually lead to higher rates of system success. The exemplar of this 
is that inequity in a community can be increased if the poorest or marginalized members of a community 
are excluded from a project. However, if the excluded households are those who would in fact be least 
likely to have the means to maintain their systems, the total percentage of systems would likely increase.  
 
Criminal organizations such as drug traffickers have been responsible for system failures through direct 
destruction of systems or, more commonly, through prohibition of maintenance or other outside support. 
The same factors that allow organized crime to decrease system success rates also prohibit detailed 
documentation of this supposed phenomenon. 
 
Finally, the power disparity between rural villagers and the institutions that surround them can lead to 
failure. Donors, developers and vendors may deceive beneficiaries or negotiate in bad faith, possibly 
leaving beneficiaries in a worse position than they may have been without the project.  
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Chapter 7. Results concerning characteristics and consequences 
The results of this research begin with defining success, as detailed in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 examines the 
uses of donated rural stand-alone PV systems and their economic implications for beneficiaries, showing 
that economic considerations in particular have a strong influence on system success. However, it is also 
clear that economic advantage is neither necessary nor sufficient for system success. Further, although the 
institutions and relationships that surround systems have an important bearing on their success, they too are 
insufficient to fully assess success. This chapter examines characteristics of users, the communities in 
which they live, and the systems themselves to highlight the influences of these characteristics on system 
success. Here I also examine the consequences of system implementation under normal and emergency 
conditions. 
 
7.1. Introduction to results concerning characteristics of users, communities and systems 
Characteristics of users and the communities in which they live influence where energy systems will be 
installed and how successful they will be. At the same time, the presence and success of a community 
energy system impacts the characteristics of a community. Fewer people might leave an electrified 
community to find work in the cities, if the presence of power affords greater comfort and economic 
opportunity. A community that uses electricity as a way to draw tourists necessarily opens itself up to the 
influences of “outsiders.” The ability to charge cell phones or power television reduces a community’s 
cultural remoteness. 
 
Chapter 6 explores results associated with institutions that surround the systems and the relationships 
between stakeholders. In this chapter, I discuss system characteristics including the type of technology 
implemented and the quality of the design, installation and physical hardware. Users and the communities 
in which they live are discussed in terms of their demographics and geographic characteristics. This chapter 
also includes discussion of changes to these characteristics, such as unintended negative consequences to 
local environment or culture. 
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Section 7.2 reviews the hypotheses and research questions related to characteristics that are introduced in 
Chapter 3. The following section describes the commonalities and differences between communities 
included in this research, and the possible effects of those differences on system success. Section 7.4 
describes the characteristics of users included in this study, and differentiates those characteristics from the 
characteristics of the communities in which they live. Section 7.5 includes results on the physical 
characteristics of the systems themselves, including the potential for influence by codes and standards. 
Finally, this chapter reviews the unintended consequences of the physical installation of rural stand-alone 
PV systems. 
 
7.2. Hypotheses and research questions 
As described in detail in section 3.5.3 of Chapter 3, the success of off-grid energy systems in rural 
developing world locations is influenced by the characteristics of the systems, the communities in which 
they are located, and the users themselves.  
 
The characteristics and consequences of community energy systems are closely tied to the institutions and 
relationships that surround these systems, as discussed throughout this chapter and in Chapter 6. As 
examples, the quality of materials used to construct systems is driven by institutional structures that dictate 
their purchase; intra-community conflict is influenced by the characteristics of a community and of the 
program that installed its energy systems; and the success of energy systems is driven by and drives the 
level of accessibility of a community. 
 
This research began with these six basic research questions about system, user and community 
characteristics, each discussed in further detail below: 
1. How is project success influenced by the characteristics of the communities in which projects 
are situated? 
2. How is project success influenced by user poverty, ethnicity, religion and age? 
3. What other characteristics of users influence success? 
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4. Are systems with high quality parts and robust, standard design more successful than those 
using inexpensively replaceable parts and locally adapted design? 
5. Are systems maintained under a highly structured regime more successful than those in which 
maintenance is improvised as needed? 
6. Have local ecosystems, environment or landscapes been adversely affected by the systems’ 
presence? 
These questions, and associated hypotheses, are examined in detail in this chapter. 
 
7.3. Results: Community characteristics and success 
This section focuses on characteristics of the communities studied that are relatively independent of the 
characteristics of community residents, covered in detail in section 7.4 and independent of community 
governance, discussed in Chapter 6, including physical geography and infrastructure. The differentiation 
between these as characteristics of the physical community and characteristics of community members or 
community institutions is not as obvious as it may seem, as discussed throughout this section. For example, 
the question of how many kilometers a community is from an urban center is easily objectively measured. 
However, that is of far less consequence to community members than is the question of how many hours or 
days it takes to reach the city, which is in large part a function of available forms of transportation – which 
depend, among other things, on disposable income (a user characteristic) and whether roads have been 
maintained, as prioritized by community or outside institutions. 
 
In my sampling methodology I sought users of both operable and inoperable systems in each community. I 
did not make exhaustive lists of successful and unsuccessful systems in these communities because success 
could not be defined without gathering substantial amounts of information – operability is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to define system success. 
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7.3.1. Commonalities 
By definition, if all communities studied in this research share a particular characteristic, it is not possible 
to assess whether presence or absence of that characteristic impacts system success. In this section, I 
summarize shared characteristics observed in this research. 
 
All communities in this study share some characteristics by design. Systems found in the communities must 
meet this study’s selection criteria, which means all were beyond the reach of the national electric grid 
when the systems were installed. These communities were all poor at the time of installation, which had led 
them to be candidates for donated systems. I did not ask explicit income questions, but it was apparent that 
they remained poor after the donation: most houses had dirt floors, for example.  
 
This study includes predominantly communities that are easily accessible in a vehicle. It categorically 
excludes any community that is more than three hours (for me) walking distance from a place that a truck 
can be parked. The factors that lead to the success and failure of PV systems installed in locations more 
remote than these may be very different. This is an unfortunate bias that is found in many both formal and 
informal assessments of energy-related development projects. Little funding is generally included in project 
or program budgets for assessment, forcing evaluators to sample from projects that can be reached quickly. 
In consideration of personal safety, I was unwilling to walk to a remote location where I would be forced 
either to walk back after dark or seek lodging, as an unexpected stranger, in a rural community.57  
 
The differences between communities are far more in number than their similarities, although the 
differences may be subtle. The remaining subsections of this section explore those differences.  
 
 
 
                                                 
57 Although I visited very isolated communities via helicopter during preliminary research, I did not formally gather data during those 
trips. I lacked the resources to travel via helicopter during the bulk of my field research. Anecdotally, members of indigenous 
communities seemed to strongly mistrust those who arrived unexpectedly via helicopter. In one community where we were forced to 
make a landing that had not been pre-arranged, we were cheerily greeted by seemingly every man in the village carrying his machete. 
This mistrust is a likely consequence of their association between helicopters and military activity during which many indigenous 
were killed in the civil war. See Chapter 3 for details. 
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7.3.2. Location, location, location 
Both the location of a community in Guatemala and the location of a household within a beneficiary 
community can influence the success of renewable energy systems, and successful systems can make 
communities and households less remote, as discussed below. 
 
An important distinction may be made between communities located in the north of Guatemala, which was 
hardest hit by the civil war, and communities located elsewhere. However, these differences are closely 
linked to poverty, ethnicity and other user characteristics, and are discussed elsewhere. 
 
7.3.2.1. Community accessibility 
A seemingly independent community characteristic like “remoteness” or “accessibility” may not in fact be 
independent of the institutions related to an energy system: project developers sometimes choose to build 
roads to or install telephones in communities in which they work. This was clear in the case of Chel, a 
community in which a solar-powered satellite telephone was installed and a graded road was built to aid in 
the construction of a micro-hydroelectric project, which has been described at length in Chapter 2. A 
telephone does not decrease the distance in kilometers from a community to roads or municipal centers, 
obviously, but it allows contact with those outside the community to coordinate travel or the delivery of 
supplies: isolation decreases, accessibility improves. In an analogous example from the literature, access to 
the isolated community of Manantiales, Cuba, was greatly facilitated when the road to the community was 
upgraded to enable the installation of a micro-hydroelectric system, just as the roads to Chel made it more 
accessible. 
 
The circumstances surrounding these two power systems here suggest that even physical location cannot be 
considered an independent variable in a post-facto assessment of rural renewable energy systems. And 
accessibility, in terms of a decrease in community isolation, is certainly affected by the presence of energy 
systems, even as accessibility impacts whether systems will be installed and how successful they will be. 
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Communities and users can be remote or inaccessible in two ways: either the communities are simply a 
long way away and hard to reach, or users are detached from the resources that physical access can afford.  
 
Every PV system eventually needs maintenance that cannot be accomplished with what is available in a 
remote community in Guatemala. At a minimum, batteries must be replaced every three to five years (if 
well cared for; more frequently if poorly maintained). No community visited for this study had a vendor 
who routinely carried batteries that could be used in a small stand-alone PV system. As such, those 
responsible for systems must either be able to get to larger towns that sell batteries that can be used for 
solar systems, or they must be able to contact someone who has that access and would be willing to help. 
 
To judge the accessibility of a system, I consider two things: whether the respondent knows who to contact 
or where to go when they encounter maintenance issues (routine or otherwise) that are not within their 
capabilities, and how long it takes users to reach a location where they can gain access to parts or expertise. 
 
7.3.2.2.  Knowledge of access 
I hypothesized that knowledge of where to go and to whom to speak in the event that the system needed 
maintenance beyond what could be obtained in the community would increase the rates of system success. I 
ascertained this by asking three questions: a) whether they knew where they could go to buy replacement 
parts such as batteries, b) how to contact the original project developer, and c) who they could contact if 
they had problems with their systems. Success relates to having only some of this knowledge, as explained 
below. 
 
Success did not depend upon being able to answer all three questions in the affirmative. Among the 47 
unsuccessful systems about which users provided this information, 58  only two users (4%) of systems 
considered unsuccessful by the definition used in these analyses answered in the affirmative to all three 
questions. Similarly, among the 67 successful systems about which users provided this information, only 3 
(4%) answered in the affirmative to all three: knowledge of all three does not predict system success. 
                                                 
58 Not all respondents answered all three questions. 
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However, users of successful systems were more likely to be able to answer at least one question in the 
affirmative: 13% of respondents with unsuccessful systems answered “no” to all three questions, whereas 
only 3% of respondents with successful systems answered “no” to all three. 
 
In looking at each question individually, knowing where to go to buy parts or find assistance is a predictor 
of success. Among successful systems, 79% of respondents knew where they could go. Among 
unsuccessful systems, only 47% knew. This is an intuitive result in that even routine maintenance like 
replacing a battery is dependent upon knowing where batteries can be bought. 
 
Most users did not know who to contact if they had problems with their systems. Only 43% of successful 
system users and 39% of unsuccessful system users responded that they knew who they should contact. 
This suggests that the availability of a maintenance person or a connection to a maintenance person has 
little bearing on system success. 
 
Among successful users, more than half (52%) knew how to contact the original donor. Among the 
unsuccessful, only a quarter (26%) knew. Ongoing involvement of the donor, therefore, may have an 
influence on system success. 
 
7.3.2.3. Physical remoteness 
Because of the sampling methodology in which I sought to find both successful and unsuccessful systems 
in the same communities, actual distances from individual communities to municipal centers are not telling 
of anything.  
 
Programmatically, distance does not seem to be a driving factor in system success. Comparing again the 
disaster relief program to the post-conflict development program – both programs for very poor indigenous 
communities in northern Guatemala – the latter was vastly more successful than the former for reasons 
discussed in above. However, communities in the less successful disaster relief program were much more 
easily accessible. Many had paved roads or highways that passed through or near them. The post-conflict 
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development communities were much more difficult to access and further from municipal centers. Most 
included in this study were accessible by graded dirt road, but others are only accessible by dirt track that 
can be driven in a 4 wheel drive vehicle, or by walking or mule.  
 
One explanation is that people who live close to roads and cities (and therefore the national electric grid) 
expect to be connected to the grid in the near future. As such, any investment in the PV system is a short-
term investment. Because replacing batteries is capital intensive relative to users’ resources, short-term 
investments do not make economic sense. However, evidence does not support this hypothesis in these 
cases: people in the disaster relief program did not talk expectantly about the arrival of the electric grid, and 
many asked if I knew how or where they could get panels donated again. 
 
Another possible explanation is that easy access from the community also means easy access to the 
community for outsiders. Three tourism projects with donated PV systems are located in close proximity to 
one another. One is an archaeological tourism site, and the PV array is not easily accessed except by boat. 
That system is working well. The two nearby ecotourism projects are accessible by paved roads, followed 
by a short walk. Neither is successful as one PV array was stolen and the other was taken down to keep it 
from being stolen as well. Also supporting this hypothesis is the “PV recycler” who visited the disaster 
relief communities. Whether he was the original vendor of the systems or not, that he could easily make 
repeated trips to the communities increased the number of systems he was able to purchase at below-market 
prices (see section 6.9 below). 
 
Finally, the fact that there were trained system maintainers in and near the post-conflict development 
communities may have made distance to urban locations moot for other users (as far as the successes of 
their systems are concerned), if the maintainers are responsible for all travel associated with system repair. 
The government loan program worked only in communities that MEM anticipated would be connected to 
the national electric grid within five years of the installation of the solar home systems. While this 
connection has failed to happen within the expected timeframe in many cases, communities that are to be 
electrified are necessarily close to the then-current boundaries of the national grid, and therefore often 
 
277 
 
roads. Qualitatively, the government loan systems exhibited wide variability in their success rates, although 
they were categorically more successful than the disaster relief systems.  
 
Finally, the locations of the government-owned early warning systems were chosen specifically for their 
ease of access. While they are categorically very successful, I find that this is driven by institutional 
arrangements not geography, as described in Chapter 6. 
 
Thus physical remoteness – distance from roads and municipal centers – is not seen to be a driving factor in 
system success. This does not discount the possibility that it impacts success, but other factors overwhelm 
it in this study, and the sampling methodology is not appropriate to assessing its more subtle impacts. 
 
7.3.2.4. Perception of distance 
Respondents from the same communities sometimes had very different perceptions of how long it takes to 
get to the nearest municipal center where a replacement battery might be purchased. In one community, 
answers ranged from one hour to a full day. However, many people answered “a day” more to signify that 
it took away a day’s work than that the trip took 12 or 24 hours.  
 
A further confounding factor is that physical accessibility is driven by wealth. Among systems in the 
government loan program, I was unable to find someone with an unsuccessful system or someone who was 
not a participant in the program to interview in a community in the wealthiest department included in this 
research. Respondents’ estimates of times to reach the municipality from that community ranged from two 
hours each way to the whole day. I believe this represented differences in means of transportation since it 
clearly could not represent difference in distance. Driving home an hour or two with one’s purchases could 
certainly be defined as much easier access than walking the same distance carrying a heavy battery, with 
the man who traveled by horseback falling somewhere in between.59 However, the presence of trucks in the 
community allows greater access to all community members, as those with vehicles can be asked to 
transport passengers or goods (whether for free or for a fee) when they are making trips themselves. 
                                                 
59 A horse is a status symbol and indicative of wealth more than ownership of a truck in rural areas. 
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Since respondents in some communities had differing perceptions of how remote they are, I examined 
whether perceptions of distance correlated to system success within a community. In three cases, people 
with unsuccessful systems perceived themselves to be one to two hours further away from municipal 
centers than did their neighbors in the same community with successful systems. In one case, a respondent 
with a successful system perceived himself to be a full day from a location he could buy batteries where a 
respondent with an unsuccessful system in the same community said the distance was only 2 hours (the 
successful respondent perceived himself to be farther away in this case, as compared to closer in the 
previous cases). The inconsistencies may have several explanations. People may have imprecise memories 
of exactly how long travel takes, people may have different means of access, or people from the same 
community would not go to the same location to purchase batteries or other replacement parts for their 
systems. In the case where one person said a few hours and another a full day, it may suggest that the 
person with the shorter travel time takes a boat across the lake to the municipal center, while the person 
who takes a day to make the trip walks around the lake on the shore. Or it may suggest that the person with 
the longer travel time would not go for only a few hours, but prefers to spend the entire day or stay 
overnight rather than invest the time and money in travel for a single errand. 
 
These do not lend particular insight into the perception of distance and the probability of system success. 
 
7.3.3. Micro-urbanization 
The location of a community or houses within a community may change because of an energy system. As 
an example, a community I visited in Mauritania, West Africa, in 2002 (not included in this study) had 
relocated because of energy: community members re-built their previously dispersed houses under electric 
power transmission lines that had recently been installed, in hopes of being connected to the electric power 
grid.  
  
In Guatemala, two communities visited during this research exhibited a phenomenon I call “micro-
urbanization.” Community-level electric power grids were built to connect households to small 
hydroelectric projects. In these, as in other hydro communities, households are either given an allotment of 
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grid extension distance to which they are entitled (all houses within a given number of meters from the 
planned distribution grid are connected) or are required to pay per meter for grid extension to their 
households.60 Both arrangements favor in-town living and living as close to the town’s main streets or 
square as possible. In the two communities mentioned, population density at the town center had increased 
markedly since the installation of the microgrid, according to residents, since people in the outlying areas 
were denied or could not afford access to power. Disparities between those in the towns’ centers and those 
in the surrounding areas increased, as those without electricity generally pay more for lower quality light 
and cannot make use of the other appliances so often wished for (blenders, refrigerators) even if they can 
afford to purchase them, further encouraging people to move to town if possible. A government employee 
interviewed during the course of this study acknowledged the phenomenon and expressed a different 
concern: who is growing the food if all the farmers move to town?  
 
Relocation of households or communities was not observed to result from the solar PV systems included in 
this study. Because of their physical independence, the added burden for a remote solar-powered household 
is small compared to the burden for a household potentially connected to a micro-grid. Beyond having to 
carry batteries when they are replaced or distilled water for routine maintenance farther than their more 
centrally-located neighbors, it is no more costly in money or time to have a remote solar home system. 
 
A sample of two communities is inadequate to draw any general conclusions about this apparent 
phenomenon, but it suggests that different means of electrification have different social and economic 
consequences, even if the quantity and quality of electricity delivered is the same. Further research is 
merited.  
 
7.3.4. Other donated community infrastructure and projects 
The infrastructure and proposed infrastructure were assumed to be characteristics of the community, in 
which case answers about donated projects would be the same among respondents within a community. 
                                                 
60 Since households or communities connected to the national electric grid were not the focus of this study, I do not know whether or 
how much people must pay for connection or if the phenomenon of moving closer to power lines exists with the national grid as well 
as micro-grids. 
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However, this was not always the case, suggesting that understanding of donations is a characteristic of 
users, as discussed below. 
 
Dependent upon this assumption, I had hypothesized that a community with more donated projects would 
be more likely to see success in the solar energy project. A community with more donated projects might 
have a better ability to work with donors, more experience in maintaining things that are brought in “from 
the outside,” or more resources to perform maintenance. This hypothesis was strengthened by my 
experience in the first community I visited, not included in data analyses because the survey was refined 
during work in this community, making the answers possibly not validly comparable to those obtained in 
subsequent communities, and because hydroelectric power and biodiesel comprised the main energy 
sources for the community. This community had lobbied for and successfully acquired numerous 
development projects from outside sources, including the two energy systems, an unsuccessful biogas 
digester project, a plant for purifying and bottling water, machinery for processing locally-grown 
macadamia nuts and coffee beans, and others. Although not every donated project was a success to the 
community – for example, a biogas digester failed due to a lack of feedstock in the form of pig manure 
after selling many of their pigs to market – the community either had intrinsic characteristics that made it 
generally good at getting projects and seeing them succeed, or each project’s success had taught the 
community skills that contributed to the subsequent success.  
 
In the communities explicitly considered in this study, respondents expressed less congruence on what 
projects or infrastructure had recently been donated. For example, three of the five respondents from the 
community of La Bolsa answered the question of what other projects had been donated recently to their 
community. Two respondents said potable water, which was not mentioned by the third. A primary school, 
latrines, and ovens were listed by one of the respondents but not the other two. This may suggest that 
respondents only identified projects that were relevant to themselves as opposed to other community 
members, that they did not give the question serious thought and therefore forgot things, that they had 
different definitions of the terms “projects” or “recently,” or some other reason. However, this 
 
281 
 
inconsistency makes it impossible to judge whether experience with other donated projects is related to the 
success of donated PV systems.  
 
Qualitatively, the number of development projects in a community does not seem to have any relationship 
to the success of panels in that community. Communities in the disaster relief program were given estufas 
mejoradas,61 seeds for planting marketable crops, and other donations at the time of the solar home system 
donation. These communities had few successful systems, with respondents stating that most of their 
neighbors had sold their panels. They also reported that the crops planted from the donated seeds failed, but 
that they still used and appreciated their estufas mejoradas. Few, if any other meaningful conclusions can 
be drawn from this data about the relationship between donated infrastructure or other projects and system 
success. 
 
7.3.5. Summary: community characteristics and success 
In this section, I reviewed the commonalities among communities included in this research, as well as their 
differences as far as location, “urban-ness” and their levels of development as suggested by other 
community projects. 
 
The “remoteness” of a community is affected by electrification, whether through PV, mirco-hydroelectric, 
or the national electric grid. Developers of the electrification project often take steps to improve access in 
order to make their own work easier (or, in some cases, possible), and these roads and telephones may 
remain behind after the developer has gone.  
 
Conversely, accessibility is a factor considered by project developers when selecting communities in which 
to work. Communities that are difficult to access demand a greater portion of available funds be put into 
logistics, so many developers may opt to use available resources to electrify more households closer to 
roads rather than fewer households in more remote locations.  
 
                                                 
61 Literally “improved stoves,” it is the general term for concrete or cinder block fireplaces designed to demand less firewood than 
traditional more open fires. 
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The same resource constraints and logistical difficulties that dissuade developers from working in very 
remote locations also make research difficult or impossible. Every community in this research is one that 
could be visited between sunrise and sunset of the same day, including time in transit. If this level of 
accessibility is viewed as a cut-off point for many developers as well, more remote projects may share very 
different characteristics. 
 
Systems were more successful when users knew how to contact the donor, a topic explored in greater detail 
in Chapter 6. They were also more successful when users knew where to go to access replacement 
components, especially batteries. However, knowing who to contact for maintenance assistance was not 
shown to relate to system success. This may be because users have not sought maintenance because they 
believed they could not afford it or because they had not encountered a failure that could not be repaired 
locally, or some other reason. 
 
7.4. Results: user characteristics and success 
The people included in this research do not constitute a homogenous group. They can be classified or 
categorized by many characteristics: rural rather than urban; northern versus southern; indigenous versus 
Ladino; poor versus extremely poor; etcetera. Even those who are rural, northern, indigenous Q’eqchi’ 
living in extreme poverty do not make up a homogeneous group. They may differ by dialect, dress, social 
status, economic resources (however small), gender, household size, religion and many unquantifiable 
factors like personality, ambition, affinity towards unfamiliar technologies, and life experience, which can 
influence how a person perceives and ultimately sustains a donated solar home system. 
 
The populations studied in this research are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. This section discusses 
characteristics of users that relate to system success, and equally importantly points to characteristics that 
have little or no bearing. 
 
 
 
 
283 
 
7.4.1. Ethnicity 
Systems installed in indigenous communities seemed to fail at higher rates than those in Ladino 
communities.62 The proposed reasons for this are many, as described below. 
 
Discrimination against ethnic Mayans is rampant in Guatemala. They are more likely to live in poverty and 
have less education and opportunity than their Ladino counterparts. However, defining who can be 
categorized as a minority is problematic. Issues of culture and blood line, and how “pure” in each one must 
be to be categorized as a minority or not a minority are far beyond the scope of this study.  
 
Communities seem to be relatively ethnically homogeneous, as judged by clothing. Excepting a few among 
the elderly, men in Guatemala all wear modern clothing. However, women in rural communities often wear 
attire that is traditional to their particular ethnic background. Patterns and types of skirts, sashes, aprons, 
and blouses vary dramatically throughout Guatemala, though all four components are normally present. But 
within individual communities, either I observed only one or perhaps two traditional styles with only 
“outsiders” like teachers or clinicians wear modern clothing in some communities, or I observed all women 
in modern clothing in others. Though I did not keep explicit record of it, women wearing traditional 
clothing corresponded with a traditional Mayan language being spoken within the community. Assuming 
that the simple combination of language and women’s attire is enough to call a community indigenous or 
Ladino, the single characteristic that is used here to define ethnicity is the language spoken in the 
community. Goldin et al. (1993) suggests a larger percentage of Ladino residents in a community correlates 
to a worse economic and developmental outcome for indigenous residents of the same community, due 
largely to economic resources such as land being concentrated in the hands of Ladinos, and to increased 
“native agency” in communities without strong Ladino populations (Goldin et al., 1993;). Because this 
study did not randomly sample community members or households, the ratio of Mayan to Ladino people in 
the communities studied is unknown, but this combination of the two were not superficially observable in 
                                                 
62 Because of sampling methodology, I am unable to determine the percentage of failed systems in each community or community 
type. 
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the communities studied.63 This study specifically excluded communities on private land (such as groups of 
indigenous workers who live on a Ladino-owned plantation) which eliminated the most dramatic cases of 
intra-community inequity.  
 
The legacy of the civil war has left the indigenous population not just economically poor, but also 
uneducated and intimidated. Few schools were functioning in the area during the war, entire communities 
were uprooted and relocated, and traveling even across town was extremely dangerous. Further, the Mayan 
populations in Guatemala place low value on education for their girls, and even young boys during the war 
were at constant risk of conscription by either the rebel or the government forces. During the war, many 
indigenous communities were occupied by government troops who viewed all indigenous as rebels or rebel 
sympathizers. Thus the price of taking initiative or a leadership role was often death.  
 
Three categories of projects included in this study – disaster relief, post-conflict development, and 
government-provided school lighting – focused exclusively on indigenous populations. They could equally 
be said to focus on very poor populations or any of a number of other characteristics that they share with 
each other but not necessarily with other beneficiaries included in this study. As such, I focus the question 
of the influence of ethnicity on solar home systems installed by the government throughout the country 
since this program included both indigenous and Ladino communities. Among these, twenty-four 
respondents lived in communities that spoke only Spanish (and are therefore classified as Ladino) and 
fourteen lived in communities in which at least one indigenous language was spoken. These interviews 
took place in five departments, two of which were made up of Ladino users (Zacapa and Chiquimula), and 
three of which contained indigenous communities (Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Izabal). Alta and Baja 
Verapaz were particularly hard hit by the civil war, and Alta Verapaz and Izabal were hotbeds of drug and 
human trafficking activity at the time of this study (see Chapter 3);64 like racism and poverty, violence and 
instability are part of what it means to be indigenous in Guatemala. 
 
                                                 
63 Excepting as mentioned above, outsiders such as teachers or health care workers who did not own a substantial portion of 
communities’ assets.  
64 The Department of Petén, largely excluded from this study, is the main department in which traffickers work; Alta Verapaz and 
Izabal are the departments that border it. 
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The post-conflict development projects took place in a department that is 90% indigenous, in which 84% of 
indigenous people live in poverty and 27% live in extreme poverty (INE, 2006). The disaster relief projects 
were implemented in a department where 89% of the population is indigenous and 87% of indigenous live 
in poverty. However, the latter department differs from the former in that almost half of the indigenous 
population lives in extreme poverty (49% versus 27%), showing it to be markedly poorer. 
 
The Guatemalan National Institute of Statistics (INE) claims that the total population is 38% indigenous. 
Fifty-one percent of all Guatemalans live in poverty, 15% of them in extreme poverty. The populations 
included in the post-conflict development and disaster relief programs are significantly worse off than 
average. By comparison, 36% of Ladinos live in poverty, 8% in extreme poverty. However, this ethnic 
disparity fails to take into account rural versus urban living conditions. Seventy-one percent of all people in 
rural areas of Guatemala live in poverty (24% extreme poverty), which is slightly better than the two 
above-mentioned departments. In summary, extricating the effects of ethnicity from poverty and extreme 
poverty or from urban versus rural habitation is complicated and beyond the scope of this study. While not 
all Ladino respondents appeared wealthy, the wealthiest respondents were Ladino; while not all indigenous 
appeared extremely poor, the poorest respondents were indigenous.  
 
Further, levels of education and knowledge of Spanish were higher among Ladinos. If written instructions 
are left with beneficiaries for the maintenance of their systems, those with the highest levels of literacy will 
be those who benefit most. Those who cannot read instructions, contracts, or warranty materials may be 
less likely to value them and keep them safe. Even with the assistance of one who can read Spanish, system 
owners will be unable to request warrantee service if they cannot provide documentation of the warranty.65  
Internalized attitudes may also play a role. Ladinos talked about “progress” and “moving forward.” The 
indigenous – especially those in the areas hardest hit by the civil war – were conditioned during the civil 
war to avoid asserting themselves, especially where the government is concerned, or risk being killed. 
                                                 
65 Although beyond the scope of this research and perhaps little documented in the refereed literature, anecdotally it seems that those 
with lower literacy levels value documentation less than those with greater literacy – even when the documentation is pictorial and 
does not require reading skills. A study of this would be valuable to those in development who put resources into creating non-verbal 
documentation; does such documentation actually aid those with low literacy, or is the need to look to a piece of paper for instruction 
an obstacle in itself? 
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Although attitudes towards self-determination seem to be strengthening, many people still live in 
communities where they were once forced to live, communities that were planned and built by the military. 
With the peace accords signed in 1996, the government committed to doing more to build up and develop 
these communities. The paternalistic attitude taken by the government towards the indigenous may do little 
to inspire people to assert themselves and may lead to the false expectation that many people had that 
“someone else” would maintain their systems and replace their batteries for them. 
 
None of the communities showed a consistent understanding of the roles played by their municipal or 
department governments in obtaining the panels. However, members of Ladino communities in both 
departments reported the aid of political influence in getting or maintaining their systems – something not 
reported in the indigenous communities included in the same solar home system program. Some 
respondents in one of the Ladino departments reported that a powerful political figure represented their 
district in Guatemala City at the time of implementation, and they received the panels despite having had a 
recently prior donation of panels from another source. Those who reported this were by far the wealthiest 
respondents included in this study, judging by home construction66 and the ownership of trucks and cows.67 
In the other department in which respondents were Ladino, many respondents reported that a recent 
political candidate had purchased new batteries for the solar home systems in a largely unsuccessful effort 
to win their votes; he was not elected and those who mentioned it did not feel obliged to vote for him 
because they had accepted the replacement battery. Both of these situations suggest that at least some of the 
Ladino beneficiaries have value to political institutions above that of the indigenous beneficiaries in the 
same program. Ladinos in these communities were treated as a constituency by their representatives and 
would-be representatives who had either influence in the capital or money to attempt to buy elections. 
Conversely, the government works with the indigenous in post-conflict areas to meet an obligation. The 
disaster relief program included in this research would have been a clear opportunity for a government 
                                                 
66 Some of these homes had drywall interiors (unlike any other homes visited in this study), most had multiple rooms and all had 
installed flooring rather than dirt floors. In many indigenous communities, homes were single rooms with clapboard or stick walls and 
dirt floors. 
67 The word for cow used in Guatemala, gana, has the same root as the verb ganar, which means to earn or to win. Cattle is equated 
with wealth. 
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official to win the favor by emphasizing his or her involvement in it, but none apparently found the 
communities to be a valuable enough constituency to invest the time. 
 
The first group (the wealthy respondents) had what appeared to be the highest rate of operable systems I 
observed among communities included in this government loan program.68 Systems in the community that 
received the recent battery donation from the political candidate were considered successful or unsuccessful 
based on the same criteria as others. However, batteries were donated to users who had failed to maintain 
systems on their own; absent the windfall batteries, the community may have shown a much poorer success 
rate. 
 
In conclusion, Ladino beneficiaries of the government loan program were more successful than their 
indigenous counterparts in maintaining operable systems. However, many of the systems of the wealthiest 
of these respondents are not considered successful on the basis that they are sub-optimal for user needs: 
their capacities are too limited to meet the power demand that these wealthy users have in order to run 
blenders, televisions and other appliances that they have or believe they can afford.  
 
The generally greater success of Ladino users may relate to wealth as Ladino users had more money to 
maintain their systems, to political influence as they were more likely to have had politicians intercede on 
their behalves, or to attitude as indigenous users had been conditioned to expect specific projects outside 
their control rather than being an engaged part of determining their needs and maintaining what was given 
to them. The lack of success among the wealthiest Ladino beneficiaries was related not to their inability or 
unwillingness to maintain their systems, but to the fact that their needs and means had “outgrown” their 
systems. 
 
7.4.2. Gender 
Gender-specific results are largely anecdotal. Women interviewed were quick to turn to their husbands to 
answer questions, and husbands who arrived mid-way through interviews quickly took over answering. 
                                                 
68 Sampling methodology prevents quantitative conclusions about success rate in one community versus another. 
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This leads to difficulty in attributing responses to one gender or another. Among those responses in which 
gender is identified, more than twice as many respondents were men as women. 
 
The same number of respondents said that there was active participation by women in system governance 
activities as said women were not involved. A few communities had specific women’s governing 
committees (JD’s69), which were generally subordinate to the main JD (made up entirely of men in those 
cases). In communities in which women attended general meetings but were not involved in decision 
making, some individuals answered that yes, women were involved while other participants in the same 
programs answered no, that this does not constitute involvement. 
 
The few explanations offered as to why women did not participate were largely pragmatic rather than 
ideological objections to women in leadership. One female respondent said that women had been excluded 
because they cannot read and write or speak Spanish, which is limiting in dealing with donors and 
recording events or signing agreements. Women’s lack of involvement (either in leadership or as 
beneficiaries at all) was attributed frequently to the constraints on a woman’s time: the practical matter of a 
woman keeping house was a priority over meetings or development projects according to men and women 
alike. 
 
The fact that women immediately conceded answering questions to their husbands and practical matters 
that keep women from being involved belie a machista culture. This wasn’t addressed outright by anyone, 
but the head of household was the person most involved in the project – and the head of household is a man 
unless the woman is a widow. 
 
Some men outwardly supported women’s participation, but still concede that the culture is not conducive to 
it. “Women can do what we do as men. They formed a committee but it wasn’t a priority for them; they had 
their household work…” explained one man. Another man, Don Compartiendo, boasted of women’s 
freedom to participate in all of the projects in his community (mostly not energy related), and indeed many 
                                                 
69 See Chapter 6 for detailed descriptions of these institutions. 
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women were involved, a few in leadership positions. However, the women who were active were 
unmarried: they were either widows or young women who had not yet found husbands.  
 
In a conversation about the economics of the community, Don Compartiendo stated that the communally-
owned store would extend credit to community members to buy food. However, he was concerned because 
people were over-extending themselves. The credit was intended to hold people over if need be when 
buying staples, but people were using it to buy processed and packaged foods. He said that though his 
household could afford it occasionally, he disliked pre-packaged foods. He preferred the meals his wife 
cooked with herbs she gathered from the mountainside herself. I asked if the availability of pre-packaged 
food might allow women more time to avail themselves of the opportunities to participate in the projects. 
He merely reiterated that the people who were using credit to buy them were living beyond their means.  
 
Successful systems were more likely to include women in management or governance. Among successful 
systems, 56% were governed under structures that included women. Among unsuccessful systems, 56% 
were governed under structures that excluded women. 
 
Women and men had different perceptions of system safety. Women noted being afraid of lightning strikes, 
and fearing the combination of electricity and water during storms. One woman suffered what she 
described as a year-long nervous breakdown after lightning struck her panel while she and her family were 
in the home. No one was physically hurt, but she and her neighbors wanted nothing to do with solar energy. 
Conversely, a man in another community said that the damage to his panel, which was shattered and bent at 
the edges, resulted from a lightning strike.70 However, he was happy with it because it was still producing 
some power and providing him with lighting. Men generally said that PV was preferable and safer during 
storms and disasters because candles and other traditional lighting sources can blow over and either blow 
out or start fires. Women tended to prefer traditional lighting during storms, and some disconnected their 
systems to prevent damage to the system or the household should lightning strike. Women’s valid concerns 
about system safety could be addressed with more robust design (see Section 7.5), just as men’s concerns 
                                                 
70 Physical inspection of the system suggested that it was damaged by impact with a solid object, perhaps a cocoanut that fell during a 
storm, leading him to believe that lightning caused the damage. 
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about candles blowing over could be addressed with better housing construction (less drafty houses), 
although it is not clear whether that would allay the fears of either, nor where the resources to improve 
either housing or system construction could be found. 
 
7.4.3. Age 
This study included only men and women of at least 18 years of age. If the ages of respondents were 
questionable, they were asked whether they were at least 18 years old, but no record was made of 
respondent’s ages. In three cases, respondents were excluded and no written record was made of them 
because they were less than 18 years of age. A seventeen year old was with a group of women who were 
interviewed for this study, and as such her exclusion was somewhat artificial: there was likely very little 
difference between speaking with her and speaking with her friends, some of whom were likely only a year 
or two older. In two other cases, children sought to be involved. In one household, no adult was present but 
two girls who appeared to be young teenagers offered to respond. I did not conduct the interview. In 
another case, a mother participated in the initial part of the interview, but then asked her adolescent 
daughter to respond to remaining questions. As the mother was present, I spoke with the daughter briefly, 
but did not take voice or written records of her responses. All four under-aged would-be participants were 
female, which is consistent with the fact that young boys (older than toddlers) seemed to be in houses 
infrequently during the times of my visits, which were during daylight hours either on weekends or during 
the week. Since no data on ages or genders of children was collected – and rumors of foreigners kidnapping 
babies for the adoption market made asking many questions about children dangerous – this observation is 
not quantifiable, but suggests that boys have either liberties or responsibilities away from home while their 
sisters are expected to remain near their mothers. 
 
The only comment on record about age was from an elderly man. In speaking of why he did not participate 
in the governance of the energy project in his community, he said that people over 60 years old were not 
allowed to hold leadership posts in the community. This suggests a youth-centered culture in that 
community that seemed common, but not ubiquitous in Guatemala. No conclusions can reasonably be 
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drawn from this single observation, but suggests another possible cause of exclusion from benefiting from 
donated PV systems that merits further study. 
 
7.4.4. Summary: user characteristics and success 
All respondents in this study shared some characteristics based on selection criteria for inclusion. All had 
some familiarity with PV technology. All were poor, and lived in rural but not excessively isolated 
communities. No conclusions about system success can be drawn based on these characteristics because 
there is no group to which to compare them. And yet, every respondent was an individual and as such 
different from every other, making comparisons of success difficult or impossible without creating 
classifications of people, like ambition or levels of literacy or standing in the community, about which I 
lack both the data and the expertise to judge. 
 
Comparing system success on the bases of gender or age of respondents is not valid since all respondents 
appear to have lived in households with both men and women, and many households were multi-
generational. However, people related to systems differently based on gender, although no such 
differentiation was observed because of age. Women regarded electricity with more fear or mistrust, while 
men were more confident in its benefits. In the communities included in this study, youths did not show 
markedly more enthusiasm or confidence in the technologies than did their elders. This suggests that people 
were adapting equally regardless of age rather than elders being less willing to give up their traditional 
forms of lighting in favor of something less familiar. 
 
Systems in communities that are dominated by ethnic minorities are less frequently operable than those in 
Ladino communities, but this does not imply causation. Ladino communities were often made up of 
wealthier, more literate residents who were valued as constituents by political leaders, though many 
considered their systems insufficient to meet their needs. Many of the indigenous communities were in 
locations that were under the control of the army during the civil war and, due to historical as well as 
current political circumstances, may expect more ongoing participation of the government than it is 
providing. 
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7.5. Results: systems characteristics and success 
This section deals with characteristics of the design, installation and components of the physical stand-
alone PV systems. I had hypothesized that these system inspections would yield the most and most valuable 
information. They in fact told only a small part of the story, as described below.  
 
I performed some sort of physical inspection of sixty-four systems. However, I was often unable to view 
the entire system: households were uncomfortable inviting me inside to see components, public buildings 
were locked, panels were inaccessible, or inclement weather made climbing on metal roofs to examine 
panels inadvisable. Results in this section reference those systems where the information was accessible. 
Some respondents answered questions about multiple systems, so there is not a one-to-one correlation 
between systems examined and people interviewed. 
 
7.5.1. Codes and standards 
I hypothesized that adherence to internationally-recognized codes and standards for quality and safety 
would lead to more successful rural stand-alone PV systems. The Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) in 
Guatemala has provided training by international experts to some of its employees on the U.S. National 
Electric Code (NEC) standards for stand-alone PV systems, which the Government of Guatemala has 
adopted but not implemented (Ley, 2006). However, MEM employees with whom I spoke wanted further 
training on the topic as it seemed that they had never applied (and thereafter forgotten) the NEC.  
 
This study does not show the impact of these codes and standards on the success of rural stand-alone PV 
systems because no observed systems met NEC standards. Government agencies that installed systems 
tended to do so with internal consistently, but not consistently between different government agencies: 
MEM systems were installed like other MEM systems and CONRED systems like CONRED, but MEM 
and CONRED systems did not follow the same design or installation principles. Lightning protection was 
insufficient in every system examined, with all systems lacking recommended grounding and few including 
mandated DC disconnects. 
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In addition to design standards, standards of quality for individual components are issued by the U.S. 
Underwriters Laboratory (UL) and CE (certified as consistent with European standards), which are 
organizations that certify that electrical and other products are consistent with industry or government 
standards. These certifications do not by any means guarantee product quality: UL tests only for safety and 
CE relies on self-reported data. However, they are suggestive of increased attention to standards which, in 
turn, should result in higher quality products. Absent the ability to perform rigorous testing on components 
for this study, these seals are used as one proxy for component quality. Further measure of component 
quality is more subjective and depends upon my judgment of the degree to which components function 
adequately and stand up over time. Discussions of each component and the standards associated with it 
follow. 
 
7.5.2. Quality of components, design and installation 
“Our nuts get stuck in the machinery…” 
Operator of a poorly designed and installed micro-hydroelectric system 
on a macadamia nut plantation. 
 
More successful systems were hypothesized to be those with higher quality components, those installed 
properly, and those designed as closely as possible to industry standards. However, as with most of my 
results, the qualities of components, design and installation in a given system are not always simple to 
assess. Further, I focus on the “operability” criterion for success in this section as it has the most obvious 
and direct relevance.  
 
The three primary components common to good design practices in systems like these are the solar panels, 
the battery, and the charge controller. The “balance of system” components include wires and effectively 
everything else needed to make a system operable.  Balance of system components are difficult to assess by 
their physical natures and because they are less consistent between designs. Thus I chose to focus on the 
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quality of the three primary components only. Relevant design criteria are included with components where 
appropriate. 
 
7.5.2.1. Change controllers 
The quality of charge controllers was straightforward to assess: they were ubiquitously poor. This may 
have little influence on the success of projects because the charge controller is normally a technically 
simple device that may not need a high level of skill or careful manufacturing processes to ensure its 
success. However, these data do not contain an adequate group of high-quality controllers against which to 
test this hypothesis.  
 
Five charge controllers failed in ways that were apparent from physical inspection such as burnt resistors 
(visible when the charge controller was opened), evidence of burning visible without any disassembly, or 
direct statements from users that controllers burned. Two of these reported that the problems were common 
in their communities.  
 
All but one were in communities in the municipality of Gualán and provided under the government loan 
program. Among the twelve Gualán systems for which charge controller information is available, six are 
Solsum brand model 6.6x, which is CE certified, five had no trademark, and the last was ASC brand, model 
unspecified. Some ASC models are UL listed while others are not. None of the four visibly and reportedly 
“burnt” charge controllers were Solsum models; they were all among those in which the certification status 
is unknown. Thus it would be logical to infer that the Solsum controller or controllers with CE certification 
are of better quality than those without. See Table 5. 
 
 
Solsum, 
CE listed 
Not Solsum, 
unknown 
Not burnt 6 (50%) 2 (17%) 
Burnt 0 4 (33%) 
Table 5. Number of damaged charge controllers, by CE listing status and brand, Gualán 
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However, this gives an incomplete picture. Although the other charge controllers were not visibly damaged, 
ten of the twelve had been bypassed. There are several reasons for bypassing charge controllers. The first is 
that it does not function properly. The more common reason, however, is that it is believed to be failing 
because of a misunderstanding of how systems work. Since a charge controller is designed to prevent over- 
and under-charging of the battery, it will cause a system to stop providing energy to lights and other 
applications when the state of charge of the battery is low. As batteries’ usable capacity decreases over 
time, the charge controller will restrict the flow of energy after shorter periods of use towards the end of the 
battery’s life than at the beginning. It is therefore possible to connect an application directly to the battery, 
bypassing the charge controller entirely, in order to extract more energy from it at a given time. However, 
this allows over-discharging of the battery and consequently shortens battery life. Looking then not at 
whether the charge controller is known to be damaged but rather at whether the charge controller is actually 
in use, the brand and its certification seem to make no difference. See Table 6. 
 
 
Solsum, 
CE listed 
Not Solsum, 
unknown 
Not bypassed 1 (8%) 1 (8%) 
Bypassed 5 (42%) 5 (42%) 
Table 6. Number of bypassed charge controllers, by CE listing status and brand, Gualán 
 
Finally, among these systems, all but one was operable. While it did not use the Solsum charge controller 
and the charge controller was bypassed, this single system is not telling of any trend. 
 
This is too small a sample from which to draw definitive conclusions, but it suggests that certification may 
improve system safety since burnt charge controllers or their resistor might pose a safety hazard. It does not 
suggest that CE certification has any bearing on whether the systems remained operable over time, in the 
case of the government loan program in Gualán. 
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Industry standard design, quality installation and manufacturers’ recommendations dictate that a charge 
controller should be present in a stand-alone PV system with a battery. Notably, the design of all systems 
inspected for this study included charge controllers initially, so I can infer nothing about the effect 
inclusion of a charge controller by design on system operability. However, they were often bypassed or had 
been removed. I inspected the charge controller (or connection between the battery and other components 
when charge controllers were absent) of ten inoperable systems. Among these, five were missing charge 
controllers or had bypassed them and an equal number had charge controllers connected. Sixteen of the 
thirty-six (44%) operable systems for which I was able to inspect the charge controller or battery had no 
charge controller connected to the system, though it was often present and bypassed. Twenty of the thirty-
six (56%) had charge controllers in place. A greater percentage of operable systems had charge controllers 
than did inoperable systems, suggesting that the presence of a charge controller improves the likelihood 
that a system will remain operable. However, the difference is slight. 
 
7.5.2.2. Batteries 
The shortest-lived component of a stand-alone PV system is normally its battery. As discussed in Chapter 
5, users often do not replace batteries because they find the cost prohibitive, either in real dollars or because 
of the relatively large amount of capital needed all at once. In this section, I explore the influence of battery 
quality on system operability. I also explore the connection between battery replacement and overall system 
success. 
 
Two basic types of batteries were found in the systems inspected for this study: deep-cycle batteries and 
automotive batteries. Deep-cycle batteries are the industry standard as they are technically better suited to 
the slow re-charge and deep discharge operation of PV systems, but are more expensive. There are various 
differentiations in deep cycle batteries, including sealed versus unsealed, lead-acid versus lithium ion, and 
those intended for marine versus terrestrial uses. Because these differences were sometimes difficult to 
ascertain and because industry standard design does not dictate one as clearly superior to another, deep-
cycle batteries are considered a single category. 
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The second types of batteries found during inspections were automotive batteries. These also vary 
considerably, but are all designed to be optimal for the quick, deep discharge necessary to start a vehicle 
and quick re-charging once the vehicle is running, not the slow discharge and charge cycles of a PV 
system. These are also considered a single category of battery, and are considerably less expensive than 
deep-cycle batteries.  
 
I had hypothesized that successful systems would be more likely to be those with appropriate, deep-cycle 
batteries, but the hypothesis is not supported by this research. Among systems for which I was able both to 
inspect the battery and ascertain whether the system was operational, the number of deep-cycle batteries 
was nearly identical to the number of car batteries, in both operational and non-operational systems. See 
Table 7. 
 
 Inoperable Operable 
Deep Cycle 2 20 
Automotive 3 19 
Table 7. Number of automotive and deep-cycle batteries among operable and inoperable systems71 
 
Battery replacement is essential to the long-term success of a system. Given that the economic obstacles to 
system sustainability seemed to be related less to the real cost of systems and more to the need to amass 
sufficient capital to replace batteries, keeping a system operable could be hypothesized to be more likely 
with the lower-cost, albeit lower quality, automotive batteries. Considering only systems where users 
specifically reported that they had or had not yet replaced batteries and the most recent battery was 
available for inspection, only four owners of inoperable systems reported that they had previously replaced 
batteries: two had deep-cycle batteries in place; the other two had automotive batteries. However, among 
users whose systems were operable, thirteen reported that they had replaced their batteries at least once: 
nine of these (69%) had purchased automotive batteries while four (31%) had purchased the recommended 
deep-cycle batteries. The reason that replacement automotive batteries are more common among successful 
                                                 
71 The number of batteries inspected among inoperable systems was very small in part because batteries were often missing from 
these. 
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systems might be attributed to their lower upfront cost, their greater availability, or users’ lack of 
knowledge or understanding of why a deep-cycle battery is technically (and, in the long term, 
economically) preferable. The result suggests that replacing previously-installed batteries with automotive 
batteries does not preclude system success and may support it. 
 
Excepting specialty “sealed” deep-cycle batteries not seen in this study, batteries require basic maintenance 
including adding distilled water to their wells. Among the twenty-eight respondents who specifically said 
that they or someone in their households were responsible for maintenance of the system, all knew that 
adding water was an important part of basic system maintenance,72 which yields no insight on whether 
understanding of this basic maintenance step is related to system success. 
 
7.5.2.3. PV panels 
In this discussion of PV panels, I include issues of panel quality, maintenance, orientation and inclination, 
shading and mounting structure. Meeting industry standards with each was hypothesized to support system 
operability. All programs included in this research specified the installation of monocrystalline or 
polycrystalline PV panels, considered to be of superior quality to the amorphous silicon or thin-film panels 
that are the alternative.73 However, not all panels installed by vendors met this specification. The post-
conflict development program relied on a vendor who they thought to be reputable for the installations of 
some systems.74 While many of the systems he installed appeared to be of acceptable quality, he installed 
sub-standard equipment in at least three communities. Specifically, all three systems inspected in the town 
of Encuentros Amajchel and one system that I inspected in each of the proximate communities of Amajchel 
and Nueva Amajchel were installed with amorphous silicon PV panels. Qualitatively, these communities 
did not seem to have poorer success rates than neighboring communities in which all panels were 
crystalline. The amorphous panels are rated at much smaller wattages (on the order of 12 W to 15 W) than 
                                                 
72 Six respondents used an acid solution marketed for batteries rather than water because they were told by battery vendors that it was 
necessary. It is not likely to affect system performance, but increases the cost. 
73 This is consistent with specifications reported by donors or developers familiar with the projects, and evidenced by the fact that 
most panels were of the crystalline variety. Crystalline panels typically have warrantee periods of 20 to 25 years, versus 10 years for 
thin film panels. 
74 The source of this information is Iván Azurias of Fundación Solar. One additional panel in the community of El Estor was also 
amorphous. However, I was unable to find a respondent with sufficient knowledge of or access to the system to speculate on why this 
might be. 
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the crystalline panels in the same and adjoining communities (40 W to 50 W), leaving these households 
with less energy than their neighbors. Only one of the five noted the discrepancy, stating that he had 
expected a 50 W panel but received one of only 12 W. Though he expressed his disappointment that the 
expectation had not been met, he stated that the systems had not caused any conflict in the community, 
which presumably includes resentment among those with smaller systems. By most users’ estimates, these 
systems had been in place approximately six to seven years; although the inequity in the size of the system 
created no apparent conflict, negative consequences may or may not result from the shorter system lives. 
Community relationships and conflict are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
While the general type of panel specified was of superior quality, crystalline panels themselves vary widely 
in quality. Among the panels examined, 48% had a visible trademark. However, I suspect some of the 
trademarks to be fraudulent because this is reported to be a widespread problem in Guatemala (Ley, 2006), 
because some panels that bore a trade name lacked the technical specifications or certifications found on 
the boilerplate of these manufacturers, and because some panels that bore a trade name showed signs of 
being of significantly lower quality than other panels attributed to the same manufacturer. Because 52% of 
the panels were missing a trademark or were situated such that I could not view it and because the veracity 
of the trademark is suspect in the remaining cases, I can draw no conclusions about the importance to 
success of using name-brand rather than less expensive or “pirate” panels. 
 
For fewer than 10% (6 out of 62) of systems I was able to physically examine, I observed damage to or 
degradation of the PV panel itself. One of these, mentioned in Section 7.4, was mechanically damaged by a 
lightning strike or falling object, but was still functioning. Another was an amorphous silicon panel, which 
have shorter expected lives than do crystalline panels, which was not functioning nor did users have plans 
to replace or repair it. The four remaining systems showed discoloration of the PV surface, which is 
evidence of degradation of the component. All of these were functioning at the time of inspection, albeit 
likely at lower efficiency than an undegraded panel under the same circumstances, and were part of 
successful systems. Thus, these analyses do not support the hypothesis that name brand, higher quality 
crystalline panels are associated with more successful systems. 
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I cannot test the hypothesis that grounding to protect against lightning strikes leads to better system success 
as none of the main programs included in this study (disaster relief, post-conflict development, government 
loan or flood early warning programs) included grounding in the design or installations of their systems. 
The four systems inspected that had some form of grounding (although not to U.S. NEC standards) were all 
successful by the definition of this research, but the sample is too small to draw any conclusion. It is likely 
evidence that they were better planned overall, and as such may have various reasons for their success. 
 
Proper panel orientation (azimuth) and inclination were also expected more frequently in successful 
systems. Inclination, measured as the angle between the panel and the horizontal, is normally equal to the 
latitude of the location where the system is located,75 so Guatemala’s latitude of 15.5˚ N suggests an 
inclination of approximately 15˚ is appropriate. However, inclination can vary by as much as 15˚ without 
significant loss of system performance. Thus for these analyses, any inclination between 0˚ (flat) and 30˚ 
was considered to be within the bounds of standard design. Only two systems exceeded this tolerance, and 
both were successful. Again, this small sample size yields no meaningful information about the effect of 
inclination on success.  
 
Azimuth may be important, however. In the Northern Hemisphere, panels should be installed facing due 
south, plus or minus not more than 30˚. Seventy-eight percent of successful systems for which orientation 
and inclination were recorded were within this range, oriented between SSE and SSW. Conversely, only 
thirty-eight percent of unsuccessful systems faced south – markedly fewer. There are two possible 
explanations. The first is that the decreased energy production resulting from improper panel orientation 
gives less incentive for people to care for their system or leaves them less likely to perceive systems as 
successful. The other possibility is that an installer who orients systems with azimuth of greater than 30˚ is 
likely inexperienced and may have made other mistakes in implementation, whether with the physical 
installation or in orienting users.  
 
                                                 
75 Design and installation recommendations in this section are from “Solar photovoltacis for development applications” (Shepperd and 
Richards, 1993), unless otherwise noted. 
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Among systems donated by the government for use in schools, panels were seen to be deliberately installed 
facing sunrise. A community member who participated in installing the system at the school in his and 
nearby communities explained that facing sunrise was the “best” orientation, according to the instruction he 
had been given by the project developer. Too few school systems were seen to succeed to draw useful 
conclusions about the influence of panel orientation on system success in this case. 
 
Other panels may have been installed in sub-optimal orientations for security reasons, such as installing 
panels on the side of a roof that faces away from a road or thoroughfare to prevent theft or vandalism. A 
system installed on a now-defunct women’s weaving cooperative was among these. Even though 
community members knew that the panel would capture more sun if mounted on the south-facing slope of 
the roof, they chose to mount it facing north to minimize the risk of the panel being damaged by children 
throwing stones at it as they walked to and from school. This system was not included in this study because 
I had helped to maintain it prior to the initiation of the study and concluded that my earlier influence would 
make it an inherently biased data point. The system fell into disrepair after the cooperative was abandoned, 
but the reasons for the dissolution of the co-op are outside the scope of this study. 
 
Panels should be installed with a minimum airspace of six inches between the panel and the rooftop or 
other mounting structure to allow sufficient air cooling, as panel efficiency decreases when panels are too 
hot. In fact, seventeen percent of successful systems lacked this clearance but all unsuccessful systems for 
which I was able to view panel mounting structure adequately had sufficient airspace. Though it is unlikely 
that decreased efficiency would lead to increased success, there may be some common factor that would 
both lead to system success and to the easier, although technically suboptimal, mounting of panels directly 
on rooftop surfaces. 
 
Dirt, dust, leaves or other accumulation on panel surfaces can reduce their ability to produce energy. Thirty 
systems examined had panels subjectively ranked as clean, mostly clean, dirty, or very dirty. All seven 
unsuccessful systems and eighteen of the twenty-three successful systems (78%) had panels that were dirty 
or very dirty, suggesting the simple maintenance activity of wiping panels periodically was not happening 
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very frequently. This may be because people are unaware of the importance: among all users who answered 
questions about training or maintenance, only 26% of respondents with unsuccessful systems and 34% of 
respondents with successful system stated that they knew that they should clean panels regularly. 
Additionally, users would logically feel little or no motivation to clean or perform other maintenance on 
unsuccessful systems, if they were not functioning and not intended to be repaired. However, “dirty” panels 
were found at about the same rate for successful and unsuccessful systems.  
 
Shading decreases panel output disproportionately to the area of the panel shaded; because the solar cells in 
a panel are wired in series, shading of a portion of the panel will affect the output of the entire panel. As 
such, shading on panels was expected to correspond to less system success. This hypothesis is also 
unsupported by this research, with 13% of unsuccessful systems and a statistically indistinguishable 17% of 
successful systems having partial shading on panels during some portion of the day.  
 
7.5.3. System longevity 
This research considers the years since a system was originally installed. Some respondents had very 
precise answers, while others had more general ideas (one system was installed on April 10, 1999; another 
in a nearby community was installed “more than 5 years ago, probably 15 or 16 years”). Some respondents 
did not remember or were not in the community at the time of installation. 
 
Projects were generally installed in communities at the same time or nearly the same time, so the sampling 
methodology of choosing successful and unsuccessful projects in each community does not allow a direct 
comparison of longevity. However, some conclusions can be drawn from the data available. 
 
This study took place ten years after the hurricane that prompted the disaster relief program. In four of the 
seven communities covered by that program and included in this study, I was unable to interview anyone 
with a successful system. People gave conflicting reports of whether any panels remained in the 
communities at all. In the remaining three communities, although I was able to talk to users whose systems 
were functioning, they were the exceptions rather than the rule. 
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Conversely, in three of the five communities in the wealthiest area included in this study, I was unable to 
interview anyone with an unsuccessful system. Respondents claimed that all systems in their communities 
were functional, excepting those on the houses of a few people who had moved away (although it is not 
clear if the panels remained with the houses or were taken by former residents). Communities in this region 
also reported that their systems had been in place for approximately 10 years, with one community 
reporting that their systems were more than 15 years old. 
 
Both the least successful and the most successful collections of systems in this study were approximately 
10 years old. Since batteries are expected to be replaced every three to five years, a system owner will have 
had to incur that expense twice or three times in ten years. Users in the wealthiest communities were able to 
sustain their systems through those periodic expenses repeatedly, while those in the disaster relief 
communities largely reported not having replaced the battery even once. 
 
While systems may be said to fail in the first few years, as in the case of the disaster relief program where 
many people sold their still-functioning systems within a year of installation, systems cannot be said to be 
sustainable for their users until after the first major maintenance expenses are met. Thus, system longevity 
is a result of system success, not a predictor of it. 
 
7.5.4. Summary: System characteristics and success 
Characteristics that were the same for all systems included in this study cannot be analyzed for their impact 
on success. The regulatory environment for codes and standards does not vary by department, but is the 
same for all of Guatemala, rendering untestable the hypothesis that the presence and enforcement of codes 
and standards would lead to greater system success. Similarly, since all users who claimed responsibility 
for the maintenance of their own systems knew to add water to their batteries periodically, I cannot test the 
hypothesis that this level of basic knowledge and corresponding action would improve system success. 
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The relationship between system design and installation and success is slight. Shading on panels, type of 
crystalline panel, and appropriate mounting are not shown by these analyses to relate to system success. 
However, panels installed at an inappropriate azimuth were less successful; this may be because an installer 
who does not know in which direction to face the panels may have less expertise in PV in general and may 
have made multiple mistakes. 
 
Two important, albeit slight, apparent relationships exist between system success and system 
characteristics.76 All systems included in this study appear to have been designed and installed with charge 
controllers, which users often bypass. Systems with charge controllers in place were slightly more likely to 
be successful systems, as hypothesized. Contrary to my a priori hypothesis, however, systems that include 
automotive batteries rather than appropriate deep cycle batteries may be more likely to be successful 
systems. This suggests the hypothesis that the lower capital cost of an automotive battery outweighs the 
advantages of a better quality, longer lasting deep cycle battery. Specific issues of charge controller 
presence and battery quality merit further research. 
 
7.6. Unintended consequences 
Here I include the physical consequences of donated stand-alone PV systems on the environment. When 
asked specifically about negative environmental consequences, most people either said there were none, or 
they didn’t know. Two respondents said that there were negative consequences. One said that the panel 
draws lightning strikes. Another said that “they say” using the panel generates heat “and it affects 
humanity.” For purposes of this research, the system owned by the latter respondent is considered a 
success, and that owned by the former is not. Unfortunately, this is not enough information to draw any 
conclusion about the impact of perceived environmental externalities on system success.  
 
Since very few users saw any negative consequence to having a PV system installed, it might be concluded 
reasonably that developers need not consider this strongly in project planning. However, it also suggests 
that developers do an insufficient job in educating users about the potential environmental harm caused by 
                                                 
76 Research methods preclude robust statistical analyses on these data, as explained in detail in Chapter 4. 
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improper disposal of lead-acid batteries since no respondent volunteered that as potentially harmful. The 
lead from spent batteries persists in the communities’ environments and can cause harm to human health 
when batteries are not properly disposed of. Although system users’ understandings are the topic of this 
research, lead contamination is an example of an area where developers can and should assert that they 
know better than the community. Developers are introducing a toxin into the community without 
adequately conveying the risks associated with it. 
 
When asked specifically about battery disposal, eleven users said they sell or give them to recyclers or 
buyers, which is the safest thing to do. None said they bury the battery far from a water source, which is 
recommended by some donors if beneficiaries are unlikely to have access to a recycler. Many people still 
had their first battery in place, and did not know what they would do with it at the end of its useful life. 
Almost all others either throw them away with regular trash or store them indefinitely. One gave it to his 
children as a toy (!). One uses the lead from dead batteries to make bullets. 
 
It could be hypothesized that proper disposal of batteries would be associated with better training, and 
therefore better system success. No such relationship between battery disposal and system success is 
apparent. 
 
Other environmental consequences were reported by users of hydroelectric systems (not included in this 
study), though not by the PV users who were the subjects of this research. An indirect environmental 
consequence of hydroelectricity for some communities is reforestation. Some hydros – typically those with 
more organization and institutional support – participate in upstream reforestation projects that reduce the 
chances of landslides that will damage the hydro project in a severe weather event and reduce 
sedimentation and other pollution of the water course that can damage or decrease the capacity of the hydro 
equipment over time. This added tree cover protects not only the hydro, which may be one of its primary 
intentions, but provides numerous other benefits (and perhaps costs) to the communities in the watershed. 
Speaking specifically in the case of weather-related disasters, preventing landslides protects crops and 
communities that may have been in their paths and protects the river or stream as a water supply, as well as 
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protecting the hydro as an energy source. On an ongoing basis, community members have better access to 
firewood and other forest products. 
 
Reforestation is not associated with solar energy, and trees may be cut back or cut down to eliminate 
shading on panels; tree planting might benefit communities’ immediate environments, but it does not 
benefit PV. 
 
7.7. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have considered the characteristics of communities, users and systems that may contribute 
to system success, considered the unintended consequences of the physical systems, and highlighted the 
close connection between characteristics and the institutions and relationships that surround these donation 
projects.  
 
The physical and communications-related isolation of a community is a factor that may have great bearing 
on the success of systems in that community. However, the limitations of this research precluded me from 
exploring this. Though there are varying degrees of “remoteness” among the communities in this study, 
they all had to be relatively easily accessible for me to be able to include them. 
 
However, some features of “remoteness” were captured. System success was greater in communities where 
respondents knew how to contact the project donor or developer, suggesting that they were not cut off due 
to distance or lack of communication. More respondents with successful systems knew where and how to 
access replacement components more frequently than those with unsuccessful systems, suggesting a 
knowledge of, if not familiarity with, larger towns and cities. 
 
Multi-generational, mixed gender households made it impossible to infer differences in success based on 
age, gender, marital status, or many other demographics. The causes of failure in Ladino and indigenous 
communities may have been different, with more indigenous households’ systems being regarded as 
unsuccessful because they were technically inoperable (and without foreseeable repair), while Ladino’s 
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systems were more frequently regarded as unsuccessful because, while operable, they were sub-optimal and 
did not meet respondents’ needs.  
 
Characteristics of system design, installation and hardware varied in their relationships to system success. 
Some, such as the implementation of codes and standards or knowledge of appropriate battery 
maintenance, were ubiquitous among systems which could be reasonably compared, and thus yielded no 
insight. Some characteristics of improper installation, such as wrong azimuth, seem related to system 
failure. This is not likely causal, but possibly both the inappropriate installation and the ultimate system 
failure result from inexperienced and improperly supervised vendors or developers. Other hallmarks of 
purportedly poor or non-standard installation, including panel shading and direct roof mounting, were not 
shown in this research to be related to success. 
 
Charge controllers, which are often bypassed by users, were present with slightly more frequency in 
successful systems than unsuccessful systems, which is consistent with industry standards and apparent 
general assumption among project developers.  
 
Importantly, appropriate selection of deep-cycle batteries was hypothesized to be a predictor of project 
success. Contrarily, this research shows that successful systems are more likely than unsuccessful systems 
to contain inappropriate automotive batteries. While not presuming causality, it may be possible that users 
who are able to amass sufficient capital to replace batteries will opt for batteries with lower upfront costs 
rather than those with higher capital but lower lifetime costs. 
 
Respondents did not perceive negative environmental consequences, so no comparisons can be made to 
assess the relationship between this and success. A scientifically well-established potential consequence is 
lead contamination from improperly discarded batteries was unknown to respondents. While this says 
nothing of system success, it suggests a systemic weakness in the development paradigm under which these 
systems are installed. 
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As illustrated by issues of “remoteness” and battery quality in this chapter, many of these characteristics of 
communities, users and systems are inextricably enmeshed with the institutions and relationships that 
surround them, as discussed in the previous chapter, Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusions 
 
This research was started with a seemingly straightforward question borne out of the frustration of someone 
who has participated in international development: why must donated rural renewable energy systems in 
the developing world fail so often? The challenges in answering it begin with the fact that the question 
itself is not straightforward. What constitutes a “donated” rather than a purchased system when nearly all 
donors require some level of contribution from beneficiaries? Which rural renewable energy systems can 
be categorized together, and which will show entirely different characteristics? Which populations are 
involved? And indeed, how does one even define success and failure? 
  
Among the original goals of this research was to create a statistically valid set of results based on a random 
sample and consistent survey techniques. This goal was not met. It was sacrificed instead for deeper 
conversations with deliberately selected individuals, yielding less data but a greater depth and breadth of 
knowledge – but not statistical significance.77 
 
To capture the perspective of those who use and benefit (or not) from these systems required a translation 
of my questions about success, energy, money, institutions, time and many other factors into questions that 
made sense to those whose perspectives I wished to understand. Although language was certainly 
important, the gulf was much broader than trading Spanish for English. That which is reasonable and 
rational to me can be unacceptable, irrational or even deadly to them. 
 
In this concluding chapter to my research, my goal is to translate back what I have discovered and failed to 
discover to the language from which I started, the language of developers and their supporters who wish to 
benefit the poor while protecting the environment. I did my best to listen to the poor in rural Guatemala 
who someone tried to help by donating stand-alone PV systems. This is what they had to say.
                                                 
77 See Chapter 4 for details. 
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8.1 Success78 
Characterizing systems as successful or unsuccessful can be complicated, and is more than a simple 
question of operability. A system may be successful even if it is not currently functioning, or may be 
unsuccessful even if operating as designed. Three characteristics emerged from this research as important 
to defining system success: 
– Operability, where a system is either in working order, active steps are being taken to 
return it to working order, or it was operable during its useful life and has been replaced 
by something preferable. 
– User perception, where users see the system as successful, find it useful in their activities, 
and brings something good. 
– Optimality, where it meets users’ needs to the degree that they would not replace it with 
something “better” if they had the chance. 
 
This definition of system success is neither necessary nor sufficient in that some development projects that 
have had unconscionably negative results could still be seen as successful here, and some that fail to meet 
one or more have provided real benefit. 
 
Among the greatest challenges to identifying systems as successful from the perspectives of users is that 
users may have motivation to portray their systems as successful to anyone they associate with the 
development community. Perhaps they will seem ungrateful, ignorant or incapable of maintaining 
successful projects if they are willing to point to a system as unsuccessful. However, some themes are 
recurrent in users’ views of success. Many spoke of agency: they were able to achieve something in getting 
and maintaining their systems. Others spoke of outcomes: they were the grateful beneficiaries of the 
decisions of others.  
 
Perhaps the most difficult question in the definition of success is one not addressed by this research at all. 
This study was constructed with the presupposition that a greater percentage of successful systems was 
                                                 
78 See Chapter 2 for details. 
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synonymous with a more successful project or program. That definition of success comes at a cost. Those 
users who are most likely to have successful systems are those comparatively less likely to have needed the 
donation, so achieving a higher percentage of successful systems can mean exacerbating inequity and 
excluding the poorest and most marginalized households and communities. Higher rates of “failure” should 
perhaps be expected for programs that are “successful” in helping the poorest of the poor.   This implies 
that program evaluation should use measures and descriptors of “success” that are broader than mere 
technical functionality, and broader than the definition used in this research. 
 
8.2. Money79 
All users included in this study were unquestionably poor, some more than others of course. The reality of 
the economic hardships faced by users and the monetary costs necessarily associated with the systems 
made money a recurring theme. Whether speaking of costs or benefits, everyone had something to say 
about money. 
 
Most beneficiaries of the donated systems studied in this research saved money in real dollars by having the 
systems, with economic benefits accruing over time. The reduction in expenditures on candles, kerosene 
and other forms of traditional lighting more than offset the cost of replacement of the PV system batteries 
every three to five years. These real cost reductions mean the economically rational decision would be to 
save a portion of the money not spent on traditional lighting sources every month and spending those 
savings on battery replacement when needed. However, this was frequently not done. The economic 
rationality argument presupposes a “reasonable” discount rate, and an expectation that if replacement 
batteries were not saved for, the system would no longer function. However, those living in poverty and 
extreme poverty, perhaps more importantly, perpetual uncertainty and insecurity may have discount rates 
that approach infinity. What is the value of a dollar in three years when you do not know whether you will 
be alive a year (or a day) from now? This economic rationale also presumes that “willingness to pay” and 
“ability to pay” are synonymous. The decision to buy food rather than saving for battery replacement when 
subsistence crops fail is a rational decision, regardless of long-term economic impact. 
                                                 
79See Chapter 5 for details. 
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Access to capital was a greater barrier to system maintenance than was real cost. Batteries are expensive. 
When saving for them is undesired or simply unrealistic, users must amass a considerable quantity of 
money at one time. This is hardest for the poorest system users, who rely on subsistence agriculture and 
barter rather than cash more often than their relatively wealthier neighbors. 
 
Not all supposed beneficiaries in fact gain cash benefits from using their PV systems. Some households, as 
well as community buildings like schools and clinics, incur additional expense in maintaining PV systems 
as compared to traditional energy sources. Some recipients of donated PV systems realize economic benefit 
by selling the system rather than from long-term cost savings on household energy expenses. 
 
Opportunities for earning additional income from donated PV systems were few – such as additional sales 
realized by shopkeepers who were able to conduct business after sunset – and incremental income was 
small. Any lost income at the community level – from reduced sales of candles, for example – was also 
small, and was considered inconsequential even to those who sold candles. 
 
Thus, the largest economic benefits of these donated stand-alone solar electric systems in rural Guatemala 
were realized by the “rich among the poor,” both because they were most able to access the capital needed 
for system maintenance (and thereby maintain the energy cost savings that were lost to their neighbors who 
could not afford maintenance), and because they were those most likely to realize the few additional 
income opportunities. Importantly, this research does not show that the donation of these energy systems 
will necessarily aid in poverty alleviation for all beneficiaries – although it may for some – and may in fact 
contribute to economic inequity within communities. 
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8.3. System Use80 
The systems included in this study were used for lighting. The light was viewed to be of better quality than 
light from traditional sources, and in many cases had benefits such as enabling children to study at night 
and strengthening family bonds by allowing people to more easily see one another and communicate. 
Another common use of energy was cellular telephone charging. If even one person in a community had 
electricity, this allowed at least a few people to charge cell phones, which in turn gave the community 
much more ready access to people outside the community. By virtue of a single system and telephone, the 
community becomes less remote. The addition of radio and television in some households with PV systems 
further brought the community in closer contact with happenings outside of the community. This greater 
access was not ubiquitously found to be good: some disliked the distraction of television and its 
interference with time the family could spend together. 
 
Almost everyone wanted more energy than their PV systems could produce. People wanted refrigerators, 
and women specifically wanted blenders and electric irons, whether or not they would have been able to 
afford these appliances if the energy for them were available. The desire for blenders and irons is 
remarkable in that they are easily considered “conveniences” where other energy applications (such as 
water pumping, for example) are considered necessities. But whether it is time saved chopping food or time 
saved carrying water, the effect is the same for the women involved: time is saved. This begs the question 
to the development community: do we consider sufficiently the desired end result, and do we achieve that 
in ways that are most useful to beneficiaries and most cost-effective to donors? I have yet to hear of a solar 
home system that was sized to meet a demand that included a blender. 
 
System usefulness affected success in an unexpected way. I did not find that systems were more or less 
likely to be successful because of the types of uses to which they were put. However, those who could 
afford to purchase more appliances than their systems were designed to power were likely to consider their 
                                                 
80 See Chapter 5 for details. 
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systems sub-optimal, where those who could not have purchased color televisions or refrigerators even if 
their systems could power them were more likely to find PV to be an optimal solution. 
 
8.4. Institutions and relationships81 
The political context of Guatemala negatively affects development and poverty alleviation, including in the 
area of rural electrification. The state is in large part corrupt and ineffective and, perhaps equally 
detrimentally, is believed by its people to be so. Bribery, embezzlement, drug trafficking, money 
laundering and even political assassinations are believed to be rampant among the elite. Schools, food 
assistance and other social services are plundered by the officials responsible for administering them while 
people sometimes literally starve to death. Confidence in the justice system is so low that murder and 
similarly severe crimes are increasingly punished by lynch mobs. The legacy of the civil war and the 
impunity with which crimes against humanity were committed have left many people, especially among the 
indigenous, deeply distrustful and fearful of the government. Extreme poverty and racism persist. The 
covert and sometimes overt control exerted by drug cartels and other crime syndicates over large parts of 
the country mean that, in some places, there is no functioning government and people are subject to the 
“justice” of terrorist organizations like Los Zetas. 
 
However, much of that is, to a degree at least, removed from people’s daily lives, and more local and 
involved institutions can help rather than hinder the people included in this study and the success of their 
systems. Continued involvement of the donor or development organization was strongly associated with 
system success. Two reasons emerged in this study for this association that suggest that this correlation was 
a cause and effect relationship. First, the donor was available to help with advice, technical assistance, 
negotiation with a vendor for warrantee service, and in a few specific cases, material assistance for 
maintenance.  
 
The second reason dealt with accountability. When users were accountable for the state of their systems to 
an outside party, such as the panel owner in hybrid-ownership arrangements, an inter-community project 
                                                 
81 See Chapter 6 for details. 
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governance structure, or the donor in cases when the beneficiary hoped to continue to receive development 
assistance from the donor, users applied more of their resources and efforts towards upkeep of their systems 
than did users in analogous situations who did not have this accountability. That beneficiaries can be held 
accountable to donors highlights the power inequity that invariably exists between the parties, which can be 
(and occasionally is) abused. 
 
The idea that accountability leads to system success is a dramatic break from the established wisdom in the 
development community about project ownership. It is nearly universally believed that users who have a 
sense of ownership of their systems, especially if they have committed their own financial resources to the 
project, will have greater motivation to maintain their systems and have better success rates. This was not 
found in this research. In addition to the lack of accountability to anyone but one’s self, those who owned 
their systems could and sometime did exercise the prerogative to sell the components.  
 
 Local governance structures or maintenance cooperatives were created with the implementation of the PV 
projects in most communities included in this study. Most of these governance structures fell apart quickly. 
In contrast to micro-hydroelectric plants which connect to houses via a microgrid, PV systems were 
physically independent from one another. Where physical interdependence required or at least strongly 
encouraged cooperative administration and maintenance, physical independence did the reverse. If every 
household must contribute enough to a maintenance cooperative to maintain its own system, why should 
the household not save money on its own?    This is what economists call the “free rider” problem of joint 
action. 
 
However, local governance structures and savings cooperatives were successful in some communities 
included in this research. Communities in which local project governance structures were successful also 
saw a greater degree of success among systems in the community. There are many potential reasons for 
this, one of which might be that the institutional burden is removed from the household: a lone household 
with a PV system must be its own electric company, making all decisions and incurring all expenses 
independently. 
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In addition, user involvement in project origination, planning and implementation also did not lead to 
system success. The availability of adequate technical and administrative training, however, was found 
more among users of successful systems than users of unsuccessful systems. This was true whether the 
training was informal one-on-one training at the time of installation or if it took place in more structured 
group lessons. Whether training was available to users or not, all were interested in further training 
sessions.  
 
The final conclusion about institutions and relations concerned how intra-community relationships were 
affected by these projects. These effects were important.  Some users spoke of a greater sense of 
community that emerged from working together to create or implement the project, or from being able to 
spend more time with neighbors at night as a result of having light. People did not see religious or cultural 
conflict resulting from the projects, even in the few cases where some people were excluded either by self-
selection or for reasons thought to be the fault of the donor. However, in a few other cases where people 
were instead excluded from the project by members of the community, resentment was obvious though the 
consequences of that resentment are unclear. Notably, exclusion can in fact improve project success rates. 
If those who are least likely to successfully maintain a system are excluded, then the percentage of 
successful systems will increase. Here project donors and developers must carefully consider the goals of 
their programs before engaging in a project with this type of exclusion: the resulting increased success rate 
comes at a social cost. 
 
8.5. User and community characteristics82 
Some characteristics of users and communities can be linked to system success while others cannot be 
related to success by this study due to methodological limitations.  
 
Perhaps the most significant conclusion of these analyses about user and community characteristics is that 
these characteristics cannot be considered independent and exogenous variables when analyzing system 
success. Interactions with vendors and donors, institution building, and the introduction of the technology 
                                                 
82 See Chapter 7 for details. 
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itself all feedback and change the characteristics of the beneficiaries and their communities. Additionally, 
communities are often chosen as beneficiaries based on characteristics that are convenient to developers or 
which donors believe will lead to system success, which introduces a selection bias in the analyses of 
success based on those characteristics. 
 
The concept of a community’s “remoteness” is an example of a characteristic that cannot be considered an 
independent variable in these analyses. Firstly, donors and developers often chose communities that are 
easily accessible as beneficiaries of donated stand-alone solar electric systems. Accessible communities 
reduce logistical and transportation expenses and problems, allowing more beneficiaries to be served with 
the same resources. Projects may include the improvement of community access for the benefit of project 
development personnel and the transport of project-related materials. Additionally, in order to reduce 
resource demands and safety concerns during the course of this research, the communities included in this 
study were limited to those that were relatively easily accessible. The addition of PV systems in remote 
communities allows better communication – primarily via cell phone – which makes communities less 
isolated, even if it does not reduce the actual time required to travel to or from a community. In aggregate, 
then, the seemingly independent variable of community accessibility or remoteness is instead 
interdependent with the project itself. 
 
Indeed the concept of remoteness cannot be measured in kilometers from a city or even kilometers from a 
passable road. Remoteness instead is very much a function of means of transportation, which is in turn a 
function of wealth. Someone who must walk all day to reach an intended destination – and then return 
walking with a heavy piece of equipment – lives much more remotely than does someone who owns a truck 
or a horse and can cover as long or longer a distance in less time and with less effort. 
 
The predominant ethnicity of members of beneficiary communities was related to ongoing system 
operability, with Ladino communities showing overall greater success in maintaining their systems than 
communities populated primarily by indigenous peoples. This result raises more questions than it answers. 
The Ladino communities were in aggregate wealthier than indigenous communities, and wealth was 
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independently found to relate to success. Ladinos also categorically have more education, are more likely to 
speak Spanish fluently, and seem to be regarded as constituents rather than subjects by their political 
leaders. Indigenous populations have been subjected to a paternalistic government culture which, for 
centuries, has prohibited initiative and self-determination upon pain of death. Thus simply having learned 
not to take initiative in anything may have hindered indigenous peoples from taking the initiative to 
maintain their systems; they were more likely to express the expectation that “someone else” – namely the 
project donor – should be responsible for the physical and economic maintenance of their systems. Notably, 
wealthier ladino beneficiaries were more likely to have systems that failed based on the condition of 
optimality: although their systems were functioning as intended, they did not succeed because they did not 
sufficiently provide for beneficiaries’ energy needs.  
 
Beneficiary households were multigenerational and mixed-gender, in largest part, and that precludes any 
analyses of success based on age, gender, family status, or other demographics that would vary within a 
community. Women took less active roles in projects, including their initiation and governance, and were 
less likely to agree to be interviewed for this research if a man were available to respond. In many cases, 
women were not welcome to be a part of project administration. In cases where women were permitted to 
be involved, men and women agreed that women were less involved because a woman’s work at home took 
precedence for her time.  
 
8.6. System physical characteristics83 
This research does not strongly support the firmly held belief in the development community that higher 
quality design, installation and components should lead to greater system success. 
 
No systems in this study met the National Electrical Code standards for PV installation. The NEC has been 
adopted by Guatemala, but never implemented or operationalized, even by the Ministry of Energy and 
Mines, which was responsible for its adoption. Similarly, although many PV panels were stamped with UL 
                                                 
83 See Chapter 7 for details. 
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or CE certifications,84 many of these stamps appeared to be forged and at least one distributor in Guatemala 
procures panels from a U.S. company that is under investigation for fraudulent use of the UL certification. 
As such, the effects of compliance with these codes cannot be assessed in this research. 
 
Notably, however, systems that included panels that appeared to be of good quality did not succeed at 
higher rates than did those with apparently low-quality panels, as long as the panels were mono- or 
polycrystalline PV rather than thin-film technology. Proper maintenance of panels, including clearing 
shading and cleaning, did not appear to relate to success. 
 
The statistical significance of the following observations cannot be tested due to in ability to obtain random 
samples or controls. However, a few technical features did appear to relate slightly to system success. The 
use of inexpensive automotive batteries in place of more suitable, albeit more expensive, solar or marine 
deep-cycle batteries was found slightly more among successful systems than among unsuccessful systems, 
suggesting that people’s ability to replace batteries with a lower-cost alternative may be of greater benefit 
than the reduction in real cost over the long term that could be obtained by using the better battery. Slightly 
more successful systems than unsuccessful systems had functioning charge controllers, although the 
difference in frequency was not large. Proper allowance of airspace under the panel, as required by industry 
standards, did not lead to system success; greater numbers of successful systems than unsuccessful systems 
were mounted flush with a rooftop, which may add stability and accessibility at the expense of adequate 
ventilation. 
 
Independently of system success, users were not educated about proper disposal of used components. Lead-
acid batteries in particular can pose threats to human and environmental health. While some users knew 
that the “best” thing to do with their spent batteries was to give or sell them to a battery recycler, few knew 
that improper disposal could be a threat to their families or communities.  
 
 
                                                 
84 U.S. and European, respectively, quality standards evaluators.  
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8.7. Applicability and limitations of results 
This research is intended to contribute to the body of knowledge about electrification in rural development 
by expanding the understanding of the realities of development within the academic community, and by 
providing information that can contribute to greater project success among governments, donors and 
development organizations. However, context impacts the results of a study or evaluation (White and 
Bamberger, 2008), so these results reflect outcomes for stand-alone PV systems that met my selection 
criteria.  
 
One limitation of this research is my inability to draw valid statistical inferences from the data gathered. 
Firstly, the data are from a non-random sample of PV system users. Further, the data was gathered in semi-
structured interviews that focused on topics of greatest interest to individual users, rather than being 
gathered from a consistent survey instrument used with all respondents. Though this precludes statistical 
inference, it allowed for a greater depth and breadth of knowledge to be gained from the users whose 
perspectives were the intended subjects of this research. 
 
Another limitation to these results is that only rural stand-alone PV systems were included. Anecdotal 
observation suggests that interconnected systems such as micro-hydroelectric systems may have very 
different outcomes. The data are further limited to rural communities in Guatemala and to a few specific 
development programs.  
 
That many of the causes of success and failure observed in this research are likely to be present in other 
contexts is a hypothesis that merits future study, and is not a conclusion of this research.  
 
8.8. Areas of future research 
Many factors that might be expected to influence the success of stand-alone PV systems in Guatemala are 
not explicitly included in this study. This section includes areas for further research that were highlighted 
by this study. Except where otherwise noted, a methodology analogous to that used for my research could 
be used to explore these questions. 
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Comparison of these results to similar studies in other countries in the region and other regions in the 
world, and to studies of other rural electrification technologies in the same locations will lend insight into 
which factors are more universal and which are particular to Guatemala or to stand-alone PV systems. The 
contrasts between stand-alone PV systems and the community-interconnected micro-hydroelectric systems 
I observed while conducting this study were at times remarkable. A comparison of the outcomes of 
electrification using stand-alone systems as compared to community interconnected systems could yield 
information on the means of electrification that are most effective for communities and most cost-effective 
for donors, and what circumstances drive those decisions. 
 
Beyond these general comparisons, topics meriting further investigation include questions of development 
work done under existing aid and development paradigms, direct and indirect economic impacts of 
systems, and the influences of culture and peoples’ roles in society on system success.  I discuss each of 
these in the following subsections. 
 
8.8.1. Development paradigms 
This research challenges the long-held ideas that user contribution to projects (in cash or in-kind) and that 
user ownership of systems lead to greater system success. These hypotheses were not borne out by the data 
in general. Because this result differs markedly from received wisdom, these results should be confirmed 
by further investigation in this and other populations. One of the hypothesized reasons that ownership does 
not lead to success is that the donor did not contribute what beneficiaries actually wanted or needed and as 
such beneficiaries did not value it regardless of their contribution or of ownership structure. To test this 
hypothesis, a comparison could be made of these factors in communities that initiated projects and 
requested solar home systems from a donor versus those that accepted projects when offered but did not 
actively pursue them before the donor presented the idea. 
 
None of the beneficiaries in this research had the benefit of further training on the maintenance of their 
systems after the initial implementation was complete, although some participated in more thorough 
training than others. The timing of the training is significant in that it predates the need for battery 
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replacement – usually the first major maintenance item with a stand-alone PV system – by several years. 
An examination of the success of systems for users who are given supplemental training after three years 
(the minimum length of time that a reasonably well maintained battery should last) could inform future 
development projects if a short refresher course at that time increased long-term success significantly.  
 
The development community values and invests resources in non-verbal documentation for instruction and 
reference in populations with low literacy: if people cannot read, make the instructions pictorial or 
graphical. This is logical and is used in developed world instructions that are sent with products to 
countries that speak different languages (for example, Ikea furniture and Lego toys are sold with graphical 
instructions). However, anecdotes suggest that people with low or no literacy benefit less from these types 
of instruction manuals than might be supposed. The idea of referring to a piece of paper to learn to do 
something is almost self-evident to those who live in highly literate societies. However, those who do not 
read have little experience with expecting to find information in written or illustrated form, and may be less 
likely to value or preserve paper. A question pertinent to the success of rural renewable energy systems but 
excluded from this research is whether receiving physical documentation on system maintenance aids in 
system success, and whether those with low levels of literacy preserve and make use of non-verbal 
instruction sheets at the same rate as their more literate peers. Do those who cannot read have the means 
and motivation to keep any documents, including legal documents like birth certificates or land titles and 
“helpful” documents like PV maintenance instructions? If pictorial instructions that accompanied a 
donation are preserved, are they used by either literate or illiterate beneficiaries? 
 
8.8.2. Economic implications 
The only economic or vocational activities explicitly included in this work are those that users claimed 
were influenced by the PV system directly, and not the indirect economic effects such as improved health 
and education, greater knowledge (enabled by cell phone coverage) of seasonal jobs outside the 
community, or trickle-down impacts in which people who directly benefited from the systems would, as a 
result, hire more labor or buy more goods from local sources. System success may be influenced by the 
nature of users’ economic activities: do those who must travel for wage labor see less success because they 
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are home with their systems less?; are those with more technical careers better able to maintain their 
systems?; does the timing of income (seasonal versus weekly or monthly) change system success?; what 
financing mechanisms are available, and how do they change system success?  
 
All respondents perceived light quality to be better with solar or other electric lighting sources than with 
traditional lighting sources such as candles, gas lamps and ocote torches. Among these, ocote provides the 
lowest quality of light and creates the most unpleasant indoor air quality effects, but it is not purchased; 
users cut it from nearby trees for free. To better understand the threshold between willingness to pay and 
ability to pay, traditional users of ocote who have received donated solar home systems merit further study. 
Ocote users have the most utility to gain from the use of electric light, compared to users of gas lamps or 
candles, but they are also generally the poorest users, who settle for ocote because they cannot afford better 
sources. Two possible hypotheses suggest themselves: either ocote users will be more successful with their 
solar home systems because they have so much to gain, or they will be less successful because they have so 
few resources to maintain their systems. Such an analysis would shed further light on the questions 
surrounding system success and failure, and would require a more ethnographic methodology, spending 
more time with individual beneficiaries to understand their motivations and decisions. 
 
One important question for future study is how the success and failures of these systems differ from those 
of systems purchased by their end users, which were not examined in this dissertation. In addition to 
systems purchased in retail markets, I am interested in a phenomenon I call “secondary beneficiaries.” 
Donated panels are often sold on the black market, but this does not end their useful lives in providing 
electricity to the rural poor. Many of these panels seem to be purchased by local elites – people poor by 
traditional definition, but wealthier than their neighbors. They become beneficiaries of donated projects 
since they are able to purchase systems to provide themselves with electricity when purchasing the same 
system from a retailer would be economically infeasible. The research questions I seek to answer are these: 
who are the purchasers of donated systems that are then sold; how successful are these systems compared 
to those that are kept by intended beneficiaries and those purchased through legitimate retail markets; and 
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although the end users are not the intended beneficiaries, are the benefits to them consistent with donors’ 
development goals? 
 
The economic analyses in this research85 suggest that most users should be able to reduce their energy 
expenditures by saving for PV maintenance rather than purchasing candles and kerosene as needed. These 
theoretical cost reductions could be achieved by simply saving cash – an amount less than or equal to a 
household’s previous monthly expenditures on candles and gas – as long as the PV system is in operation. 
At the end of the useful life of the battery or other components, the savings fund would more than cover the 
maintenance expenses. However, this sort of cash saving is uncommon and perhaps unrealistic for a variety 
of reasons discussed in Chapter 5. Community-level cooperatives that help users save only for solar home 
system maintenance have not met with tremendous success, possibly in part because they end up restricting 
a large portion of a household’s assets for a long period to a single purpose: PV maintenance.  
 
A research question suggested by this phenomenon is whether the financing mechanisms available to users 
strongly influence system success. Would savings accounts that allow users to withdraw money for other 
large expenses rather than solely for solar home system maintenance lead to greater cash savings and would 
that in turn lead to greater system success? Would credit programs that provided maintenance loans be 
repaid consistently enough to make them viable? Would group-based savings or borrowing programs help? 
Is a portfolio of financial options necessary to increase system success? This could be investigated by 
studies of development interventions involving microfinance in Guatemala. As few of these are in place, 
new microfinance interventions should be implemented with careful assessment mechanisms included in all 
stages of planning, implementation and follow-up. 
 
8.8.3. Cultural influences 
Although many aspects of culture were included in this research, many more remain uninvestigated. 
Gender and religion have been suggested to play significant roles in the outcomes of development 
interventions, though they were not studied in depth in this research.  
                                                 
85 See Chapter 5 for details. 
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This research did not differentiate female-headed households from those headed by men. Women typically 
spend more time working inside the home and therefore derive greater benefit from donations that make 
work inside the home less burdensome. A question left unanswered by these analyses is whether systems 
donated to female-headed households succeed at a greater rate because women use or value them more, if 
women’s traditionally lower incomes make them less likely to be able to maintain their systems, or whether 
the gender of the head of household influences or fails to influence system success for other reasons.  
 
Religion is suggested to be a driver of or proxy for modernizing ideas: do the systems of Protestant or 
Evangelical Christian families succeed at greater rates because of their supposed greater adaptability than 
traditional Catholics; does the impact of religion depend on local religious leadership rather than on broad 
expectations of religious beliefs; or is religious identification irrelevant to system success?86 Future 
research on stand-alone PV systems in rural Guatemala will also narrow the focus of this study: what are 
the factors that will lead to greatest system success in very poor, indigenous communities, and what prior 
interventions are prerequisite in the poorest of these communities for system success?    
 
8.9. Summary 
This research has provided answers to many questions about the success of electrification for the rural poor. 
Some were predictable: modern energy sources allow modern means of communication such as cell phones 
and television; cost is a barrier to system maintenance; and weak national institutions impede the process of 
electrification. Others were more surprising and, at times, uncomfortable for sponsors of rural energy 
development programs: user ownership does not lead to system success; wholly donated systems can be a 
cost burden for beneficiaries; excluding already marginalized people from donation programs could lead to 
a higher percentage of successful systems.  
 
In aggregate, this study has led to more questions than answers. Many questions will not be answered 
definitively by any study, but can only be answered by the specific population that is gaining access to 
                                                 
86 Anecdotal 
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electricity for the first time. That, perhaps, is the most useful conclusion this work provides to those who 
are interested in development through electrification: know the individuals involved before you begin, and 
invest in maintaining that relationship to enable them to invest in maintaining their energy systems. 
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Appendix A: Survey Instrument 
“N/A” indicates a question was not used.
 
328 
 
 
329 
 
 
330 
 
 
331 
 
 
332 
 
 
33
3 
334 
 
 
 
335 
 
 
336 
 
 
337 
 
 
338 
 
 
339 
 
 
340 
 
 
341 
 
 
342 
 
 
343 
 
 
344 
 
 
345 
 
 
346 
 
 
347 
 
 
348 
 
 
  
349 
 
Appendix B: Inspection Protocol 
 
350 
 
 
351 
 
 
352 
 
 
 
353 
 
Appendix C: Data Summary 
 
Locations 
Community Name Municipality Department 
Agua Caliente Cahabón Alta Verapaz 
Chaslau Cahabón Alta Verapaz 
Chiis Cahabón Alta Verapaz 
Col. Agrícola San Juan Cahabón Alta Verapaz 
El Carmen Cahabón Alta Verapaz 
Gualibaj Cahabón Alta Verapaz 
Seazir Cahabón Alta Verapaz 
Bombil Pek Chisec Alta Verapaz 
Baldío Xalaché Cobán Alta Verapaz 
Salacuín Cobán Alta Verapaz 
Tortugas Cobán Alta Verapaz 
Naranjito El Zanjo Fray Bartolomé de las Casas Alta Verapaz 
Sepur Limite Panzós Alta Verapaz 
La Unión Raxrujá Alta Verapaz 
Mucbil'ha Raxrujá Alta Verapaz 
Chuaberená Cubulco Baja Verapaz 
Salval Pop Patzún Chimaltenango 
San Rafael Sumatán San Pedro Yepocapa Chimaltenango 
Los Horcones Esquipulas Chiquimula 
Timushan Esquipulas Chiquimula 
Parcelamiento El Socorro Santa Lucía Cotzumalhuapa Escuintla 
Cassiero Bara del Coyolate Nueva Concepcion Esquintla 
Sta Ana Mixtan Nueva Concepcion Esquintla 
Sta Marta el Mar Nueva Concepcion Esquintla 
Sto Domingo Los Cocos Nueva Concepcion Esquintla 
Microparcelamiento el Naranjo Sta Lucia Cotzumalhuapa Esquintla 
Bocancha El Estor Izabal 
Chapín Abajo El Estor Izabal 
Chapín Arriba El Estor Izabal 
Chichipate El Estor Izabal 
Chinebal El Estor Izabal 
Guaritas El Estor Izabal 
Playa Pataxte El Estor Izabal 
Selempín El Estor Izabal 
Sepóm El Estor Izabal 
El Calvario Livingston Izabal 
Santa María del Mar Puerto Barrios Izabal 
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Caserío El Zapote Sayaxché Petén 
Sta. Isabel Sayaxché Petén 
Zona arqueológica Cancuén Sayaxché Petén 
Nueva Alianza El Palmar Quetzaltenango 
Amajchel Chajul Quiché 
Encuentros Amajchel Chajul Quiché 
Ilom Chajul Quiché 
Juá Chajul Quiché 
Nueva Amajchel Chajul Quiché 
Sta. Clara Chajul Quiché 
Visiquichun Chajul Quiché 
Ixtahuacán Viejo Ixtahuacán Viejo Sololá 
El Jasmin Gualán Zacapa 
El Zapotal Gualán Zacapa 
Finca las Nubes Gualán Zacapa 
La Bolsa Gualán Zacapa 
Sta. Cecilia Gualán Zacapa 
Vista Hermosa Gualán Zacapa 
 
 
 
Select results from system physical inspections 
Count of observations. Numbers may differ because individual inspection protocols did not necessarily include all data. 
Application Panel Manufacturer Array Watts 
Array 
Orientation 
Public (non-commercial) building 25 Shell 13 > 50 W 4 N, NE, NW 2 
Income generating 6 Seimens 17 50- 199 W 17 E, ENE, ESE 3 
Emergency/early warning systems 2 Unisolar 4 100 - 249 W 5 S, SSW, SSE 33 
Domestic 41 Other 9 > 249 W 9 SE, ESE 7 
            
W, SW, 
WSW 4 
            Flat 3 
 
Array 
Inclination Module Cleanliness Battery Type 
Number of 
lights Other Loads 
0o 3 Very dirty 21 Car Battery 25 1 6 
Cell Phone 
Charging 10 
5o-14o 5 Dirty/dusty 17 
Deep-Cycle 
Battery 32 2 8 
Radio/sound 
system 8 
15o 29 Clean 5     3 11 TV 8 
16o-30o 12         >3 5     
>30o 2                 
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Select results related to economics 
Count of observations. Numbers may differ because individual survey respondents did not necessarily respond to all questions. 
5c Is there a 
tariff for 
use/ownership? 
6h Tariff, 
Q/Month 
6l Is the tariff 
affordable to 
you? 
4g7 Did the project 
result in an increase in 
income for anyone in the 
community?  
4g8a Did the project 
result in a decrease in 
income for anyone in the 
community?  
Yes 29 < 6Q 2 Yes 8 Yes 8 Yes 6 
No 53 6-10Q 2 No 5 No 73 No 31 
Unsure 0 11-15Q 1 Unsure 0 Don't Know 4 Don't Know 3 
    16-20Q 21             
    21-25Q 2             
    >25Q 1             
 
Select results related to social implications 
Count of observations. Numbers may differ because individual survey respondents did not necessarily respond to all questions. 
16a Has the project 
caused religious or 
cultural conflict 
17e Are there 
negative 
environmental 
consequences? 
17g Did everyone 
in the community 
have equal access 
to the project? 
28j Has the project 
helped create or 
reinforce social 
networks? 
28l Has the project 
resulted in an increase in 
your technical knowledge? 
Yes 0 Yes 2 Yes 52 Yes 25 Yes 15 
No 65 No 60 No 15 No 5 No 3 
Unsure 5 Unsure 7 Unsure 2         
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Select results related to project success 
Count of observations. Numbers may differ because individual survey respondents did not necessarily respond to all questions. 
19 Does the 
project meet your 
expectations? 
19b Is the project 
important in your 
regular activities? 
19e Has the 
project had any 
negative impact 
on you? 
19f Do you 
consider the 
project 
successful? 
28i2 If your system were 
lost or dammaged, what 
would you like to do? 
Yes 75 Yes 78 Yes 0 Yes 76 Replace with same 33 
No 2 No 0 No 54 No 1 Grid 4 
More or less 3 More or less 1     More or less 4 Traditional sources 15 
                Generator 3 
35
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Select results related to project origins and implementation 
Count of observations. Numbers may differ because individual survey respondents did not necessarily respond to all questions. 
21a2 Is the 
project in place 
the original 
project 
planned? 
21a6 Were you 
consulted in 
planning?  
21a7 Were you 
consulted in 
implementation?  
21h Did the 
community 
participate in 
implementation? 
5a Did the 
community 
contribute 
to the 
project? 
t21p Were 
training 
sessions 
offered? 
21p4 
Did You 
Attend? 
21p6 
Was the 
training 
useful? 
21p8 Was the 
training 
sufficient? 
Yes 9 Yes 66 Yes 52 Yes 19 Yes 65 Yes 44 Yes 27 Yes 30 Yes 12 
No 2 No 8 No 12 No 0 No 13 No 37 No 10 No 1 No 18 
Don't Know 1 
Don't 
Know 1 Don't Know 4 Don't Know 1 Unsure 4 
Don't 
Know 2         
Don't 
Know 1 
 
Select results related to current system operation 
Count of observations. Numbers may differ because individual survey respondents did not necessarily respond to all questions. 
Economically 
Productive 
Uses 
Domestic 
Uses 
Community 
Uses 
21p16 
Have you 
had 
problems 
with your 
system? 
21p18 
Were 
you able 
to 
resolve 
them? 
21p15a Do 
you know 
where to go 
to get 
replacement 
parts? 
22d What do you 
do with failed 
components? 
21l Do 
you know 
how to 
contact 
the 
developer 
now? 
20a Is there 
a 
governance  
structure 
for the 
project? 
20g Do 
women 
participate 
in project 
governance? 
Yes 25 Yes 51 Yes 44 Yes 53 Yes 17 Yes 42 
Sell or 
recycle 14 Yes 22 Yes 40 Yes 15 
No 90 No 64 No 71 No 35 No 23 No 23 
Don.t know, 
dump, leave 
in place, 
other 
inappropriate 62 No 39 No 32 No 18 
            
Don't 
Know 1                 
Don't 
Know 4 
Don't 
Know 1 
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Appendix D: Institutional Review Board Documentation 
 
IRB Authorization 
 
 
360 
 
Application for Exemption 
 
361 
 
 
362 
 
 
363 
 
 
364 
 
 
365 
 
 
366 
 
 
Page 7 of original document is blank. 
367 
 
 
368 
 
 
369 
 
 
370 
 
 
371 
 
 
372 
 
 
Consent Script 
“Hola ¿cómo está? Mi nombre es Esperanza Hope Corsair. Soy una estudiante en la Universidad Johns 
Hopkins en los Estados Unidos y me encuentro desarrollando un estudio sobre sistemas de energía solar como el que 
tiene usted. No estoy aquí para arreglar problemas que el sistema tenga o para hablar sobre futuros proyectos de 
energía solar. Deseo que mis estudios sirvan para que estos sistemas sean mejores en el futuro. Mi estudio requiere 
el  análisis de los (partes del sistema, que pueden variar por ubicación), y conversar con personas como Usted acerca 
de sus experiencias en el uso de los equipos. 
Quisiera preguntarle si Usted tiene tiempo para platicar conmigo durante aproximadamente media hora 
(personas dedicadas a mantenimiento, una hora) acerca de este sistema. Las respuestas que usted me dé solo las voy 
a usar yo.  No voy a anotar su nombre ni comentar con nadie acerca de sus opiniones (para personas de 
mantenimiento: en general otras personas podrían identificarlo(a) por las opiniones técnicas sobre el sistema que 
Usted conoce). 
No hay problema si Usted no quiere responder a alguna o todas las preguntas.  Tampoco será ningún 
problema si Usted debe irse antes de que acabe la entrevista.  Estaré muy agradecida por cualquier información que 
Usted decida compartir conmigo acerca de su sistema solar. Muchas Gracias por su atención.” 
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Documentation of Human Research Training 
CITI Course in The Protection of Human Research Subjects  
 
Human Research Curriculum Completion Report  
Printed on Tuesday, January 16, 2007  
Learner: H.J. Corsair (username: hjcorsair)  
Institution: Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health  
Contact Information:  Department: Geography and Environmental Engineering 
Phone: 310 228 8696 
Email: hjcorsair@yahoo.com 
 
Biomedical Research Investigators: This Learner group is mandatory for all Principal 
Investigators, Co-investigators, Student Investigators and Study Staff 
 
Stage 1. Basic Course Passed on 01/16/07 (Ref # 806897)  
Required Modules  
Date 
completed  
Belmont Report and CITI Course Introduction  01/16/07  
History and Ethical Principles  01/16/07  
Basic Institutional Review Board (IRB) Regulations and Review Process  01/16/07  
Informed Consent  01/16/07  
Research With Protected Populations - Vulnerable Subjects: An Overview  01/16/07  
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health  01/16/07  
 
For this Completion Report to be valid, the learner listed above must be affiliated with 
a CITI participating institution. Falsified information and unauthorized use of the 
CITI course site is unethical, and may be considered scientific misconduct by your 
institution.  
Paul Braunschweiger Ph.D. 
Professor, University of Miami 
Director Office of Research Education 
CITI Course Coordinator  
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